Commentary on "Lorik" by
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INTRODUCTION:
THE BUDDHIST EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE FIVE SCIENCES

Welcome everyone to our study course at the Nitartha Institute. It's a great pleasure for me to be here in the presence of our chief abbot, Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche, to be here with all of you, and to have this opportunity to share with you some of my study experiences. The text we're going to do is the *Lorik.* I have discussed this with Thrangu Rinpoche and he suggested we begin with this logic text in the first study session.

Generally speaking, in the ancient Buddhist and Indian educational systems, we master something called the five sciences. Those are the five major sciences or the five major aspects of knowledge. That has been the tradition or the infrastructure of the study programs in such great Buddhist universities as Nalanda University in ancient India, Samye in Tibet and great Buddhist institutions in Tibet such as the Dzogchen[??]. They emphasized the study of these five major sciences or five major aspects of knowledge. The first one is called creativity, the second is healing and the third is called sound, which is quite interesting. Sound is sometimes translated as grammar and philosophy. The fourth one is called logic or syllogisms, and the fifth is metaphysics, or the inner science, the science of insight. All the ancient Hindu and Buddhist institutions (mostly Buddhist institutions) emphasized mastery in these five sciences. That's why Maitreyanatha, the Buddha Maitreya, said in his scriptures that if you do not master these five sciences, there's no way that you can attain the state of omniscient wisdom of the Buddha. He said that in order to achieve the omniscient wisdom of the Buddha, one must begin mastering these five sciences, the five aspects of major knowledge. You may have heard that there's ten aspects of knowledge. They are the five major and five minor aspects, but basically there are five major sciences. Now we will touch briefly on each of these subjects.

བཟོ་རིག་པ་

The first subject, creativity, is the science of sculpture, art, creativity and creation. That science begins with synchronizing mind and body and making basic fundamental contact and communication between the raw elements and our physical existence. If you are a potter, you're dealing with the raw element of the clay outside with your raw hands and your raw fresh mind. There's basic communication between the inner state of our physical body and the outer physical existence of the universe. At the same time there's great *prajna* involved in synchronizing mind and body. Through this synchronization we can produce or create a beautiful image, a beautiful world. Therefore the first science is translated as creativity.

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The second science or aspect of knowledge is that once you have studied and mastered how to create something, then you have to know how to maintain or work with that object, how to heal that creation if anything goes wrong. At this second stage, the science of healing, or medicine, so to speak, in Buddhist fields of knowledge the medicine or healing is not necessarily just related to chemicals and herbs outside. The healing process is the process of synchronizing mind and body as well. You have to heal the mind in order to heal the body, and you have to heal the body in order to heal the mind. Therefore there's a great sense of an interdependent link between the mind and body. The healing process is knowing exactly how to heal or fix when something goes wrong with your own creation. We can understand that if you have no knowledge of the science of creativity, there will be no way to have a complete understanding of the second science. You cannot have a complete realization, or the power to heal, without having some aspects of knowledge, understanding and experience of the first science of creativity. That is pretty simple. If you are a potter and have created a beautiful clay vase, then when something goes wrong with the vase, you know exactly how to fix it. You know how it's been created and strengthened, and if something goes wrong it's very simple for you to fix it; it's not that complicated. Once you have mastered the science of creativity, the science of healing becomes much easier and simpler.

སྒྲ་རིག་པ་

The next science is called the science of sound. Probably you know this category better. In the most gross aspect the science of sound is the study and mastery of grammar and philosophy to begin with. According to Buddhist studies, it's not only on that superficial level. The study of sound goes much deeper. It goes beyond our conceptual study of sound. That's why it's called the science of sound, rather than grammar and philosophy. Grammar and philosophy is some kind of translation of that; it came up later. This science basically deals with our fundamental relation to sound, to the phenomena outside our consciousness. There's a basic communication such as the sound of waves. We can look at the sound of a wave, a waterfall, or a pebble falling down from the rocky slopes. If we go back to a waterfall and hear the sound of the waterfall, we usually say, "I heard the sound of a waterfall." Everyday it is the same. No matter how many times you have been there, you think you've heard the same sound. But in fact, each time you go there and listen to that sound of the waterfall, you hear a different sound. You hear a different sound, a different tone, in a different character or manner. Each aspect of this sound has it's own message. It has its own presence in that very moment of sound. When we listen to the waves, ~~or to the birds chirping, chatting,~~ you can hear different sounds each time. Each fragment of sound has its own character, its own message. We never relate to that in our everyday life; we always relate to the superficial level of sound which is mostly generalized as the waterfall sound, the sound of a wave, or the sound of birds chirping. We never relate to the sound itself. - སྒྲ་འཚོར་ན་ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] རང་འཚོར་

In Buddhism this science goes beyond concepts and thoughts, labels and grammar. It deals with the fundamental state of our being and our basic naked state of communication. I don't know whether you have come across any biographical information on the many yogis of the past who have mastered this science. Many of the predictions of Buddhist yogis come from just listening to sound. When you listen to the waves and sounds of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, you can probably tell what kind of weather is coming. Many yogis in the past have related with this raw energy of sound of the universe outside. They communicated with even the sound of a pebble falling down the rocky slopes and it meant something by the way it fell. The way it touched a certain point and made a certain specific sound had its own significance or message. We never have the chance, opportunity or prajna to experience such subtlety of sound. In this science, we are basically learning how to communicate with this naked energy of sound, the naked world outside. The yogis who have mastered this science have a complete sense of communication with nature, whether it is natural sound, or sound created from human beings or other beings. You can even tell from the sound of breathing, from the message of the breathing, how healthy or unhealthy a person is. That's why this third science, the science of sound, is a very interesting study or phenomenon which goes much beyond our grammar and philosophy.

ཚད་མ་རིག་པ་

The fourth science, the one we're dealing with here, is the science of logic. You can see the progression: from the basic communication of sound, you develop this conceptual knowledge of grammar and philosophy. From this conceptual, superficial level of understanding sound, of grammar and philosophy, we go into the depth of conceptual analysis. The depth of conceptual analysis is the fourth science of logic. It is the science which eliminates our basic confusion. The science of logic is the remedy which cuts through our doubts and conceptual ignorance. By mastering the science of logic we master clear thinking. We have a clear understanding of how prajna can manifest in our conceptual world. This science is very important because most of the time all of us are living in the world of conceptions. We live in the world of conceptions, and the conceptual world is the real world, so to speak, that we live in. This logic plays a great role in this conceptual world. It communicates and enhances our prajna and understanding of the ultimate truth. Therefore the science of logic is the fourth science in the five major sciences.

ནང་རིག་པ།

The fifth science, briefly speaking, is the metaphysics, which you all know, I believe. [laughs] No? I think I saw you in a metaphysics bookstore [laughter]. The fifth science is called the inner science. It is the major science, the real science, which Buddhism has developed, and in which we can include the Buddhist practice of meditation. Buddhist prajna, the insight of the realization of selflessness, and the discovery of buddhanature. The fundamental aspects of the teachings that Buddha gave are included in the fifth science, the science of insight, or the science of metaphysics. In basic Buddhist education, the science of logic is classified as the fourth science and is separate from metaphysics, which is very interesting. Logic is not classified as a separate content of metaphysics; it is separately classified because of its methods. The methodology used in this particular science is very common to many other schools of philosophical thought. Therefore it has strong emphasis on logic and syllogism, and this can be part of the metaphysics studies as well as separate from it. It is classified as the fourth science, and the text that we are going to study is part of the fourth science, mastering the fourth science of logic. The logic in Buddhism was actually taught in all the different sutras. It's scattered throughout different sutras, and if we look at the sources of the sutras where Buddha taught logic, there's no separate *pitakas*. We have three *pitakas* which are very clearly classified. There's no clear classification for logic, where the fourth *pitaka* is the logic that Buddha taught. There's no such clear sutra where Buddha taught logic. The logic was taught in many different scattered sutras of the mahayana and some of the hinayana. We can't locate one sutra of the mahayana and say it is the sutra where Buddha taught logic.

Dignaga, one of the major Indian pandita scholar logicians, lived between 480 and 540. He is the major commentator who collected all the topics of logic that Buddha taught into one text, the *Pramanasamuccaya*, which means "The Compendium of Valid Cognition". It is the collected teachings which are scattered in all the different sutras. He collected them all together and put the concepts together into one particular text. That became the major source of Buddhist logic. There have been some other texts, but this is the major text. Dignaga's text is commented on by Dharmakirti, who lived between 600 and 660 A.D. Dharmakirti wrote the *Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition*, or *Seven Treatises on Pristine Cognition*, which is the commentary and is in verse form (most of them are in verse form). It is a commentary on the *Pramanasamuccaya* of Dignaga. These eight treatises, the seven by Dharmakirti and one by Dignaga, are the major sources of Buddhist logic. These eight major texts of Buddhist logic are written in Sanskrit and have been translated into Tibetan. They are the major texts of Buddhist logic from India that we study in Tibet.

We also have Tibetan commentaries to make these Indian texts clearer. It is like this Lorik text. When you see the literal translation, it's pretty hard. When it's a direct translation from Sanskrit to Tibetan, it's extremely difficult, almost impossible to understand. Therefore there have been many commentaries written in Tibet and in our particular lineage of the Karma Kagyu tradition. The commentary upon which our Lorik study is based was written by the seventh Karmapa, Chödrak Gyamtso. (I'm just giving you a short history.) He wrote commentaries on all the eight treatises, not just one or two. He wrote a commentary on the seven works of Dharmakirti, which is called the *Ocean of Reasoning*, or in this case they have translated it as the *Ocean of Texts on Logic*. If you look at the history of how he wrote it, it's pretty amazing. He dictated the whole commentary to his heart son, spiritual son, Pawo Rinpoche. He wrote it all down on paper. When Pawo Rinpoche wrote his biography, he said that when the seventh Karmapa wrote this commentary he never had any texts in front of him to comment on; [laughter] it was all in memory. It was not like the research scholars today who go to a library and open hundreds of books, get a paragraph from here, another from there, and put them all together into a big book. Pawo Rinpoche wrote that Karmapa was just sitting there without any texts, and he would comment on the *Pramanasamuccaya*. He would comment on the *Pramanavartika* of Dharmakirti, verse by verse, and Pawo Rinpoche would write it down. At a certain point he lifted his hand up in the space and said, "When I was Dharmakirti..." [laughter] Pawo Rinpoche said it was very clear that there was a karmic connection from the past—otherwise you couldn't remember all these texts. He not only commented on Dharmakirti and Dignaga, but also quoted other Indian commentators. He said, "This commentator said this, and that Indian scholar said that..." He gave his own view, saying that this is correct or not correct. To have all these things coming up was pretty exciting for Pawo Rinpoche [laughter]. Pawo Rinpoche witnessed it and wrote it down. Therefore it's been a very profound commentary, as far as the history goes. If you really read this commentary in Tibetan, it's very profound, clear, precise, and at the same time it's not long. It's not like one of those commentaries that goes on and on. It's well known not only among the Kagyu scholars, but among all the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism as well. This commentary is very famous. In studying such a commentary and logic in the Tibetan Buddhist educational system, before you get into such lengthy discussions and studies of logic, you would first study the three synopses, the three short texts that are drawn from these major commentaries. One of these is the Lorik text that we are trying to study here.

In the twelf century there was a great Tibetan master called Chaba Chokyi Senge. He was a great Tibetan logician who lived from 1109 to 1169. He was the first teacher to write such a synopsis, short text. He wrote a textbook for logic called the *Collected Topics of Logic*. (It's been translated into English, and it's also on-line in English.) This *Collected Topics* is actually the collected topics of all the texts on logic, such as the seven treatises of Dharmakirti and the *Pramanasamuccaya* of Dignaga. He extracts all the major topics and briefly explains each one. In this way people get familiar with each topic in the beginning. The second synopsis that developed afterwards is called the Lorik. The Lorik text is translated here as *Classification of Mind*. Sometimes it's also translated as *Awareness and Knowledge* or *Mind and Awareness*. The second synopsis of the logical texts deals basically with the mind and mental factors, subtle classifications of mind. The third synopsis is the science of reasoning, the syllogism. Once you have studied these three synopses, then if you study the texts by Dharmakirti or Dignaga, they will become very clear. Because you have studied all the summaries, the Cliff's notes, it becomes much easier to enter into major commentaries such as those of the seventh Karmapa, or Dignaga himself. In keeping within that framework, we are trying to study the second synopsis of the logic, which is the text of the *Seven Treatises of Dharmakirti*, and the one treatise by Dignaga. The second synopsis is actually drawn from the second chapter of the *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, the *Pramanavartika*, one of the seven treatises of Dharmakirti. This text deals with detailed classifications of mind and mental factors.

This study is regarded as intellectual as well as intuitive, in the practical sense. It is a very important topic because the major concentration emphasized here in Buddhist practice and study is to learn about our mind and mental factors. We are trying to learn more about our mind. We are trying to deal with our mind. We are trying to develop the basic potential of mind. Therefore this is the text which deals with the detailed classifications of the mind. It is regarded as an important text for all the different aspects of logic. While different aspects of logic deal with objects, this particular chapter or synopsis deals with the mind. It is regarded as a very important text for both study and practice.

We're trying to learn about our mind!

This text is written by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, and is a synopsis of the seventh Karmapa's commentary. When Rinpoche was teaching the seventh Karmapa's commentary at our Nalanda Institute in Sikkim, he wrote this Lorik text, the *Classification of the Mind* text. I will tell you a little bit about how he wrote it. We students asked Rinpoche to write such a text because we didn't have it in the Kagyu tradition. We may have had it, but it was lost during the different political situations that Tibet went through before and after 1959. Rinpoche asked me to write it down, and so he dictated this to me. We wrote this together and I didn't quite have the experience of Pawo Rinpoche. It was very wonderful because most of the time when Rinpoche wrote these texts he also was not reading or copying a text. We did not copy down line by line the *Ocean of Reasoning*, or anything like that. It was more like Rinpoche would meditate, and then he would talk. He would speak a paragraph, and then I would write it down. Then I would read it back to him several times, make some corrections, and it would go on like that. We had a very wonderful time. Rinpoche wrote five textbooks during his stay in Nalanda, and the Lorik is one of them. (We wrote four together, and the fifth Rinpoche wrote with one of my colleague Rinpoches.) It's been translated recently at Marpa Institute by some of Rinpoche's senior students. They sent me this copy with notes, saying Rinpoche asked me to correct the translation. We can look at the homage briefly.

The Title of the Lorik Text

The title is the *Presentation of the Classifications of Mind* called *The Essence of the Ocean of Texts on Logic*. 'Essence' refers to the seventh Karmapa's commentary. The first verse in the beginning pays homage to the Buddha Shakyamuni. The second verse of homage is to Manjushri, the bodhisattva of wisdom and prajna. The third homage that Rinpoche wrote is to the sixteenth Karmapa. The fourth verse is the verse of promise to compose this particular text.

The Homage

First, he praises the Buddha Shakyamuni, pays homage to him for possessing the qualities of great immeasurable compassion, loving kindness, and not only that, but also for manifesting that loving kindness and compassion with his great wisdom, the omniscient wisdom of the Buddha which shows the path of the profound and vast aspects of Dharma. He praises or pays homage to the Buddha throughout his lives for the sake of clarifying our confusion with this great light of wisdom, light of prajna, that illuminates confusion and ignorance. That's how the homage is paid. Usually when you pay homage, you pay homage to the qualities of the being.

The second homage is paid to Manjushri, who in the ultimate sense is already Buddha, right from the beginning. Manjushri is not on the path–he's on the resultant stage. He's a Buddha already, but he shows his image in this world as a bodhisattva, as youthful Manjushri, forever young. In the ultimate sense the buddhas and bodhisattvas are beyond any rupakayas, yet in the relative conventional sense, without the rupakaya there's no way to communicate, no way to relate with the sentient beings. Therefore, they show these different rupakaya manifestations such as a youthful bodhisattva or the nirmanakaya Buddha. Manjushri holds this powerful sword of wisdom or prajna to cut through our ego clinging, to cut through our darkness of ignorance. Rinpoche says that in the ultimate sense there's nothing to cut through because ignorance has never existed. The darkness has never existed, and so there's nothing to cut through. In the relative sense, in a conventional sense, we have this confusion. He cuts through that confusion. That bodhisattva has tremendous power and compassion, and so we pay homage to him

Then he pays homage to the sixteenth Karmapa. The Karmapas are known as the embodiment of all the activities of the Buddhas of the three times. That's why they're called Karmapa. "Karma" means activity, and "pa" is the one who is the embodiment of the activities of the Buddhas of the three times. Therefore the Karmapa is inseparable from all the Buddhas in the ultimate sense, in the dharmakaya sense. In the rupakaya aspect he shows many different manifestations, many different aspects of the nirmanakaya Buddha, and that nirmanakaya manifestation is the unceasing play of the dharmakaya. That unceasing play manifests love and kindness, the activity of love and kindness and compassion, to protect all sentient beings who need protection. Rinpoche is paying homage to His Holiness Rangjung Rigpe Dorje, the sixteenth Karmapa, who has this activity to protect those beings who need protection. His Holiness gave these texts, the commentaries of the seventh Karmapa, the logic commentaries, to Khenpo Rinpoche in the early seventies. The sixteenth Karmapa empowered Khenpo Rinpoche and gave the transmission that he should propagate the teachings of this logic, the seventh Karmapa's treatises on logic. That's why Rinpoche is paying homage to the sixteenth Karmapa, and also offering this composition to the sixteenth Karmapa. In the next verse he says the Karmapa is inseparable from Avalokiteshvara. In order to give this offering of composing the Dharma, clarifying the Dharma, teaching the Dharma, and also to help the young intellects who are the freshmen students at the Nalanda Institute, Rinpoche says he is composing this, which is the essence of *Rigchen Gyamtso*, the essence of the *Ocean of Reasoning*.

The Definitions of Mind

This Lorik text is actually written for debate. It's written for a debate style of teaching which is how we study logic in Tibetan Buddhist education. In the next sessions of our study, we can have more of a debate style, more of a sharp intellectual style to question, answer, and cut through different positions. The style of the presentation, if you read it in English, may be difficult, because it's written in the style of debate. It's written in the specific presentation of logic, and that's why it's awkward. The sentences are awkward and have a funny structure and style. When you translate it directly from Tibetan, it becomes very strange, very awkward. You must understand that this is written in the style of Tibetan debate, and so we can try our best to make it as debatable as possible. [laughs] I don't know how possible it is in English, but we can try. There's some other translations of similar texts from the Gelugpa tradition. I think these will be helpful if you have the chance to read them while we are doing these studies. You may find those books in the library.

Since this is a very short text, as you may have noticed, we must, to a certain degree, memorize the definitions. We do not need to memorize all of the text, but just the definitions. For example, you say "mind". What is mind? Mind is defined with a very specific term. If you can try to exercise that, to memorize some of the important definitions in this text, that will be very helpful in making it more debatable. As a study guide, you can try to memorize some of the definitions in the next paragraph.

Q1: Can you tell us which definitions to memorize?
DPR: Starting on page three, it says "There are definitions [of mind]." The definitions are in single quotation marks. The definitions says, 'that which is clear and aware', 'that which is aware of objects', and 'that which experiences an object of comprehension.' We have to remember not just the definition, but which term goes with the definition. When we say 'that which is clear and aware', what is that? That is mind. When we say, 'that which is aware of objects', what is that? That is consciousness. It's very interesting. We're looking at different terms: consciousness, awareness, and knower. Each has a slightly different definition.

Q2: Rinpoche, would you say something about the third science of sound and mantra?
DPR: In general, there are different aspects of mantras. It is hard to generalize all the mantras; many of the vajrayana mantras, sounds, are the sounds of the dharmata, the sounds of basic awareness. They are more like natural sound, the fundamental sound of the nature of mind. It's more like the sound of the mind than the sound of a sound or the sound of a body. There are different sounds, such as when a pebble falls down the flat irons. You can hear the sound of a pebble falling down, but that's body, the physical body of a rock. On the physical body of a rock falls a small physical body of a pebble rolling down, and you can hear the sound. It's more like sound that is connected to a body. It's the physical body and the sound. It's the sound of a body, so to speak. There is also the sound of a sound. This is connected to our speech or to instruments. Obviously it relies on a body, but it's more like the manifestation of speech. There is also the sound of the mind which is basically the mantras. They are the sound of awareness, the basic space, dharmata. You make a deeper connection at the point when you connect with the sound of the mantra. You are making a raw, naked connection to the sound of the mind, to the sound of the awareness, rather than to the sound of a body. That is why it is more profound than relating to the other sounds. I don't mean that the others are not very profound, but that there are different layers, different depths that we're getting into.

Q3: Rinpoche, could you give us the Tibetan world for the terms that we're using? That will help us in the future when we're reading texts. It's often difficult to know what term people are referring to, for example, when they say 'mind'. Sometimes it might be '*sems*' and sometimes something else.
DPR: You're right. I'll try.

Q4: Regarding the definitions on page three, in the Gelugpa tradition it's said that they are all synonymous. Are they in fact synonymous? Are they just different ways of describing the same thing?
DPR: That's good. We'll discuss the details.

Q5: I'm interested in the idea that phenomena are all the books one needs. You were talking about the messages of the phenomenal world. How do we reconcile that with the imputation of meaning onto the world. Is the suggestion that if we're sensitive enough, if our prajna is sharp enough, we can read the sound? Can we read reality as a guru?
DPR: The meanings are connected with the conceptual framework. There's no meaning without a conceptual framework. Let's say that we impute that a certain sound is a bad sound. That is bad only in that conceptual or cultural framework. Whatever you regard as bad in one cultural framework may be good in some other cultural or conceptual framework. The imputations that we give are very relative, very conceptual, and do not have much meaning in a certain sense. At the same time, if you can really relate with the sound, with a certain very limited level of imputation, then that is the basic way to communicate in the relative conventional sense. As long as you live in the conceptual world, you need that imputation. You need that basic imputation to communicate. In order to understand that, you need labels. Right now, if you had no labels to communicate, it would be very hard for you to understand what I'd like to say about sound. There is no way I could communicate with you and talk about the sound, and how we can relate with it.
Q5: It seems like we're talking about different levels of meaning, and that the meaning you are referring to is a nonconceptual knowing when the world speaks to us in that regard.
DPR: No. That is connected with the conceptual knowing that I was talking about. On the Buddhist path we talk about relying on the conceptual path to go beyond concept. There's now way we can go beyond concept without a conceptual path. That's why you have utpattikrama. In order to go beyond the conceptual world into the sampannakrama, you need the utpattikrama path. That is why you have shamatha before you reach the vipashyana stage of the mind. Through relying on these different paths you have all these bridges.
Q5: There are common new age notions that reality is always speaking to us, and you're saying that if you're open to it, reality is in fact speaking to you. So how do you know?
DPR: That's right. In a more Buddhist way of thinking, the basic thing is to appreciate the nakedness of your communication with sound and with all sensory perceptions. Sound is just one medium, and in the Buddhist approach, one would appreciate the raw energy of the nakedness of our communication in the most fundamental basic state. Then when you come out of that, you have to go into conventional labeling. You have to go into the conventional process of handling the imputation, rather than going into a more dreamy state, into fantasy. When you say that reality is speaking to me, sometimes it becomes more like a fantasy. You're creating more things. Maybe there's nothing out there telling you this and that; maybe you just want to hear that subconsciously. So you hear it. That's a very unhealthy way of imputing. As long as you impute, it has to be a conventional imputation. That is the healthy way. Does that make sense?
Q5: Yes, that really makes sense.
DPR: Either you are in a very fundamental state of nakedness, which is like ultimate experience in some sense, or you come out of that into a relative experience which is the relative conventional world. When you're in the conventional world, you have to go with the conventional norm, even though it is not ultimate or authoritative in the ultimate sense. It does have some sense of authority in the relative sense; there's some sense of validity. Later, we will deal with valid cognition. It has to be more valid, rather than fantasy. At a certain point, it becomes more like hallucination. You hear sounds, see different images melting and rainbow bodies, and so on. [laughs]

Q6: I'm wondering why the third science is about sound as opposed to visual image or anything else. To me visual image is more powerful in communication than sound; it's more prevalent in my experience. Ultimately, is there really any difference between visual communication and the communication of sounds?

DPR: No, there's not much difference. The first science, creativity, deals more with those senses, like the visual sense. It deals with the visual and with texture. You work more with the body or physical senses of communication. In the third stage, you have sound which is more like synchronizing mind and body. In a sense, body and mind has already happened in creativity science. It's more like a progression. At the same time, when we work with the conceptual mind, it's more connected to sound than to form. Even though there's no sound, we have a concept of sound. The label comes up very clearly. That's why there's a stronger link with the conceptual mind and with the sound. Does that make sense?

Q6: Yes it does. In terms of the raw communication that you've been talking about, though it seems that ultimately we're trying to get to direct perception with logic and metaphysics. It seems that there wouldn't be any difference between sound and appearances.

DPR: In many ways, it is more connected to our conceptual mind, and it's easier for us to communicate with sound than with the body. If you look at basic habitual patterns or tendencies, it's dealing more with our mind and mental imputations, with the sound and labeling process. Therefore it's easier to begin with the sound. Most of the self-created fetters are connected with the sound and labeling process. That is the main thing that we have to cut through in order to go beyond the conceptual world into the real naked world of phenomena. In order to do that we have to cut through these labeling processes of speech, sound and conceptual mind.

Q7: What is the Tibetan for Chotrak Gyatso's text, *The Ocean of Reasoning*?

DPR: *Rigshung Gyamtso.*

Q7: Are the three texts that are drawn from that Chaba Chokyi Senge's text?

DPR: Oh, no. Chapa Chokyi Sengki's is not drawn from the seventh Karmapa's text, but from the seven treatises of Dharmakirti. The three synopses are: 1) *The Collected Topics, Dudra*; 2) *The Classifications of Mind, Lorik*;.and 3) *The Science of Reasoning, Science of Syllogism, Takrig*.

Q7: Who wrote the Lorik, originally? What we have is a synopsis of the Lorik by Khenpo Tsultrim Rinpoche.

DPR: No, this is called Lorik. The source of this text is the third chapter of the *Pramanavartika*.

Q7: Third or second? You said second before.

DPR: Did I say second? I must be right. [laughter] I didn't want to get into complications. The seventh Karmapa divides the chapter differently from the Gelugpa commentators. That's why, it's our second chapter, so that should be fine.

Q8: I want to see if I understand in a simple way the progression of the five aspects of knowledge. They seem to go from gross to subtle. The first one, creativity, always involves some combination, or synchrony, of body and mind, so that the body aspect is always present. There's always some kind of discipline or learning involved with body. Is that correct? Would you always be talking about some kind of discipline or, in the sense that a child always begins by learning, by doing something?

DPR: Yes. In a way these five sciences are like five topics, and you can master any one of them in the original educational system. You can master any of the five, but that doesn't mean you don't study the rest. You touch base with the rest of them, but you can master one of them , one which you feel more connected to, such as healing, logic, metaphysics, or any of the others. The most important thing we have to realize is that all five are present in every science. All five are present in every aspect of our being. No matter who you are, or what you are, you have these five qualities, so to speak, of the five aspects of knowledge. In a way, what we are doing in this learning process is taming, getting deeper, making more connection with these five elements that exist within us, and developing that into a certain skillful way of manifesting.

Q8: Would it be correct to say that the first two, creativity and healing, are somewhat more body oriented, that the third one, sound, is like the link or sambhogakaya quality, and that the fourth and fifth become more mind oriented. Is that too simple minded?

DPR: No, that's very complex. [laughter]

Q8: I'm curious about sound because it sounds so mysterious. We say, "Grammar and philosophy,"

and we think, "Oh, yeah, grammar and philosophy." But when we say, "Sound,"we think, "Goodness. Where's that coming from?"
DPR: That's right.
Q8: There's a quality of magic there...
DPR: The first one, creativity, is very body oriented. The second one is a mixture of body and mind, according to Buddhist healing, because healing is not just body. The main healing begins with the mind. If you can't heal the mind, you can't heal the body. The third stage, sound, is connected to speech and mind together. There's still a certain sense of physical presence; you can't have speech without physical presence. Either it's the outer element or the inner being. You need to have a physical presence in order to have such a sound. The fourth and fifth are more connected to mind, to the science of mind.
Q8: When you were talking about health, or healing, you said that you heal the body in order to heal the mind, or heal the mind in order to heal the body. It sounds like the chicken and the egg, but it isn't really–is it? Is healing the mind primary?
DPR: That's right, according to Buddhist healing.

Q9: I don't understand the difference between philosophy and logic. Isn't philosophy a system of how things work, how things are organized and how they relate to each other? It seems that logic might be quite similar. Would you clarify the difference between logic and philosophy?
DPR: I think it's a translation problem. We've translated the third one, sound, as "Grammar and philosophy." I think this means the philosophy of language. It's more connected to language than to metaphysical philosophy or anything else. It's connected with the way in which language is treated or worked with. The third aspect of sound is more connected to the basic sound that we talked about, the more superficial level of sound, which is like the language process. It is the grammar and philosophy of language and the whole process of how language works. That's a very complex issue. Many western scholars have written on this, like Wittgenstein and others. Logic is simply the syllogism, the method of measuring and analyzing things.

THE MAIN BODY OF THE TEXT: THE DEFINITIONS OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS AND AWARENESS

The main body of the text begins with the general discussion of the mind, what the mind is. As you all know, in Buddhist studies of psychology and *pramana*, we talk about mind and mental factors. This text begins with the general description of mind, what mind is, the definition of mind. This is a very important subject because we always talk about mind, but we don't know what we're talking about; it's a very vague idea. When we say "mind" we are very unclear about it. We begin our studies in logic by defining as clearly and specifically as possible what we mean by mind. Therefore these definitions should have a very specific and narrow description of each concept and idea of what is meant by mind and mental factors (which will come later). There are three things that are defined in the first stage. We have the definition of mind, consciousness, and awareness. These three things have different names in Tibetan and Sanskrit.

The first term is mind or *lo* in Tibetan. The name of the text is called Lorik. When we say mind in Tibetan, it means *lo*. It means a lot to me. I don't know whether that means anything to you. [laughter] One book I've seen describes this *lo* as *buddhi* in Sanskrit. For *sems* the Sanskrit terms *citta* or *manas* are used. *Manas* is more like *sems*, I think. *Lo* or *buddhi* is translated here as mind. The translation is very optional; it's very tricky. The second term is called consciousness which in Sanskrit is *jnana* or *shepa* in Tibetan. *Shepa* is *jnana, citta, manas* or *vijnana*. The third term, which is translated as awareness, in Sanskrit, is *samvedana*, and in Tibetan it's *rigpa*. In Tibetan these three are known as *lo rig she sum*. (*Lo, rigpa* and *shepa*; the three things.) Sometimes these three things are called *sems, shepa*, and *rigpa*. Another word for mind is *yid*. I'm just giving you synonyms. One is called *sems* and the other one is called *yid*. *Yid* is like knower. The third one, *namshe*, is usually translated as consciousness. In that sense, *sems* is like mind, *yid* is awareness, and *namshe* is consciousness. You can compare with the terms that we have here.

[illegible] even are the same from mahayana viewpoint but not from Hinayana

We have different ways of approaching these three aspects of so-called mind. In the basic hinayana approach, such as in the views of the Vaibashika and Sautrantika, these terms are synonymous. There's no difference between mind, consciousness and awareness. They're all the same according to the hinayana approach, hinayana view. They all express different qualities of mind, but are the same general mind according to the hinayana view.

In the mahayana point of view, from the Cittamatrin or Yogacara point of view, these three things are separate. They're not synonymous. Mind in the Cittamatrin school refers to the *alayavijnana*, the eighth consciousness. I think you have all studied the Shentong text in some detail with Thrangu Rinpoche. The *alayavijnana* is the eighth consciousness which is generally known as a stable consciousness. It's a very unclear, vague, and stable consciousness which has this qualities of being the basis of all consciousness. The reason why it is called stable is because it is continuous. It is continuous not only in this particular life, or this particular moment, but in many moments of lives, and in many moments of existence. It's all the same throughout the continuity. It's called vague or unclear because it is neither positive nor negative. It has no clear expression of any state of clear mind or emotions, such as anger. It's neither negative, like the expression of an angry or jealous mind, nor is it positive, like the thought of generosity, or giving some good breath in *lojong* meditation. It's not a clear expression of mind, but a very vague and unclear aspect of our mind. This is almost like our general notion or connotation of mind. When you say "mind," it's not clear, right? That heaviness quality is there in the *alayavijnana*. Therefore in the Cittamatrin approach, this mind is the eighth consciousness, the *alayavijnana*. Awareness is the seventh consciousness, which is *klesha* mind or *klesha* consciousness, in the mahayana philosophy. It functions as the main ego-clinging *klesha*. It is the *klesha* that clings to the eighth consciousness as a self, as "I." This very vague eighth consciousness has no clarity that says "I', "me", "positive" or "negative". There's nothing. The seventh consciousness looks at this vague stream of mind and says, "Oh, this is me. It's me. It's "I" From there you get, "Oh, I have a headache," and "I have pleasure and pain." Therefore the seventh consciousness is the first projection coming out of the eighth consciousness. The first thing that comes out of the eighth consciousness communicates with the rest of the six consciousnesses.

We have the three: mind, awareness and consciousness. Mind is the *alayavijnana*, awareness is the seventh consciousness, the *klesha* mind, and consciousness has all the six consciousnesses. That is why in Buddhist psychology there are different degrees of ego clinging which arise from this basic stream of mind. First there is the *alayavijnana*, which is the mind. From that *alayavijnana* arises what we call the innate self, the innate ego. The innate ego or self is a very subtle expression of ego clinging which is almost nonconceptual. The seventh consciousness is almost nonconceptual, and it is extremely difficult for us to pinpoint or recognize the exact pattern of its functioning, exact pattern of its chaotic state. It's very difficult to map it with our conceptual mind. From that very subtle level of ego clinging which is the seventh consciousness, arises the more gross aspect of clinging which becomes the six consciousnesses. The six consciousnesses are a very gross aspect of clinging. You see forms, you hear sounds, and you label all of them. Thus you have good and pleasant objects, unpleasant objects, and neutral objects. Then you create all these emotions on top of that. Therefore, according to the mahayana view, these three things are separate and different, and relate to three different levels. This stage of Buddhist studies in logic combines the Sautrantika and Cittamatra views. The view of the Buddhist logics, such as in Dharmakirti's or Dignaga's texts, as well as all the commentaries, are mostly mixed between the Sautrantika and Cittamatra schools. We should have some sense of a common view at this point. We are not particularly clinging towards the mahayana view, and it's not a totally isolated hinayana view either. It has to have some balance.

The definition of mind is 'That which is clear and aware'. When we define mind, it says that which is clear and aware. What do you get when you read clear and aware? What do you think is the clarity aspect here? When we say "clear," it is a clarity which is a quality of our mind that is receptive or reflective. It is like a mirror in which everything can reflect. If there is no clarity, no light, if it's totally dark–even if the mirror is here–nothing can reflect in it. You need the clarity, the luminous quality to reflect, even though the mirror has all the necessary qualities to produce the reflection. A mirror is open and has all the qualities. When you have no light, there's no way we can reflect any image in the mirror. In a similar way, this clarity refers to the luminosity nature of mind which is devoid of material things. Material things do not possess the quality of clarity, and the clarity aspect of our mind is not present in material things. Therefore, when you say "clear", it cuts off any notion that our mind is material. When you say "clear," it means non-material. It is non-material because material things outside do not have this sense of clarity in their nature. They do not have a receptive quality. "Clear" means it's non-material, and non-material means it is devoid of colors, shapes, forms, or dimensions. Because mind is totally free from those, therefore it is clear. It has the quality of clarity.

At the same time you say "aware." The second portion of the definition shows the cognition aspect of the mind, mind being cognitive. Cognition is actually the conscious faculty of apprehension, which functions in the other conscious activities of the mind, such as seeing, hearing, smelling and so forth. "Aware" has a sense of the cognitive quality. When you say "clear and aware", you can look at your mind. When you say "my mind," you can simply look at the mind and see these two qualities. One quality is very luminous, very clear, with lots of light, so to speak. When you close your eyes and think abut your mind, it's not just totally blank. You don't feel it as being a total sense of darkness, vacuum state. It has a tremendous energy flow. There's clarity which at the same time has a strong presence of the cognitive quality. The cognitive aspect recognizes (or cognizes) all things that are happening within that sphere. Therefore we have these two portions of the definition here. Mind means clear and aware. That is the definition of mind.

Q1: What is the difference between the definition of mind ("that which is clear and aware") and buddhanature? I think they are similar.
DPR: Mind cognizes the conventional objects, whereas buddhanature is not *vijnana*, but the *jnana* aspect. It cognizes its own nature. Rinpoche said that the only mind that can recognize this buddhanature is the self-awareness, *jnana*. The self-awareness wisdom cognizes, in the context of buddhanature, its own state, its own nature. It does not cognize something outside, something around you. In this case we are talking about recognizing something outside, not inside.

Q2: I don't understand the difference between apprehension and comprehension.
DPR: Can someone describe the difference?
Q: Apprehending is seeing. It's like the immediate impact of the two. Apprehending means you meet something. Comprehend means to understand it, or to give it a label, possibly.
DPR: Does that sound right?
Q: There's a difference between meeting and holding. I think "com" means "to hold with". Comprehend may be related more to conception than to perception.
DPR: Good. Maybe this is a good topic for debate. I think you should leave it for debate. It's your native language and you can debate better. [laughter]

Q3: In the context of these definitions, since they're all synonymous, that would imply that what's meant by these definitions is not separate. In the English language they may mean different things, but the function of these definitions is that they are supposed to relate to the same concept.
DPR: That's good. It will be good to debate what these terminologies really mean to us, because we always use them. In our everyday life we say, "I apprehend, I comprehend, I perceive, I conceive, etc." Then we have the consciousness which is defined in this text as that which is aware of objects. Aware again refers to the cognitive side of our mind. Isn't cognitive something that is very commonly talked about in psychology?
Q3: There's a whole major aspect of experimental psychology concerned with cognition and how it works. For example, how to see your face and how to put all the elements together to recognize you.
DPR: Do you see my face?
Q3: I think so.
DPR: Good. That's right. Awareness, in a general sense, is the cognitive aspect of our mind which sees objects. We will cover more details later, but briefly speaking, there are two objects: the objects of direct perception and the objects of conceptual mind. Both are perceived by consciousness because consciousness includes all aspects of mind. It's not restricted to just perception or concepts. It is the general aspect of all of mind. Therefore, we have to define "object." It refers to the two different objects. First, the object of perception, direct perceptions, are material things or objects. For example, the eye consciousness perceives the material objects of this glass outside, the table, or the whole universe. It is more of a material thing such as sound. At the same time the other object is the mental object, the object of conceptual mind. This is simply the isolates.

Isolate means that when you think about Halifax, when you say "Halifax" in your conceptual mind, it isolates that particular thing from any other possibilities. It is not the paper, it is not the table, it is not Richard, it is not the shrine. We cut off all these things, possible existences, and so there's only one thing which is called "Halifax." That is called the isolate, and that isolate is the object of our conceptual mind. If you really look at it, there's nothing. There is no solid object perceived by our conceptual mind. It simply exists in that isolate. It is called isolate, form or aspect. It is really a non-existent object that you're perceiving with your conceptual mind.

We can have a more beneficial example such as the conceptual object of suffering. Say you have the conceptual object of anger, such as being really angry with someone. Maybe it is someone behind you, so you can't see him or her. If you really think about that person, get angry at that person, actually, there's nothing. There's no object toward which you are getting angry. The only object you have in that mental state is the isolate, and that isolate is nothing. You're actually getting angry at nothing. The object of anger is not there in any solid form. Therefore, that is what we call the direct object of conceptual mind; the indirect object of the conceptual mind is the material thing outside. For example, Halifax is in Nova Scotia somewhere down there, some hundreds of miles from here. That is the indirect object of your conceptual mind; it is the real material object upon which your conceptual isolate is based or developed. Generally speaking, those are the two different objects of our mind, of awareness.

Awareness is defined as "that which experiences an object of comprehension." [laughs] There are two different ways of saying it. One way is to say "being aware of objects." Now we are saying "experiencing an object." According to this particular view and tradition, they are synonymous in the hinayana view. Therefore being aware of an object, or experiencing an object of comprehension are the same. This means that what you are experiencing is two different states of mind. Either you are engaged in direct sensory perception, which experiences objects more directly or nakedly, or you are engaged in the experience of an object through your conceptual mind, in which case it is not the direct experience of anything. It is a very indirect experience. And at the same time, the experience of the conceptual mind which sees an object, comprehends an object, is a very vague experience. For example, if you conceptualize, think about cancer (isn't that a pleasant object to think about?), you can have this conceptual fear or thought about cancer, and look at that conceptual object of cancer. What is that cancer? There's nothing you can clearly pinpoint. That cancer is the object of our experiences of conceptual mind. When you think about cancer, you have to relate or refer to certain very specific objects. These objects are not direct objects of this conceptual mind. When you refer to the very specific object, it loses the quality of being the object of our conceptual mind. At that point it is no longer the object of our conceptual mind. It becomes more like the object of our more direct sensory perceptions. If you really look at the conceptual framework of our thoughts and concepts, at their functioning, and the hope and fear in our concepts, they are simply very illusory. There is no solid object, there is no solid subject, and there is no solid action really happening in that conceptual reality. It's all very, very superficial, vague, and unclear. If you look at the very specific object in the more direct sensory perception level, then there's no hope and fear. It's simply non-thought experience, non-conceptual experience.

These are the three definitions or characteristics which describe mind. When we say mind, we're talking about one of these three things: that which is clear and aware, aware of objects, or experiences an object of comprehension.

Q4: Are you saying that *rigpa* is the same thing as an object of conceptual mind? Is that which experiences an object of comprehension the same thing as conceptual mind?
DPR: No, this one has both experiences. It has the experience of an object which is direct sensory perception, as well as the experience of an object which is a mental phenomenon, conceptual mind. In this case, where awareness means *rigpa*, it helps, it is very beneficial. In such texts as the Lorik, where *rigpa* is studied at the most basic level, it means something different from the *rigpa* in the Dzogchen teachings. That's why in the many profound Dzogchen instructions, we have something which is called distinguishing *rigpa* from consciousness, distinguishing *rigpa* from *sems*. You can distinguish without learning the Lorik first. In a way, maybe we are stepping towards the Dzogchen studies through the Lorik. This is because it is stated in the *Commentary on Valid Cognition*. In the Buddhist presentation of logic, the first thing that is emphasized is the reasonings, the intellectual mind of reasoning. You have to prove every statement with a valid reason. The second thing that is emphasized is the authority of the scriptures. You can't just simply make up something even though your intellectual reasoning is perfectly superficial—I mean, perfectly super. [laughter] You can't have that complete sense of presentation without having a scriptural basis, a

scriptural authority that you can base your presentation on. That is why Rinpoche is quoting this *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, the *Pramanavartika* by Dharmakirti, who said that consciousness is the phenomenon that apprehends an object, and so on. Rinpoche says, "In this context, in the *Presentation of the Classification of Mind*, there are many ways to posit the definitions as well as negations and positions." This is just one set of definitions, but there are different views of defining mind, consciousness and awareness. You can posit, and you can negate these different possible definitions. Rinpoche says "these are to be known from the '*Continuous Movement of Waves on the Ocean of Texts on Logic, a Critical Analysis of Mind and Reasons*'". This is another text written by Rinpoche. This text would be helpful for us to have in the future because in it Rinpoche does a lot of critical analysis on different definitions. These would help us get more into the details.

Q5: These first three definitions are supposed to be all inclusive categories. They include all types of mind. So if you had an angry state of mind, that anger would be clear, known clearly, and with awareness. In other words, these definitions include mistaken minds, *klesha* minds, and everything.
DPR: Yes, that's right. Thank you.

Q6: It seems that the word "cognize" is a very central and important term in our discussion. Could you give a very clear and narrow definition of what you mean by "cognize?"
DPR: We could probably say that it is the conscious faculty of apprehension. Is that clear? Is that narrow enough? Do we want to get more narrow like hinayana?
Q6: That's still a bit vague. What does apprehension mean?
DPR: I think it means more like being conscious of things, in other words, being aware. It is being aware of being conscious, reflexive.
Q6: Does it simply mean that it apprehends an object?
DPR: Yes.
Q6: Would the mind be able to take itself as an object, and would you use the word "cognize" in that sense?
DPR: If you take the mind as an object?
Q6: Yes. If the mind takes itself as an object, would you say that the mind cognizes itself, or would that not be a legitimate use of the word.
DPR: Yes, you can say that, because there's different levels of mind that we will go through. So some aspect of mind is seeing itself.

Q7: Is unclarity non-specific?
DPR: Yes. That's right. Unclarity means non-specific.

Q8: Regarding the definition of clarity as including the idea of knowing, I would have thought that knowing refers just to the cognizant aspect, and that clarity or the reflexive aspect is not connected with knowing. Is that not true?
DPR: Clarity means non-material.
Q8: Yes.
DPR: In not being material, it has this basic sense of knowing. There's a clarity that has this sense of openness, right?
Q8: I understand that it's openness. I don't understand why it's knowing.
DPR: Why it's knowing?
Q8: Why knowing isn't the second part of the definition which is cognizant.
DPR: Aware, right?
Q8: Yes. Could you say capacity to know? Knowing without an object, or not introducing an object. It's knowingness.
DPR: Quite good. Yes. Does that make sense?
Q8: Knowing without an object?
DPR: No. Capacity to know.
Q8: I don't see that as knowing. I mean a mirror has a capacity to reflect, but I don't see that there's

a cognizance; there's no cognizance in the mirror reflecting.

Q: So this word "clear" could be the capacity to know.

Q8: Right. But it seems to me it's just empty and spacious.

DPR: That's good. I like that.

Q8: There's no knowing quality in it.

Q: But a mirror's never not reflecting.

DPR: That's right.

Q: No—when the light is off...

Q8: Isn't the cognizant aspect separate from that?

DPR: When the light is off, then the darkness is reflecting.

Q8: But is it knowing it's reflecting? [laughs]

DPR: Good. We'll stop here. [laughter] I'd like to point out that on page four there are only two definitions that you may memorize. In the first, Rinpoche gives different views, different interpretations of this definition by different Indian and Tibetan masters. Of course, he gives the seventh Karmapa's view at the end. The seventh Karmapa's definition is the one that is given at the beginning, the first two definitions. If you get the first two definitions, that would be good enough. In debate you can refer to the text (it's easier). I would like you to use our definitions here in the Lorik and to try to make use of the four possibilities. Try to think about something you know. You don't have to bring in everything from the text. The text gives you basic definitions, and then you can bring in other things like rock, and make connections with the three or four possibilities or contradictions.

THE PRINCIPAL SECTION--GENERAL TEACHINGS ABOUT THE IMPORTANT DIVISIONS OF MIND

Explanation of the Definitions of Conventional Valid Cognition

We have discussed the basic definitions of mind, consciousness and awareness. In this particular view of Buddhist logic all these three are considered to be substantial and momentary phenomena that maintain their own causal conditions. All these things are non-material and non-substantial in the sense of being non-material. At the same time these three synonyms of mind are regarded as substantial. Having discussed the general notion of mind, consciousness and awareness, the text then goes into the details of the classifications of this mind, and then into the specific classifications of this mind. It is classified into two categories: valid cognition and non-valid cognition. Mind or consciousness has these two categories or divisions. One aspect of mind is valid consciousness and the other is non-valid consciousness. The first one, valid cognition is defined by Rinpoche.

> The first, [definitions] exist, because the general definition of conventional valid cognition is "a new and undeceiving awareness" and the definition from the point of view of dispelling wrong ideas is "an awareness which clarifies that which was not known [previously]."

There are two fragments, two aspects, of this definition. Both are given at two different times in the *Pramanavartika*, by Dharmakirti. The first portion of the definition says, "A new and undeceiving awareness." New, in connection with valid cognition, actually means freshness. The first moment of arising consciousness, of arising mind, of arising awareness, is called new. New relates to the momentary arrival of the consciousness at the same time as the momentary arrival of the object of that consciousness, of the object of that mind or awareness. Therefore, in Buddhist psychology in the logic here, when the mind conceives or perceives an object it is always new and fresh. The first moment of perception or conception is very fresh and new, and it has never been repeated twice. It is one moment of perception, one moment of conception. In that state of our mind, our consciousness, at that very moment of perception, all conception is a valid cognition. That is the one factor that makes it valid.

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ee will
clearly.

The second part of this first portion is infallibility, or undeceiving. In some sense, this part of infallibility or undeceiving is very tricky. The Gelugpa logic defines it quite differently from the logic of the Kagyu tradition. We have a different connotation or interpretation. When they say "undeceiving" in the Gelugpa tradition, they are referring to a certain notion of ascertainment. When you perceive a certain object, it makes a very strong impression; it makes a strong impression on your consciousness. There is a sense of an undeceiving impression that is made on you consciousness by the object that you perceive. Therefore, this ascertainment is being continually produced. There is a first moment of seeing the object that attains this ascertainment. That ascertainment becomes a cause to have a continual sense of cognition, a continual sense of valid perception, or conception, to see the object clearly or undeceivingly.

The seventh Karmapa and the Sakyapandita agree on a different interpretation. They both agree that undeceiving here cannot have the notion of ascertainment because ascertainment is concept. It is the conceptual mind. When you have the general definition used in our study for all valid cognition, you can't have a conceptual definition. In the Gelugpa logic, conceptual characteristics define this particular aspect of mind, this particular aspect of consciousness which is called valid cognition. This is because they believe all direct perceptions should have this ascertainment, and so direct perceptions are not perceptions, but conceptions. Therefore, "undeceiving," or "infallibility" [according to the Gelugpa tradition—ed.] means perceiving or conceiving in accordance with the object's characteristics. For example, if you perceive a white piece of paper as white paper, then you see the object in accordance with the object. If you perceive the white paper as blue or green, then you are not perceiving it in accordance with the characteristics of the object.

In our text infallibility means not mistaking the object, not perceiving or conceiving it in a way that is against its own state, its own qualities. If the object has the quality or state of being white, then if you perceive that object as yellow, blue or green, you are not perceiving the object as it is. That cognition is not valid. That mind is not valid. In order to have a valid cognition, one must conceive or perceive that object in an undeceiving way. That is the undeceiving quality.

Awareness is the third part of this definition. It is connected with the notion or quality of being cognition, which we discussed yesterday. This is the general definition of conventional valid cognition. Conventional valid cognition means more in the relative sense. It is in the relative sense that we perceive things in their momentary nature; everything you perceive or conceive is new and undeceiving, and there is a quality of cognition, awareness.

The second part of the definition is from the point of view of dispelling wrong ideas. Is that clear? It's clear! So I don't need to explain! That's great! [Laughter] No ,you're the minority. Okay. We'll go through that. The first definition is "an awareness which clarifies that which was not known [previously]". This is not really different from the first one; it is somehow connected with it. When you say "new" in the first definition, it has the same quality. However, the second definition is emphasizing this momentary perception, the momentary conception. When you are being aware of an object, experiencing an object, or perceiving or conceiving of an object, then that object is something that you haven't seen, perceived, or conceived of previously. This means that every moment of your perception or conception is fresh and new.

The second definition goes a little deeper in its interpretation because it relates more to the absolute reality, the ultimate reality. It means that this awareness is something that you haven't had before. You are developing this awareness which clarifies that which was not known before. You are seeing or knowing something that you haven't seen or known before. It is more connected to the ultimate perception or conception at this point. When we say this is a definition from the point of view of dispelling wrong ideas, it is referring to the Tirthika view of the Hindus in the ancient Hindu/Buddhist debate during the time of Dharmakirti. The Tirthikas believe that valid cognition is permanent. It is the cognition of the Isvara, the mind of the Isvara which is self-arisen... They have these definitions. In Buddhism we are challenging that. You are not frozen in that permanent state. It is something that you come to realize through momentary perception and momentary conception. The ultimate truth is something that you realize within your awareness. Therefore there are these wrong ideas of the Tirthika and Hindu philosophies, or the logic which was present during the time of Dharmakirti.

The seventh Karmapa puts these two definitions together in order to have the complete definition of valid cognition. It is a new and undeceiving awareness, and an awareness which clarifies that which was not known before. That is the full definition of valid cognition, which has different interpretations by the Indian commentators.

The first commentator, Prajnakaramati, believes that these two definitions are two definitions of valid cognition. He separates the two definitions into valid cognition of the conventional reality and the valid cognition of the absolute reality. Acharya Devendrabodhi considers them to be two different sorts of definition, which mans they are two different names but they are basically the same. They define one and the same thing with two different definitions. Sakyapandita believes they are synonymous. There are these different views.

In the debate, the seventh Karmapa sees problems with each interpretation because if the two definitions are separated, then neither is a complete definition. At the same time, both are very much alike. The absolute mind can become the relative mind valid cognition and the relative valid cognition can also become the absolute valid cognition. This is because both relative and absolute valid cognition have these qualities of valid cognition. The absolute valid cognition is a new and undeceiving awareness, and the relative valid cognition clarifies that which was not known previously. If you separate them, then the problem is that they can become mixed; the absolute mind can become the relative mind and the relative mind can become the absolute mind. So there is a slight problem in logic. If you believe they are two different definitions defining that which is to be defined, the same object, then in the more logical sense it is not possible in the debate style. This is because one definition cannot define two different things, or that which is to be defined cannot have two definitions, technically speaking. Maybe in a debate session we should look at the relationship between a definition and that which is to be defined, or you can say, this is the definition of that. There is a certain rule that explains why it is not possible to have two different definitions.

In order to define the whole notion of valid cognition, the seventh Karmapa believes that both of them have to be present in one definition. When you say valid cognition it is not just one of the valid cognitions. It doesn't mean just the relative valid cognition or just the absolute valid cognition. Therefore, you should have a general definition. If you hold the view of Prajnakaramati, the problem is that there is then no general definition that can cover all aspects of valid cognition. The seventh Karmapa believes that the first definition is from the point of view of eliminating non-concordant types (whatever that means), and the second definition is from the point of view of dispelling wrong ideas. Dispelling wrong ideas is something we discussed briefly in the Tirthika view. The first one, eliminating non-concordant types, I think refers to those that are not valid cognition. If you see something twice, it is not a new and undeceiving awareness. Therefore, your perception is not in accordance with the object. The first definition eliminates wrong perception or wrong conception as a valid cognition. Non-concordance means not corresponding with its own characteristics, not corresponding to its own state of being. If it is not new and not undeceiving, then that perception or conception is non-concordant. Therefore, the first definition lets us define the relationship between our mind, consciousness, or awareness, and the object we perceive or conceive. When these two things are in a proper relationship, in good communication, then we have this sense of valid cognition. When we have a wrong communication with the object, then it is not a valid cognition. It is deceiving and it is not fresh.

From the point of view of this first definition, it is very interesting to look at a discussion in Dharmakirti's text. For those people who have cataracts and see dots in space, fallen hair or whatever, the question here is: "Is that a valid perception or a non-valid perception?" Dharmakirti and the seventh Karmapa's interpretation agree with Sakyapandita in that the first moment you perceive an object it is the valid cognition. You see something that is out there, projected out there. It is a fresh moment, you are seeing it in the first moment, a new moment, and it is undeceiving. For that consciousness it is undeceiving. When it comes to the second or third moment of consciousness, then it is deceiving. When you are dreaming, as long as you remain in that state, you have the objects of a dream, and those objects are valid. You have the water in the dream, you can drink it, and you can quench your thirst. That's what I learned at Arby's in Boulder! [Laughter] They had "Quench your thirst" on their soda cup. It is interesting to look at these definitions and to work with our subtle moments of perception, subtle moments of conception. You can debate about valid or invalid cognition. I'll leave it up to you.

Rinpoche says in the conclusion,

> "Because these are the positions of the Mighty Lords of Logic (the great scholars of logic), actually there is nothing incorrect about them, but so that the dexterity of intelligence may increase, the analytical skill must be exercised through negation and proof."

This is a good reason which we should think about. In every Buddhist logic and debate we engage in, we do not do it because we are dying to refute the other position. We are not looking for some kind of conquering of the other position. The reason for debate is to increase our intellectual capacity. For that reason, we are getting involved in lots of debates and refutations. I think this is a very short but helpful message. That's our definition of valid cognition. The definition of non-valid cognition will come later.

Summary of the Definitions of Conventional Valid Cognition

Remember that when we talk about the definition of valid cognition, you can think about three basic points. The first is *pramana* in Sanskrit. *Pramana* means "best measurement." It has so many literal definitions that you can talk about this word alone. *Pra* in Sanskrit means the "first," "first moment," or "prime." It also means light. In the context of logic, it is the first definition that applies. That is why we have this sense of freshness or first moment. That's why it's *pra*. So new is the first thing we can think about. It is fresh and new.

The second point is undeceiving or infallibility. This is talking about the relationship between subject and object. The third point is the awareness which is the cognitive side, the cognitive quality of the mind.

When you have these three things together, and when you perceive or conceive a thing, then it always becomes something which was not known before. The second definition is almost like a summary of the first one. It says, "an awareness which clarifies that which was not known." Every time we see a thing, it is a new and undeceiving awareness. Therefore it is something we have not seen, not known before. That is the definition of valid cognition.

In the second definition, you can talk about the ultimate realization, the ultimate perception, where you have this awareness that clarifies ignorance, ego-clinging, and *klesha* mind. It also sees something that was not known before, and is beyond *klesha* mind, beyond ego-clinging, and beyond ignorance. Therefore, the second definition has more of the quality of the ultimate mind, the ultimate consciousness. You can debate about that.

The Divisions of Valid Cognition

Next is the categories or divisions of valid cognition. Remember that mind consciousness is divided into valid and invalid cognition. Valid cognition is further divided into direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition. There are two different states or functions of valid cognition. Direct valid cognition refers to perceptions. Inferential valid cognition refers to the conceptual mind. Perceptual and conceptual mind are two different states.

In presenting the direct valid cognition, there is a definition: "A non-conceptual and non-mistaken awareness." Non-conceptual, non-mistaken awareness has three parts. The first part is non-conceptual. A direct valid cognition must be a non-conceptual state of mind. Second, it must be non-mistaken. Third, it has to be an awareness. These are the three criteria, so to speak, for a consciousness defined as direct valid cognition. Just being a direct perception or direct cognition does not mean that it has these three characteristics. All three together make a direct valid cognition. What makes it direct is that it is non-conceptual. The first part makes it direct, non-mistaken makes it valid, awareness makes it cognition. It's very simple. Therefore, these three parts of the definition have three different things that they clarify and isolate. "Non-conceptual," isolates the consciousness from all conceptual mind. All conceptual mind is eliminated. Non-conceptual eliminates all conceptual thoughts, conceptual mind. Is it eliminate and not illuminate? Eliminate. This is why we have to learn grammar and philosophy. Which science was it. Sound, yes. [laughs] It's important.

"Non-conceptual" eliminates the conceptual mind, which is the wrong direct perception. It eliminates all aspects of conceptual mind. Whether they are valid or non-valid, it doesn't matter. Whether it is the right conceptual mind or the wrong conceptual mind, it has to be eliminated for this cognition to be direct valid cognition. When you see this white sheet in front of you, even if you have the right thoughts, they have to be eliminated. Otherwise, it doesn't become direct perception. That's why non-conceptual eliminates the conceptual mind.

"Non-mistaken" eliminates the wrong non-conceptual mind, the mistaken non-conceptual mind. For example, when you have a certain disease, then maybe you see this paper as red. That is mistaken. People who have suffered from jaundice have told me that they haven't seen it as yellow, so I don't know. Maybe the best example is being color blind. If you are color blind maybe you see this paper as grey or blue, or something like that. A friend of mine at the Shedra was color blind. We didn't know until very late. He always wore very, very bright orange socks under the very, very beautiful maroon robe. One day I asked him why he was wearing such bright orange socks. He looked down and said, "Where?" I said, "Your socks," and he said, "No, this is not orange, it's maroon." He had been seeing all these orange colors as maroon. Something like that is wrong perception according to the logic and according to the Sautrantika school. According to Madhyamika, who knows? [laughter]. That's a whole different thing. Non-mistaken means not having these superficial causes of error, where you see things in a wrong way, such as having cataracts, or seeing white paper with lots of black dots.

The third part of the definition is awareness, which means it is a non-material thing. When we say awareness, it eliminates the consciousness as being a material substance.

With these definitions, we have to see and look at different aspects of direct perception. This is the definition of direct valid cognition, direct valid perception. We have to look and see whether or not this definition is applicable to all the direct perceptions or valid cognitions. If you think there is something that this definition doesn't apply to, and yet it is still direct valid cognition, then you have a very good point to debate or argue with your fellow students, and then with Khenpo Rinpoche later on [laughter]. So that is the definition of direct valid cognition.

We will go through each of the things that have been eliminated by this definition. Non-conceptual eliminates all the conceptual mind. This will come later in the section that talks about the opposite of direct valid cognition. Then we will talk about the mistaken non-conceptual mind, and then about non-awareness.

This is so because it is stated in the *Compendium of Valid Cognition* by Dignaga, it says,

> A direct valid cognizer is that which is free of concepts
> Connected with names, types, and so on.

This means direct valid cognition is that which is free of concepts. The second line describes what is meant by concepts. Concepts are connected with names, types, and so on. Names, such as table or Tingzin. Tingzin is a name, and is conceptual mind. When you say table, you have this conceptual definition. Types refers to groups, different groups. For example, when you say, "cows," you're talking about a specific group of animals, cows. When you say, "humans," you are talking about one specific group of sentient beings. When you say, "sage," you are talking about a specific herb. These are called types. "And so on," refers to the qualities or different aspects. When you say, "cow," this is the group. When you say "white cow, "then you are talking about the quality of the cow being white. Further, you can say "white, giant cow," and so describe even more qualities of the cow. When you say, "intelligent Tingzin," it describes more qualities of that person. Dignaga says very clearly that direct valid cognition has to be free from all these conceptual things. In the *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, the *Pramanavartika*, by Dharmakirti, it says, "A direct valid cognizer is free of concepts. This is established by direct valid cognition itself." Dignaga has given a statement and Dharmakirti is trying to reason or prove the statement of Dignaga. His reason is that it is established by direct valid cognition itself. You can experience it by the self-awareness of direct valid cognition. (Direct valid cognition of self-awareness is one category which will come later.) Therefore, Dharmakirti is saying that the nature of this direct valid cognition is something you can experience. It is not just something that has been taught by Dignaga or the Sutras; you can also find it in your own experience of direct valid cognition of self-awareness.

[illegible] part [illegible] view [illegible] truths [illegible] conventional [illegible]

Q1: I don't understand what is meant by conventional and ultimate.
DPR: Generally, conventional is a relative truth. Relative truth is that which is the object of consciousness and mind. Ultimate is the object of *jnana*. That is the general view. But in this specific view of the Sautrantika school, you may say that conventional reality is more conceptual reality, more conceptual mind and its reality. The absolute or ultimate reality is the reality of more direct perception, the reality of the fundamental state of being, whether it is outer or inner perceptions, or outer objects or inner perceptions. It is more substantial existence.
Q1: If I understand it right, valid cognition is something like ultimate nature.
DPR: That's right. Great!

Q2: In the example of the very first moment of seeing a white sheet of paper, in my understanding of how we acquire that very first moment of perception, that would seem to be both conceptual and mistaken. First of all, the purpose of the sense is to limit or narrow the entire field of information in order to acquire an object.
DPR: What does that mean?
Q2: In terms of what is actually presented to our eyes, for example, it's a lot of information. Unless that information is selected such that we ignore certain parts of the information and focus our attention on other parts of the information, no object will arise. So, in order to separate object from not object, you have to attend to certain parts of information and ignore all the rest of the information. That in itself is conceptual, just at the very first level of finding an object. Actually the structure of the organ itself is conceptual. Using computer terms you would say it is hardwired for concept.
DPR: Hardwired?
Q2: Hardwired means it is built within the system itself. In other words, concept is actually built within the actual organ. For example, you say seeing this white paper as white corresponds with the correct quality of the paper. But actually the whiteness does not exist within the paper. That's imputed by mind. If you were to put a different color light bulb in there that paper would appear blue. So the qualities are not inherent within the object but are merely imputed by the mind. For those two reasons I think it would always be conceptual and always mistaken.
DPR: Finished? Maybe we are looking at the word, "conceptual," in different ways. The way you define conceptual in whatever theory it is, whether it is computers, science, or general understanding seems to be different from the way we were talking about conceptual in the logical text here. Conceptual refers to the discursive thoughts that have clear distinctions of labels and to the functions of labels in relation to the labels. We are not really talking about this mechanism as a conceptual pattern. You are really referring to the mechanism of how it's perceived. Choosing the object is more like a mechanism that the non-conceptual perception is going through.

diff between [illegible] & [illegible]

Q2: There are two things: one is choosing object from not object.
DPR: That is mechanism, right?
Q2: No, I see it more as the function of the labeling. I see the actual structure. I don't want to take a lot of your time to explain how the eye actually sees the object...
DPR: Thank you!
Q2: You'd be very surprised. I think of that as the actual mechanism. So there is the epistemology or the philosophy which is the function and which is the first part of separating object from not object.
DPR: Yes.

Q2: If I could just use one more example. Brian was telling me about a man who was born blind and then later he was able to have his vision restored when he was thirty or forty. It was an absolutely horrible experience for him because he was unable to acquire the object. Even though all his visual functions biologically or anatomically were working, for example, if he was in front of me and I was talking to him, he couldn't separate anything from me or anything else. He couldn't find where I was. He couldn't designate any of the objects. It was very confusing for him and apparently he never was able to... it wasn't just a matter of him learning because he had not experienced it before. He was never able to acquire the object. So, I am just giving that as an example.
DPR: Example of what?
Q2: An example of how I was saying we are hardwired for concept.
DPR: Hardwired? Okay.
Q2: Like soldering between two points so that it is built right into the system. So that's the mechanism side.
DPR: Is there no question?
Q2: The question was using these examples.
DPR: There's no non-conceptual.
Q2: Yes, there is neither a non-conceptual... Let's talk about non-deceptive...
DPR: It's deceiving.
Q2: Yes, because it is implying that the qualities or the characteristics exist within the object and there is a correct way of viewing them. This is as opposed to the more correct understanding which would say the qualities are always imputed onto the object by mind, they aren't in the object itself.
DPR: I think as I said before, non-conceptual here refers to discursive thoughts, and in that sense the subtleties of its functioning. You can look at this thing which is taught in the logic; I think we will come to it later. We talk about very, very subtle moments of how the perceptions arise and the different states of perception, which we haven't gone through yet. The sensory perceptions, mind perceptions, self-awareness, and the concepts and how they arise and in what pattern. So when you say choosing, it may be acquiring prior to the direct sensory perception. Of course you have the thought or whatever; our perception and our focuses are moving, and so you are choosing a certain object. That is before the perception arising. The state of perception itself is not when you choose it. After you choose and focus on a certain object, then the sensory perceptions are arising. The text says: when the perception arises it is non-conceptual. They are two different moments, in my understanding. When you say there is this mechanism of choosing whatever object and not-object, etc., I think that is happening before the actual perception has arisen. It is a very subtle moment that we are going through and we see them all as one moment of perception. We usually cannot differentiate between perceptions and concepts. There is no momentary perception of perceiving this itself, whatever it is. It's beyond words, labeling it, and saying, "I saw it." We say, "I am lifting it," and "I am drinking my water." All these things are seen as one, when actually we are going through hundreds of moments of fragments of thoughts. It's like the movies which have so many different frames. When they are moved together very fast with the machine, you see them as one, as a continuity. That is one thing I would like to say about non-conceptual and your question relating to that.

Choosing. [illegible]

Secondly, the way you described non-mistaken seemed to be very conceptual and philosophical. When you say it is all projected, all labeled, that is very conceptual and very philosophical. When we talk about perceptions in a subtle way, we are going beyond that philosophy of whether it has an inherent existing quality or not. We are not talking about that. We are not talking about the Cittamatrin view of things being labeled by your mind. You are just perceiving what you have labeled. What you have projected out karmicly. All these things are more of a philosophical theory. When I say, "white paper," I don't really mean there is a sensible whiteness in the paper. When you say, "white," that particular label is a conceptual label. However, we need that particular label to communicate. Otherwise I can't say that I perceive it. Even when you say that you perceive it, it is a label. As soon as you start opening your mouth, it is labeling. Therefore, we have to use particular labels. What we really mean is whatever the object really is, being whiteness, having this atomic

existence of the paper, or whatever it is. Seeing that correctly is called the "non-mistaken," or "undeceiving awareness." I don't mean you don't see white because white is a label. What I mean is beyond any characteristic of being white, that is what you are seeing. Is that clear?
Q2: I think that clarifies it. Using your example of the white paper, under these circumstances we would see it as white. By changing the lightbulb, that same piece of paper would be seen as blue.
DPR: Yes, but that's a deception. That is mistaken.
Q2: Do you understand my confusion?
DPR: Yes. Like when you wear sunglasses you might see the whole thing differently.
Q2: Yes, if you wear sunglasses it might look orange.
DPR: That's right. So that is the mistaken perception because you are seeing this paper as orange.
Q2: But the thing that makes the paper orange is the light bouncing off the paper. The color perception is not dependent on the object but on the light that bounces off of it.
DPR: Yes.
Q2: Can direct valid cognition involve more than one sense at a time? Can my seeing and hearing you be one simultaneous moment?
DPR: Yes. Maybe one last thing to you: No matter what change occurs in the lighting, in the object that you perceive, there is the basis of that object to be changed. That basis of the object is called the non-mistaken. When you perceive the basis of the object as it is, whatever it is, before it is altered by your lighting process, that is non-mistaken perception. So you can debate now.

Q3: Rinpoche, when you talk about ultimate perception here, are you still talking about the ultimate perception of a relative reality? My understanding is that when mind is directed outward, it is necessarily involved with delusion. When you are talking about ultimate perception, are you talking about an ultimate perception of a relative reality?
DPR: In the Buddhist tenets of the Sautrantika and Vaibashika, when you perceive the subtle momentary existence of things, relate with the momentary nature of things, or see or hear things in moment to moment perception, that very basic or fundamental experience is the ultimate truth. Therefore, you can see in the Hinayana view that the perception or realization of impermanence is one of the ultimate realizations. Therefore, when you see the moment to moment nature of things you see the nature of impermanence. You have a certain sense of realization right there. Not only that, but when you have this direct sensory perception, mind perception, or the direct self-awareness through perception, that experience itself is the ultimate experience. In the Sautrantika and Cittamatra views, and similarly in other Mahayana views and Vajrayana practices (which will come later), when it comes to self-awareness and mind perception, it becomes very subtle. Does that answer your question?

Hinayana
holds realization
of agt

Q3: Yes, that's it exactly. When you presented the *alaya* consciousness yesterday, it was a very linear presentation. I'm always suspicious of "big bang" things, things that come from one source. Can you speak about *alaya* consciousness in its dependent origination form. For instance, if you take someone like an ultimate Helen Keller, someone who doesn't have the five senses, what would happen to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses? The question is: Can you approach the eighth consciousness, from a point of view other than that everything emerges from the eighth?
DPR: Are you asking is it possible to have seventh and eighth alone without the other five or six?
Q3: I'm wondering about the specific relationship between the first five sensory consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness, and whether it would be more accurate to look at this model as a dependently originating model instead of a linear model. Is everything coming out of the eighth?
DPR: In the Cittamatra view the eighth consciousness is the basis of all consciousness. There we have planted all the seeds of habitual tendencies and positive or virtuous actions. You can say that the other consciousnesses, the sixth and the other five, arise on the basis of the eighth consciousness. So you get the six consciousnesses of a human being, an animal, or other different levels of being, but they all arise from the same eighth consciousness, which is the stream of consciousness which is continuous. Therefore in the Cittamatrin view there are three natures. The dependent nature is like the alaya and the seven consciousnesses, from which you get all the outer projections. That is the pure nature in all the projections you have. These consciousnesses can be classified into

dependent nature.

Q3: Does that mean you can have a sixth and seventh without one through five?

DPR: Yes, you can.

Q3: Can you say what that might be like?

DPR: No, [Laughs] Actually it is described in Buddhist Abhidharma that certain levels of beings don't have all five consciousnesses, like certain god realms. There are different states in the god realms where you have only the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. As long as you are in samsara, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are present all the time. You don't necessarily have to have all the other five. In different levels of being it is described that you may have one through three or one through five missing. That is possible. In many ways in the Mahayana, the sixth, seventh and eighth are seen as the same, like in the Madhyamika view. The Prasangika Madhyamika don't believe in having the seventh and eighth separate from the sixth. That's why the notion of eight consciousnesses has been refuted in the Prasangika literature.

Q4: In the text it says "... there is nothing incorrect about them... that dexterity of intelligence may increase... " Is that dexterity the Tibetan word *rtsal*? Can you say some more about what *rtsal* means?

DPR: In Buddhism we have the analogy of mind being like the ocean. *Upaya* is the vastness of the ocean and *prajna* is the depth of the ocean. These are the skillful means and the profound nature of the mind. Dexterity is like the waves of the ocean. Even though you have these qualities present right from the beginning, there are the qualities of being very deep and profound and very vast and skillful. At the same time, if the waves do not develop, the ocean is pretty boring. When these beautiful waves are developed, then the ocean is very beautiful. In some sense, the waves are separate from the deep quality of the ocean, and from the vastness of the ocean. They are their own state. At the same time, they are not separate from the ocean, but arise from the ocean. *Rtsal* is more like the beautifying quality of the mind. It is like an ornament to your mind. Without these waves as ornaments, the nature of the mind cannot be fully manifested.

upaya = vast
prajna = deep
རྩལ = beauty

Q4: How does one go about developing this?

DPR: It is by engaging in debate. In the Buddhist training it is really developed through debate. The way to develop this is through thinking about the different sides of the definition and how they are applied, and seeing different possibilities of how the definition cannot be applied. That, together with reading texts such as the Lorik or Dharmakirti's text, or whatever, is developing through intellectual exercises. The other way is through the intuitive practice of meditation, which is done through Manjushri practice. Manjushri practice is the main practice for developing such intelligence. One of the most common and powerful ways to practice Manjushri is to read the root Tantra, *Manjusrinamasangiti*. This has been translated as "*Chanting the Names of Manjusr*.". It's a pretty thick book. If you chant the text of that tantra everyday, once a day, it is said and experienced that in one month you can see the difference. This tantra is supposed to be one of the most profound tantras, in the Buddhist tantra. In the ancient tradition, if someone said, "I know *Manjusrinamasangiti*," that means he knows all the tantras. It started when Chandrabhumi and Chandrakirti met. One of them asked what texts did the other know and he answered, "I know *Manjusrinamasangiti*". I forget what sutra he said he knew. Therefore he knew both sutra and tantra. It is regarded as a very high tantra. We do it at Nalanda.

Q5: I have a question about ultimate cognition, which is the object of *jnana*. In the Sautrantika view, you have basically two objects: one which you perceive and the other which causes this perceived object to occur. It sounds like the Sautrantika view is still referring to the perceived object as the ultimate. What about this non-perceived object?

DPR: It is also ultimate.

Q5: Both are ultimate?

DPR: Yes.

Q5: Then what do they say about this non-perceived object?

DPR: They say that whatever is able to perform a function is regarded as ultimate truth.

Q5: This refers to the perceived object and the non-perceived object?
DPR: Yes, they are both doing their own work.
Q5: We had a discussion about what you can say about an unperceived object. All anyone knows through inference is that the perceived object is different from the outer object. This is an interesting point in terms of science. Nowadays, they say that the effect of perceiving changes the whole object in an experiment. I am just curious about the opposition.
DPR: They would say it is ultimate.
Q5: I wonder how they can ascribe qualities to an object which no one has ever perceived.
DPR: They are things that can function.
Q: He is raising the issue of the epistemology of knowing in the Sautrantika system. You don't see the object itself, you see the image in the mind. That's what he is referring to.
DPR: Oh, okay. Why didn't you make it clear? [laughter] So, are you talking about the hidden object?
Q5: When the logic talks about objects, is it talking about the perceived object which is valid cognition, or is it talking about the hidden object?
DPR: No, no, no. As long as we talk about cognition we are talking about the mind. Whether it is perceptual mind or conceptual mind, that mind is what we call valid cognition. At this point, we're not talking about objects at all. When you define valid cognition, it is cognition, not object.
Q5: My point was, when they say the real object, this sounds like the ultimate.
DPR: That's right, the real object.
Q5: So they are not talking about this.
DPR: No.

Q6: In the first moment, someone with an eye disease sees floaters, black objects. Is the first moment valid cognition?
DPR: Yes.
Q6: Does the idea of "unmistaken" eliminate the perception of someone who has eye disease?
DPR: That's a good question. I think they distinguish between the appearance of the falling hair or dots, or whatever, and seeing them as an outer object. In the first moment in the new and undeceiving awareness, it is just simple appearance. The object appears and that's it. You are aware of the object. Then later you say, "Oh, I saw a blue dot or black dot." You have a projection which sees that these are outer objects in the later moments. You project these outside. When you have the projection outside, it is said to be a mistaken perception because there is no outer object. The experience of just seeing it is, in a way, undeceiving to that mind. To the mind that perceives the falling hair, it is an undeceiving object.

[illegible]

Q6: Does any first moment of any sensory experience have to be *pramana*? Is there no such thing as a mistaken *pramana*?
DPR:. According to Sakyapandita, yes.
Q6: I see. Maybe we're in different systems. We're under direct sensory perception, so that the idea of mistaken is completely unnecessary. It's redundant.
DPR: It's impossible.
Q6: You wouldn't even need to say that. It's redundant.
DPR: Which other parts?
Q6: If it's a first moment of sensory cognition, then it is already, by definition, unmistaken.
Rinpoche: When it comes to the definition of direct valid cognition, it doesn't have the first part, where it says it's a new and undeceiving awareness. The definition begins with a non-conceptual and non-mistaken awareness, right?
Q6: Yes, but if it is non-conceptual, then it has to be non-mistaken, by definition.
DPR: If it's non-conceptual, then it has to be non-mistaken.
Q6: If the first moment of the eye-diseased person is valid?
DPP· Not necessarily, because our perceptions go through a three stage process. There are the three moments so to speak. The third moment is more mistaken. It's almost like saying that the first perceptual moment is non-mistaken all the time, but that doesn't mean all direct valid cognitions

are non-mistaken. Direct valid cognition includes the moments of perceptual mind, the sensory perceptions, as well as the mind perceptions, self-awareness, and yogic perception. I think that is why that is added here. Does that make sense?
Q6: It may. I've got to admit I got lost in there.
DPR: Maybe we can talk about it later with the chart.

Q7: In the definition of valid cognition, I wanted to clarify the term "new" and the difference between the Kagyu and the Gelugpa presentation of this term. For instance, if you are looking at the same object, like a table, for several moments, can each moment be valid cognition? In other words can each moment be new in itself, or is only the first moment new? If I understand it correctly, the Gelugpas say that the first moment is valid cognition and the second is not. They are called subsequent cognizers and they're not new. It wasn't clear to me if the Kagyu position was that each moment can be new and undeceiving, even if you are looking at the same object.
DPR: That's right. That's the position of the seventh Karmapa. He categorized ways of seeing which are opposites of direct valid cognition, and these are different than the Gelugpa classifications. We have less classifications than them and therefore, in the view of the seventh Karmapa, each and every moment is new and developed. There's no old moment in the sensory perceptions. How can you have an old moment? The second moment, or the old moment is already conceptual. Therefore you cannot really have an old moment of perception.

Q8: As an extension of that, in any moment where you have sense perception, even if you have cataracts, in terms of your perception of it, it is an immediate and non-conceptual experience. It seems that, given the apparatus, it's a direct experience of whatever is coming through the apparatus, even if the apparatus is distorting it. If I were to say, "No, that is not a yellow paper," or "There are no dots on the paper," it would seem that the perception is still direct and non-conceptual, even if the perception is distorted. Do you still posit that that first moment is a direct valid cognition?
DPR: Yes, according to the Sakyapandita, the first moment of encounter with the sensory perception is new and fresh, and it is a direct experience. There is a certain sense of validity to it in its own realm, in that isolated realm.
Q8: But relative to other people's perceptions, it would be considered deceived.
DPR: Yes. When you come out of that perceptual state, then it is a mistaken perception. That has something to do with this chart of how the *ngongsums* arise. There is *ngongsum* and *dsernsum* right? The views of the Gelugpas and Kagyus differ as to how the direct valid cognitions arise. There is the sensory direct valid cognition, mind direct valid cognition, mind awareness direct valid cognition, and yogic direct valid cognition. These are the four categories. We have a different view of how they arise. In the view of the seventh Karmapa, we can see that there is a way that these arise: first moment, second moment, third moment. There is no moment that you can divide in the sensory perception itself, but in relation to the other perceptions you can have moments, or a moment basis. When we describe the moment basis, we're not talking about sensory perception having a second or third moment. We are talking about sensory perception in relation to mind perception and self-awareness perception, the direct perceptions. You can take the concepts of mind and valid cognition and compare the two. See what the relationship is between mind and valid cognition, mind and direct valid cognition, or direct valid cognition and valid cognition. All these things you can use as examples.

THE DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS OF DIRECT VALID COGNITION

The Definition

We have discussed the general definition of direct valid cognition, and now we will go through the divisions of direct valid cognition. I hope the general meaning of direct valid cognition is clear to all of you. To clarify further, "non-conceptual," "non-mistaken," and "awareness" are the three fragments of the definition. Non-conceptual, technically speaking in Buddhist logic, refers to many different things. One general meaning, which we have discussed, is it is not discursive thought, which is still very vague and general. What do we mean by not discursive and non-conceptual? In a more technical sense, there are two things connected to the meaning of conceptual. One is that conceptual minds have a cognizing or apprehending quality in conceptual sounds. For example, when you say "Sangpo," the sound "Sangpo," as soon as we hear it, creates a general conceptual image almost at the same time. We don't see the detailed development of that conceptual image, but almost as soon as we hear the sound the image appears in our conceptual mind. That is called the generality of the sound which is apprehended by the conceptual mind. At the same time there is the general meaning of that particular image which has been conceived in our conceptual mind. For example, when you have the image of a person, like Sangpo, then you have a general image, created by the sound and at the same time, a general meaning of that image, which has been conceptualized or conceived almost simultaneously with the sound. Non-conceptual means that this is bare perception which is not covered or disturbed by these general meanings and sounds. It is a direct perception, direct contact with the bare object, bare consciousness and bare sense organs. That is why it is called non-conceptual.

སྒྲ་སྤྱི་ དོན་སྤྱི་

། [illegible]

The meaning of non-mistaken comes from, as we have discussed, superficial causes of error. The mistaken perceptions arise from superficial causes of error which are divided, in the Buddhist logical texts, into, four. They are the superficial causes of error connected to: 1) the object, the basis of your perception; 2) the sense organs; 3) the abode; and 4) the instantaneous conditions, or the immediately preceding condition. From these four causes of superficial error we get the mistaken awareness, mistaken perceptions.

The first cause of error is the mistaken perception arising from the object. For example, if you quickly spin a fire stick, you see a circle. In actuality there is no circle; it arises from the object that is spinned around so fast that you see it as something else. There is no such circular object outside, but you see the circle of fire coming from this firebrand. The movies are the same kind of thing. Because things are turned so fast, you see them as something else. The images on the film are just fragments of pictures, and when you turn them fast, you see a person moving, shooting or cutting someone's throat. Isn't that a nice example? [laughter]

འཁྲུལ་རྒྱུ་ ཡུལ་ལ་ཡོད་

The second cause of error is the basis, the sense organs. For example, when you squeeze your eye sense organ, the sense object is seen as double. For example, when you look at the moon with squeezed eyes, you see two moons instead of one, or if you have some defect in the sense organs, then you see, hear or taste differently. One time I was very sick in Dharamsala. I didn't know what the sickness was, but all the food I ate tasted so bitter. I asked my friends, "Why does everything taste so bitter in Dharamsala? I know this good food is not bitter in other places." They said, "No, it's not bitter." But I truly tasted it as bitter. I think the cause of something like that is our sense organs. Therefore, this is what we call the second cause.

རྟེན་དབང་པོ་

གནས་ལ་འཁྲུལ་པ།

The third cause of error is the abode. The traditional example is when you are riding in a boat, then you perceive that the trees or objects around you are moving. When you kayak down a river, you can see these objects moving so fast. You almost feel like the trees are moving. That kind of thing is called the superficial causes of error which is connected to the situation that you are in.

དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་ལ་འཁྲུལ་པ།

The fourth of the superficial causes of error is the immediately preceding condition, or the instantaneous condition. It is basically your previous moment of thought consciousness. When your thought or mind is so obsessed by certain emotions, or whatever, when you see things right after that, in the next moment, you see something which is not really there. You see it totally differently. We project out from our intense emotional state of consciousness.

[illegible]

We have these four causes of mistaken awareness. They are all non-conceptual, but mistaken. Simply having this quality of being non-conceptual doesn't mean that it is valid cognition. In order to be a valid cognition you have to have these three definitions together: non-conceptual, non-mistaken and awareness. Awareness is the same thing that we have talked about, it has the quality of being a cognitive state of being. It eliminates direct valid cognition as being non-material. It means that it is not matter, it is consciousness. It separates the two. If you look at Wangchuk's example of the rock, the rock can be non-conceptual and non-mistaken in its own state, in some sense, but it doesn't have the awareness according to this logic. That is why it is different from consciousness. It is matter.

The Divisions of Direct Valid Cognition

It is very important for us to know the definition of direct valid cognition in order to know the classifications or divisions of the direct valid cognitions. Direct valid cognition is divided into sense direct valid cognition, mental direct valid cognition, self-aware direct valid cognition, and yogic direct valid cognition.

Sense Direct Valid Cognition

Sense direct valid cognition is defined as, "A non-conceptual and non-mistaken awareness," which is the same as the definition of direct valid cognition, "Arisen on the basis of its own uncommon dominant condition, a physical sense faculty." We don't need the details on the first part of the definition, since they have already been discussed. Sense direct valid cognition which can arise only on the basis of its own uncommon dominant condition. "Its own uncommon dominant condition, a physical sense faculty" eliminates the other three direct valid cognitions. It makes it separate and different, and clearly defines its own state, because neither the mental direct valid cognition, self-aware valid cognition nor yogic direct valid cognition arises from its own uncommon dominant condition, the physical sense faculties. This direct sense valid cognition arises on the basis of the physical sense faculties, sense organs, like the eye, the ear, and so on. These sense organs are described in Buddhist abhidharma as very interesting forms. We did this in the *Kenjuk*, which is pretty amazing. *Kenjuk* is an Abhidharma text written by Lama Mipham of Tibet.

What is its own uncommon dominant condition? It is the physical sense faculties. The dominant condition is common in all the direct perceptions. The mental direct perception also has its own dominant condition as does self-awareness, but the difference between sense direct valid cognition and the other direct valid cognitions is its own uncommon dominant condition, which are the physical sense faculties.

Sense direct valid cognition generally arises from three main conditions: the object condition, the dominant condition and the immediately preceding condition. The object condition is, in the visual sense, a visual form, object. In the audial sense the object is sound. The object can also be smell, taste, and tangible objects.

The dominant condition means that without this condition, it cannot arise; it is the main condition. The dominant condition is the sense organs: the eye, the ear, the nose and so forth. Organs in the Buddhist Abhidharma refer not only to the outer physical organ that we can see, but also to a subtle organ within each of them. For example, the eye sense organ has subtle form which is in the form of a blue flower. (No one has really seen it though.) The text describes each one of the subtle sense organs.

From among the three main conditions that give rise to a direct sense valid cognition, the third is the immediately preceding condition. It is the previous moment of the consciousness, the perception. You need the continuity of the previous moment of consciousness giving rise to the next moment of consciousness. The past moment, just before the sense direct valid cognition, is called the immediately preceding condition.

These physical sense faculties which are the dominant condition of sense direct valid cognition are not the direct cause for mental direct valid cognition or self-aware valid cognition. At the same time the uncommon part applies to each of the five classifications of sense direct valid cognition. This will be discussed shortly.

In the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, Dignaga said,

> "On the basis of the sense faculties, conceptuality is impossible. Through conventional terms the respective specific objects of awareness cannot be shown; the essence [is to be] the objects of the sense faculties."

"On the basis of the sense faculties" means that within the sense faculties you cannot have any sense of conception, conceptuality is impossible. As long as we remain in the sense perception, we cannot have concept within that state. This is not saying that we cannot have concept after that moment—obviously we can, and we do. It means that the sense perception itself, which is based on the sense faculties, is free from conception. It is impossible to have the concept within that state. He is also saying that the sense faculties cannot produce or have a conceptual mind. The eye sense organ cannot have a concept, think and label.

"Through conventional terms the respective specific object of awareness cannot be shown," means that the respective specific object, the *svalakshana*, is the object of the sense direct valid cognitions, the sense direct valid cognitions of the eye consciousness, ear consciousness, and so on. Each has its own particular object that is very specific to itself. That specific object of awareness, awareness of the sense direct valid cognitions, cannot be shown by conventional terms. This means it cannot really be expressed, or thought conceptually. It is just the object of the sense faculties and sense direct valid cognition. Therefore, he says that the essence is to be the object of the sense faculties. When you have this direct sense perception of seeing, let's say, a table, you have the perception of seeing the flat top and the sides or legs of the table, but in that very direct sense perception itself, within that state, it is just perceiving each particular object without any labels. There is no label, such as saying it is "flat," or, "It's the top," or, "It's the leg." It just perceives the object as it is. Therefore, in the direct sensory perceptions there is a certain quality of seeing the fundamental nature of reality. That is why, in the view of the Sautrantika, it is regarded as the ultimate perception, ultimate mind. That is what this quote is saying.

a la [illegible]. [illegible] of ultimately [illegible] Sautrantika

Dharmakirti, commenting on that, said, "Therefore minds arisen from the sense faculties are all perceiving subjects of particulars." He is saying that minds arisen from the sense faculties, from sense direct valid cognition, all perceive the subject of their particular objects. This means that they do not have a general object—they all have their specific object. Even within the sense faculty of, let's say, the eye consciousness, it has its own specific particular object of each moment, in each fragment. There is no general object such as the eye consciousness or ear consciousness. It is very specific. That is why it is call svalakshana.

Svalakshana has the quality of not being dependent on anything. In Buddhist philosophy it is described as being its own characteristic or mark, which is not dependent on others. It is distinguished by its own characteristics. Therefore, the *svalakshana* of this glass has its own independent characteristic, independent nature, or independent mark which distinguishes itself from anything else. When you perceive or have any sensory direct valid cognition, it is a very particular perception that is connected with the object. That perception is also known as the nature of the *svalakshana*, its own characteristic.

Q: Can it be the same in the next moment?

There is a sense of continuity, yes, but it is not the same because each moment is different. Each moment is new, and if there is a sense of being the same, then we will have the second moment of direct perception and the second moment of the object of direct perception. Because we have the second moment of the object of direct perception, we can have the second moment of the subject, which is direct perception. According to this logic it is not possible because it is a new and undeceiving awareness. This is basically the same as what we have been talking about, the direct valid cognition. It is just one sub-division of it, which is the sensory direct valid cognition.

Once you have understood the main definition, then the divisions are easier. The divisions are basically the same with slight changes. We have sense direct valid cognizers apprehending forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible objects. These are the five divisions or classifications, and each one of them is defined here with the same definition and with slight changes in each. I think the last sentence is different. "A non-conceptual, non-mistaken awareness, arisen on the basis of its own dominant condition." It describes this dominant condition, beginning with the eye sense faculty. The second one is the ear sense faculty, then the nose sense faculty, tongue sense faculty and body sense faculty. Each shows its specific dominant condition. Once you understand the definition it is very easy; they are all the same, with one aspect in each switched.

In the beginning, we said that the uncommon dominant condition can also refer to each having its own uncommon dominant condition. The ear consciousness has the dominant condition of the ear sense faculty which is different from the eye consciousness. The eye sense consciousness has the eye sense faculty as a dominant condition. Therefore it is the uncommon dominant condition in its own way. Each one has its own uncommon dominant condition. At the same time, the uncommon dominant condition also implies that it has its own uncommon object condition, and uncommon immediately preceding moment of consciousness, cognition which is uncommon to itself. The ear consciousness has the immediately preceding condition which is the past moment, the previous moment of ear consciousness. This is different from the eye consciousness which has the immediately preceding moment of eye consciousness.

MENTAL DIRECT VALID COGNITION

I hope at this point we all know the meaning of a non-conceptual, non-mistaken awareness arisen on the basis of its own dominant condition. We have had the physical sense faculty as the dominant condition for direct sensory perception, and now we have the mental sense faculty as the dominant condition for the direct mental perceptions. The dominant conditions for the physical sense faculties are the five sense organs, whereas in this case the dominant condition is the mental sense faculty. The mental sense faculty is the cessation of the preceding moment of direct sensory perception. It is like the sense organs for the mental perception to arise.

In the earlier stage, in order to have the direct sensory perceptions arise, we have to have the sense organs in good condition. We have to have an eye sense organ and an ear sense organ in order to generate sensory perceptions. In this case, in order to generate the mental sense perceptions, the direct valid cognition of mind, we have to have the mental sense faculty, the preceding moment of sensory perceptions. Whether it is the direct valid cognizer apprehending forms, sounds, smells, tastes or tangible objects, any one of them can [by ceasing—ed.] become the mental sense faculty. On the basis of that sense faculty, the non-conceptual, non-mistaken awareness of mental direct valid cognition arises.

At this stage, we need some more explanation, and so I won't ask you whether it is clear. In the particular logic of the Sautrantika Cittamatra view of Dharmakirti, this stage is interpreted in different ways. Our interpretation is the similar views of the seventh Karmapa and Sakyapandita. We have the first moment of direct sensory perception arising purely as a sense perception. It is just simply a moment of direct sense perception such as an eye consciousness perceiving or apprehending a form. That is the sense direct valid cognition of the fresh, first moment. The second moment, so to speak, of that direct valid cognition arises simultaneously with the first moment of direct mental valid cognition. The mental direct valid cognition arises simultaneously with the second moment of direct sense perception. In that second moment there is not only the two of them, but there also arises the self-aware direct valid cognition, which we will look at later. These three things arise together in the second moment.

In the nature of perception itself, there is no second, first or third moment. There is a relationship to direct mental perception and self-aware direct valid cognition. Therefore we can say that this is the second moment of direct sensory perception. It is a second moment in relation to something else, but the sensory perception itself has no first or second moment. That is why every moment is new.

In this three stage process, or three modes of arising, you have two perceptions apprehending the outer object and one perception apprehending the mind itself, which is the self-awareness. Self-awareness has no outer object, while direct sensory perception and direct mental valid cognition have an outer object to perceive. Two perceptions are directed towards the outer object and one perception is directed towards the inner object, the mind itself. That is one view; it is our interpretation coming from the seventh Karmapa and Sakyapandita—whereas in another interpretation, you have one moment of sensory perception alternating with one moment of mental perception.

In a third interpretation, mental direct valid cognition arises at the end of the sensory perception, no matter how long the sensory perception lasts. It may last five moments or hundreds of moments to complete its function. At the end of that, you get one short moment of mental direct valid cognition which then gives rise to conceptual mind. That seems to be a view that many Gelugpa scholars hold. With these different options we can examine, analyze and decide which we think is most appropriate.

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view
iew -
VC arises
fter the
ast moment
of SDVC.

The seventh Karmapa's and Sakyapandita's interpretation is the three modes, three types of arising, or the three stage process. The first moment of sensory perception leads to the second moment of sensory perception, and this arises simultaneously with direct mental valid cognition and self-aware direct valid cognition. Three things arise together in the second moment: direct sensory perception, mental direct valid cognition or perception, and self-aware direct valid cognition.

The second interpretation is the alternate arising. First you have one moment of sensory perception, then one moment of direct mental valid cognition, and then self-awareness and conceptual mind. Then it repeats in the same way. Each has only one moment. They do not say that the second moment of direct sensory perception arises with direct mental valid cognition. They don't posit that view. They believe that each independent moment is separate, and that they alternate. It is the alternation of sensory perception and the mental perception. First you have one moment of direct sensory perception, then the second moment is mental direct valid cognition. This alternation is repeated again and again and again.

In the third interpretation, they believe that there is a long process of sensory perception where there are moments and moments of direct sensory perception. At the end of that there is one short moment of mental direct valid cognition which gives rise to conceptual mind.

In the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, it says, "Mental [direct valid cognition] as well [apprehends] objects and ..." He is saying that mental direct valid cognition, the second direct valid cognition, apprehends objects. This means that like direct sensory perception, this too apprehends an outer object, such as a form, sound, smell, taste and tangible object. It also apprehends an object. "Object" means outer objects. Dharmakirti comments:

> "Therefore, arisen from the sense consciousnesses,
> The immediately preceding condition,
> Mental consciousness apprehends another object:
> Therefore the blind do not see. "

That's good logic. It says, "Arisen from the sense consciousnesses, the immediately preceding condition..." The sense consciousness immediately precedes the mental direct valid cognition. In this case those consciousnesses are the mental sense faculty. It is the mental consciousness which arises on the basis of those sense consciousnesses. The mental consciousness cannot arise without the sense consciousnesses. The mental consciousness apprehends another object, which is other than its preceding sense consciousnesses. It is another object which is different from the object of the immediately preceding sense consciousnesses. "Therefore the blind do not see." Although the blind person has mental consciousness, the blind person does not have mental direct valid cognition. The blind person cannot have mental direct valid cognition because this mental direct valid cognition is dependent on direct sensory perceptions. It cannot arise without having the first moment of sense direct valid cognition, such as sense direct valid cognizers apprehending form. The blind do not see because they do not have the preceding sensory perceptions which generate the mental perception.

Mental direct valid cognition is a very difficult subject because it is a very subtle moment of consciousness that arises between two moments of sensory perception and conceptual mind. First you have sensory perception without mental perception, then concept, and then this is repeated over and over. We pretty clearly see only the sensory perception and then we see very clearly the concepts, but we miss the very tiny moment in between. Mental direct valid cognition arises with self-aware direct valid cognition, and is a very short moment. They arise simultaneously but are not easy to notice, perceive or experience. It is so subtle and it is happening so fast, like a movie projector. In between each frame, each isolated picture, there is a line, but you don't see the line when the frames move so fast. You only see two images connecting together; you don't see the separating lines between the two.

Mental direct valid cognition perceives the same object as the sensory perceptions. The same object is the outer object, not something inside. The outer object is perceived by mental direct valid cognition. This usually includes clairvoyance. Clairvoyant mind is maybe the clearest example we have. It is the mind that can see different things, but it is hard to show a solid example because it is different from sensory perception. It is going to a much subtler level because it is not only sensory perception perceiving an object, but a mental perception perceiving an object with mental perception.

Clairvoy. is a good example of [illegible]

The mental perception communicates between the direct sensory perceptions and the concept, it joins the two. Right after a moment of mental direct valid cognition the conceptual mind arises. Then we say, "Oh, it's a glass." "It's a person." These labels arise right after a moment of mental direct valid cognition. In some sense, mental direct valid cognition and self-aware direct valid cognition make a stronger imprint of the objects we have perceived by the sensory perceptions. With these imprints we label, and the thought process arises on the basis of that.

function [illegible] to join SDC thought.

You can try to contemplate this and relate more with direct sensory perceptions and mental direct valid cognition. See whether you can have any insight or stability in your mind to experience this mental direct valid cognition. Most of our logic texts, our commentary, and the Gelugpa commentaries always say that this is almost impossible to detect with the mundane consciousness. It is possible to experience it with the help of yogic perception or contemplative or meditative experiences. You can have certain insight to experience these subtleties, but these subtleties are only possible to experience through inner contemplation. You cannot experience these just through theoretical explanations.

The divisions of mental direct valid cognition are pretty similar to the divisions of sensory perceptions. There are the five divisions of mental direct valid cognizers apprehending forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tangible objects. The text says:

> "A non-conceptual, non-mistaken awareness arisen on the basis of its dominant condition, the mental sense faculty, and the observed object condition, a form."

Each division has a separate observed object condition. The observed object of the mental direct valid cognizer apprehending forms is the forms. Then you have the sounds, smells, tastes and tangible objects. Each one must have an object condition that is unique to that particular mental perception. The object condition unique to the mental direct valid cognizer apprehending form is the form. Without having this uncommon object of a form, you can't generate the mental direct perception which apprehends the form. Similarly, sound, smell and so on are the other uncommon dominant conditions of the mental sense faculty. Didn't you have this mental sense faculty in the Shentong text that you studied with Thrangu Rinpoche?

Q: He said the exact same thing you just said. He also said that he'd never experienced it and that he had to just trust that the texts were right.
DPR: I think this sense faculty is described in that Shentong text.

Q: You stated that the object of sensory direct valid cognition is the same as the object of mental direct valid cognition. Did you use this term "the same object" metaphorically, or did you literally mean that it is the same object. They seem to be different..
DPR: I am using "the same object" loosely to mean an object that is an outside phenomenon. Both sensory perception and mental direct valid cognition see the external object. When we say "mental," we always think that it means something inside; we don't think that it perceives some-

thing outside. In this case, mental direct valid cognition perceives an external object. In a sense, it is the same as the sensory perception that also perceives the external object. Loosely speaking, it is the same object, but it is not the same. You can clearly see this in Dharmakirti's code, where it says that the mental consciousness apprehends another object. "Another" means another from the object of sensory perception. It is a different moment, but the same object. The second moment of sensory perception may have the same object as direct mental valid cognition because they arise simultaneously.

2 moment
SDVC &
mental
DVC arising
= same object

Q: Thrangu Rinpoche said that the sensory object is much more vivid and strong and the mental object is weaker.
DPR: I think that refers to the mental sense of conceptual mind, but not to mental direct valid cognition.

Q1: In the Sautrantika perception process, although it's called direct perception, you don't actually experience the object—you experience an image in your mind. In direct perception the image is considered to closely reflect the object. It is not the object, but it is intimately related to it. When you have thoughts or concepts the image that appears to the mind is a general object; it is not nearly as detailed as the image of direct perception. Is the image of a mental direct perceiver the same image as that of the sense direct perceiver?
DPR: I think it is the same object, the same image. At the same time, as we have discussed, it's not the same in the sense that when you perceive by mental direct perception, it is different from the image that has been perceived by the preceding sensory perception.
Q1: It's different in time, but it has all the details?
DPR: I think it's the same.
Q1: What is confusing about this category is that it's a mental cognition, and many Westerners think mental means conceptual. In this case there is a mental organ that actually perceives a very detailed image that is a direct perception. It is not a mental concept, not generalized.
DPR: That's right, yes. I think, as you mentioned, it is important for us to remember that throughout the text, we are in the first category of direct valid cognition. This issue of the Sautrantika view of the object is very interesting and important. In the Sautrantika view, you can't really perceive the atomic level of external objects, but you can perceive an image of an object. It is an image or aspect (*nampa*) of that level of existence. The usual example (which is from Thrangu Rinpoche) is when you see a glove, you know there is a hand inside. You know the fingers, you can sort of see, but you do not really see the object directly; you see the aspect of it. It is not the real thing. When you see shoulders hidden under clothes, you know it is a shoulder there but you do not see it directly. The atomic level of the object is called the hidden aspect. The object that we perceive directly is the image, an aspect of the object. I think it is very similar to science where you can't perceive the atomic or particle level of things. You perceive something like an image. In order to perceive the particle level of things you need a microscope. With our perception level we see an image of that atomic composition.

Q2: In the Sautrantika view, whatever is real must have a function. In perceiving an image, what is the functional aspect of it? Is it at the atomic level or is it an image aspect? What would a non-functional aspect be? What is the term "functional" referring to?
DPR: The general conceptual image we have in our labeling process is seen as a non-functional thing. You might say that anything within direct valid cognition and its objects is basically functional. It is more ultimate in a certain sense. The images that we have in our mental conception are non-functional. Concepts and thoughts do not have any sense of solid relation with the object. It is an impure image.
Q2: A lot of concepts have a functional process. Does this mean that all kinds of concepts would be considered non-functional, like communication?
DPR: You have to differentiate between the concept and the image that is created by the concept, the object of concept. Non-functional things are the object of concept, not the concept itself. The

concept itself is mind, a substantial thing. It has its own momentary phenomena, therefore it is functional. Concept itself is mind, state of mind.
Q2: Would any object of concept be non-functional?
DPR: Most objects of concepts.

Q3: How does concept come out of self-aware valid cognition?
DPR: It is not directly from self-aware, but directly after mental valid cognition. Self-aware valid cognition is the main consciousness that perceives sensory perception and mental direct valid cognition. It sort of recognizes them all, or it has this quality of being awareness.

Q4: Did you mean that a mental direct valid cognizer apprehending form would actually see the same thing as the sense direct valid cognizer apprehending form, but at a later moment? If that is so, I don't understand how this mental direct valid cognition perceives without the organ of sight.
DPR: It cannot.
Q4: But it is seeing the same thing.
DPR: Yes, that is why in the definition it says that it is arisen on the basis of its own dominant condition, the mental sense faculty. The mental sense faculty is the preceding moment of sensory perceptions. Without having the preceding moment of sensory perceptions you will not have mental direct valid cognition.
Q4: Does it sort of "see" the previous moment of sense direct valid cognition?
DPR: It is a separate moment of seeing the object, but at the same time that separate moment cannot be generated without having the preceding moment of a sensory perception.
Q4: Can it actually see the outer world with just the mind, independent of that previous moment? The only way I can understand that is through the idea of clairvoyance, that the mind could actually directly perceive the world without an organ.
DPR: Yes, but it arises on the basis of the sense faculty. In a way, it's not totally independent because it has a strong relationship or dependency with the sensory perceptions. Without the sense perceptions it cannot arise. It arises on the medium of the sensory perceptions, but it is independent in the sense that it perceives its own object.

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Q4: Perceives its own object?
DPR: In the code of Dharmakirti, it says that mental consciousness apprehends another object. The mental consciousness does not perceive a perceived object of the sensory perceptions, but at the same time that it arises with the sensory perception, it is not separate. In that sense it arises simultaneously with the second moment of sensory perception, and observes or perceives the object.
Q4: It sounds very connected to the previous sense.
DPR: Yes, definitely. That is why he says, "Therefore the blind do not see." Because it is totally dependent on sensory perception.

Q5: What is clairvoyant mind an example of?
DPR: It is the example, and also sometimes a classification or division of mental direct valid cognition. Mental direct valid cognition can have different states, and one of them is clairvoyance. There are different kinds of clairvoyance which belong to mental direct valid cognition.
Q5: What makes it clairvoyant? If it is still dependent on the previously arisen sense direct valid cognition, it must be dependent in a different way.
DPR: If you have the clairvoyance of seeing a form, for example, it is somehow connected to the perception of eye consciousness. You can't see a form or color without eye consciousness. In clairvoyance, you see it in the mental direct valid cognition, but it is dependent on a sensory perception. If you hear a sound, it is dependent on the sound that is the object of ear consciousness. If you have the clairvoyance of hearing a sound from another universe, probably it is dependent on the ear consciousness at a certain level.

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Q6: My question has to do with the object of the visual consciousness.
DPR: Mental or sensory?

Q6: It could be both because it is the same object. We were talking about seeing snow as red because of the condition of the light. The perception of that snow as red in the first instant is sensory direct valid cognition, and in the second moment of the mental consciousness, it is also valid, now mental direct valid cognition.

DPR: Direct mental valid cognition, yes.

Q6: My confusion comes from the belief that there is some validity in the object itself, that snow has properties that are absolute. In this example, we call it both valid and red. In the third instant, when we think about it, it is no longer valid because it is a concept. Is what is defining its validity not what is directly perceived, but whether there are concepts or not? The concept makes it very relative and we recognize things as relative when we deal with things as concepts. The phenomena in itself is also relative because it is influenced by the light. There is nothing fixed about that particular phenomenon of snow and how it appears.

DPR: That's a great relief. Yes, it is actually the validity. The validity is like when you have that situation of seeing the reflection of the sunset on the snow mountain where the colors are reflected as pink or red. At that very moment, if you see a white snow mountain, then you have a problem, because you are not corresponding with that momentary nature of reality. I think the validity is there in that particular moment itself. Whether it is the moment of daytime when you have a white mountain, or the moment of sunset when the snow mountain is red, in both cases there is some sense of validity. Without having any conceptual labeling or making a justification, just by being in that particular situation itself, in that very moment, it has its own validity of its experience. That is called the *svalakshana* form because it has its own characteristic or mark of snow, mountain and sunset all coming together. That is separate from the moment when you have the snow, the mountain and the very bright sunlight. It also has its own characteristic, its own validity.

Q6: How do the Sautrantikas view the object as possessing any kind of reality? Regarding the object itself, which we don't actually perceive and remains hidden, is there something there that is real?

DPR: Yes. I think the sense of being real is the *svalakshana* in Sautrantika.

Q6: Which isn't fixed.

DPR: No, there is nothing like a fixed reality. The whole concept is based on impermanence, the momentary nature of things. There is no one reality existing forever, but there is the momentary nature of reality, of validity, of the object of itself, which does not depend on anything else. It doesn't really depend on our conceptual labeling of saying this is true or this is not true. It has its own state of being in whatever moment it is. For that reason, I think that the *svalakshana* in the Sautrantika view plays a very important role. It is the main thing that shows the validity of an object of a subject of anything that exists.

Q6: It keeps opening questions.

DPR: That's good.

Q7: My question is about how the experience of the *svalakshana* of the Sautrantikas differs from the emptiness of the Mahayana view, or the Karmapa's view. How would each school describe their experience and their views about the differences in the experiences, but without the language of the schools.

DPR: Without the language of the schools, I can't speak. [laughter] Just kidding. Generally speaking the experience of the *svalakshana* reality in the Sautrantika view is very close to the experience of the realization of emptiness. It is not very far. That is why Nagarjuna says in his Madhyamika treatise that when you try to understand or apprehend the meaning of arisal, then through that you can understand the meaning of cessation. Once you have the understanding of both arisal and cessation, then you have a clear understanding and apprehension of impermanence. Once you have this true realization of impermanence, then, he says, at that point you are not very far from experiencing the genuine dharma, the true nature of reality, emptiness. Therefore, in this subtle experience of the *svalakshana* of the Sautrantika view, all the perceptions and concepts that we go through to experience the *svalakshana* nature of reality are actually the subtle level where we experience impermanence. We observe it, perceive it, relate to it at a more direct level. This is a very subtle experience of relative phenomena. In the view of the seventh Karmapa, in his presentation of the logic, the bridge he makes between the Sautrantika Cittamatra view of logic and the Madhyamika view is that there is not much difference between this view of the logic and the view of Shentong Madhyamika. Because of that connection, relationship, this subtle level of direct valid cognition that we re going through now is getting very close to the experience of the mahamudra or tantric view. The *Kalachakra* tantra talks about six *jorwa*, the six applications. In that kind of teaching, there are certain practices which directly relate with these direct valid cognitions. If we had no clear understanding of these direct valid cognitions, it would be hard to relate with those teachings. It is going so subtle to the level of direct perception and different states of direct perception. Therefore, like Khenpo Rinpoche says, and also in the seventh Karmapa's commentary, you can see the link between this teaching and the mahamudra practice and the higher tantras. There is great insight in this very basic teaching of Buddhism of the Sautrantika and Cittamatra view. At the same time it goes beyond this Buddhist tenet because it is direct experience, non-conceptual experience.

Q7: What is it that keeps these appearances distinct from each other?

DPR: Me. [laughter] Yes, me. Our ego.

Q7: I don't understand.

DPR: Yes, ego is hard to understand. Actually, the difference is the method. The method as it is presented here, as you can clearly see, is very dry, logical and technical. We are going through logical mind, making a lot of analysis and assumptions, and there is lots of space for debate and so on. It's pretty much left for you to discover such things as direct mental perception. You have to find out for yourself. All the definitions and divisions are given here, but then we have to find out exactly how it corresponds to our experience. In the mahamudra tantra teachings, it is more directly pointed out to your experience through the different methods of practices. We don't go through so much conceptual or logical theory; we are getting into more direct experience. At the same time it is emphasized by many masters of tantra that you can't reach that level of experience, connect or click to that experience, without having some prior knowledge of these details. It is like putting a bridge between our mundane, confused vague state of mind and this very awakened state of tantra or mahamudra. This bridge is built with such texts as logic.

Q7: Can you say that the experience is the same, but the methods are different?

DPR: Yes.

Q8: Yesterday I was trying to approach the possibility of mind without the sense faculties, and you suggested that it is possible. Today you say quite clearly that mind is dependent on the sense faculties.

DPR: Were we talking about the eight consciousnesses?

Q8: I was trying to determine whether mind could arise outside of the linear presentation of everything coming out of the eight consciousnesses. You said that that is true, that you could have the sixth and seventh without one through five.

DPR: That's right, yes.

Q8: Today you say that you can't have mental direct cognition without the senses.

DPR: That's right. You can't have this sense of mental direct valid cognition without the sensory perceptions. That doesn't mean that you can't have the sixth consciousness, because the sixth consciousness is not just mental direct valid cognition. It also involves the other thing such as the yogic valid cognition, conceptual mind, self-awareness. All these things are the mental state. It is a mind. Therefore, mental direct valid cognition is just one portion, one part of the sixth consciousness, the mind consciousness.

Q8: This morning you presented three conditions for the arising of sensory experience but you left out the traditional causal condition of the eighth consciousness. Is that because it is not in this system?

DPR: In this tenet system of the Sautrantrika view, I don't think they really accept the notion of the eighth consciousness. They are mainly working with the notion of the sixth consciousness, and they believe that the seventh and eighth are not separate from the sixth. The sixth, the mind consciousness has this continuity. It is the clinging aspect of the klesha mind. Therefore, it is not separate from the sixth consciousness in their view. The eighth consciousness is more of a Cittamatra view.

Q9: My question has to do with clairvoyance and the perfection of shamatha. With the attainment of super normal powers, you could see very long distances. I assume that means without the fleshly eye. You see something that is not directly based on or connected with direct sensory cognition. It is separate from that.
DPR: It is interesting because in our commentaries they sometimes use the examples of vultures who can see meat at a very, very far distance. We use that example to show this kind of super normal power. It seems that to a certain degree, it is based on this sense organ, sense perception. From that you develop something to further extend its capacity.
Q9: Is this because with the perfection of shamatha mind slows down enough so that you can actually see the process of these three moments of sensory direct, mental direct, and self-aware direct valid cognition? Is it that you are tuning into once of those?
DPR: No. I think through meditation your mind gets more subtle. Your *prajna* gets more subtle, and then you can perceive or observe these subtle levels of our mind functioning. Right now it is sort of overwhelmed, distracted and disturbed, like on a very windy day when the ocean has huge waves; you can't see the subtle level of the ocean.

Q10: You said that in terms of the nature of the perception, there is a first and second moment, but that there are not really two moments in terms of the nature of that perception. There is only one moment, but it appears that there are two. Is that correct?
DPR: When you isolate the moment of perception itself, and look at the very nature of that moment of perception which changes from moment to moment, it is always fresh. There is no sense of a second or old object, or old consciousness. It is always fresh and new.
Q10: When we talk about the first moment of the sense direct valid cognition, the dominant characteristic is the sense perception. At the same time, there is this object condition, there is something that you are looking at. What appears in the second moment is that the object becomes stronger, more imprinted, and that is called the mental direct perception. The imprint is stronger.
DPR: That is what I think, yes. It is not something clearly expressed in the literature here, but when you look at the sensory perception, it is very mechanical. It just has this sense of perceiving and perceiving and perceiving and perceiving and perceiving and perceiving, moment by moment. They need something to connect that mechanical process, in the Sautrantika sense of the sixth consciousness, to make it more like an imprint, which then takes it to the level of conceptual mind. The direct valid cognition of mind is taking that further than just simply the perceiving process of sensory perception. It goes more into a depth of imprint.

Q11: There is a first moment of a sense direct valid cognition, then a second moment in which there are three elements: another sense direct valid cognition, a mental direct valid cognition, and a self-aware valid cognition. Is the image that is being intensified or imprinted by the mental direct valid cognizer in the second moment the first or second moment's impression? If it is intensifying the first moment then you have a second moment's impression which is different from the first moment.
DPR: I believe the first and second are intensified together, because the second is also happening at the same time.
Q11: And it is closely related to the first one
DPR: That's right, and we are looking at the same object, so to speak. [laughter] Therefore, I think we are creating habitual patterns, tendencies, which are basically imprints on our continuity of consciousness. That tendency is starting to imprint more strongly in the mental consciousness, the mind consciousness in this three stage process.
Q11: It sounds like it is almost verging on being a conceptually non-valid cognition.
DPR: That's right.
Q11: There is sort of a tendency, when there's a repeated sense perception, for the mind to kick in

and say, "Oh, there's something continuing solid here."

DPR: It is taking it further into your mind consciousness, and that appears later as a conceptual object. Then it says, "Oh, it's a glass which I've seen before."

Q11: There seems to be a slight element of memory to it. The previous moment is being remembered, very subtly.

DPR: That's right, RAM. Random Access Memory.

Q11: You were talking about the concept of a general image. That image seems to be a functional phenomenon. It refers to its object of reference. The image appears in your mind, but the referent object does not exist. When you think "chair" you have a generalized image. There are specific chairs, but there is no universal chair out there. You just have this image which is a momentary phenomenon. You conceive it as referring to an abiding universal out there. The actual image, the conceptual image exists momentarily, but its referent doesn't exist.

DPR: At the same time, it is non-functional in the sense that that conceptual image, the object of the conceptual mind, does not function like the chair. You can't sit on it, it doesn't function.

Q11: Is the image of the chair also non-functional? Using that same logic, the image itself can't function either.

DPR: Not really, because in the direct sensory perception we do not see a chair, we see the *svalakshana* of the chair. It is doing its function there, but we are not seeing the chair. There is no way we can perceive chair. Chair is a concept, a conceptual image. It's not the object of perceptual mind. We've never perceived chair.

Q11: So the image that is appearing in the mind, this *svalakshana* is an appearance, not the actual external object. But it's how we know...

DPR:...The aspect of the object.

Q11: Is that a non-functional phenomenon? You said the aspect of the concept was a non-functional phenomenon.

DPR: I think these two aspects are slightly different. When you see the aspect of the direct sensory perception, it has more of a sense of direct connection with the object which is out there functioning. That aspect or image is also inseparable with that object. You can't perceive that outside without having that object. Without having this here, you can't perceive the aspect of this phenomenon in your direct sensory perception. Whereas in the mental image you can perceive it, you can conceive it without having these things here. There is no relation whatsoever, as you have pointed out.

[illegible]

Q11: To summarize, in direct perception the external object and the image that is perceived by it are ultimate truths, are able to perform a function. Whereas a concept, the referent that it refers to, and the actual mental image are conventional truths. They are not able to perform a function.

[illegible]

DPR: Yes, I think we can say that now.

Q11: Both consciousnesses are able to perform a function. Even though conceptual consciousness is perceiving something that doesn't exist, the consciousness itself is able to perform a function.

DPR: That's right, because it is itself *svalakshana*. The consciousness itself exists in the nature of *svalakshana*, in some *svalakshana* form or realm.

SELF-AWARE DIRECT VALID COGNITION

རང་རིག གཞན་རིག

In general there are two types of consciousness: the self-knower and the other-knower. Today we are going to discuss the self-knower. The definition is, "A non-conceptual, non-mistaken awareness that experiences itself." The first two sections of this definition are similar to the others. We have had non-conceptual which eliminates conceptual mind, and non-mistaken, which eliminates mistaken perceptions that are non-conceptual but are not non-mistaken. Those mistaken perceptions are caused by superficial causes of error. Finally there is awareness, which eliminates material things; awareness means non-material. The difference in this definition is that it experiences itself. It is the direct valid cognition, or cognizer, that experiences mind itself. "Itself" refers to mind. It is the consciousness that experiences consciousness itself, or the mind that experiences mind itself, or the awareness that experiences awareness itself.

This self-aware direct valid cognition is, for example, like when you have the sensory perceptions, such as the ear consciousness, perceiving or apprehending a sound such as music. The ear consciousness itself is an other-knower consciousness that apprehends an outer object and which is directed outward. The consciousness that experiences the ear consciousness is the self-knower. Therefore we have these two aspects happening here. The first is a more gross aspect where a sensory perception apprehends its object which is outside. The second is something happening inside, a consciousness or mind that experiences the sensory perception itself. That consciousness is called the self-aware direct valid cognition.

When you look at that self-aware direct valid cognition, it is the cognition that recognizes different aspects of mind, mental states or movement. Whether they are conceptual or perceptual they are experienced, perceived or apprehended within the self-aware direct valid cognition. Its object of apprehension is the apprehender. The apprehended object of self-aware direct valid cognition is the apprehender. (This is getting nice.)

There are basically two aspects: the aspect of the apprehended and the aspect the apprehender. This is more like the duality of subject and object or perceiver and perceived. In the example we had of the ear consciousness apprehending music, it hears the aspect of the music, of the sound. We talked about sensory perceptions not seeing things directly; they only see some aspect. The ear consciousness is apprehending a particular sound called music, and in that case it hears the aspect of music, the aspect of the sound. That is called the aspect of the apprehended object. When we look at the consciousness that experiences that ear consciousness, it is what sees the apprehender itself. We have the self-aware direct valid cognition, the self-aware perception which apprehends the apprehender, which is the sensory perceptions. The sensory perceptions themselves are the apprehender. When it comes to the self-aware level , the self-aware direct valid cognition level, then the sensory perceptions become the apprehended object of self-aware direct valid cognition. Therefore, self-aware direct valid cognition is the apprehender which apprehends the apprehenders [laughter]. That's nice.

is experiencer [illegible]

The consciousness which experiences that ear consciousness sees the apprehender itself, and is called "That which has the aspect of apprehender." That is the technical way of saying it. We are going into a more subtle level of mind and its functions. First we see some consciousness as apprehender, like the sensory perceptions, the eye consciousness, ear consciousness, and so on. They are the apprehenders apprehending an object such as a form, sound, smell, and so on. When you reach the level of self-knower, then those consciousnesses, which are apprehenders, become the apprehended objects. So we are becoming more subtle, coming to a more subtle level of experience. That is the self-awareness in self-aware direct valid cognition. We call this self-aware direct valid cognition because it is non-conceptual, which is why it is direct; it is non-mistaken, which is why it is valid; and it is awareness, which is why it is cognition. For that reason, when you look at the self-aware direct valid cognition, this consciousness is present in almost every state of mind or consciousness.

It is important for us to know that this view which posits the existence of self-aware direct valid cognition is the view of the Sautrantika Cittamatra and Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika, a Madhyamika branch school. (Have you heard of this Sautrantika Svatantrika school before? We studied that in Boulder a little.) The idea of self-aware direct valid cognition appears in many Tantric literatures that talk about self-awareness and this kind of prime cognition. At the same time, the existence of the self-aware direct valid cognition is not accepted by the Vaibashika school of the Hinayana, the Madhyamika school in general (like the Prasangika Madhyamika school), and the other Svatantrika schools of Madhyamika. The problem they see is that it becomes an infinite continuum of self-aware cognition. Self-aware has to see the self-aware itself, and then it has to see itself, and itself and itself, and it never gets out of it. It goes on and on and on; it is an infinite stream. That is their refutation of self-aware direct valid cognition. At the same time they ask how it is that a thing can see itself. How can the eye see itself? There is no way the eye can see itself without looking outside somewhere, like in a mirror. The refutation also says that a very supple person, no matter how well developed or supple, can't ride himself and walk. They also say that no matter how sharp a knife is, it can't cut itself. It can cut others, but it cannot cut itself. Therefore, in their view it is difficult and almost impossible to posit the view that the mind can see itself. That is just a general overview of the other Buddhist tenets. The other three direct valid cognitions are accepted by all Buddhist schools, there is no dispute or argument, but self-aware direct valid cognition is not accepted by some.

Next there is a quote by Dignaga. The text says,

> "...it is stated in the 'Compendium of Valid Cognition'...desire and so on are self-awareness without concepts."

This means that such experiences as desire, anger, ignorance and so forth are simply the experience of mind, simply experienced by mind, and that experience is not dependent on any material faculties or any material existence. Therefore, they are self-awareness without any concept. They are experience within the realm of self-awareness. They are a self-experience, direct experience, or bare experience without conceptual clothing. Desire or anger is not the conceptual form of desire or anger, but the raw energy, so to speak, of the very naked form of these different states of mind. Whether it is an experience of naked desire, or naked anger, aggression, or naked ignorance, at this level of experience it is simply a non-conceptual and very direct experience. It is not something like an unconscious state. It is a very conscious state, vividly experienced, beyond concept, words and labels. It is getting pretty close to other topics we have studied [like suchness—ed.].

Next, Dharmakirti says, in his *Pramanavartika*,

> "The nature of happiness and so on does not depend upon something other;
> It has no power to assign a term.
> Therefore the self-awareness [experiencing] these
> is not connected to expressions."

Here, Dharmakirti is commenting on Dignaga. Dignaga says very briefly, "Desire and so on...," and then goes on to say that the nature of happiness does not depend upon something other. Here Dharmakirti says that experiences such as happiness are not expressible or imaginable in our conceptual imagination. The true experience of such happiness is something other than our conceptual labeling experience of that happiness. Therefore he says that since they are not expressible, and are not dependent on that conceptual realm of happiness, it is not possible to assign a term or label that can fully express those experiences. It is very simple. We don't have to go to the Madhyamika or Mahamudra sense of ultimate truth; here in the relative experience, in the conventional realm, things are beyond labels and concepts. Even at this very simple level of our relative world, the experience of, for example, a Snickers Bar [laughter] is inexpressible, totally awesome. If you really experience, for example, a Snickers Bar, and look at that experience, you can see clearly that it is not expressible. How would you express that experience? Totally awesome? That doesn't say it, that doesn't really describe the experience of a Snickers Bar. That is as close as we can get. It is actually beyond expressions. When you try to express such a thing you have to go around and around and around, and you have to say, "It's sweet, it tastes rich, creamy, chocolaty, and it has peanuts." We can say these words to express in different ways, but they do not really say anything. For example, if you are in a nomadic town in Tibet, and you want to tell them about the experience of a Snickers Bar, it will be very difficult to explain, it will be as profound as Madhyamika [laughter]. Therefore, the profundity of this non-conceptual experience of our mind starts at this very simple level. In the fundamental state of existence of a samsaric being is that experience which is not realized or recognized. That is what self-awareness is trying to talk about.

There is one more quote in this section on self-awareness. This is from the *Drop of Logic*, the shortest of the seven works by Dharmakirti. It says, "Mind and mental factors are all self-awareness." This means that every state of our mind is in the state of self awareness. Whether it is the state of the basic mind, or the secondary state, which are the mental factors or different aspects of movements, no matter what state we are in, it is observed or experienced by the self-awareness, self-aware wisdom.

Summary of the Three Modes of Arising of the First Three Direct Valid Cognitions and Concept

We have had the direct valid cognition of a sensory perception, the direct valid cognition of mind perception, and the direct valid cognition of self-awareness. The three modes of their arising are in the chart. There is a first moment of direct sensory perception, and then a second moment. The first moment generates the second moment. They arise together in the second stage and perceive the same object. Both of these states are experienced by self-awareness. You can see that the first two moments are outward directed perception, are directed towards the outside object, and the third one, the self-awareness, is more inward directed. It sees or experiences from the background, so to speak. That gives rise to the third, which is concept. Concept arises right after the direct mental or mind perception. These are the three stages, processes, or modes of arising.

You can clearly see that there is a gap between two moments of concepts. After having a concept you then go through the same perceptual process. After a moment of concept, then you have direct sense perception, mind perception and self-awareness, and then you get a concept again. That is why Milarepa sang his song that between the chain of thoughts, conceptual mind, there is a moment of non-conceptual wisdom. In a certain sense, at this level of logic, we might say that self-awareness here is sort of a moment of non-conceptual wisdom. Self-awareness and the experience of direct sensory perception and direct mind perception is a profound experience. And this is very difficult to experience anyway.

[illegible]
concept
[illegible]
chain
[illegible]
wisdom.

Yogic Direct Valid Cognition

ཉོད་ཧྲེ་འཛོར་མཉོག།

Yogic direct valid cognition arises at the end of the path of unification, which is the beginning of the path of seeing. The path of unification has four stages: heat, peak, patience and the highest meditation, which is usually translated as supreme. The last moment of highest meditation refers to the fourth stage of the path of unification. It is the highest level in the mundane or worldly meditation. This is like the borderline. When you reach the border and stand on the line that divides the two countries, you are almost on the other side, but not quite on the other side. That is the stage of highest meditation.

Both the self-aware direct valid cognition and the yogic direct valid cognition arise on the basis of their uncommon dominant condition, the mental sense faculty. These three seem to share the same common, dominant condition, the mental sense faculty. You will remember that the proceeding moment of sensory perception is the mental sense faculty. On the basis of that dominant condition, the self-aware valid cognition and the yogic direct valid cognition arise. This is not clearly stated here or clearly explained, but it is what some treatises, some logic texts say.

We have talked about three conditions in sensory perceptions: the dominant condition, the object condition, and the instantaneous or immediately preceding condition. When it comes to the mental direct valid cognition or the self-aware direct valid cognition, the dominant condition is the mental sense faculty. In the yogic direct valid cognition, the dominant condition is samadhi, which is basically the union of shamatha and vipashana. Without that samadhi we cannot have this direct valid cognition which is "a non-conceptual, non-mistaken awareness arisen from the last moment of highest meditation." You cannot have that valid cognition without samadhi preceding it, without having developed the qualities of samadhi. Samadhi refers to the union of shamatha and vipashyana meditation.

Q: Why is it called the dominant condition?
DPR: Dominant means that without that it cannot arise. For example, without the sense powers, without the sensory organs, you cannot have the consciousness of that. The dominant condition has more power than the immediately preceding condition. The immediately preceding condition in the case of mind perception [mental direct valid cognition—ed.] is the last moment of sensory perception. In the case of yogic direct valid cognition it could be the preceding moment of sensory perception or mental perception. In a way, the direct mental valid cognition, self-aware direct valid cognition and yogic direct valid cognition are all said to be the mental direct valid cognition. All three are mind, categorized as mental, and are not separate entities.

Q: Would samadhi have to be experienced by the mental sense faculty, or is it beyond all faculties?
DPR: Mental sense faculty.

Q: You said that, in the case of yogic direct valid cognition that samadhi would have to be experienced by the mental sense faculty. But then you said that yogic direct valid cognition has samadhi as its dominant condition. Doesn't samadhi have to be experienced by the mental sense faculty?
DPR: No. Do you know what the mental sense faculty is? Mental sense perception is the cessation of the sensory perceptions, which immediately precedes the mental direct valid cognition. It is just before the mental direct valid cognition arises. [see chart]

Q: Don't these mental events have to have some faculty to experience them, some organ?
DPR: The cessation of sensory perception is the organ. The chart shows that we have the first moment of direct sensory perception, then the second moment of direct sensory perception arising simultaneously with the mind perception. The first moment of direct sensory perception has already ceased at the time that mind perception arises. That cessation is called the mental sense faculty.

Q: Direct mind perception seems to come from this sixth consciousness. I think of this sixth consciousness as a kind of organ, like the sense perceptions. It is an organ that perceives mental events, rather than sensations.
DPR: Organ meaning the sensory organs?
Q: I think of it as being comparable to them. It is one of the consciousnesses, right?
DPR: That's right.

Q: I think that by analogy there would be some kind of organ associated with the sixth consciousness.

DPR: That's right. The organ of the sixth consciousness is the cessation of the five sensory perceptions.

Q: It doesn't seem like much of an organ. [laughter] It seems like an afterthought.

DPR: There is no solid organ because it is a mind. Because it is a mental organ, a sense faculty of the mind, it will not have physical solidity like the perceptions which rely on the solid organ of the physical body. Otherwise it would not be mental, it would be physical.

Q: How is samadhi experienced? Is it beyond all these moments of perception?

DPR: No, samadhi is experienced at this level of yogic direct valid cognition.

Q: Is it an experience of the sixth consciousness?

DPR: That's right. That is why I was saying all these three are, in a way, mental direct valid cognition. They are divided into three, but they are not like separate entities. They are not separate entities like the other-knower and self-knower. If you divide the other-knower and self-knower, as in the sensory perceptions and mental perception of awareness, then it is very different. The other-knower goes outside, the sensory perception perceives the outer object, whereas the mental self-awareness observes mind itself. There is a very different quality to it. These three stages are not that different. There is a slight difference between them but they are not really separate entities. You cannot say that this is absolutely mental direct valid cognition, this is absolutely self-aware and this is absolutely yogic, and they do not have any connection together–they do have connections.

Q: I thought that since yogic experience is a separate category, it would be different than any other kind of perception..

DPR: It is different. That is why we have a different definition here. What is your question?

Q: Is it the mental sense faculty that experiences samadhi?

DPR: To be more precise, it is the yogic valid cognition that perceives samadhi. If you want to make it very loosely defined, then maybe you can say it is the sixth consciousness, the mental direct valid cognition. As I said before, all these three are mental direct valid cognition. In that way you can say it is the mental direct valid cognition. But to be more precise, you have to say it is the yogic direct valid cognition.

Q: Does the fourth stage of the highest or supreme have a certain characteristic that distinguishes it from any other kind of meditative experience? It seems to be a unique experience.

DPR: The characteristics of the highest meditation are described as almost the experience of selflessness. You have the direct experience of the selflessness of phenomena and selflessness of persons at this level, but it is still not the full realization of selflessness. You are still standing on the borderline which you haven't crossed. It is the mundane meditation which is not yet the supreme meditation of the arhats or bodhisattva bhumis. You are still on the path of union, otherwise you would be on the path of seeing. This highest meditation is the realization which is very close to the full realization of selflessness. This is the direct valid cognition of the yogic state, the fourth valid cognition. In the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, by Dignaga, it says:

> "[Having meditated on] the teachings of the Guru of Yogis
> It sees the pure reality unmixed [with concepts]."

There is a slight problem with the translation. It should say, "The Yogis having meditated on the teachings of the guru, it sees the pure reality unmixed with concepts." "Guru" refers to the Buddha Shakyamuni in this particular text by Dignaga. He says that after the Shravakas and Pratyekabuddhas follow the teachings of the Buddha, and meditate on the four noble truths and the twelve nidanas ("meditated" refers to the four noble truths and twelve nidanas), what they see is the pure reality unmixed with concepts. "Seeing" refers to the direct seeing of selflessness, translated here as "pure." It can also be translated as "mere reality." "Reality" refers to the actual state of phenomena, whether it is the outer phenomena or inner phenomena of the five skandhas. In the view of the Shravakas, seeing reality has the meaning of directly seeing the *svalakshana* of the outer and inner realities. That reality, when seen at the level of *svalakshana*, is unmixed. It is expressed in particular, separate and individual identities. You see that individual nature which is an unmixed and non-conceptualized state. That is how Dignaga describes yogic valid cognition. It is actually the realization of seeing the selfless nature of persons and phenomena.

Then Dharmakirti explains Dignaga's code as:

> "Yogic consciousness, as explained before,
> Is arisen from meditation on the [aspects] of those [Four Noble Truths].
> The net of conceptuality fully eliminated
> [The true reality] appears very clearly."

He says, "Yogic consciousness, as explained before..." "Before" refers to the first chapter in the *Pramanavartika*. I think I told you that the Lorik comes from the second chapter. He is saying that it is also explained in the first chapter. He says that this yogic perception is arisen from meditation. This shows the dominant condition, the condition of meditation and meditating on the aspects of the four noble truths. "Aspects" refers to the sixteen different aspects of the four noble truths. Each noble truth is divided into four aspects. For example, the truth of suffering is divided into four aspects of impermanence, suffering, emptiness and selflessness. The other three are also divided in the same way.

Having seen the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths that particular perception is free from all aspects of conceptuality. The net of conceptuality is fully eliminated, and the true reality appears very clearly. "True reality" refers to the ultimate truth, which is the selfless nature, or the nature of the four noble truths or the twelve nidanas. "Appears very clearly" means realized clearly by this yogic valid cognition. That is what Dharmakirti says.

Although the divisions are not given here, we can divide yogic direct valid cognition from different angles. From the point of view of the basis of who possesses such yogic valid cognition, there are three divisions: the yogic direct valid cognition of Shravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas. According to the general presentation, Shravakas and Pratyekabuddhas realized the selflessness of persons and half of the selflessness of phenomena. Bodhisattvas who are on the bhumis realized the true selflessnesses of both phenomena and persons. That is the general view in Buddhism. Yogic direct valid cognition can also be divided according to nature or entity. This again is divided into three: the path of seeing, the path of meditation and the path of no more learning. Dividing it according to the viewpoint of aspects, there are the sixteen aspects as previously described. These sixteen aspects can be generalized into two: the subtle and gross aspects of yogic valid cognition. These are the different ways of dividing yogic direct valid cognition.

YDVC starts
@ path of
junction & goes
to
all the way
[illegible].

According to this definition, yogic direct valid cognition starts at the path of unification and goes all the way up to the path of no more learning. That is why it says that it is the highest; it arises as the last moment of the highest meditation. After that, whatever realization develops is part of this yogic direct valid cognition. It is not really isolated at just the path of unification; the path of unification is included in the definition because it is the starting point of attaining the yogic direct valid cognition. Until we reach that level we do not experience the yogic direct valid cognition. Whatever experiences we may have had on the path up to this point simply reflect the general aspect of this yogic direct valid cognition, experienced on the path of the ordinary level, the path of accumulations.

Until we reach this level of the path of unification which is the last moment of the highest meditation, the fourth stage of the path of unification which is the supreme dharma, we have not really experienced any level of yogic direct valid cognition. Whatever we experience before that on the path of accumulation, or the first three paths of junction, are called the experience of the general aspect of yogic valid cognition. What we have experienced before this is mixed with concepts; it is not the pure reality unmixed. This is very difficult to express in a subtle way because it is the experiential level of the meditation state. As soon as we see something there is always the label together with it. We almost see the label. When you see an object such as a flower, the label "flower" is already there. We cannot really separate the conceptual state, conceptual realm, from the non-conceptual state, the direct perceptual level. They are not easy to experience separately. We almost experience them at the same time, rather than going through the three stage process.

Many times we can not differentiate between "glass" and the object, the designated object of that label. We almost see them in the mixed form. In our meditation we also have the same experience with the labels. When you say "stillness, shamatha," being very calm and peaceful, that experience is already mixed with labels. It is very hard to experience them separately, unmixed. Maybe we have this experience unmixed on a subtle level, but we don't see it. Here it says that the yogis see the pure reality unmixed. Either we don't see it or we see it mixed with labels.

One of the important things not mentioned here is the dominant condition of the self-awareness and yogic direct valid cognition. Also, the divisions of yogic direct valid cognition are important.

Q1: Could you say something about the word "yogic." What does union refer to?
DPR: In Tibetan, yoga is *naljor*. *Nal* means namar, the genuine state. *Jor* means to arrive or join. Together *naljor* means arriving at the level of the genuine state of ultimate truth. Or it means joining with that state of ultimate reality, the *namar*. From that term itself it is very clear. It has to be something connected to meditative experiences, meditation practice. You can only reach that level through the path of meditation.
Q1: So, you arrive at the end of the path of unification and at that point you are joined with that state.
DPR: You arrive at direct valid cognition at the end of this path of junction. That doesn't mean you really arrive at the state of genuine reality, in general. You can arrive before in the paths of accumulation and junction, but you are not arriving in the same fashion and the same manner.
Q1: What is the difference?
DPR: The difference is direct valid cognition. Before, we arrive more conceptually with more of a mixture of concepts and experience. You can't get there without having a conceptual framework.
Q1: But before, you couldn't call it yogic direct.
DPR: You cannot call it yogic direct valid cognition. It can be yogic but not direct.
Q1: At this moment, when you arrive at the end of the path of unification, that is something that happens in one moment. At one moment in time you're there.
DPR: That's right.
Q1: After that moment, you are on the path of seeing.
DPR: Yes. It is a process to reach there, to go to beyond that borderline. Once you have reached that peak, which is the highest state of meditation, at that moment, you enter the path of seeing. Then you get this more direct or naked experience.

Q2: How do the three natures link up with this presentation?
DPR: Which one?
Q: The imaginary nature.
DPR: In relation to which?
Q: In relation to this mixing process you have talked about.
DPR: It is almost like the process of the relationship between the other-powered nature, the *paratantra* and the *parikalpita*. The *parikalpita* is the imputation that you give on the basis of *paratantra*, the basic stream of consciousness. You label and project on that something that is non-existent.
Q2: You distinguished the yogic direct valid cognition from the ordinary perception of phenomena. You said that whenever we perceive phenomena, they are usually mixed with concepts. In

shamatha where you have an experience of stillness and there's still a labeling process happening, is that *parikalpita*? My confusion is always about *paratantra*.
DPR: O.K. Let's start the exam. [laughter] What did Thrangu Rinpoche say?
Q2: He presented a Shentong model and a Yogacara model. In the Shentong model, he said the dependent nature is from the point of view of thoughts, which are dependent on not seeing the buddhanature. The truly existing nature would be the nature as it is. He said that he usually didn't present it that way; this is a special presentation from a Shentong point of view. In the Yogacara model, if I understood him, the *paratantra* was that if you tried to express the truly existing nature in words, you would express it with some kind of conceptual framework.
DPR: The projections and the projector consciousnesses are known as the other-powered nature, which arises from the alayavijnana. You have the seed planted in the alayavijanana, and from that seed the result has grown out. At the level of the fruition stage of those seeds, we have the world outside and the inner world of beings, projector and projected world. That experience of the whole is known as the other-powered nature, the basic experience of the whole thing. On top of that you project more labels, more superficial projections that say that that is object and this is subject. Then that goes to an even more gross level, where it says that object is blah, blah, blah. It becomes a very strong expression of *parikalpita*.
Q2: We always tried to quiz him about the difference between the *paratantra* and the *parinishpana*. Could you try that?
DPR: I thought you were taking the exam, not me. That is very tricky because it depends on how you want to present the *paratantra*. There are different ways of presenting *paratantra*. In the Cittamatra school, they divide the *paratantra* into two. There is the pure state of *paratantra* and the impure state of *paratantra*. And the pure state of *paratantra* is not separate or different from *parinishpana*. The impure state of *paratantra* is different from *parinishpana*. The whole process of duality would be the impure expression, the impure state of the *paratantra*.

Q3: Is DVC *paratantra*?
DPR: What is DVC?
Q3: Direct valid cognition.
DPR: Really? Or it can mean director of valid cognition. [R. laughs; laughter] Which are you talking about?
Q3: Are all four direct valid cognitions the pure aspect of *paratantra*?
DPR: In the Cittamatra view direct valid cognitions are *paratantra*. They are more on the level of *paratantra*, but obviously there is a strong link between them and conceptual mind. Concepts do not arise without direct valid cognition, direct perceptions. The concepts arise from that process. There is a strong link between these three in the process that we go through. Therefore, the whole sense of duality involved in the direct valid cognition can also be expressed in the *parikalpita* stage.

Q4: How does this yogic direct valid cognition work with these other cognitions? Would it work into this chart?
DPR: Mind perception is not really separate from the yogic direct valid cognition. All three valid cognitions are mental direct valid cognition, including self-awareness and yogic perceptions. In that case you can't say that it is connected to the second moment in this chart. At the same time, yogic direct valid cognition is very independent from this diagram. It is not dependent on a physical sensory perception or physical sense organs as a dominant condition. Therefore, it can arise independently from this process, whereas mind perception cannot arise independently because it needs the mental sense faculty which is connected to the sensory perceptions.
Q4: So this yogic direct valid cognition could function with sense perceptions or without.
DPR: That's right. That is why, in higher states of realization, we talk about the subtle sense organs that are not physical sense faculties. In the stage of non-remainder arhats, they don't have a physical body or existence, but they rest in this great samadhi. There is a mental faculty.
Q4: Is the object of yogic direct valid cognition, when it is not the sensory object, the mind? Is it any different than the self-aware?

DPR: That's a very good question. There is a lot of debate on that, because from the more technical Buddhist presentation of logic, the yogic direct valid cognition is connected to mental direct valid cognition. That mental direct valid cognition is connected to sense direct valid cognition. Therefore, the argument or debate is whether or not the Buddhas see the object with their sensory perceptions. If they see the object with sensory perceptions, it would be difficult to say they have the all-knowing, omniscient perception or mind. The all-knowing, omniscient wisdom is happening in the mind perception. We talked about clairvoyance being part of the mental direct valid cognition. Therefore, if it's happening at the mental level, and if Buddhas have to see the object with the sensory perceptions, then that means it will be difficult to say that they have all-knowing omniscience or wisdom.

There is a lot of debate on the object of yogic direct valid cognition. Whatever the argument is, it seems to mean object of this yogic direct valid cognition is actually the mind, some kind of mental state, which is the samadhi. Different states of samadhi become the object. At the same time, it is not object because at that level it's going beyond duality. The subject/object orientation is only valid before the last moment of highest meditation. Once you go beyond that, you go beyond the duality. Once you go beyond duality it's beyond a subject and object distinction. When you rest in that state of samadhi there's no sense of separation between the meditator and meditated object, such as selflessness. When there is no self, what is the selflessness? How can you differentiate between the meditator and the meditated object at that level? All they are experiencing is selflessness.

Q5: Since the dominant condition of yogic direct valid cognition is samadhi, on the fourth stage of the path of union, or when you cross over into the path of seeing, is that samadhi continuous 24 hours a day in all activities?
DPR: Are you asking about the path of seeing?
Q5: If it is at this point of going from the path of union to the path of seeing, does that change from being part-time to being full-time?
DPR: Part-time yogi to full-time yogi, that's good. No, it is not continuous like that. It's something they experience in the meditative state, but not in the post-meditation state at this level. And that goes on until the...is it the eighth bhumi? Then you can get more of a sense of a continuous experience in every level of being. I think that it doesn't really happen until the tenth bhumi because the main quality of the Buddha, that differentiates from the bodhisattvas, is this continuity. For Buddha there's no separation between the meditative state and non-meditative state. For Buddha it's always one. So as long as you're not Buddha, there is this slight separation between the two states. So that's why it is described that when you reach the level of the tenth bhumi, your qualities are almost inseparable from the qualities of the Buddha. The tenth bhumi bodhisattva is not really different from Buddha. It's almost the same. Therefore, I think this continuous sense of realization, experience of every state of being, doesn't really happen until the tenth bhumi bodhisattva level.

SEEMING DIRECT COGNITION

We have completed the first section of the Lorik, which is the direct valid cognition. Now we'll look at the second part of that, which is the opposite. Seeming direct cognition is actually the opposite of direct valid cognition in general, and in particular, has four classifications.

The definition for the opposite of direct valid cognition is: "A mind that is not non-conceptual and/or not non-mistaken." That's pretty straightforward. The opposite of direct valid cognition, or the definition of seeming direct cognition, is a state of mind that is neither nonconceptual nor non-mistaken, or both [i.e. not non-conceptual and not non-mistaken—ed.], which means conceptual and mistaken; or it is either conceptual or mistaken consciousness.

In the original Tibetan text we had some debates about this definition, and so it needed some modification which Rinpoche wanted to do. I think they've done it here. This particular thing, which is called seeming direct cognition, is a state of mind that appears like a direct perception, or that is experienced by people as a direct cognition, direct sensory perception, direct mental perception, or as the other aspects of direct valid cognition. But it's not really direct cognition–it's mistaken cognition.

The first part of the definition is not being non-conceptual. That is very clear because in order to be a direct perception, it has to have the first part of its definition or characteristic, which is non-conceptual. As long as it's not non-conceptual, it's very clear that this is not direct perception or cognition. In the second part of the definition, in order to be a direct valid cognition, it has to be unmistaken. Since it is not non-mistaken, it is not valid. Therefore, with these two definitions, you can see it's neither direct nor unmistaken. Therefore it does not qualify to be a direct valid cognition. It is the opposite of that direct valid cognition, which is called seeming direct valid cognition. It will become clear, if you look at the divisions, how it appears to be direct cognition.

This seeming direct cognition is divided into two different styles or methods by Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Dignaga first divided this into seven. The first one is called the *Seven-fold Division* according to the *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, the *Pramanasamucchaya*, by Dignaga. The second one is the *Summary into Four* according to the *Commentary on Valid Cognition*, by Dharmakirti. Dharmakirti's *Pramanavarttika* puts these seven categories into four basic divisions.

Seven Categories of Seeming Direct Cognition according to Dignaga

The *Compendium of Valid Cognition*, the *Pramanasamucchaya*, says: "Mistaken and conventional consciousness, inference, that which has arisen from inference, recollection and what is known as actual wish, as well as cataract, are seeming direct cognition." There are these seven divisions from the root verses: mistaken, conventional consciousness, inference, arisen from inference, recollection, actual wish, and cataract. Rinpoche gives a little commentary here. It says: "Accordingly, seven types have been taught; mistaken consciousness..."

The first one is called mistaken consciousness, or mistaken conception. For example, there is the perception of seeing a mirage, a magical illusion, or something like that. Something appears to be water, an elephant, or something, but actually there's nothing. It's a mistaken consciousness. So that is the first category, the mistaken consciousness, which is actually mixed with concept; we're mixing the perception and concept.

The second one is called conventional consciousness, whatever that means. Direct valid cognition can be conventional consciousness, right? Why? Do you remember the ultimate and relative truth in this particular school of Sautrantika Chittamatra? The conventional refers to the relative consciousness which is the conceptual mind that conceives the isolates. Do you remember the isolates we talked about? Wrong conceptual consciousness is the thought concept that conceives the isolates of conventional phenomena. Conventional consciousness is wrong in the sense that it's not ultimate; it's not working with the basic *svalakshana* level. At this point, when we look at the different aspects, we should think about the Sautrantika Chittamatra tenets or view. If you say conventional in Madhyamika, it includes everything. It includes direct valid cognition, all aspects of mind and mental factors and relative phenomena. Therefore we cannot bring in that view here at the level of Sautrantika Chittamatra. We must remember that when we talk about conventional consciousness, we're talking from the point of view of the Sautrantika Chittamatra school.

The third one is inference. This particular category is actually the concept that conceives or apprehends the signs or reasons. It is mind that apprehends the reason in inference, in syllogisms. When you put forth syllogisms, you have to put forth a reason. For example, mind is impermanent because it is composite, or something like that. The thought that conceives the reason, or the thought that conceives the sign, is what we call inference.

The fourth one is called that which is arisen from inference, which is the consciousness. It says, "consciousness having the reason." Does that make sense in English? This is a very technical term in Buddhist logic, which refers to the mind or concept that conceives what is to be proved altogether (*drup ja*). For example, 'sound is impermanent.' Sound is impermanent is what is to be proved, right? So that whole concept (that whole thought) of seeing that which is to be proved (or that which has been proven) by reason, by inference, is what we call the mind that has arisen from inference. At the first stage of inference, you just have these three modes of reasoning. For example, you might have a sound, impermanence, and the reason. Then you have to apply these three together in order to get the full image, the full understanding. When you come to the full understanding, that is the result of the inference, the result of your process of syllogism. That mind which understands or conceives the whole theory, so to speak, is what we call 'that which has arisen from inference.'

Question: I don't really see the difference between inference, and that which arises from inference.
DPR: The difference is that the third refers to the mind or concept that conceives the sign or reason. First you have to understand the reason. In the example, 'Sound is impermanent because it is produced,' first you have to understand the meaning of produced, right? You have to have some sense of ascertainment of what that really means. That ascertainment is an isolated thought. You're not looking at the whole image, you're just looking at the isolated image of the sign or reason. The fourth one is the outcome of the logic of the whole syllogism. Then you say, "Oh, the sound is impermanent." That is the whole concept.
Question: So is the fourth one understanding all three parts of the syllogism and how they fit?
DPR: No. It's mainly the concept which understands what is to be proven, which is the probandum (*drup cha*).

The fifth one is called recollection. Recollection is basically memory, which is the concepts or thoughts about remembering something that happened in the past, the memories of the past.

The sixth one is called the actual wish, which is wishing in the present for something in the future. The actual wish is something that you're wishing for in the future in the present. You're engaged in active thoughts that are connected with the future, whereas in the fifth category you're engaged in active thoughts that are connected with the past. So all of the first six categories of seeming direct cognition are conceptual; therefore, they're not direct perception. They're all conceptual mind. They're not necessarily not nonmistaken.

Question: Are they valid?

DPR: Some of them are valid, for example, the third and fourth, "inference" and "that which has arisen from inference," are valid. They're sort of true understanding. But they're not direct.
Question: Would they all be correct conceptualizations?
DPR: That's right. It will come later when we talk about inferential valid cognition. They're not valid cognition in the sense that they're not direct valid cognition. All these six divisions are not nonconceptual, but they're not necessarily not nonmistaken. Some of them are mistaken. For example, numbers one and two are mistaken in the sense that we get mixed up with direct valid cognition, with sensory direct perception. The labeling process comes so fast and is such a mechanical process that as soon as we see an object outside, it's almost the same as seeing a label, right? We cannot differentiate between the isolates and the actual object, the substantial object outside.

Reason for no. 1 & 2 = being seeming d.c.

The seventh category is nonconceptual but mistaken. This is called nonconceptual wrong consciousness arisen from an impaired basis. It is caused by some defect in the sense organs, such as, for example, a cataract.

So these are the seven divisions given by Dignaga in his *Pramanasamucchaya*.

Four Categories of Seeming Direct Cognition According to Dharmakirti

The seven divisions of Dignaga are summarized into four categories by Dharmakirti in his *Pramanavarttika*, where it says:

> "The four aspects of seeming direct cognition are the three aspects of conceptual consciousness and one aspect without concept arisen from an impaired basis."

He divides this into four. The first three are conceptual, and the last one is nonconceptual but not nonmistaken. The first three are not nonconceptual. In Rinpoche's commentary, it says,

> "Accordingly, this seven-fold division has been summarized into four [types]. Conceptuality based on terms; conceptuality which superimposes [something] onto another object, and conceptuality which has a hidden object, and nonconceptual seeming direct cognition arisen from an impaired basis."

Napper translated this as:

> "Conceptions having term as their basis; conceptions making superimpositions on other objects; conceptions having a hidden object, nonconceptual facsimiles of direct perception."

So we have a fax this morning [laughter] from Napper. Facsimile.

The first one is the conceptuality based on terms. According to the commentary by the seventh Karmapa, this is the conventional consciousness, the second one in Dignaga's division. So the conventional consciousness is a conceptuality based on terms, which are isolates. The terms, names, or labels are the isolates. This conception, or the mind which perceives that isolate, is the concept [i.e. conceptuality—ed.].

The second one is called the conceptuality which superimposes something onto another object. That is the first one in Dignaga's seven divisions, which is mistaken consciousness, according to the seventh Karmapa's commentary. You see an object onto which you superimpose something which is not there, like water. You see some object outside, like a mirage, and then you impose some conceptual labeling on that, saying, "Oh, that's water outside, that's water."

The third category is the conceptuality which has a hidden object. It includes the third and fourth divisions or categories of Dignaga, which are inference and that which has arisen from inference. You can't see the object directly, you can't see the probandum directly. You always have to infer; you always have to understand it through conception, conceptual inference: for example, if you say, "There's a fire." The famous example is: "There must be a fire on the other side of the mountain because we see smoke." So in that case the probandum is: "There's a fire on the other side of the pass or the mountain." When you say that, you can't see it directly. The probandum is a hidden object. You can have a conceptual understanding. But all you can see directly is the sign, the reason, which is 'smoke'. That's why they're called 'having hidden objects' because the object is something that you have to infer and get through conceptual understanding. You can't get it directly.

The fourth one is easy, right? It's simple, the cataract stuff.

Summary of the Categories of Seeming Direct Cognition

When we summarize these seven categories given by Dignaga into the four categories by Dharmakirti, the first one is the second one of Dharmakirti, and the second one is the first one of Dharmakirti. The third category of Dharmakirti includes the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth of Dignaga, all four in one. Finally, Dignaga's fourth one is the seventh of Dharmakirti. I think all of these are said to have hidden objects because you can't see them directly. You have to see them through memory, some kind of desire, a wish in the future, or through conceptual reasonings.

So now do you know the reason why they're called seeming direct cognition? It is because they're the opposite of direct valid cognition, and they don't have the quality of being non-conceptual non-mistaken awareness.

Question 1: In number seven of Dignaga's categories we talked about cataract, and before we said that was a mistake in the basis. But I don't know exactly where the mistake arising from the object, arising from the abode, and arising from the immediately preceding moment would fit into these categories. Would they as well fit into the seventh category?
DPR: Which one? Do you mean all of them?
Q 1: Yes, all three of those. All the types of mistakes.
DPR: They're not types of mistakes; they're causes.
Q 1: The causes for the mistakes.
DPR: Usually they're taught in connection to the seventh.

Q 2: I was wondering why seeming direct valid cognition is included under the category of valid cognition. Direct valid cognition is new and undeceiving and clarifies that which was previously unknown. Well, it doesn't seem like any of these fall into that category.
DPR: These, the opposites?
Q 2: Yes.
DPR: It's not really categorized in direct valid cognition, so to speak. It's just showing you the opposite of that, right after you finish that. Right after we finish the presentation of the direct valid cognition and its divisions, then it shows the opposite of that. But it's not really a subcategory or division of that.
Q 2: For recollection, for memory, how is the memory of something that happened in the past, different than, say, a learning kind of memory, like tying your shoes? It seems like the first kind of memory is different from the second kind of memory.
DPR: I think in a basic sense there's no difference, in general. But obviously there's different levels of imprints you make in your mind that repeats often or less. So depending on how much imprint we make in our stream of consciousness, whether it's the sixth consciousness or the eighth consciousness, no matter what, that kind of imprint repeats in our present consciousness. When

that repeats in the present consciousness, then that's part of the memory. So that imprint is connected with the Buddhist notion of tendencies, habitual tendencies because the memory is connected to habitual tendency. So we try to make positive imprints so that we can have positive tendencies to react.

Q 2: Is this learning that we're going through now part of this seeming direct valid cognition?

DPR: The memories?

Q 2: Yes.

DPR: Yes. Direct valid cognition is very specifically characterized. And so it's very definite. It's like your eye-consciousness or the mind-consciousness. They carry this definition of being new, undeceiving, non-conceptual awareness. It's very direct. So right now when you listen to the sound, when you hear the sound, when you see the letters here, these are direct perceptions that we're going through each moment.

Q 3: Rinpoche, in the discussion group yesterday there was a lot of uncertainty about the mental direct valid cognition and the *svalakshana* and...

DPR: Say it again.

Q 3: The *sva-lak-sha-na*.

DPR: That's right. [laughter] Making stronger imprints. That's all. [laughter]

Q 3: Absolutely. In fact, it was to such a degree that we couldn't even reach a consensus on how to formulate a question. So I would like to ask for some clarification on the mental direct valid cognition. First of all, I'd like to understand why they even posit such a thing. What function does it serve, in the sense that you have the self-aware direct valid cognition present. Why do you need this mental direct valid cognition? Why even posit it?

DPR: The problem is not really experiencing the mental direct valid cognition, but conceptualizing that moment of mental direct valid cognition and isolating that moment and blowing it up, like we always do in our life. Here we're reaching a point where we really have no capacity to do that. Therefore, we're having a hard time even thinking about it or understanding it conceptually. For that reason I don't know whether there's any quick method for us to capture this moment of mental direct valid cognition and see the function of it in the whole process of perception and the concept. Just follow the definitions and work with the conceptual understanding of the definition, of the technicality of how it's arising and what it's perceiving. That has been taught in the sutras and treatises, like here. Therefore, it is said in many commentaries that this moment of mental direct valid cognition and the self-aware direct valid cognition are only perceived clearly, only seen clearly, when you reach certain realization on the path. This is because they're so subtle that we can't really perceive them. It's almost like not seeing the nature of impermanence, or something like that. Even though in every moment we're going through impermanent nature. There's no doubt about it. [R. laughs] At the same time, we can't perceive it directly. We can have some conceptual understanding, but we're not really seeing anything of the details of impermanence.

Q 3: If I could ask for a little further clarification on another aspect of this. In the definitions, mental direct valid cognizers have as their object of apprehension a sensible object, like a form, sound, smell, taste, or touchable object. An object of apprehension cannot be a mental object. I thought you said that the self-aware direct valid cognizers and the yogic direct valid cognizers could also be considered mental direct valid cognizers. If that's what you said, then I don't see how those valid cognizers, the self-aware in all cases and the yogic direct, are taking sensible objects as their objects. They seem to be taking mind as their object, whereas this one only takes sensible objects as its object.

DPR: When you look at these consciousnesses in general, the mental direct valid cognition is more like the basic state of the mind, right? It's more like the sixth consciousness. If you look at the eight consciousnesses theory, it's like all five consciousnesses are sensory perceptions, and the sixth one is the mind consciousness. In that sense, that theory, if you ask where the yogic direct valid cognition and self-aware direct valid cognition fit, then they should be included in the mental direct valid cognition because that is more like the sixth consciousness, the mind consciousness. The self-aware and the yogic cannot be said to be the five perceptions. You can't say they are klesha mind.

or the eighth consciousness, the alayavijnana. You can say they are the mind consciousness, the sixth consciousness. That's why I'm saying, on the one hand, all of these three are mental direct valid cognition.

Q 3: Couldn't we say that the sixth consciousness includes more than the mental direct valid cognition? That's just part of the sixth consciousness. To avoid this confusion, couldn't we just simply say that the yogic direct and the self-aware direct valid cognitions have their own place within the sixth consciousness without having to say that they are the direct mental valid cognition? In other words, including them within the sixth consciousness, but not necessarily including them within the mental direct valid cognition.

DPR: Sure, you can say that. There's no problem with that.

Q 3: Since this text is based on the systems of the Sautrantika and the Chittamatra, it sometimes becomes confusing...

DPR: Sautrantika and what?

Q 3: Is it Chittamatra or Yogachara?

DPR: That's right, yes.

Q 3: It sometimes becomes confusing when we talk about the sixth consciousness. If we're talking about the sixth consciousness from the Chittamatra or Sautrantika view, if I understand it correctly, the Sautrantika view of the sixth consciousness includes the seventh and the eighth, though they don't posit those; they might not think of them in those terms. If it could just be made clear when we use this term, which system we're talking about, then it might be a little bit easier in the discussion group to talk about which sixth consciousness this is and what's going on there.

DPR: You can base all discussions on the Chittamatra view in this case.

Q 3: Oh, I see. OK.

DPR: It's more like Sautrantika, you know, included in Chittamatra, or something like that.

Q 4: When you talk about the definition of a seeming direct cognition, the definition is 'a mind that is not non-conceptual and/or not non-mistaken'. We've been talking all along about awareness. I looked at the definitions and I'm trying to figure out why it's mind here instead of awareness. Is it because it's a seeming cognition and not a cognition? I don't see why it says 'mind' rather than awareness in this definition.

DPR: Why it says "mind". It's the same.

Q 4: All of them said an "awareness" and this one says "mind," and so I thought there was a difference in...

DPR: It's the same thing. At the beginning we had these three: mind, consciousness and awareness. We said they're all synonyms, *tön chig*. So it's the same; it doesn't matter.

Q 5: Is the difference between mental direct valid cognition and self-aware and yogic direct valid cognition that the mental direct valid cognition is directed outward, taking some external object, whereas self-aware and yogic direct valid cognitions are directed inward, having internal mind as an object?

DPR: [laughs] Yes, self-aware is inward, you know. And the yogic can be both, I think. You can see the true nature of phenomena which is outside and you can see the true nature of self which is inside. But if you just maintain very strong Chittamatra view, then maybe it's just inside, everything is inside and there is nothing outward. You become a fundamentalist, Chittamatra fundamentalist [laughter].

Q 5: Regarding number three in Dignaga's list, you said the inference, which sees the reason or the sign, fits in with the hidden object. You used the metaphor, "There's fire on the other side of the mountain because you see the smoke, you see the sign." So why is that hidden?

DPR: On the one hand, all the objects of concepts are hidden, in the most fundamental sense, because you're not seeing any object directly. You're just seeing an isolate of the object which is hidden behind all the isolate labels.

Q 6: Part of the mental direct valid cognition that I just don't get centers around the mental sense faculty. It seems pretty straightforward to look at, say, a visual perception and say there's visual consciousness, the gate which is the eye or the organ, and then the visual object. My understanding of MDVC is that there's mental consciousness...
DPR: Is that a doctor? [laughter] Is that a general physician, or what? Or a psychiatrist?
Q 6: Probably a psychiatrist . [R. laughs] With the mental direct valid cognition, there's mental consciousness, the mental sense faculty which is the gate or the medium, so to speak, and again the visual object. Is the mental sense faculty nothing more than the cessation of the previous moment of the sense perception? Is it merely just the cessation?
DPR: No. Cessation causes it to arise, right? That's why it's called the dominant condition. Without that dominant condition it cannot arise. And so, on the basis of that dominant condition, then you get the mental direct valid cognition.
Q 6: So what's the bridge from the mental sense faculty to the visual object? In other words, eye consciousness sees through the eye. But I don't see how the mental sense faculty "sees".
DPR: There're a lot of things you don't see. [laughter]
Q 6: That's true.
DPR: No. It arises simultaneously with the second moment of sensory perception, right?
Q 6: So it's seeing the same thing as the eye...
DPR: Yes. It arises at the same time and it has some sense of connection or reliance on that to perceive.
Q 6: So is it like a mental image?
DPR: No, because when you say mental image, it's more like an isolate. It's an aspect, you may say, of a form.
Q 6: It just has this additional thing that's happening. There's the sense perception and then the mental faculty is also picking up and expanding on that.
DPR: Yes, I think it is the recording process. From the sensory perception to your mind perception there has to be a bridge, otherwise sensory perception would just be sensory perception and mind would be just mind, and what would be the bridge between the two? There has to be something, and I think that mental direct valid cognition is the bridge that brings the sensory direct perception with the mental direct perception to the conceptual level to the imprint level. So it is making this gradual process, this gradual development. It makes a link from a very solid outside object to a very inner sense of perception, inner sense of perceived.
Q 6: To have mental direct valid cognition seems to be intrinsic to what makes human perception human perception. It seems like if you had sense perception alone, then you could have something like computers where robots with cameras pick up visual objects and can get around. But there's a huge difference between that kind of machine or system and the kind of system that we are.
DPR: Oh, that's very likely.[laughter]
Q 6: Do you think that has any truth to it?
DPR: Not too many. [laughter] No, I'm just kidding. Yes, in a way there's some connection to that. That's why I'm saying it's making the bridge; bringing more connection between the two. It's two very different worlds. If you just look at the perceptual level, it's just very outwardly directed, and in seeing the outer objects it's a very mechanical process. There's no sense of being in the mind realm. So the mental direct valid cognition is like the bridge that takes the perceptual level into mental phenomena, which gets more into the isolate forms, the mental images. Then you have the conceptual world and then there's a stronger imprint you're making each time. Does that make sense?
Q 6: Yes. Thank you.

Q 7: What is the *svalakshana* of the mental direct valid cognition as opposed to the sense direct valid cognition?
DPR: According to this view of the logic, there's not much difference in their object: They're both outwardly directed. They're both seeing the outer objects on a different level. Therefore, first you see the same glass perceived by the sensory perception, then secondly, by the perception with the

mind perception. So each level has its own characteristic to recognize, to be perceived. Its own characteristic on each level or in each moment is its own *svalakshana* of the object.
Q 7: On the mental level, isn't that the beginning and arising of a label?
DPR: Not at this level of mental direct valid cognition. After this, then we get concept,which is after the mental direct valid cognition. We can't differentiate the two because the sensory perception is a little easier to think about. It's a little farther away from the concept. So this is right on the border; it's almost like the borderline. So when you're standing on that borderline, you don't see the line
Q 7: In the second moment, are there three distinct *svalakshanas*; one being the mental direct valid cognition, one being the sense direct valid cognition, and the other being the self-awareness direct valid cognition?
DPR: Yes.
Q 7: So there's three distinct...they're not the same.
DPR: That's right.
Q 7: How does the mental direct valid cognition arise with its own *svalakshana* of an external object since it has no sight capacity, no sense capacity?
DPR: It arises simultaneously with the second moment of the sensory perception. That's why we're showing in the chart that there's a strong reliance or connection between the two. They arise together; they can't separate, in a way. At the same time, when they perceive the object, it has to be independent.
Q 7: Would it be similar to when you move a wire through a magnetic field, you induce a current in the wire.
DPR: I don't know that example, I'm sorry.
Q 7: It's an electric motor. You create an electric field and then turn the wire through that field and it induces a current, or an alternator actually.
DPR: Maybe.
Q 7: And it induces current in that wire.
DPR: Maybe.
Q 7: It arises parallel at the same time without direct contact and is a distinct separate event, although occurring at the same time...
DPR: Sounds similar. Yes. What time is lunch?

Q 8: I don't understand why a cataract is non-conceptual.
DPR: The first moment it appears to your eye consciousness you just perceive.
Q 8: Doesn't that apply to every object?
DPR: Every object?
Q 8: That it's non-conceptual when it arises for the first time?
DPR: Yes, to the sensory perception. You're right.
Q 8: So what makes a cataract different from any object?
DPR: Because the other object has a basis to arise. Some sense of relative basis or existence to arise, whereas a cataract arises from the defect of the sensory organs. It doesn't arise from its existence outside, but it arises from the sensory defect. For example, if you squeeze your eyeballs you see two objects, like double moons. When you see that, there are no double moons outside; it arises from the basis of the sense organ being affected by some condition. [R. laughs]
Q 8: What is the sense organ? Is it the subtle organ or the ...
DPR: Cause organ.
Q 8: Is it the cause organ because in the second case it wouldn't make a difference to an object? Would it be the same thing, like an outer object? So the cataract would have a base, like being something on the lens. I don't know what a cataract is. [laughter]
DPR: [laughs] Oh, I see, no wonder [laughter]. No, actually in this case we're talking mainly about both coarse and subtle sense organs. It's not separated.
Q 8: So my cataracts would also be a dimension of the subtle organ.
DPR: Yes.
Q 8: And I have a tinnitus, which is a sound going on all the time. Would that be the same thing?

DPR: Yes. In Tibetan medicine, the sound comes from the wind disease. When the prana is not working properly, then you get this sound. So it's a physical thing, caused by a physical disease, a psychosomatic disease.
Q 8: At the same time it would be a damage of the subtle organ.
DPR: Yes. [laughs] That's good.

Q 9: You said previously the Sautrantika point of view is very similar to Shentong point of view.
DPR: Sautrantika is similar to Shentong?
Q 9: Yes, you said this.
DPR: I said that? [laughter] OK.
Q 9: So I was wondering about that. [laughter]
DPR: I said that?
Q 9: Yep. Am I the only one who remembers this? [laughter]
Scott W.: In certain respects.
Q 9: Yes, obviously if you look at their tenets, there are a lot of differences. Obviously, Sautrantikas talk about an external object. There seem to be also two Shentong schools; one I think going back to Longchenpa, and the other is more the one which Thrangu Rinpoche presents where there is no external object . A few people were also wondering what your point of view is. Do you, for example, think that from a Shentong point of view that there are external objects or not?
DPR: The seventh Karmapa makes the connection between this view of the logic and the Shentong view. In a basic sense, the view of Dharmakirti or Dignaga's presentation of logic is the Sautrantika Chittamatra view. The seventh Karmapa brings that all the way up to Shentong. He says that this view of the logic in the ultimate sense can be the Shentong view rather than just being Sautrantika or Chittamatra.
Q 9: Which aspects of this view would be similar to Shentong?
DPR: Basically the view of the two truths, presented in this whole treatise, like *Pramanavarttika* or *Pramanasamucchaya.*
Q 9: Could you elaborate on what that means? [R. laughs]
DPR: No, in the Shentong view, as you said before, there's Longchenpa's view on Shentong and Thrangu Rinpoche's view. I really don't know Longchenpa's and Thrangu Rinpoche's views on Shentong. Basically there's a Shentong presentation in the different schools, right? They interpret a little differently. If you become a Shentong fundamentalist, then your view will not be very different from the Chittamatra view. In their case, you would say there is no outer object, and everything is an illusion and a reflection of your mind. Then, if you talk about the three natures, there will be no basis of the outer imputation. There will be no outer basis for *parikalpita;* it will all be just a reflection of your mind. But in a more moderate Shentong view, so to speak, in the Tibetan interpretation, then it's said that there is an outer. When we say that everything is mind only, it doesn't mean there's no outer object. This means that there is no outer creator. It means that the whole creation of the outer world, or the inner world, is the creation of your karmic mind, your karmic action. You're involved in the past and in the present and then you're creating this whole world. Therefore, it is said, "Everything is a creation of your mind." This doesn't mean that there's no outer universe; it doesn't mean that everything is just mind flavor, mind quality. It doesn't mean this glass is mind, and it doesn't mean that you are my mind. Does that help?
Q 9: No. It's clear that from a Yogachara point of view that phenomenon, like solidity, is just an experience of mind. I think there are two positions; either there's something like mind...
DPR: You said in Sautrantika view?
Q 9: No, in the Yogachara view. I think there are two positions. There's only mind, or there's mind and matter. Longchenpa seems to present the view that it's not only mind itself, but there are external objects or matter. It's not clear, for example, how they would justify that view. Thrangu Rinpoche said, "Well, the main point is you really need to understand that everything... the power, basically, of practice comes from understanding that things are appearing as mind right now." He didn't go into presenting, for example, Longchenpa's view. He basically said, "The main point is you have to understand that everything appears as mind right now." I'm wondering whether

Longchenpa, for example, argues that there are certain causes. Why do we assume external objects? Because there are certain phenomena which cannot be influenced by our mind. I think that's how the logic goes. You have to assume external phenomena because if you just said that they are all your mind, you should have certain power over them. But reality shows you don't have power over most of the phenomena.
DPR: What reality shows you?
Q 9: Your perception.
DPR: It's your reality.
Q 9: Sure. But... [R. laughs] How I understand the Sautrantika point of view, that they say that you have to assume that there's something like an external phenomenon because no phenomenon arises without cause. So it's a question of finding out. If you perceive an object, what is the cause of its appearance? Then you can say it's your own mind, or it's something external. However, with most experiences, we don't have any power over them. Even if you would try real hard, most of our experience would say that phenomena nevertheless don't function in accordance with our own mind. So you must assume the existence of external phenomena. That's how I understand the reasoning of it.
DPR: What's your question? [laughter]
Q 9: The question, within the Shentong point of view...
DPR: If what?
Q 9: Within the Shentong point of view of Longchenpa, is there a similar position where he assumes there is actually matter independent of mind to that of the Sautrantika point of view?
DPR: Independent from mind, right?
Q 9: Let's say matter which is not mind, which is not a projection of mind.
DPR: Yes.
Q 9: So how does he justify this? Is it the same as Sautrantika reasoning?
DPR: It is similar but not the same.
Q 9: What is the difference?
DPR: What we're saying is like what we discussed before. Everything is a creation of your mind. That's why it's called mind-only. When we say it's a creation of your mind, as we did in the *Dharmadharmatavibhanga*, there are two causes: individual karma and group karma. So everything is a creation of these two karmas. When it's individual and group karma, it's the action of someone, the action of a being that creates the whole universe. Buddha said it's mind-only. This means that it's a creation of the mind only of sentient beings, which doesn't mean everything is only your mind creation, right?
Q 9: Yes.
DPR: So from there you can see there are certain creations that are not just your mind's creation.
Q 9: I don't have a problem with that one.
DPR: Then what's the problem?
Q 9: The problem is whether there are, nevertheless, in spite of the fact that from the Yogachara point of view, all phenomena are creation...
DPR: Now are you saying the Yogachara view or the Shentong view? Which view? We started with Shentong, right?
Q 9: O.K.
DPR: From the Shentong view, there's an interpretation like Longchenpa or like Lama Mipham, maybe, where they would say there's an external object out there that is not your mind's projection only. For example, we're sitting here right now in this room, and there's the Abbey out there. Even if we're not there, the Abbey's still there and it is separate from our projection, our mind.
Q 9: From our own personal ones, but it would be due to the projection of other sentient beings.
DPR: Even if there are no sentient beings, there will be this building here.
Q 9: Well, then that is saying that there is matter.
DPR: What we're saying is it's a creation of a group karma. When the group karma comes together then we have this creation. The St. Lawrence Gulf or Gampo Lhatse mountain.
Q 9: But that would all have as its cause mind.

DPR: The cause is karma.
Q 9: Which is mind, isn't it?
DPR: Which is action.
Q 9: Which is mind.
DPR: Which is the action of body, speech and mind together.
Q 9: So there's no matter in there. There's no matter which is independent of that which is not mind.
DPR: No. There is a matter which is independent of your mind. That's the example I'm giving. There's Gampo Lhatse when you're still not there. When we're not there to project, there is still Lhatse there, Gampo Lhatse mountain.
Q 9: If I understood.Thrangu Rinpoche, he was saying "No, there's no matter."
DPR: I will tell you what that view means. That view is saying everything is illusion; your mind's illusion. As long as we're in relative samsara, then he's saying that every experience of samsara is an illusion of your mind. Every aspect of what you perceive is your own mind's projection. For example, the way you perceive this glass is your individual perception. It's more Sangpo's perception than mine. The way I perceive this glass is very much my own way of perceiving it, and this is not experienced by any of you. It's very much into my mind. It's my projection, the way I perceive this. That doesn't mean the glass doesn't exist outside. So this view is saying that everything that you experience, in the relative sense, is illusion. It's illusion. There's nothing real solid outside, like the dream analogy. The analogy that they give is the dream. In the dream you experience subject, object, and the action, but all these three do not exist even in the dream. Like a dream, our experiences of the relative phenomena are illusory. When you compare your experience of yesterday with the experience of our last night's dream in this point of view, if you look back, there's no difference.
Q 9: I don't have a problem with that. The issue is more like, is there matter or not?
DPR: I say yes, there is.
Q9: There is? O.K, thank you.[laughter]
DPR: And so what's the problem with that, having matter outside?
Q9: Thrangu Rinpoche said there isn't, that's the issue.
DPR: What Thrangu Rinpoche means by "There isn't" is that it's all an illusion. It doesn't mean there's no matter outside; it means how you perceive and how you work with them is all your illusion.
Q9: He said, I think, "All is mind." We asked him that because we gave him these two choices and he picked this one.
DPR: That's because you restricted the choice. [laughter] Yes, you gave only two choices; he didn't have the third choice. [R. laughs, laughter] Is that clear? [R. laughs]

THE DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION OF INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION FOR ONESELF

We have completed the section on direct valid cognition. The second part of the Lorik is the explanation of inferential valid cognition. Valid cognition is divided into two as shown in the chart: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.

There are two inferential valid cognitions. The first is inferential valid cognition for oneself and the second is inferential valid cognition for others. The definition of the first one is "an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven from a reason having the three modes." That's pretty clear, right? [laughter]. Awareness here means it's non material, consciousness, "newly realizing that which is to be proven." "Newly" has the meaning of being valid. This fragment of the definition is 'a new and undeceiving awareness.'

"Newly" also shows that it's not only direct valid cognition that is fresh and new, but it's also the inferential valid cognition that is itself new and fresh. In order for it to be valid, it has to be new, or newly realizing the subject.

"A Reason Having the Three Modes"

The subject is "that which is to be proven;" which is the probandum. It is realizing the probandum from a "a reason having the three modes." This "having the three modes" is defining the reason here. When you come to an understanding or knowledge through an inferential method of reasoning, but the reason doesn't have the qualities of the three modes, then the inference is wrong, not valid, and not undeceiving. It's a wrong inference. Therefore, in order for it to be undeceiving and true conceptual understanding, the reason has to have the three modes. We have to have a little understanding of the three modes before we go into the details. In the chart, *Structure of a Syllogism*, in the second part, it has these three modes. The first one is the subject or the subject quality. The second one is the forward pervasion, and the third one is the reverse pervasion. Those are the three modes. Each of them is defined very particularly and strongly. The definition of the subject quality is: "A reason that valid cognition has determined to be present in all instances of the flawless subject in question in a corresponding mode of statement."

Thank god we have a short definition [laughter]. The very short one is "subject quality", [R. laughs], the definiendum. That is the definition of the first one, the presence of the reason in the subject. It's also called the subject quality.

The definition of the second one, which is the forward pervasion, is: "A reason that has been determined to be present only in that which corresponds to the predicate." It doesn't need to be shorter.

The third definition, which is the reverse pervasion, is: "A reason that has been determined not to be present in a single instance of that which does not correspond to the predicate."

These are the definitions from Khenpo Rinpoche that are given in the *Takrig*. *Takrig* is translated as *The Presentation of the Classification of Reasons*. The rest of the name of the text is the same as that of the Lorik, which says, *The Essence of the Ocean of Texts on Logic*.

From the definition we can see that we have the basis of the inference, the three modes of reasoning, and the subject, predicate and reason. The first thing that we have to establish is the presence of the reason in the subject, which is the first mode. The particular subject here is very interesting because it is referring to the flawless subject in question. It's translated as "in question," which in Tibetan is like *she du, shes pa,* and *du pa*. It's more like inquisitive mind, being inquisitive. You're wondering about it, you want to know more about it, and you have doubts about it. You have to have that quality in the subject, otherwise it will not be a flawless subject. If you already know and if someone's trying to prove that again, it will not be the correct reasoning because you already know the probandum. The definition says "newly realizing." It's not newly realizing if you have already realized that probandum. Therefore, if we put forth a reason such as "Sound is impermanent because it's produced," then you must have this subject quality, which is that the person or respondent must have an interest in, or a question about, or inquisitive nature of mind regarding the subject that we're trying to establish or prove. At the same time it says that it has to be in a corresponding mode of statement, which is referring to different ways of putting forth your reasons. In Tibetan there's a difference between *yod pa* and *yin pa*, to exist and to be. When you say, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced, "Sound is" and "it is produced" have to correspond.

This means that the way you put forth the reasoning has to correspond. You can't put forth a reason that is in a different mode of statement or expression from the predicate. It is something like to exist versus to be. "Determined to be present in all instances," means it is there, it is present in all aspects of the subject. So that is the first mode.

The second mode is interesting. It says, "A reason that has been determined to be present only in that which corresponds to the predicate." When you say, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced," the reason, "produced," has been determined to be present only in "that which corresponds to the predicate," which is impermanent. So the reason, "produced," is present only in "impermanent," which means it is not present in things that are not impermanent. It is only present in the predicate , which is the second of the three modes.

The third one is easy. It's the reverse of the second one, which means the reason has been determined not to be present in a single instance of that which does not correspond to the predicate. So that which is not the predicate, in every single element which is the opposite of the predicate, so to speak, does not have the quality of this reason. Like when you say "Sound is impermanent because it's produced", then whatever is not impermanent does not possess the quality of the reason, which is "produced". It's not present. "Whatever is produced is not present in single instance of whatever is not impermanent." Is that right? It's not right? Did I say it wrong?. I'm not used to thinking technically in English.

I have to think in Tibetan first. [R. laughs, laughter]. Whatever is produced, which is the reason here, is not present in that which does not correspond to the predicate. Whatever is produced is not present in whatever is not impermanent. We can have a nice meditation [laughter] on that, and you may realize the nature of impermanence [laughter] before you understand the reason [R. laughs, laughter], before you understand the concept [R. laughs].

Whatever is produced is not present in all the things that are not impermanent, all phenomena that are not impermanent. All phenomena that are not impermanent are not produced. It's a double negation, isn't it? In logic and debate we have triple or even more negation. Maybe we should try that one day. That would be fun [R. laughs]. Whatever is produced is not present in all phenomena that are not impermanent. This means what is permanent is not produced. That's very simple [R. laughs].

We can have different reasonings or examples. For example, the subject can be: suffering is impermanent because it is produced or because it is momentary phenomenon. If I put forth something like: suffering is permanent because it is produced, is that a correct reasoning?

Voices: No.

DPR: What's wrong with that? Which of the three modes is not present?

Voice: It's the second mode.

DPR: The second mode is not present in that reasoning. You can try different things with the Lorig definitions, such as direct sensory perception or mental direct valid cognition.

Q: I don't understand why the third mode is necessary. It seems like if you had the first and second modes that would be enough.

DPR: Each fragment of the reasons in each of the three modes has a different element to exclude or eliminate. Some of them are connected to Hindu logic that made some statements that had to be eliminated. (Maybe I can distribute some pages of the *Tagrig* so you can see what it eliminates.)

Q: This forward and reverse pervasion in the western form of logic is equivalent. In the forward pervasion, you base a direct proof, and in the reverse pervasion you base an indirect proof. But the two figures or two syllogisms are equivalent. So if you have the forward pervasion, the reverse pervasion is true automatically.

DPR: In general, when you make these three statements, the forward and reverse pervasions, and the presence of the reason in the subject, it emphasizes more, or makes it more clear, that the reason is not present in the phenomena that are not its predicate. If you (only) say it's indirectly known, it's still not clear. When you make these two pervasions clearly, then they make it more obvious, so to speak. Furthermore, in a Buddhist technical logic sense, each of them has a different purpose to eliminate. Without more information, I don't think we can debate on the basis of the Lorik alone because it's too short. It's just definition. It will be difficult.

You usually have to give an example when you make such statements of the reason. When you say, "Sound is impermanent because it's produced," you have to give an example after that. The best example is [R. snaps his fingers] a finger snap. You can clearly see it's impermanent. In order for a person to realize the probandum of such a reasoning, that person to whom you're putting forth the reason must know the reason first. If the person doesn't have a certain sense of ascertainment of the reason, of the meaning of the reason, then you cannot really prove that probandum with such reasons. So the person must know the reason and have a common understanding with you about the example. Through that you can establish a realization through reasoning. The example should have a strong combination of the presence of the reason and the predicate together; they have to be very strongly present. When you use the example of the sound of a finger snap, it has a strong meaning of impermanence, and at the same time, of being produced. It's very clear

Such reasoning, which has all three modes can bring a new realization of the probandum to the person to whom you're putting forth the reason. Two persons are debating, and the challenger, so to speak, puts forth reasons to the defender. Then, the defender comes to a new realization through that reasoning which has the three modes. Therefore, if you read any classical Buddhist texts in translation, whether it is a Hinayana scripture or Mahayana scripture, they are all presented in this logic of the three modes. If you understand this clearly, when you read a translation you may understand it better because you understand the logical basis, how it's reasoned. Sometimes, if you read a traditional translated text, you say, "It doesn't make sense." The reason it doesn't make sense or prove anything is because we're looking at the text from our western logical point of view, or western axiom of logic. Traditional reason in Buddhist philosophical texts is based on these three modes. So, in general, everything is proven through the three modes of reasoning. Any questions? I don't know whether lamas should be first, monks should be first, or ladies should be first. I know gentlemen are last. [laughter, R. laughs]

Q1: In the sentence, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced," if it's not clear to me that the first mode is present, if I don't understand that a sound is necessarily produced, then the reason won't be true for me. If someone used that as the reason, and if I had any doubt that a sound is produced, how would you respond to that? You'd have to prove that if it's a sound, then it must be produced. You have to make that connection. But if it's not clear to me and I don't really understand it, what can you say? What can you do to ascertain the fact that the reason is present in the subject?
DPR: The defender has to say he or she doesn't agree with that, and then the challenger has to prove that the sound is produced. The challenger has to give a reason because he or she has a problem seeing sound as being produced. It has to be proven by the challenger. And so when the defender says he or she doesn't get it, the challenger has to prove it by saying whatever reason, "Sound is produced because..."
Q 1: I see. O.K. Thanks.

Q 2: Regarding the example of sound being impermanent because it is produced, I was wondering what would be an example of something that's not permanent when you were going through the third mode. The only thing that's not impermanent is tathagatagarbha. Does that mean that sound is not present in tathagatagarbha because tathagatagarbha is permanent? If it's a debate, I would say that it logically follows, from what you just said, that sound is not present in tathagatagarbha because it is produced. When you were using the example of sound being impermanent because it is produced, I thought, well, what's an example of something that's not permanent when you were going through the third mode. And I thought the only thing that's not impermanent is tathagatagarbha. And then I thought "Does that mean that sound is not present in tathagatagarbha?" because tathagatagarbha is permanent. So then I thought, well, if it's a debate, I would say that it logically follows from what you just said that sound is not present in tathagatagarbha because it is produced.
DPR: That's a very good debate topic. I wouldn't spoil it by answering [laughter, R. laughs].
Q 2: Because according to the logic, that's what it's saying.
DPR: That's right. You're right. Absolutely. You can debate and then ask me later when you guys come up with the answers. That's how the logic works. If it's answered everything, then there's nothing new to realize, right? If it's taught already, you have to prove it and come to some new realization. In the Sautrantika school, when we talk about permanent, one of the things that is permanent is the isolate. The isolate is permanent, the general characteristics are permanent, space is permanent, cessation is permanent, relative is permanent, and relative phenomena are permanent. Yes it is. Yes it is. [R. laughs]. Look at Harrison! [laughs]

examples of permanent in Sautra. School

Voice: The relativity of relative phenomena.
DPR: No. Relative phenomena are permanent.
Voice: The unceasingness of the relative phenomena is permanent.
DPR: Gee! That sounds like mahamudra. [laughter] Unceasingness. No, in this tenet, Buddhist tenet, in the Sautrantika school, the relative truth is synonymous with general characteristics, it's synonymous with the isolates, with generally characterized phenomena.
Voice: But that's different from relative phenomena, relative truth.
DPR: That's the same as relative truth, relative phenomena. Whatever is absolute is the *svalakshana* level that we're talking about. Impermanence is absolute truth, the *svalakshana* is impermanent and *svalakshana* is ultimate truth. It's really opposite to Shentong in some sense. Please debate your topic, it's a very nice topic.

Q3: I've never been able to grasp logic as a discipline, and I'm having difficulty putting these parts together. Let's say, from the perspective of just the street, ordinary life, how does one translate what you have just told us into that kind of language. Is this kind of logic actually meant for Buddhists, and does it not translate into conversations or discussions with non-Buddhists? For example, is it possible to use this kind of reasoning in conversations with people who have no familiarity with this kind of reasoning?

DPR: Yes. You can use basic logic. It doesn't necessarily have to be in the same format, the same language.

Q 3: How does one apply what you have given us in ordinary language with people who are not Buddhists?

DPR: By using the three modes. I think that once you know the basic structure of the logic that we apply, the fundamental format which is free, so to speak, from language, then it can be applied in every sate of our experience, whether sacred or mundane. Then how you translate that is very individual. Not everybody expresses it in the same way. When you have that fundamental structure, and out of that it is expressed in our mundane language, it depends on the situation you're in. Depending on that situation, then we express it in our own language, in our format. If you're in New York City, it's one question, and if you're in Tibet, it's another. Depending on that situation, it expresses itself in different formats. For example, you say we look at life as being suffering in Buddhist teaching; not only in the teachings but also if you come back into your life on the street, so to speak, the street level, you also see that it is very much present. It's not only present when we sit on the zabuton and meditate, and you say, "Oh, life is suffering, life is suffering, "and then when you come out of it it's totally different. It's not like that. It's very similar, even at the street level. So there's some kind of logic going on at that level to realize or see that it is suffering.

Q 3: And is that logic this logic?

DPR: In a regular sense we're using these logics very loosely, in a loose form. This is not being very precise, and so our understanding is not precise. Our understanding is very vague because our logic is vague. One of the purposes of studying the logical format in Buddhism is to understand it more precisely. When you understand things more precisely, even if it is conceptual understanding, and even if it is this inferential understanding, then there's a subtle sense of realization, a conceptual realization which is very subtle. When you get to that very subtle level of conceptual realization or understanding, that leads you to some sense of nonconceptual realization. It clicks into that state of nonconceptual realization at a certain point.

Q 3: Is that clicking into the nonconceptual what is newly realized?

DPR: No, no, no. The newly realized is happening on the conceptual level each time you understand something new. For example, when you first come to Buddhism and hear about the truth of suffering and how samsaric existence is existing in the nature of suffering, then you come to a new realization. Before this we thought that not everything was suffering. Some things may be suffering, but not all. Now we come to a new realization that everything is suffering through different logic, reasons, and experiential reasons. This is called "newly realizing," in the definition, which is present in every conceptual understanding. For example, when you understand that sound is produced, that is a new realization, a new conceptual level of understanding. However, when you click into that state of non-conceptual thing, it is actually more of an absolute realization than relative realization. You're getting more into the non-conceptual phenomena. That's why it is said in the debate tradition of Tibet that one can awaken into the state of Buddahood right within this format, right within the debate. That's why the tradition of debate believes that while you're debating very actively, conceptually, reducing things down to very subtle level, you can come to a certain [R. snaps fingers]. You can get into this awakened state of no matter what level of realization it is, whether it is the last moment of highest meditation on the path of meditation or seeing, whatever, it can come to a certain point. There are stories of great geshes in Tibet who have come to realization through debate, through this conceptual meditation. In some sense this debate is meditation, in the Buddhist tradition, because you're doing analytical meditation. You're meditating on these subjects of relative and absolute phenomena through conceptual analysis. In that particular process it requires tremendous awareness, and at the same time, one pointed concentration. If you lose this one pointed concentration a little, then you're not on that track of debate and you lose something in that very process. In a way, it's very intense meditation, because when you sit in silence and meditate, you have lots of space to dream, fantasize, or freak out [laughter] in your own way. When you're in this particular atmosphere of debate and discussion with your dharma friends, then it's a very intense situation. You're really one-pointedly concentrated, and you're communicating with the others on a more profound level of analytical meditation. You meet your

[illegible] debate

[illegible]

friends on a different level. You're not meeting them on a coffee table level, but in a more analytical state of meditation. There's a higher communication between you and your dharma friends, and between you and the book. It's not a very passive thing. It's a very active engagement in that particular dharma. Whether you're studying the dharma of impermanence or the dharma of egolessness, there's an active involvement in this format.
Q 3: I've taken a long time. May I say one more thing?
DPR: Yes, please.
Q 3: My experience of being in that state is one of feeling very claustrophobic and [R. laughs] very aware of fear and ignorance. Speechlessness, actually. Sort of a stuttering quality.
DPR: Stuttering?
Q 3: Stuttering. D-d-d-d-d-.Wh-wh-wh-.
DPR: I think that's a very good...
Q 3: I knew you'd say that. [laughter, R. laughs]
DPR: That's a very good quality. [laughter, R. laughs] Yes, that's a very good quality because this sense of being claustrophobic shows how one-pointed it is, how one-pointedly concentrating we are in this particular state. It's very, very narrow, so to speak, so you're really one pointedly concentrated. It's very claustrophobic in a good sense. What was the other one?
Q 3: Fear and ignorance.
DPR: Knowing how ignorant you are?
Q 3: Right.
DPR: That's great because [laughter, R. laughs] usually we're puffed up with pride, and we think that we know better than anyone, know more than anyone, and that we know everything better. In this particular state, we realize how much dharma there is that we don't know. Generally speaking, when you say, "I know suffering," you probably think you know what suffering is. When a teacher or dharma friends says, "Impermanent," you usually respond and say, "Oh, I know what that is. I don't want to hear more. I've read a lot, I've heard a lot." However, when you come to this situation, then you know how much you know, and how much you don't know about impermanence and suffering. It really boils down to the essence: how ignorant we are in the most fundamental state, how much we know of this dharma, and how much we don't know of this dharma. So knowing how much we don't know is a great knowledge, a great prajna, because usually we don't know how much we don't know. We only fantasize or believe we know something when actually we're not really looking at how much we understand or know. That fear of seeing how much we don't know is a prajna itself.
Q3: It sounds like a side effect, or an intended effect to this, is the awareness of vulnerability on the spot.
DPR: Awareness of vulnerability on the spot. Yes, I think so. It's also important to reflect on that, and not just freak out. You think, "This is the section of dharma that I don't know, and I'm weak in understanding." Therefore, if you discuss more with dharma friends and teachers you can improve. You develop prajna, and you can perfect.
Q 3: Thank you for going on so long.
DPR: You're welcome.

Q 4: In this idea of the new realization, the way that you talked about it, it's obviously more than just a scientific debate. There's something more going on. It made me think of TGS. It almost sounds like this inferential cognition is almost direct cognition, or it's pointing to it. What's the difference? It seems like they're very closely related. When you reach that point in the realization through concept, that it's not really conceptual, how do those connect. What is the difference between that point of inferential reasoning and direct cognition?
DPR: Good question. At the beginning, when we go through such reasoning, it's more conceptual reasoning because we're going through these three modes of reasoning and applying the relationship between the three. Then we come to an understanding, saying, "Oh, the probandum," or, "Sound is impermanent." or "The self is impermanent." That is a very conceptual understanding at the beginning. When you come to that light, so to speak, of the conceptual realization of sound

[illegible]

being impermanent, that is a new understanding, a new thought, a new realization. At the same time, when you do that over and over with all phenomena, with different levels of phenomena, in that process you click into something nonconceptual, a gap. That's why it's so profound in many ways. When you do that more and more, then you get closer to the nonconceptual realization of impermanence, through the conceptual path. Earlier we talked about how we have to rely on the conceptual path to get to the nonconceptual realization These are the methods that we go through. When it comes to the classification of this logic, it becomes more clear about the levels and aspects. At this point logic becomes more profound. It's not just a dry philosophy of Buddhism.

INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION: THE THREE REASONS AND THE THREE MODES

We have talked about the definition of inferential valid cognition for oneself. Within that is the definition of a correct reason which is, "A reason that has the three modes." We also talked about the general definition of the three modes. Further, in the text it says, "In this context, the three types of inferential valid cognition arisen in dependence on the three reasons of effect, nature and non-observation..." Correct reasoning, or inferential valid cognition for oneself, has three different types of inferential valid cognition which arise on the basis of these three types or styles of reasoning, three types of modes. All are known as a correct reason. In other words, correct reason is divided into three. The three correct reasons are: 1) the correct reason of effect (according to this translation); 2) the correct reason of nature; and 3) the correct reason of non-observation. (Maybe I'll give you the definition but it doesn't help very much. The other translators say, "Correct result reason;" we say, "effect reason." The definition of a result reason, or the definition of correct reason of effect is a result reason with the three modes. [laughter] I told you it wasn't going to help very much. Is that clear? [laughter])

All the reasons must have the correct relationships of the three modes in every aspect of reasoning. The reason or sign is the last of the three aspects. When we put that forth in the first correct reasoning, we put forth a result or an effect as a sign. That's why it is called the reason of effect, or the correct result reason. For example, (it's easier if you look at an example), on a mountain pass where there is smoke, there is a fire; the reason is there is smoke. The smoke is the result of the fire. Smoke is put forth as the reason to show that there is a fire. Because of the result of that particular thing [i.e. fire—ed.], we can infer the existence of the cause of that particular smoke. When we give the reason, we have to develop all the correct relationships. First you must have the smoke which must be present in the subject. The mountain pass which has smoke is the subject. It must have the reason which is smoke. That is the first mode. The second mode is the forward pervasion. Can you establish the forward pervasion?

Q: Wherever there is smoke there is fire.

Rinpoche: That's right. What was the definition of the second mode?

Student: "The reason must be determined to be present only with respect to that which corresponds to the predicate."

Rinpoche: Yes. That has to correspond to the predicate. When we say that there is a fire, in the forward pervasion we say, "Wherever there is smoke there is a fire." There is a difference between that and when you say, "Whatever is impermanent, is something." That is what "corresponds" means in the definition of the second mode. (A famous example in our debate is the person who smokes a cigarette must have a fire in their mouth.) Another example that Rinpoche gives is maybe very difficult and challenging but nice to look at. He gives this example as the correct result reason. I will read the whole thing. "Given the awareness present immediately after entering the mother's womb, it was preceded by prior awareness because the present awareness exists." What is this trying to prove? What is the subject here?

Student: The awareness present immediately after entering the mother's womb.

Rinpoche: Yes, that's the subject. What's the predicate?

Student: (Is) preceded by prior awareness....

Rinpoche: So this would be a good example to work with and challenge us The example shows that the correct result, the reason, which is the present awareness, is the result of the past awareness. That past moment of awareness is the result of a previous moment of awareness. It traces back and back and back. Rinpoche gives this example to show there is a continuity of consciousness throughout the different states of samsara. That's one example. Generally speaking, the first category, the reason of effect, puts forth the result as a sign or reason to prove the existence of the cause.

The second division, which is called the nature, refers to the correct reason of nature. Correct reason of nature is translated as correct self-nature reason. "Self," is a little confusing to me. We can just look at it as the result of the nature. What is the definition of a correct reason of nature?

Student: Self correct.

Rinpoche: Usually when you define something you can't bring in the definiendum. In this case we have "correct" in the definiendum. We can't put this in the definition because it doesn't say anything separate.

This definition is like the other one. It is a "nature reason with the three modes," or in this translation it says, "A self-nature reason with the three modes." The example that we always use is, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced." We can also say, "Suffering is impermanent because it is produced, " which is the example that Khenpo Rinpoche gives in the text. Nature here refers to the nature of suffering. We say, "The nature of suffering is impermanent," or "The nature of suffering is non-existent," or, "The nature of suffering is a great joy," or whatever it is you want to prove. When you put forth that reason, it is saying that the nature of the subject is impermanent. We are giving the reason why it is impermanent. It's impermanent because it is produced, because it is a momentarily existing phenomenon. It is impermanent because it is composite.

Student: Is it impermanent because it's ultimate?

Rinpoche: Yes, you can probably say that in this particular tenet.

Student: Does the nature here refer to the subject or the reason?

Rinpoche: The nature of the reason is usually not separate from the predicate when you try to prove it. For example, impermanent is not separate from produced. Impermanent and produced are more general, so to speak. They are all pervasive. They are not only the nature of sound but they are also the nature of candle, light, beings, and so forth. We are trying to prove one particular thing, which is the nature of impermanence, the same nature. We can look at the relationship between sound and impermanence. What are the four possibilities, or the three possibilities. Are they *gelwa* or *musum*? Can you establish the relationship?

Student: *Musum*. [Unknown example, like "Beethoven's symphonies"]) are (both) sound and impermanent. I am impermanent but not sound. An isolate is neither impermanent nor sound.

Rinpoche: Yes, that's right. Usually when you establish the relationship you have to say that whatever is sound is impermanent, but whatever is impermanent is not necessarily sound. For example, the skandha of form, and an isolate is neither sound nor impermanent. From there you can understand the relationship between the reason, the predicate, and the subject. If you are not clear you should try to make this relationship. From that you can quickly get the idea, whether it is correct reasoning or incorrect reasoning. It's very easy.

Student: Could you say a Mercedes is a vehicle because it is a car? Would car be its nature?

Rinpoche: Is that correct reasoning? Can you establish the forward pervasion?

S: The three modes would be: The Mercedes is a car, which is established. Whatever is a car is necessarily a vehicle. And whatever is not a vehicle is necessarily not a car.

Rinpoche: Yes, that sounds like nature.

The third reason is a little difficult. It is the reason of non-observation. The definition is: "The definition of correct reason of non-perceivability." (I think "non-perceivable" is better than "non-observation.") The specific definition is: "The non-perceivable result with the three modes," or, the reason of non-perceivability with the three modes. The general definition of a correct sign says, "The existence of all three modes in the proof of that which is to be proved." In the case of non-perceivability, it is the negation of a phenomenon, or, the existence of all three modes in the negation of that which is to be negated. It's a tongue twister. It's a pretty nice definition.

The third reasoning is very interesting because all Madyamika reasonings fall into it. It plays a very important role, in general, for negating our conceptual clinging onto anything as an existent in the Mahayana reasoning. In this case, it is taught in a very basic sense. It helps us to understand the correct reasoning for saying that something in front of us does not exist, (that is to say,) that something is not perceived or conceived.

The example of the reasoning says, "In front of us there is no ghost, or there is no demon because there is no perception that perceives such existence." This is correct reasoning of non-perceivability because of the non-existence of a valid cognition that would allow one to perceive a demon or ghost. That's just an example.

The space in front of us is the subject. That space is defined in relation to the person sitting in front of it. This person has an inquisitive mind which knows whether there is or isn't such a being. In the definition of the subject, the person must have a question, or this inquisitive quality. There must be this person sitting in front of the space with this inquisitive mind, saying, "Is there or is there not a flesh eating demon or a vegetarian demon?" (laughter) The traditional example is a flesh eating demon, but we can also include the vegetarian people (laughter). We have the space in front of us and there is no such vegetarian or non-vegetarian demon sitting in front. If there were any existence of the demon, then it would be the object of our consciousness, the subject. However, our consciousness' valid cognition doesn't perceive such existence.

We can also apply this to other things. To those of us who have the inquisitive mind of wanting to know whether there is a Nirmanakaya Buddha or Shakyamuni Buddha sitting in front, we can say there is not because our direct valid cognition doesn't allow us to perceive such existence.

These are the three reasons which are the classifications or divisions of correct reasoning. As long as we talk about correct reasoning we have the three modes, and the three modes must be applicable to these reasonings. In the Lorik, we are talking about inferential valid cognition rather than reasoning itself. This inferential valid cognition is the awareness which realizes the contents, so to speak, of the reasoning. It is the perceiver or subject of these three reasonings.

Rinpoche says that these three modes of inferential valid cognition, which arise in dependence upon the reasons, can be indirectly known by understanding the basis of the inference. The *Presentation of the Classification of Reasons* is another text by Khenpo Tsultrim Rinpoche. It is based on the third chapter of the *Pramanavartika* and the third chapter of *Pramanasamuccaya*. The Lorik is based on the second chapter of the *Vartika* (as well as the *Samuccaya*); the Lorik consists of subdivisions, and classifications of the reasonings. The three basic types of reasoning that we have discussed are again divided into subdivisions. The reason of an effect, the reason of nature, and the reason of non-observation are divided again into many subdivisions in this text.

So we will stop here with a basic understanding of the three.

Q1: This third type of reason, non-observability or non-perceivability, seems so trivial. If you say there is no flesh-eating demon in front of you because I can't see it, that may be true, but you want to prove or disprove the existence of these demons. Just because you don't see one in front of you right now does not mean it doesn't exist. You could use the example of the proof of god. You could say that I can prove that god doesn't exist because I don't see him sitting in front of me, but no theist would ever accept such an argument. God is not the sort of entity that you would find sitting in front of you. Maybe I am just not understanding it properly.
DPR: In this particular tenet, if something exists it should be the object of the direct perceptions, direct cognitions, or direct mind. Therefore, if something exists in front of you it must be somehow perceived, either by sensory perception, mental perception, or the other perceptions. Therefore, in general, we can say it is not there because we cannot perceive it. The possibility of it being there is more than the possibility of this existence being there in front of us, generally speaking. At the same time, in this tenet there is also a belief that there is a subtle form, a subtle existence of a form. Mind-body is more like the body of the ghosts or the bardo beings, and so we can't really prove the non-existence of those beings just because ordinary beings can't see them. However, they can be perceived through yogic perception. They are not absolutely non-perceivable. They are perceivable but you have to have that yogic perception. Here you are just given a more common, basic example which says there is nothing existing; there are non-perceivable things. We have to go into the details to see exactly what this reason is about. There are basically two divisions of this reasoning, and each one is divided into four or more divisions. So it is a very detailed thing.
Q1: In this example of non-observability something was not an object of direct valid cognition, we didn't perceive it, and that was the proof. I thought that for ordinary beings like myself we would not know...
DPR: That such things existed?
Q1: If we are not subtle enough to observe a direct valid cognition because it's in the first or second moment, then we wouldn't know if we did or did not have the direct valid cognition.
DPR: Yes we do. We do know the direct valid cognition of mental sensory perception and self-aware direct valid cognition is there, but the yogic is questionable. It is individual. I can't say whether you have it or not. It's up to you. The yogic direct valid cognition arises at the end of the path of unification. If you are at that level you have it, and if you are not, you don't have it for sure.
Q1: The reason why we would be able to perceive that is because the self-aware direct valid cognition accompanies every aspect of the six consciousnesses. In other words, whenever there is a thought, cognition, or perception, it is perceived by this self-aware valid cognition. Even though it might not see the first sensory valid cognition, we might see the conceptualized object that is based on that sensory direct cognition.
DPR: Mm-hmm.
Q1: My second question is: Why do we define inferential valid cognition as merely an awareness newly realizing? That seems to imply that if you already have the realization that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then you can never have an inferential valid cognition of that because you already realized it.
DPR: That's right. The second moment of your realization of sound being impermanent is not the inferential valid cognition because it becomes more like memory.
Q1: Basically, reasonings would only be used for people who don't understand the reasonings already. What do you call that? What type of cognition is it when you know from having already gone through the reasonings that sound is impermanent because it was produced?
DPR: There's a name for that. Let me look up the label. I think it is called the subsequent cognizer.

Q2: Rinpoche, if I add up a long column of numbers, and then I realize, oh, 126, is that an inferential valid cognition?

DPR: Yes, I think so.

Q2: But in the definition it employs the three modes. Obviously, while I am doing my math I am not doing forward and backward pervasions, or I might never get done. [laughter] Does the definition mean you could do that even though you are not consciously doing it? Would the logical pervasions work if you took the time?

DPR: Yes, or they are present in their own way. You say it is because of this and this and that. There is a whole logical mind going on. It's not like direct perception where you perceive things in their nature, but you go through a whole logic. You make these pervasions in their own way, a different way. This is what I was telling you this morning; you can have this in the street in its own way.

Q2: Let's say you are adding two and two, which is part of a long column. Would you say, in an unconscious way, the pervasions are operative there?

DPR: Yes. In a way you can say it comes with the conceptual mind. The whole framework of the conceptual mind is somehow based on these reasonings. It's like computers. You have to build a logic first, the infrastructure, the programming. Once that is built then it does it automatically, very fast, depending on the chip. So depending on our chips it goes faster or slower.

Q2: To some extent, learning your multiplication tables as a child means you've got the pervasions down.

DPR: That's right. You're going through the basic steps.

Q3: I was wondering what the actual definition of *svalakshana* was, so I looked it up in Khenpo Rinpoche's writings. He defines it as that which performs a function. Is that a good definition for what we are studying now?

DPR: Yes. It is the definition.

Q3: That is also the definition of ultimate truth for Sautrantika. Are ultimate truth and *svalakshana* synonymous?

DPR: Yes, that's right, synonymous.

Q3: You've mentioned a number of times the momentary nature of the *svalakshana*. I was thinking of the criteria for the ultimate truth in Vaibashika. In terms of consciousness, is it momentary, and in terms of matter, is it the individual particles?

DPR: That's right.

Q3: Is momentary part of the Sautantrika definition? In terms of the ultimate truth, does the *svalakshana* have to be momentary?

DPR: Yes.

Q3: Are the visible particles of matter momentary?

DPR: That's right. They are also momentary.

Q3: Are they also *svalakshana*?

DPR: That's right. Even in the Vaibhashika school they agree with that view of the individual particles being momentary, being momentarily existing.

Q3: And the Sautrantika accept that the momentary individual particles have *svalakshana*?

DPR: That's right. But they don't accept the view that we can perceive them directly. We can only perceive an aspect of the indivisible particles; we can't perceive them directly.

Q3: I think you said before it's the *nompa*...

DPR: *Nompa*, that's right. The number you build up (chuckle).

Q3: Do both the aspect and the real hidden particle have *svalakshana*?

DPR: Yes, they do. That *nompa* is, in a way, inseparable from the indivisible particles. If there are no individual particles of the object outside, then we can't have the nompa of it according to the Sautrantika. In the Cittamatra you might be able to have it.

Q3: In a moment of sensory direct valid cognition, for instance, I look at the brocade that is in front of your throne, which is red and gold. I just see that in that one moment. What can you say about that in terms of *svalakshana*? It has red and gold. There are probably billions of particles if you think about it, and each one bears its own character.

DPR: That's right, exactly. That's why, when we talk about perception, it's very precise in Buddhist psychology, in the Lorik. We talk about different ways of perceiving; whether you perceive the whole object as one or one indivisible, you can't perceive indivisible particles, but rather the *nompa* aspect of each. Do you perceive them separately or all in one moment? It's like the whole room can reflect in a mirror in one moment. Do you perceive in one moment, or one by one?

DPR: It's hard to understand the definition of inferential valid cognition for oneself without knowing the three modes and the three reasons, the three classifications.

Q4: Could you clarify briefly the relationship between the three modes and the three classifications? Do the three classifications always need the three modes in order to be established properly?
DPR: Each of the three classifications needs three modes, but they will be different types of modes, so to speak. One will be in the form of a fact , one in the form of a nature, and one in the form of non-observation. All three of them need the three modes. Otherwise they don't become a correct reasoning. If they don't become a correct reasoning, then we won't get the inferential valid cognition for oneself. We will get the wrong conception, the wrong understanding.
Q4: Are the three modes considered to be a kind of inherent necessary logic.
DPR: Inherent?
Q4: Yes, in the sense that the validity of the valid cognition is inherent.
DPR: What do you mean by that?
Q4: I mean that the logic is somehow in-built, or ultimate. It would carry over regardless of language.
DPR: Yes. I think you can say that.

Q5: Is non-observation always a negation, or is it possible to posit something on the basis of non-observation?
DPR: You can put forth the reason with the signs. It is not always a negation form. That is why it has many sub-categories. Even if it is put forth in a positive way, it is proving something that is non-existent or non-perceivable.
Q5: Would that be like saying there is permanence because there is no impermanence in tathagatagarbha?
DPR: Something like that, yes.

Q6: Valid cognition comes in two categories: direct and inferential. In our lineage, we always try to get away from concepts. Would the inferential valid cognition also be something that would be given up at some point?
DPR: In other words, do we have to live with it forever? (Laughter)
Q6: Is it valid while there is something distorted, or is it valid as a concept when it is seen as a concept. For example, would the Buddha have it?
DPR: No. This is still a coarse way of understanding or knowing things, or knowing reality. It is a very conceptual understanding, conceptual realization, which means that you haven't really realized the actual meaning of sound being impermanent. You haven't had the direct realization of that, but through such reasonings you can be led to such a level or a direct realization. For that reason, the path of inferential valid cognition becomes somewhat helpful, or important in order to direct our thoughts, or our mind, in a more precise understanding.

Q7: In the Mahamudra investigation you investigate stillness and movement.
DPR: With the three modes (laughter).
Q7: No, not quite. First you investigate stillness, and at some point it is said that movement becomes the real meditation. So from that angle, why not just have concepts occur in your mind and see them as concepts, as movement, see their nature. What's the problem with that? What would be the obscuration in just seeing concepts in your mind, and just seeing them as concepts?
DPR: Is there a problem?

Q7: I don't see a problem with that.
DPR: Is that a question?

Q8: When we talk about inferential valid cognition we say that at some point it is sort of overcome, left behind. So why would we have to leave it behind?
DPR: Do you have an idea?
Q8: Because inferential valid cognition is newly realized, and the Buddha doesn't have a question.

Q9: Just for argument's sake, that would be a very static idea of the Buddha. The Buddha couldn't grow.
DPR: Couldn't grow?
Q9: He couldn't grow. He couldn't learn about computers.
DPR: Oh, too bad.
Q9: You would end up saying that the Buddha Shakyamuni knew all about e-mail and software.
DPR: Generally speaking, we have concepts in the reasoning, and when we go into this type of reasoning, we go on and on with the conceptual chain, one after another. One chain of thoughts will lead to another chain of thoughts. That's how the arguments go on. Otherwise, the debate would just stop after one reasoning. But it doesn't stop; it goes on and on.
Q9: If it is valid, it would.
DPR: Yes, it is valid in the sense that you get to realize some things, but it is subtle. Once you have realized it, and you do it again and again, it is no longer valid cognition. There is nothing wrong with the general nature of the concepts, but when you cling to these concepts it becomes a problem. Clinging is a problem if you want to bring in Mahamudra investigation. That is why Tilopa said that appearance does not bind you to samsara. What binds you is clinging to these appearances. Appearances refer to anything that appears to our mind. It can be the object of direct valid cognition or the object of inferential valid cognition.

Q10: Rinpoche, when I think about how I go about constructing my sense of self, it seems that there is just this immediate reflexive memory that is brought to everything. Outside of a very short reference you gave to memory being associated with self-aware direct valid cognition, I'm wondering how the mechanics of memory are described within the system. Is this something we're going to get to? Is this question a bit premature?
DPR: We talked about seven divisions or categories which are the opposites of direct valid cognition. One of the seven is recollection which is memory. This discussion might come up again in the section on the fifty-one mental factors. Basically, memory is something which has been imprinted repeatedly in our stream of consciousness, whether it is the sixth consciousness or the eighth consciousness, whichever view you hold. When you imprint some actions over and over, repeatedly, whether they are physical or mental, they make imprints in our stream of consciousness and those imprints become memory, which is accessed randomly (laughter).
Q10: A second question: You said that these debates actually lead one to a moment of awakened mind. I can understand the non-conceptuality and how that arises in the context of the debates. Where exactly does that happen in relation to the moment? Is that moment of non-conceptuality synonymous with awakened mind?
DPR: That's right. It can arise as a non-conceptual mind, consciousness, which can lead to a non-conceptual wisdom.
Q10: But they are not necessarily *tönchik*, right?
DPR: No, not necessarily *tönchik*. That's good!

DPR: It can be *musum*. For example, there would be a momentary gap experienced by ordinary beings, beings on the path of accumulation, or junction or unification, which can be a glimpse of wisdom within a non-conceptual state of mind. Second, there is a non-conceptual state of mind which is not wisdom, like the mind of going unconscious or spacing out. Third, there is a wisdom that is non-conceptual and not mind; it is the wisdom of the Buddhas. Finally, there's the rock (laughter), which is neither wisdom nor mind.

INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION FOR OTHERS

Yesterday we discussed the first part of inferential valid cognition, the inferential valid cognition for oneself. The second part is the inferential valid cognition for others and is defined as, "A sentence construction fully clarifying for others the facts seen by the disputant himself, [i.e.] a reason having the three modes." In order to generate the inferential valid cognition for others one must generate the inferential valid cognition for oneself. Therefore, whatever we are trying to clarify for others is simply a fact that is seen by oneself, who is the disputant. The disputant is the challenger who puts forth a sentence construction to the defender in order to fully clarify the subject matter, which is seen by the challenger or the disputant oneself. The fact which one has seen is a reason that has the three modes. For example, it is when you have come to an awareness realizing that which is to be proven from a reason having the three modes, such as the knowledge of sound as impermanent, or the present moment of awareness having a past moment of awareness, that we can trace back. Such knowledge or realization is what the challenger is trying to communicate to the defender. That communication is a sentence construction which means it is an expression, sound or language structure, and is what we call the inferential valid cognition for others.

These two classifications are made mainly as terminology divisions between the inferential valid cognition for oneself and inferential valid cognition for others. The actual inferential valid cognition is the inferential valid cognition for oneself. The second one is really something that you put forth to others, and is not really inferential valid cognition; it is a sentence and word structure, a language that we are trying to communicate. Therefore it is called a terminological division. This means that we can classify this as inferential valid cognition, but it is not really a valid cognition because it is not a state of mind that realizes something new. It is simply a word or language that we try to communicate to others. It is communicating what we have seen before, what we have realized before through the modes of reasoning.

གཞན་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག
is not really
རྗེས་དཔག།
real རྗེས་དཔག་
རང་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག

If you look at the definition and divide it into parts, first it says, "A sentence construction fully clarifying for others the facts seen by the disputant." From "sentence construction" you can see that it is not consciousness. It is words, consciousness, sound. "Fully clarifying for others" has the meaning that it is not really a new realization, a newly realizing awareness, because it is something that you try to clarify for others and which you have already seen. "Facts seen by the disputant" eliminates this being inference for oneself, because it is inference for others [since the disputant has already seen the facts—ed.]."A reason having the three modes" is what you have realized or seen, and which you are trying to communicate to others. You are trying to communicate to others a reason having the three modes. You have seen it, come to an inferential valid cognition of it, and you are trying to generate the same inferential valid cognition in the other person's mind stream. Therefore, the format of the reasoning is slightly different than in the divisions of inferential valid cognition for oneself.

Inferential Valid Cognition for Others, Part I:

Correct Proof Statements with Concordant Attributes

Its divisions are basically two modes of clarifying. The first one is called, "Correct proof statements constructed with concordant attributes." The definition here says,

> "A construction where both the subject in question and the example subject have concordant attributes in terms of the reason and the predicate of the probandum."

This is the definition of a correct proof statement constructed with concordant attributes. Does this make sense? It is very difficult, especially for me. Does this sound like Tibetan to you? [Laughter] It sounds like English to me.

The first part of the definition refers to a sentence construction of words, sounds and language. It is a conceptual construction where the subject in question, the object of the first mode, is established in relationship to the reasons. When you establish the presence of C, the reason, in A, the subject, that becomes the first mode. It is the presence of the reason in the subject, the presence of C in A. A, the subject in question, is the object of the first mode of the correct proof. You are not sure what A is, and you are not sure whether sound is permanent, impermanent or not produced. With the subject, we are trying to establish the correct proof about the first mode. The example subject is the example you give such as sound is impermanent because it is produced, such as the sound of a finger snap. Both of these should have concordant attributes in terms of the reason and predicate of the probandum. Attributes are different qualities and the reason and predicate must have the same attributes. A, the subject, and D, the example subject, should have the same attributes as the reason and the predicate of the probandum. For example, we can say sound is impermanent because it is produced, such as the sound of a finger snap. The subject in question, sound, and the example subject, the sound of a finger snap, in terms of the reason, are both produced; in terms of the predicate, they are both impermanent; and in terms of the probandum, both are sound which is impermanent. In other words they have the same attributes. When you put forth such sentence constructions, the example that you give and the subject in question should be similar in terms of their attributes, so that the defender can understand the probandum.

[illegible]

To clarify further, the first division, this particular correct proof statement constructed with concordant attributes is basically working with the second mode, the forward pervasion. It is a direct statement that clearly shows the forward pervasion. The next division is a correct proof statement constructed with discordant attributes, and works with the third mode, the reverse pervasion. You should keep that in mind; it may help to understand it better.

Correct Proof Statements with Concordant Attributes Based on a Reason of Effect

There are three correct proof statements constructed with concordant attributes based on a correct reason of effect, nature and non-observation. Each of these three have examples. (We don't have definitions anymore.) The first says, "At a base from which smoke arises, and/or at a base where smoke billows forth heavily, there necessarily exists fire: for example, like [in] the kitchen. Here too there is smoke." This statement very clearly shows the forward pervasion. We are not beginning the statement like in the other kind of reasoning [i.e. "Here there is smoke, therefore...."—ed.]. There necessarily exists "fire" shows the forward pervasion. Then you give the example which has to be similar, concordant; the example has to be concordant with the subject in question, and here the example is the kitchen. (I think this is like a kitchen in ancient Indian and Tibetan villages.) It says, "Here too, there is smoke." If we see smoke on the mountain pass, we say there must be fire. That is a correct proof statement constructed with concordant attributes based on a fact.

Q: What is the subject here? Which is A?

DPR: A is "At a base where smoke billows forth heavily," the predicate, B, is "There necessarily exists fire," and the reason, C, is "Here too there is smoke." After that there is the example, D, "Like in the kitchen."

We have to show the subject in question; we can't escape that. Without showing the three parts we can't have any sense of establishing the three modes. We begin with the subject which clearly shows the forward pervasion. "Wherever smoke exists there necessarily exists fire" clearly shows the pervasion. Whereas, in a previous example, "In the mountain pass where there is smoke, there is fire because there is smoke," it doesn't really show the necessary pervasion in the reasoning. It just gives you the three reasons. "Here there necessarily exists fire" gives the forward pervasion more clearly. It does not show clearly the reverse pervasion, but it is implied.

Q: Is "Here too there is smoke" a reason?

DPR: Yes. We see the smoke on the mountain pass, and we say, "Here too there is smoke." We see smoke coming out of a kitchen and in a similar way we see the smoke here. So there must be fire behind this mountain.

That is the first example of the first division, the reason of effect.

Correct Proof Statements with Concordant Attributes Based on a Reason of Nature

The second one is the reason of nature. "Whatever is produced is necessarily impermanent, for example: like the five aggregates of one's own continuum. My five aggregates too are produced." "Whatever is produced" is the reason, C, "Is necessarily impermanent" is the predicate, B, "For example" is D, and "My aggregates" is the subject, A. "My aggregates are produced" establishes the first mode. The reason, "produced," is present in the subject in question, "my aggregates."

Q: Why is not "Whatever is produced" the subject?

DPR: No. It shows the pervasion very clearly. If you say "produced" is the subject, what would the reason be?

Q: The reason would be "Necessarily impermanent."

DPR: No, then you would have no predicate.

Q: I see. You couldn't say that the reason is "my aggregates."

DPR: No, that wouldn't work. Usually you take one particular thing as the subject and you take the more general thing as the predicate. Usually it is a *musum* relationship. In the reasoning of nature, you can usually find the *musum* relationship between A and C.

Correct Proof Statements with Concordant Attributes Based on a Reason of Non-observation

The third category is the sentence construction in relation to non-observation. I think this example is better than the one we had yesterday. "If something that is an observable object of awareness is not observed, it is necessarily an object to which the conventional term of non-existence [can be applied]: for example, like the horns of a rabbit." This is the famous Buddhist logic example that students know better than their daily practice sadhana. The text goes on, "At this base in front of me too, fire is not observed." Not observing fire in front of us is the subject. The first part, "If something that is an observable object of awareness is not observed," is the sign, the reason. "It is necessarily an object to which the conventional term of non-existence can be applied," is the predicate. The example is very clear, "For example, like the horns of a rabbit." (At Naropa someone gave me this picture of a rabbit with horns [laughter], so I don't know.) Then it says: "At this base in front of me too, fire is not observed." The non-existence of fire is the subject. This example is more clear than the other example of the vegetarian or non-vegetarian ghost. It is very hard for us to decide whether the ghost exists in front of us or not. Here we are talking about one solid material thing, like fire. We do not see fire here in front of us because it is not there. If it is there, it is observable, perceivable. That completes the third category.

It may be helpful, if you are familiar with Madhyamika teachings, to bring in some examples of the third category in order to see the non-existence of ego or non-existence of suffering. Whether you want to find the example for inferential valid cognition for others, or for oneself, it is helpful to make up your own three mode examples ahead of the debate session. Each person should prepare at least one example. You can present it and see how the others challenge it. In our training we have to use lots of examples that are not in the text.

Q1: The English presentation of these examples is confusing. It seems to me that each is taking a particular instance of something, and in every case it is an observable instance or an instance where nothing is observed. Then that observable thing is the subject of the inquiry. I sort of rewrote the English to make it clearer to me.
DPR: That's good.
Q1: For example, the last one would be: "Fire is not observed here and hence does not exist because if something that is an observable object of awareness is not observed, it is necessarily an object to which the conventional term of non-existence can be applied, like the horns of a rabbit." Is that the gist...?
DPR: Yes. I think one thing that we must know is the way we put forth the reasoning is different in the two types of inferential valid cognition. In the case of inferential valid cognition for oneself, you would put forth the reason in this fashion, in this style. The subject is first, the predicate second, the reason last, and then the example after that. In the case of inferential valid cognition for others, usually, in most cases, you put forth the reason and predicate first, then the example, and then the subject. It is very hard to say that this follows through all these reasonings because, in the case of effect, it does not really follow.
Q1: When you put together the sentence construction for others, it is set up this way. In order for us to pick out the A, B, C and D, we actually have to think a lot.
DPR: That's right. It is given more explanation than the reasoning. In the first case of inferential valid cognition for oneself, there is not much explanation. You just say that sound is impermanent because it is produced. You have to figure out the relationship between produced and impermanence and sound. Here the relationship is developed already; it is more like explanation, so you say, "Whatever is produced is necessarily impermanent like the five aggregates of ones own continuum, my five aggregates too are produced." It is explained more.

Q2: Are proof statements, which are used for inferential valid cognition for others, organized differently than syllogisms, which are used for inferential valid cognition for oneself?
DPR: That's right. I think it is translated here as sentence construction.

Q3: What would you say the relationship is between an inferential valid cognition for others and the correct reason of effect of an inferential valid cognition for oneself?
DPR: I think it is opposite. One is words, language and sound, and the other is cognition. These are proof statements, just statements. The other is your own understanding.
Q3: So you see smoke, and that is the experience aspect of it. And then you deduce that there is fire?
DPR: Yes. It is more like ones own realization coming to a certain conceptual realization which is an awareness. It is defined as being an awareness. The second one is defined as being a sentence construction; it is not awareness. I think they are opposite.

Q4: I want to clarify the phrase "Conventional term of non-existence." Have we defined this anywhere previously?
DPR: In the last paragraph on page ten.
Q4: Is it the B portion of the syllogism or proof statement?
DPR: "Conventional term of non-existence" just simply means, in the mundane sense, in the relative sense, that whatever you don't see you can label it, you can say that it is not there.
Q4: So it has nothing to do with sensory direct valid cognition?

DPR: No. This is an interesting point. There is a lot of debate in our logic about whether you really see the non-existence or an existence which is empty of something. For example, when you see that there is no fire, do you really see that there is no fire, or do you just see the basis where there is no fire? It is an interesting question. Usually we take it for granted. When you say, "I don't see fire," it is a gross idea. It almost sounds like you perceive that there is no fire, like there is a direct perception seeing the non-existence of fire.

Q5: I think you gave your approval to Nancy's version of this statement, which makes good sense, but it is definitely not what you said before. She said, "If something that is an observable object of awareness is not observed, it is necessarily an object to which the conventional term of non-existence can be applied." She made that whole phrase the reason and you said that the reason is just, "If something that is an observable object of awareness is not observed."
DPR: Right, that is the reason.
Q5: She made the reason plus the predicate as the reason of her proposition. This is not the same as what you said, although it makes really good sense.
DPR: Maybe you can print it and then we can look at it later. It is hard for me to just work with the words, especially with language.

Q6: In regards to the relationship between different phenomena, we talked about the image, *nampa*. Does this include both generally characterized phenomena and specifically characterized phenomena?
DPR: *Nampa*. I think, in connection to Sautrantika Cittamatra together, it would be both.
Q6: Generally characterized phenomena and specifically characterized phenomena seem to be *gelwa*. We have concepts which are generally characterized phenomena. However, we also said that they could have a function, which would make them specifically characterized phenomena. From that point of view, generally characterized phenomena and specifically characterized phenomena would be *mushi*, and not *gelwa*.
DPR: Did you debate that?
Q6: No, it is just a question.
DPR: You should debate. That would be a nice subject.
Q6: In regards to the Sautrantika point of view, the ultimate is the specifically characterized phenomena, which are impermanent, but then their notion of nirvana seems to be a dissolving of the specifically characterized phenomena. They say nirvana is just peace, emptiness, and that there is no impermanent phenomena. Wouldn't that be the ultimate? How can the specifically characterized phenomena be the ultimate? What is nirvana then?
DPR: Nirvana is impermanent in this view. It is the continuum of the mind stream that rests in samadhi. It is not just a permanent mind. Your mind does not turn into permanent. So there is a continuity of this stream of consciousness which rests in the samadhi, and so it is still impermanent. That is why this view has been brought up even to the Mahayana view by many interpreters. They say the wisdom of Buddha is impermanent. They don't say the wisdom of Buddha is permanent in many of the interpretations.

[illegible]

Q6: Then you have the problem that impermanence is suffering, right? They are *tönchik*.
DPR: Is it? Not in this view. Suffering is more conceptual.

Q7: In regard to the first example, a proof statement of effect, you said that the order in which it was presented is different than the order of reason, predicate, and then example and subject. In our debates, should effect statements always be given in this order?
DPR: We could say that, as I said before, "At a base from which smoke arises, or a base where smoke billows forth heavily," can be the reason. The predicate is, "There necessarily exists fire." When you have the base here, it makes it difficult. Otherwise it can be reasoned very easily, with no problem. The kitchen is the example; "Here too there is smoke," is the subject. "Here" refers to the mountain pass with the smoke that we see in front of us. That is the subject. There exists fire because we see heavy smoke arising from that base. We can follow this same logic.

Q7: The base from which smoke arises, or billows forth heavily is the subject.
DPR: That's right. That's what I said before. That can be one way of looking at it. You can look at it either way. What makes it difficult is when we have this word "base." It makes it more subject than reason. We can have that as a reason to follow the same pattern. There are other Tibetan texts that give the same example in that structure, but they don't have this base here.
Q7: For our purposes, to change it a little so that we can follow one pattern would be helpful.
DPR: That's right. I think that would be better.

Q8: Each of these examples, for example, the first one which talks about smoke, is in the form of the second mode. Do we also need to present it in the first and third modes to complete the proof?
DPR: Yes. The first mode is pretty much present in these. When we say, "My aggregates too are produced" it shows the first mode relationship, the reason is present in my aggregates. The third mode is not clearly established here because once you establish the second mode, it is understood automatically that the third is there, it is implied.
Q8: In the examples presented, would each be considered a complete proof because of the structure it is put into?
DPR: That's right. However, the third one, the reverse pervasion, is coming later in the second set. It has its own set of the three. Either way, you can prove the probandum with the different ways of looking at it. You can look at it more strongly from the second mode, the forward pervasion, or from the third mode, the reverse pervasion.

Q9: This has to do with practice paths of self-aware direct valid cognition. In the text, Rangjung Dorje says that enlightenment isn't attained through contemplation, it is only through self-knowing wisdom that one actually attains enlightenment. Are self-aware direct valid cognition and yogic direct valid cognition linear, or does self-awareness, which I am assuming is the self-knowing wisdom, apprehend yogic direct valid cognition? Does one first experience self-aware direct valid cognition and then move into yogic direct valid cognition, or does self-aware direct valid cognition apprehend the yogic direct valid cognition?
DPR: Yes, it does.
Q9: That is the final way, as opposed to the yogic direct valid cognition?
DPR: Self-awareness is the most subtle, so to speak, state of consciousness. It observes, perceives or apperceives all the other states of mind or consciousness.
Q9: It apperceives samadhi and yogic direct valid cognition?
DPR: Yes, yogic-direct valid cognition. The one explained in Rangjung Dorje's text refers to wisdom rather than consciousness. The level of self-aware direct valid cognition is still the level of cognition, consciousness, which is slightly different from the wisdom aspect of it.
Q9: I thought self-awareness, in the sense of self-knowing, was prior to all the consciousnesses, and therefore, wasn't a consciousness.
DPR: It is a consciousness, yes. At this level one might say the difference is that one has more of a sense of duality, and the wisdom aspect of self-aware is beyond duality.
Q9: So is it progressively more fruitional throughout the paths?
DPR: Through yogic-direct valid cognition it transcends. All these eight consciousnesses are transcended into different states of Buddha wisdom. The consciousness aspect of it becomes wisdom, non-dual awareness, and then it becomes self-aware wisdom, rather than self-aware consciousness.

Q10: What is the function of the three types of correct proof statements? Why do we have them and what purpose do they serve? Because each one has to have the three modes to be a proof, why are they delineated in these three types?
DPR: I think that to understand reality, you can categorize it into three states. The first two, effect and nature, work with the actual state. Result or effect is working with the cause and effect level of how things function in the relative sense. Everything can be included in cause and effect. Nothing is beyond cause and effect. Everything is within cause and effect. When you analyze it through the resultant aspect, the effect, you can naturally understand the causal aspect of it. You understand the dharma of all relative phenomena through that.

The second is through the nature. Once you realize the nature of things, such as the nature of sound or aggregates, relative reality, then you are approaching the relative phenomena through that aspect. Either you approach through the cause and effect aspect, or through the true nature of that relative phenomena. In this particular view, when we talk about impermanence and so forth, it is more absolute.

The first two deal with existent things, and the last one is analyzing phenomena that do not exist. In order to have the correct comprehension of the phenomenon of non-existence, we use the third reasoning.

Q10: Aren't they just another way of talking about the three modes?
DPR: Yes. They all are three approaches to understand.
Q10: They are not the three modes.
DPR: No, they are not the three modes. They are three different ways to approach the three modes, because each one of them has three modes.
Q10: It seems like the nature examples are basically the first mode, the reason being in the subject. They seem similar. The effect seems to be the same thing as the forward pervasion. But you are saying they are not.
DPR: There is no such relationship here. We are applying the three modes, the method, the framework. The three modes are just a framework. It has nothing in it. They are like making three boxes or frames on a computer. All you have is the structure of the three frames, three blank frames. Then you have to fill in each of these three with the three ways of analysis. You can put in the effect, nature or non-observation. The three modes are the basic structure which has no particular form. You apply that in different forms. For example, when we say, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced," in that context we are using the three modes in the reasoning of nature. Just take these three divisions as three separate divisions. Each one of them possesses three modes.

INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION FOR OTHERS, PART II: CORRECT PROOF STATEMENTS CONSTRUCTED WITH DISCORDANT ATTRIBUTES

The second part of the inferential valid cognition for others is called the correct proof statement constructed with discordant attributes. The text says:

> "'A construction where both the subject in question and the dissimilar example have discordant attributes in terms of the reason and the predicate of the probandum' is the definition of correct proof statement constructed with discordant attributes."

This definition is similar to the first definition. Here, instead of having concordant attributes, it has discordant attributes. Correct proof statements constructed with discordant attributes are divided into the three aspects of effect, nature and non-observation, as before.

Correct Proof Statements with Discordant Attributes Based on a Reason of Effect

The first example says, "Wherever there is no fire, there necessarily is no smoke: for example, like on the blue billowing ocean. Here, there is smoke." Let's look at the definition with the example. In the example, the subject in question is the smoke. This subject in question is dissimilar to the example, the ocean where there is no smoke. The reverse pervasion is, "Wherever there is no fire, there necessarily is no smoke." "When there's no smoke," is the opposite of the sign, "having smoke." "No smoke" means "There is no fire." That is what it is trying to show. There is a reverse pervasion that says, "Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke." The correct reverse pervasion, in the technical sense, would be, "Wherever there is no smoke, there is no fire." It can go either way, it doesn't really matter. The correct way to say it in a syllogism would be, "Wherever there is no smoke, there is no fire."

No C → No B

c

When we say, "Here there is no smoke," "Here" is A, the subject. "Smoke" is C, the sign. When you have the reverse pervasion, then the sign becomes "no smoke." "No smoke" is the sign which develops the reverse pervasion with "No fire," the predicate. It is like looking at the syllogism in a more negative way.

First we had the syllogism ,"On the mountain pass where there is smoke, there is a fire, because there is a heavily billowing smoke." It is saying, "Wherever there is a strong smoke that you see on the mountain pass, that means there is a fire," which is a forward pervasion. The reverse pervasion says, "Wherever you don't see smoke, there is no fire." That is what we're saying here. The reverse pervasion says, "Wherever there is no smoke there is necessarily no fire", or "Wherever there is no fire, there is necessarily no smoke." The example is the ocean. (When you have an oil spill, then you can see smoke on the ocean. [Laughs]).

In the logical debate, it is understood that "Here" refers to the specific spot, specific point, which is in question. In this case, it would be the mountain pass where there is smoke. For that reason I gave the definition of "the subject in question" through the definition in three modes. In that way, you can identify through the definition what the subject in question means. You can see from the definition that "subject in question" refers to A, which is our interest, our subject that we want to know about. We want to know whether there is a fire, or not, whether it is impermanent or not, whether it is produced or not.

Correct Proof Statements with Discordant Attributes Based on a Reason of Nature

The second example is, "Whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not produced: for example, like space. The five aggregates of my own continuum are produced." In this case, it is a construction where both the subject in question, "The five aggregates of my own continuum" and the example, space, are dissimilar. Space is not the right example to show the meaning of five aggregates or impermanence. The definition says, "The subject in question and the dissimilar example have discordant attributes in terms of the reason and the predicate of the probandum." The reason here is "produced," the predicate of the reason is "impermanent," and the probandum is "the five aggregates are impermanent." Here we have the two opposite elements of the subject in question and the example subject. The example subject is space, and the subject in question is five aggregates. They are opposite elements. Again this is actually showing the reverse pervasion. It is saying, "Whatever is not impermanent is necessarily not produced, like space." In this view of Sautrantika, space is not produced, and so it is not impermanent. Therefore it says, "The five aggregates of my own continuum are produced." This is establishing the statement of the first mode, "The five aggregates are produced."

Correct Proof Statements with Discordant Attributes Based on a Reason of Non-observation

The third example is basically similar to that of the first division. The text says, "If at some base an entity suitable to appear is present, it is necessarily observed by valid cognition: for example, like an ox." [DPR laughs] "Here, fire is not observed." That is simple, right? It is saying that if there is any entity, or substantial thing appearing to exist, then it must be perceived or observed by a valid cognition, a consciousness. The example is "Like an ox." If an ox is here, it will be obvious to us that we perceive it. It will be obvious that we have this valid cognition of the ox. But when it is not here in the present, we can't see it. In a similar way, it says, "Here, fire is not observed." That is the third reasoning.

Summary

Khenpo Rinpoche says, "The many proof statements that are subdivisions of the above are to be known from 'The Continuous Movement of Waves on the Ocean of Texts on Logic, A Critical Analysis of Mind and Reasons.'" These are two separate books or texts. One is a critical analysis of mind and it's classifications, and the second is a critical analysis of the science of reasoning.

There is a slight difference between the inferential valid cognition for oneself and the inferential valid cognition for others. In the case of inferential valid cognition for oneself, we use syllogisms to develop such valid cognition, to develop such certainty. Syllogism consists of the three modes of reasoning. In the case of inferential valid cognition for others, we use correct proof statements. These statements may not necessarily follow the same pattern or structure as syllogisms, because they are not really correct in a certain way. They are not really valid cognition, but just proof statements. It is a statement of what you have correctly understood or realized. We make these statements in order to bring others to such an understanding and realization when we are not totally confused. [Laughter] C'est la vie. That is why I presented the three modes before. I have presented the three modes and the three types of inferential valid cognition arisen in dependence upon the three reasons of effect, nature and non-observation. It is important for us to use this first, in order to come to a correct proof statement. A correct proof statement will not become clear until we have a certain sense of mastering the syllogisms of the three modes and the three types of reasoning.

In traditional Tibetan Buddhist education, we have a saying that logic is learned or understood through debate. You can learn the syllogism and the logic by engaging in debate, and you can learn poetry by composing. There is no way you can learn poetry just by talking about it. You have to compose it and generate the whole sentiment within yourself in order to be inspired to write a good poem. There is no way we can write a beautiful poem through a conceptual or theoretical understanding of poetry. In a similar way, it is not possible to understand logic through reading books; you have to engage in debate. That is why it is important for us to use the three modes and syllogisms. We need to bring as many examples as we can to debate, and then you can begin to understand the correct proof statements. Proof statements are not different from the structure of syllogisms; they just have more of a statement style.

Q1: Can we go over the reverse pervasion, in terms of letters. The chart says, "Whatever is not B is necessarily not C." I just want to make sure that that is how you are expressing it. In the example you gave a few minutes ago, you said that in a syllogism the way to phrase this is, "Wherever there is not smoke, there is not fire." This would actually be "not C is not B."
DPR: That's right. What was the definition of reverse pervasion?
Q1: "A reason that has been determined not to be present in a single instance of that which does not correspond to the predicate."
DPR: That's right. So it shows clearly that C is not present in B.
Q1: C is not present in what is not B.
DPR: In the reverse pervasion, right?
Q1: Can we say that that means "not B" equals "not C?"
DPR: In a very subtle technical debate, if you say, "Whatever is not B is not C," that is not the correct way to develop this pervasion. I don't think it makes any difference in English. When you make this pervasion, it can go both ways. It doesn't matter that much. In the Tibetan debate, it has some point where there is a fault, if you say that.
Q1: I think it may be the case in English too, because of the *musum* relationship. *Musum* doesn't go both ways. Are you saying that it should really say, "Not C equals not B?"
DPR: Whatever is C is not B. It is the reverse pervasion. Whatever is C is not present in whatever is not B.
Q1: In the chart, "Structure of a Syllogism," it says, "Whatever is not C is not B."
DPR: You are saying the same thing in a different way. I am saying that "Whatever is C is not present in whatever is not B." It is a double negation. That is the correct technical way to develop this reverse pervasion. Maybe it makes it easier to say, "Whatever is not C is not B." To say, "Whatever is C is not whatever is not B" is saying the same thing, but it is a more technical way of saying it..
Q1: As far as the *musum* relationship, it works if you phrase it that way. It doesn't work if you say, "Whatever is not C is necessarily not B." For example, if you take something like, "This cushion has a color because it is red." "Has a color" is your predicate and "Is red" is the reason. It works to say, "Whatever is red is not present in what is not a color." It doesn't work to say, "Whatever is not a color is not red" because red is a subset, is *musum* to a color,. but not all colors are red. That was where we were having our confusion in our discussions.

Q2: If you give somebody a correct proof statement which is the result of your own realization of a valid cognition, will the effect on the other person be a new realization, whereas for you it is conceptual?
DPR: Yes, you can, but you may need to make more statements than just proof statements. A proof statement is a very simple way of saying what you have understood. It is almost like saying, "Sound is impermanent, because it is produced." That is what we have understood. We state it in a proof statement, saying "Whatever is produced is impermanent, like the sound." Therefore, the sound is produced.
Q2: That may not necessarily be new for the other.
DPR: They may not get the inferential valid cognition just from the proof statement. Therefore you may need to put forth syllogisms.
Q: Then that will be the process of producing a valid cognition for them.
DPR: That's right.
Q2: Is that process also debate?

DPR: That's right.
Q2: Would you clarify how to arrive at the probandum in these correct proof statements with discordant attributes?
DPR: We are looking at the second set from the reverse pervasion point of view.
Q2: The presence of the reason in the subject?
DPR: No, the presence of the reason in the subject is there, like "Here there is smoke," or "My own aggregates are produced." It clearly shows the presence of C in A. In the second set, the forward pervasion is not clearly shown because we are looking at the reverse pervasion at this point.

To make it more simple, look at the syllogism, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced." There are three ways to look at it, three modes. The first way is sound is produced. The reason, produced, is present in the quality of the sound. The second way is, "Whatever is produced is impermanent." You are really looking at one isolated cycle of pervasion, the forward pervasion. You just look at that particular part of the whole reasoning. The third way is, "Whatever is not produced is not impermanent," or "Whatever is not impermanent is not produced." We are looking at it more from negation, that whatever is not this is not that. At that very moment, you are just looking at one isolated cycle of pervasion, the reverse pervasion.

When you look at these two divisions of correct proof statements, you are isolating the two, forward pervasion and reverse pervasion. You just look at that section of the reason. The probandum is always the same, but you isolate that part to make it a clear relationship of the forward pervasion and reverse pervasion. That is what we are trying to develop.

Q2: Is forward pervasion concordant and reverse pervasion discordant?
DPR: That's right. But in all cases we are looking at the same set of reasons.
Q2: I find it difficult to locate the probandum in the reverse pervasion.
DPR: Let's look at the second example, "The five aggregates of my own continuum are produced." "The five aggregates of my own continuum" is the subject and the predicate here is "impermanent."
Q2: So the probandum is, "The five aggregates of my own continuum are impermanent."
DPR: That's right.
Q2: Is that we are trying to prove to the other through discordant attributes?
DPR: That's right. Whenever you want to find the probandum, it is always the subject and predicate. "My five aggregates are impermanent" is the probandum here. In the first example, "The mountain pass where there is smoke has fire," is the probandum.

Q3: My question is about whether the last sentence in each of the correct proof statements are concordant or discordant. It looks like each of these examples, it is always stated in the first mode. Is that true for all of them?
DPR: That's right.
Q3: If you know what the first mode is, then you will know where C is in the rest of the statement.
DPR: That's right. That is why these correct proof statements explicitly show the first mode, and then one of the second two modes. In the first section, where you have concordant attributes, it shows the forward pervasion explicitly and the reverse pervasion is implied. In the second set, the reverse pervasion is explicitly shown and the forward pervasion is implied. Therefore, you can clearly see from this structure that we are trying to say something to people. It is not a full thing that we want to know about. We break the thing that we have known down into pieces, and try to show that there is this pervasion here, therefore it is this, and therefore it isn't that.

Q4: I think you have given two different ways that we could work with the reverse pervasion. One of them seems workable in our debates and the other quite difficult.
DPR: Which two?
Q4: For example, let's take fire and smoke. Basically, wherever there is smoke there is fire. That's

not the reverse pervasion. If you see smoke, there has to be fire. But the reverse is not true. Sometimes you have a fire and no smoke, like when a blacksmith puts his anvil in the fire, it is red hot, and it doesn't smoke. That is the example of fire, but no smoke. I learned that from a Gelugpa; maybe Kagyus think differently.

DPR: Yes, that is why it says, "Smoke billows forth heavily." These are the attributes to make sure that whenever you see such smoke there is a fire because of that smoke.

Q4: But you can have a fire without smoke.

DPR: Yes, you can.

Q4: One way of presenting the reverse pervasion is, "Wherever there is no fire, there will definitely be no smoke."

DPR: Yes, that's the reverse way it is put forth in the proof statements.

Q4: The other way of presenting the reverse pervasion is, "Wherever there is smoke, there is definitely not not fire." Although this is true, I can't imagine how we can use it. I'm wondering if the first way isn't more usable and workable for us.

DPR: That is why I say that it doesn't make much difference between the two. The forward pervasion is, "Whatever is C is necessarily B," and the reverse is "Whatever is not B is necessarily not C. Either way is O.K.. But I think that in a technical debate, when you develop a relationship the other way, like from B to C, there will be some problem. I don't think it matters very much to us because we are not debating in that form, the exact format is not applied here.

Q5: This is a question about non-observation. The last sentence of the two examples of concordant and discordant seem to follow slightly different patterns. Rather than stating the first mode, which is what you do in the examples of effect and nature, you negate the probandum by saying A is not B. It says, "In the space in front of me too, fire is not observed." That's basically saying, A is not B, right?

DPR: That's right.

Q5: You are negating the probandum..

DPR: Negating the probandum?

Q5: Yes, A is not B. The reason isn't in there. I don't know how to construct that last sentence. It says, "At this base in front of me too, fire is not observed." Is that the negation of B?

DPR: The probandum here is given last.

Q5: Yes, I don't see the reason there. I thought the "base" was the subject and the reason is that the object of awareness, fire is not observed.

DPR: If something that is an observable object of awareness is not observed, it is necessarily an object to which the conventional term of non-existence can be applied: for example, like the horns of a rabbit. At this base in front of me, too, fire is not observed. It is saying that, if the fire is there, if any observable object is there, it should be observed by your awareness, by your consciousness. When it is not perceived or observed by any consciousness, it is the object of the common term which says there isn't such a thing existing, because it is an observable object which is not observed.

Q5: I think you said that correct proof statements with discordant attributes always involve a reverse pervasion, but I notice that the third example on page 11 is not a reverse pervasion. It doesn't seem to be a reverse pervasion because there are no "not nots" in it. It just seems like a statement of a forward pervasion.

DPR: Yes, because the third reasoning is usually put the other way. Here it is put in a positive way, and so it is reversed. Usually we say, 'There's no fire, because it is not observed." Here we are saying that if there is anything existing, it will be observable. It is put in a more positive sense, which is the reverse of the negative.

Q6: Do all reasons of effect and non-observability use the Tibetan word *yod ba*, or can they also use *yin ba*? Does it divide that way?

DPR: I have to think about all the subdivisions of effect and non-observability. Yes, I think it is mostly *yod ba* or *med ba*. I can't think of anything that is *yin ba* at this point.

Q6: Would all the reasonings regarding nature use the Tibetan verb yin ba, or would they be both *yod ba* and *yin ba*?
DPR: I think that most of the reasons with nature use *yin ba*. We would have to go into the subdivisions to make sure. I can't say definitely.

Q7: In our discussion group we were not clear about the difference between effect and nature. For example, if you have a candle flame lighting the room, the effect is that the flame lights the room. You can also say that the nature of the candle flame is to light up the place. Could you define these two so that they are clearly differentiated?
DPR: The definition of effect is a reason of effect which has the three modes, and the definition of nature is a self-nature reason with three modes. That is how it is technically defined. Effect always talks about a cause and effect relationship. For example, smoke comes from fire. There is a cause and effect relationship. When you have a present consciousness which arises from the past moment of consciousness, that is the direct cause and effect result. We usually look at the effect as a sign to infer the existence of the cause of that result. If you say that you have a bad headache this morning, a hangover, that is the result. From that you can infer, "Oh, I must have drunk a lot last night in the bar." It is cause and effect. You infer the cause from the result. The second reason is the reason which shows the nature of things. You can say that the nature of candlelight is luminous, burning, and however you define it. Does that answer your question?
Q7: It is not completely clear. In the example of the candle flame, there seems to be a clear cause and effect relationship which is the presence of the flame lighting the room.
DPR: No. When you say "candleflame," you have to specify whether you are using it as a subject, reason or predicate. Otherwise it doesn't make any sense. A candleflame is just a candleflame, and is just impermanence. When you put impermanence in the predicate, then the reason is *tönchik* with impermanence. It is the nature. If a candleflame is the subject, then what is the predicate? Depending on the predicate, you can decide what you want to prove. Do you want to prove the past moment of the existence of this candlelight? If so, you would have to put forth the first reason which is the effect. But if you want to prove that the light of the candle is impermanent, then you have to put forth the reason which is self-nature. It depends on what you are looking at and how you want to present the candle.

Using Syllogisms and Proof Statements in Debate

Q8: Could you further clarify the relationship between syllogism, proof statement and what we are doing in debate. Should we be working with syllogisms primarily in debate, or should we also be responsible for moving from syllogism to proof statements. Beyond that, should we be able to make proof statements, and then find the syllogisms in them?
DPR: Right.
Q8: All of the above? [Laughter]
DPR: Yes, that is what I was going to talk about. I think it is important to begin by working on syllogisms first, and then with correct proof statements. Without working with syllogisms we cannot do the correct proof statements, it would be very difficult. The syllogism is much shorter and makes it clear. It gives you the whole image, whereas the correct proof statements are looking at a specific section of that whole idea, whole thing. It is very difficult if we do not understand the whole logic first. I think that doing the syllogism first is important.

In order to do that, whoever is the challenger, which means every one of us, and whoever is the defender, also every one of us, must know the definition and the meaning of the three modes. If you don't know the three modes there is nothing to debate. Knowing the three modes, we have to bring our own examples to the debate. We have the example, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced."

You can use any example, like, "The white horse is a horse because..." Then you have to give a reason why it is a horse. You can bring different reasons to debate. If someone says, "A white horse is a horse," you can debate and argue, and say "It is not a horse, because a white horse is a color, it's not a horse." And also "A white horse is not a horse because it is a label, it is a conceptual image, and it's not horse, because it is an isolate. It's an isolate, not a horse. There is no separate isolate of horse outside horse. The horse must be an isolate." I am just giving you some ideas.

The most helpful thing is for everyone to prepare an argument, prepare some examples in their minds for debate by reflecting on the definitions, or by reflecting on the divisions that are given here for the syllogism. We have lots of questions about rebirth. It has been given here in the text, and I didn't hear anyone debating on it. We have such an example from Khenpo Rinpoche, saying, "Because of present awareness being here, there is the past moment of awareness. Because of that, the first very moment of awareness that enters the womb has a previous moment." That is the argument and you can debate on it forever. [Laughter].

Q8: Is there a way to bring the four relationships to debate, to the syllogisms? Or should we leave them separate?

DPR: Yes, most of the time you can. But it is not done in the syllogism discussion or debate per se, because it is a sidetrack. Then you lose track of the three modes and the application of the three modes. Before you develop the relationship, you go off on *musum* and *mushi* discussions, and before you come back to it, it becomes a long journey. You have to be aware of them, because if it is a nature reason, there is a *tönchik* relationship almost all the time. And if it's an effect reason, then it is a cause and effect relationship.

Q9: In our discussion group the question came up about the potential difference between a logical identity of two things, and another kind of relationship, like a dependent or functional relationship. The example we came up against was mental direct valid cognition and sensory direct valid cognition. On the one hand it seemed that they were *gelwa*, and on the other hand, one always arises in dependence on the other. There is a functional relationship or identity. It seemed like we were going down two different logical paths with those two ways of thinking. Could you remark on that?

DPR: Yes. When we talk about cause and effect relationship there are different categories of relationships. There is the direct cause and effect relationship, the indirect relationship, and the dependent relationship, which you are describing. Therefore, in this particular Hinayana presentation of cause and effect, it's divided into six different aspects of causes, and four different aspects of conditions. So there are different ways to connect and communicate with each other. We can look at them later if you are interested.

If you have on-line access there is a *Collected Topics in Logic* that you can study. The address is: http:/farady.clas.virginia.edu.

THE DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS OF NON-VALID COGNITION

We have completed the section on inferential valid cognition and have gone through the two first stages of the Lorik, which are the most important parts. We have gone through the sections on the two valid cognitions: direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition. The first one is non-conceptual and the second one is conceptual. The third stage is the result of valid cognition, and result of non-valid cognition. The section on the result of valid cognition we will do later, after we have finished the section on non-valid cognition. Non-valid cognition gives us a complete understanding of the valid and non-valid, direct and inferential. Therefore, we'll do non-valid cognition first because it is easier; then we'll come back to the result of valid cognition. After we understand what is valid and what is not valid, then it's easy to understand the result.

Non-valid cognition is defined here as a "consciousness which is deceived" [laughs]. That's an easy definition. A consciousness, awareness, or mind which is deceived is the definition of a non-valid cognizer. What the definition eliminates is very clear. When we say "consciousness," it eliminates material things. Consciousness eliminates this particular thing being material. Non-valid cognition is non-material and deceived. This is the description of what kind of consciousness it is.

Wrong Cognition

In the view of the seventh Karmapa, there are only two divisions of non-valid cognition: wrong cognition and doubt. Wrong cognition is defined as, "A mind that has engaged in its specific object in a wrong way" [laughs]. This is the deceived consciousness of conceiving an object in the wrong way. It doesn't mean the object is wrong, so to speak, but you conceive it in a wrong way. The basis or object of this consciousness is neither right nor wrong. The problem here is the mind itself and how it conceives or perceives. The way the object is perceived or conceived is wrong.

The first category of non-valid cognition is clearly illustrated with examples, such as clinging to the aggregates as permanent. There is a basis or object of our conception which is the five aggregates. This consciousness perceives or conceives these aggregates as being permanent. That is the "wrong" part, wrong aspect. It is not saying that the object of this conception, the basis of this object of conception, the five aggregates, is wrong. There's no problem with the object. The way it's perceived or conceived is a problem here. Is that clear? Non-valid cognition is easier. [DPR and students laugh].

Therefore, we have many wrong cognitions, such as perceiving the composition of the five aggregates as one. We conceive them as one instead of seeing them in their own state. This is perceiving the five aggregates as "me" or "I." Furthermore, the five aggregates, which have a subtle sense of continuity in their momentarily existent nature, are perceived as permanent. The permanence is held in the confused mind which sees the continuity of the five aggregates as permanent. The continuum is misunderstood to be permanent. It's very easy to look at the example of a river or waterfall. If you look at a river or waterfall, every moment it's a new waterfall; it's a new element of water that you perceive or conceive. You see a new element of river every moment, but you see it as the same waterfall, the same river. There's a sense of it being one or permanent. That is wrong cognition. Anything like this is called wrong cognition—for instance, seeing something that is empty in nature as an existent thing. This is wrong cognition: seeing the existence of a self when there's no self existent.

[illegible]

Doubt

The second aspect of non-valid cognition is doubt. [laughs, laughter] Doubt is defined here as: "A mind that is divided between two alternatives with respect to its specific object." That's easy, right? Doubt is a mind that is divided between two alternatives. You look at one specific object and you have two ideas, and so you don't know which one is correct. The famous example in logic is: you see a water well from a distance and then you get this doubt which says, "Is there water in that well? Is it a living well or a dead well? Is there water or not?" I think we have no problem with doubt—we have plenty. [laughter] Doubt is divided between the two, "yes" or "no": "Yes, there is water," or, "No, there isn't water." We have no certainty in that dichotomy.

I think this is why the other views of logic say that the direct perceptions have ascertainment. They say that whatever is valid cognition must have ascertainment. That is their view—it's not our view. Their view is that it's simple—such as when you see something through direct perception. For example, you see this glass, it's very clear, and there's nothing in between that creates a doubt. It's very certain and direct. At the same time, in the view of Khenpo Rinpoche and the seventh Karmapa, there's no ascertainment in this direct perception because direct perception is non-conceptual. Ascertainment is conceptual and therefore, at the direct perceptual level, there is no ascertainment. However, as a result of that perception, ascertainment arises, and then you get thought or concept which says, "Yes, there is water." This is ascertainment which results from direct perception. It is not ascertainment within that state of non-conceptual perception. With direct perception, that's very clear.

ascertainment
= conceptual

With inferential valid cognition, through signs we get ascertainment. We say, "O.K., there's very strong smoke coming out of this house and so this house must be on fire." We get a very strong ascertainment from the sign. We see the correct reason, the correct logic, and get a clear idea or ascertainment, which is not doubt. Then, there's no doubt about it.

Therefore, the second aspect of non-valid cognition is doubt. Rinpoche gives an example here which is very difficult [laughter]: "Are there former and later lives, or are there not." This is pure doubt. It's hard to solve this problem. If you have doubts, like "Is there water in the well, or not," it's easy to walk to the well and find out whether there is or isn't. But with our present example you have to analyze more. From this example, we can see how Rinpoche wanted us to use the logic in a more helpful way, in order to understand the relationship between former and later lives, or past and present lives.

Five-fold, Three-fold and Two-fold Subdivisions of Non-valid Cognition

Then Rinpoche says, "Concerning the mind that is a non-valid cognizer, there is [also] a fivefold presentation which is a general view of the logic in some other traditions." These five categories are: 1) non-cognition; 2) wrong cognition; 3) doubt; 4) correct assumption; and 5) appearance without ascertainment. These five divisions are summarized into three: 1) non-cognition; 2) wrong cognition; and 3) doubt. The five-fold division is the common Gelugpa view and the three-fold division is the view of Sakyapandita, a great scholar of the Sakya school. Rinpoche presents these two views here. The seventh Karmapa says that non-cognition is the general category and is divided into wrong cognition and doubt. He says you cannot bring the general idea of non-cognition into a specific division classification. Therefore, you cannot count non-cognition as a sub-category or sub-division because it isn't separate from doubt and wrong cognition.

[illegible] is general [illegible]

Then he says that correct assumption can be either doubt or inferential valid cognition. If you say, "Maybe there's water in the well," you're making an assumption. It may or may not be correct. You're still in a state of doubt. He says that assumption is doubt and no other than doubt; it cannot be a separate entity. Furthermore, if you have a correct assumption that arises from a reason, correct proof, logical proof, then that assumption is inferential valid cognition. If you say, "There is fire because I see smoke," that's also assumption. If that assumption has a correct reason and logical proof, then that is inferential valid cognition and cannot be non-valid cognition. It is a valid cognition. Is that clear?

When you're not sure whether there is water in the well or not, you're making an assumption that there is water. You don't have any correct reason or logical proof that there is water. Whereas, if you have an assumption that there is water because of such and such a sign, for example, then that assumption will be inferential valid cognition. It will be a correct understanding and a valid cognition which arises through reasoning. You have the right or correct reasoning through which you determine that there is or isn't water. The seventh Karmapa says that assumption is either doubt, the second sub-division of non-valid cognition, or correct valid cognition. If it's valid cognition, then it is inferential valid cognition. If it's not valid cognition, it is doubt, which is the second non-valid cognition. Assumption is not separate from doubt; you can't separate the two and say that one is doubt and one is assumption.

The fifth category is appearance without ascertainment. We have talked about whether two moments of direct valid cognition can arise simultaneously. For example, when we see an object, can we have the direct valid cognition of hearing a sound and smelling or tasting at the same time. If you're in a very good Italian restaurant, eating pasta, and talking to your friend, you have many things happening, lots of direct valid cognitions. Whenever you're in such a situation, direct valid cognition is wherever you put your main focus. If your main focus is on talking, your direct valid cognition is with the ear consciousness which perceives sounds. At that time, if you see something, it is appearance without ascertainment. If you are totally absorbed in, let's say, listening to a tape of the teachings or music, and if you look out the window and see someone pass by, after a moment you say, " Who was it?" You're not sure about it. You're not sure about what you've seen because your whole concentration has been on the sound, the ear consciousness. This doesn't mean that you haven't seen; you have seen something moving in front of your window, and that is why you say, "Who was it?" This is appearance without ascertainment and is non-valid cognition.

At the time when we clearly see a form, if we hear a sound, we do not gain any ascertainment of the sound. That sound that we hear with our ear consciousness is appearance without ascertainment. This is not talking about the object; it's talking about the consciousness that perceives the appearance, whether it's a form, sound, smell or whatever. The seventh Karmapa says that there's no ascertainment in direct valid cognition. Therefore, whatever you perceive by the sensory perceptions, direct perceptions, are valid whether or not you have ascertainment afterwards. In that very moment it has completed its function. Valid cognition has heard something, and did not bring a strong conceptual labeling afterwards, such as, "That was the voice of Steve." Therefore, the seventh Karmapa is saying that if there is an appearance without ascertainment, then all the direct valid cognitions are valid cognition because they are appearance without ascertainment. Appearance without ascertainment is a quality of direct valid cognition, and whatever is appearance without ascertainment is direct valid cognition; it's not non-valid cognition. The relationship here is *tönchik*. If it is direct valid cognition, it is appearance without ascertainment. Whether it's a form or sound, whatever, it is appearance without ascertainment. It if is an appearance without ascertainment in consciousness, then, as a perceiver, that perceiver is direct valid cognition.

The seventh Karmapa is saying that it is not necessary to divide non-valid cognition into five. At the same time, he's also saying the division into three by Sakyapandita is not appropriate. He says that non-cognition is the basis of classification. On the basis of non-cognition you have these two classifications of doubt and wrong cognition. For example, aggregate or skandha is divided into five, and you can't bring aggregate as a sixth division. By bringing aggregate as a sixth classification, then there would be six aggregates. So non-cognition is not a division, but more like the title of the category, or the basis of the divisions. It is the basis for further classification. Is that clear? I think what is not clear is the meaning of non-cognition.

Q1: You said that sentence construction is not a cognition, but it doesn't fall into non-valid cognition. What is sentence construction?

DPR: The proof statement.

Q1: Yes.

DPR: I think the problem is the term non-cognition, which is the basis of all. Non-cognition sounds like it is not a cognition, not mind or something like that. In English, how does it sound to natives.

Q: Sounds dead.

DPR: Sounds dead. In Tibetan, how would you translate it?

Elizabeth Callahan: Lack of understanding.

DPR: Yes, or not knowing, something like that.

Q: Non-comprehension?

DPR: Something like that. Non-comprehension or not knowing.

EC: Could you give an example?

DPR: Yes, wrong cognition and doubt. [laughter] [DPR laughs]. Yes, these are the divisions of that. First you have non-comprehension or not knowing. That is divided into two: wrong cognition and doubt. In wrong cognition you haven't really understood; you haven't really correctly comprehended what the object is. In doubt you have not come to any clear comprehension, clear understanding, where you say, "There is," or "There isn't." Then Khenpo Rinpoche says, "The presentation of their refutations and proofs are to be known from the 'Critical Analysis'". We did that briefly when we looked at the five categories and how it is not appropriate to divide them into five or three. We did a brief analysis that came from Rinpoche's *Critical Analysis*. Was your question answered or not?

Q1: Probably it doesn't quite fit into what you're discussing. If you look at mind and you divide it into valid cognition and non-valid cognition, does that mean that cognition is everything that occurs within mind? There are other things like the proof statement and feeling. Is cognition everything that is mind?

DPR: Yes.

Q1: How does the sentence construction, for example, fit in? Where do feelings fit in? Would feeling be a valid cognition? Obviously you can't say it's a non-valid cognition.

DPR: Proof statements cannot be classified as valid cognition, inferential valid cognition. It's not real valid cognition because it's words and sound. It's not really a consciousness because you're just putting these statements in words for someone to understand. We're not saying that it's not coming from mind; it's coming from mind. It's coming from your valid cognition of the inferential valid cognition of oneself. It arises from there. Its nature is not consciousness because it is a statement; it is just simply a statement which is a sentence construction.

Q2: Is ascertainment conceptually knowing that you've had a direct valid cognition, or could it be the second moment of sensory perception?

certainty

DPR: When we say ascertainment, it is the certainty that, "I've seen a glass." That certainty is called ascertainment.

Q2: It's pretty evolved. You have already had a concept.

DPR: That's right. That's what the seventh Karmapa is saying. The other view is saying that within that very direct perception itself, there is a certainty. So, I think they are saying that certainty is not conceptual.

Q2: I would think that mental direct perception has a certain kind of certainty.

DPR: Certain kind of certainty.

Q2: Because it's made an impression on you.

Yes, this,

DPR: Yes. that's what we are talking about. Mental direct valid cognition is like the borderline between direct perception and concept. We can't distinguish or differentiate between the concept which arises right after and itself. Therefore, it may seem to us that there is some certainty in mental direct perception, but actually it is like a result, so to speak, which arises right after the direct perceptions. Then you have certainty and you say, "Glass." Even without labels, there's a certain aspect of certainty. First you arise after the direct perception, and then you have the gross labeling process that says, "Oh, this is a glass." That is the first gross aspect of labeling. The second is, "Oh, this is a glass in Söpa Chöling," or, "This is a glass that belongs to this kitchen." We can go on with different labeling.

Q2: In yogic direct valid cognition you say that there's no certainty. If you're at the stage where you're beyond concept, is there no certainty?

DPR: That's right. That is what is being debated in the text. The text says, if the direct perceptions have certainty, then the Buddha should have certainty. If the Buddha has certainty, then Buddha has thoughts, concepts. If the Buddha has thoughts and concepts, then he has labeling mind, discursive mind. If Buddha has discursive mind, then his mind is disturbed with the labels of "good glass," "bad glass" and so on. Therefore you can't have ascertainment in basic valid cognition.

Q2: So ascertainment is dual.

DPR: It's conceptual, yes. That's the seventh Karmapa's view. We are just looking at one presentation, one view, which is the seventh Karmapa's view. We are also looking at the other views, such as the Gelugpas who say they have ascertainment. We have our own space to sort of analyze by reasonings, debate, discussion, and maybe analytical meditation. Then we see how to come to an understanding.

Q3: When there is a proof statement, which is neither valid cognition nor non-valid cognition, and if Sangpo constructs such a correct proof statement, it would be just words. When I am curious and listen to him, that could ignite a valid cognition on my part.

DPR: That's right.

Q3: Would there still be something in between that is not mind? There is Sangpo's valid cognition, then something is a sound, and then my valid cognition. So there's mind, then no mind, and then there is mind again.

DPR: There's a rock in between. [laughter] Oh, that's a mystery. No, actually when we make such a correct proof statement, and when we are making it through our own knowledge and understanding, at that moment it is not valid cognition. If Sangpo is making that correct proof statement, whatever Sangpo's understanding is at that point is non-valid cognition because it is the second or third moment of his understanding of that probandum. Sangpo has already understood the probandum and his inferential valid cognition has already arisen. It's sort of a post-state of that inferential valid cognition. For him it's not an inferential valid cognition anymore. When he makes that statement, it is coming from that inferential valid cognition. If Sangpo had never understood that sound is impermanent because it's produced, he would never have had the courage to put forth such a statement. When your consciousness first has a direct contact with the sound that translates into concepts, that translates into logic, the correct logical states, and that logic brings you to the correct inferential valid cognition of "Sound is impermanent."

Q3: Why is curiosity necessary? Sometimes people learn because it's beaten into their heads, so to speak. [laughter]

DPR: When we say the subject in question, which means that the subject is not ascertained, if you knew the subject already you would not be interested in learning it again. If you have known that subject already, it will not be an inferential valid cognition.

Q3: If there is ignorance which has aggression in it, such as, "I don't want to know that," or , "I don't want to believe in impermanence," and then I die, [laughter] would that be inferential cognition without this curiosity?

DPR: At that point, it's not inferential, it's direct. [laughter]. When you have curiosity about death, then you learn from reasoning, which says, "We will die because we're impermanent." When you don't believe in that whole system, then when you die it's more direct experience rather than inferential.

Q4: Regarding yogic direct valid cognition, after you have that first instant, you enter the path of seeing, the first bhumi bodhisattva does the next meditation session, and has the exact same realization as the previous meditation session. What do you call that type of cognition? It can't be

yogic direct because it's not fresh or newly arisen. He's having the same insight. In other words he hasn't progressed at that point.
DPR: I think in this view, every moment, when you go back, is new experience. There's no repetitive experience. Even at the sensory level it's not repetitive. In realization, whatever you do is not repetitive; it's new, direct experience. At the same time it adds on more qualities. This is called the three qualities of clarity, progression and completeness which are improved throughout the stages. These three are developed or added on in each session of practice throughout the path of meditation. Your realization of emptiness will be more clear, more progressive, and more complete in each stage of progression on the path. Otherwise there would be no sense in going on, dragging on for ten stages. [laughter]

Q5: I don't understand how doubt can be a division of non-cognition, because the definition of cognition is awareness. You're talking about non-awareness, and it seems like anything that's happening in the mind, doubt or wrong cognition, is still awareness. To me, non-cognition means no awareness. Non-cognition which includes doubt and wrong cognition seems like a contradiction.
DPR: That's right. That's why we were trying to re-translate this word in Tibetan. Tingzin suggests non-comprehension. Other suggestions were not knowing and not understanding. This translation is very weird. It sounds almost like not being aware, or not being mind.

Q6: Are all the 51 mental factors included in cognition, or is cognition included in the 51 mental factors?
DPR: Which cognition?
Q6: All of them.
DPR: In general?
Q6: Yes.
DPR: They all have to be cognition, yes. Cognition means mind, right?
Q6: In the text, it is divided into valid cognition, non-valid cognition and also direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognitions.
DPR: Yes.
Q6: We tried to figure out the relationship between chair and emptiness and we thought it was *musum*. However, if you try to establish *musum*, you have to say one thing which is not a chair and not emptiness. You can't really find anything which is outside of emptiness. So what can we say about the relationship between chair and emptiness? It's not *gelwa, tönchik, musum* or *mushi*.
DPR: That's a good question. Usually it's more like *musum*. If you have to find something that is neither, you cannot find that one that is not emptiness.

musum

Q6: What about wisdom?
DPR: Wisdom is emptiness. Emptiness is taught in three stages. The first is called the stage of no analysis, the second is the stage of slight analysis, and the third is the stage of thorough analysis. The same term is used in different ways. No analysis refers to the relative truth, the conventional truth. Slight analysis is the stage where you have the presentation on emptiness, yet still in the relative context. This is when we talk about emptiness, reason about emptiness. The third stage is where you really reach the level of emptiness which goes beyond concept and thought. Therefore, you may say the emptiness of the third stage is neither emptiness nor chair, because as long as we stay in this *musum*, it is still on a relative level.

Q7: An inferential valid cognition has to have this reason with the three modes. In the discussion groups that was easy to present. However, if you put it into a proof statement, it seems to get more complicated. You do this proof statement because you want to teach. Is it that you want to try to instigate inferential valid cognition in another mind?
DPR: Yes. Proof statements are done to clearly show others the relationships of forward and reverse pervasions. In order to show them you do the proof statement. You say, "Whatever is impermanent is produced," like the clay pot. Then you say, "Sound is also impermanent," or something like that.

You're right. It is to show others.

Q7: But it is not to show how smart we are. [laughter] but it is so that they get this valid cognition too.

DPR: Yes.

Q7: From my experience, it was much easier to bring this about if you leave it in the original form of the...

DPR: The three modes?

Q7: Yes, of the syllogism.

DPR: Yes. The primary method is the three modes and the syllogism reasoning. We can mainly do that, that's no problem. The proof statement can be used as a helping method to further develop the relationship of the forward and reverse pervasions when they are not clear.

Q7: Would it be valid to use other proof statements, such as "This clay pot is impermanent because it's produced."

DPR: That's a syllogism.

Q7: Then you might say, "Look, if you produce something you will find it will fall apart some day."

DPR: Yes. That's not called the proof statement. That is the follow-up reasoning. Your primary reasoning is, "The clay pot is impermanent because it's produced." And then, you continue with that syllogism and say, "Look, whatever is a clay pot will fall apart." You continue the statement or syllogism that you have made. It's a follow-up reasoning. So it would not be called a proof statement.

Q7: Why the proof statements? Why do we have this strict form?

DPR: This is just the basic suggestion, the basic form of the syllogism. It has the subject, predicate and reason, and then three modes. In order to establish the three modes, we have the forward and reverse pervasions, which are clearly shown in the proof statements which are in two formats. It's not a definite number. You can have four or five if you find something that is separate from these three. However, I think it's hard to find a separate entity of logic.

Q7: I was thinking that it's easier just to say the forward pervasion, "Everything that is produced is impermanent," without using an example.

DPR: Well, sure. That's fine. No problem. It may be easier if you have an example. However, if you find it's easier without examples, that's also fine. No problem. [laughs, laughter]

Q8: You said that we can have only one direct valid cognition at a time. Is there a time when we can have more than one?

DPR: Yes. That's right.

Q8: Could you say more about when that is?

DPR: Did I say you could only have one?

Q8: What does it mean to have more than one at a time?

DPR: You can have more simultaneously. For example, right now we're having two or three going on: we're seeing form, that's a direct valid cognition of the eye consciousness; we have the direct valid cognition of the ear consciousness hearing sound; and we may have direct valid cognition of tasting something, if you're chewing gum. So we can have three at the same time? Is that clear?

Q8: Can you have more than one ascertainment at a time? [laughter] That's what I meant.

DPR: Oh, ascertainment. Ascertainment in the view of the seventh Karmapa and Khenpo Rinpoche is thought, concept; it only comes after the direct valid cognition. Let's say that after I see this room with the eye consciousness, I have an ascertainment thought which says, "Oh, this is the shrine-room."

Q8: I thought you were saying we could only focus on one direct valid cognition at a time. I remember you said that through practice or realization, or in certain circumstances, we might be capable of extending that focus so that we can know more than one direct valid cognition at a time. Maybe I'm mistaken. It sounded interesting.

DPR: We were talking about different ways of perceiving things. Someone asked that when you see an object, do you see each aspect, each element of that object, one by one, or simultaneously. It is said in these teachings that you can actually have the perception of seeing the whole aspect of the thing. For example, when you look at this book, you're seeing many, many different partless particles, and then the aspects of those particles, you perceive them together. One view is saying that you cannot see them all simultaneously, but only one by one, individual aspects, like pixels. If you look at the pixels, there's many squares. Pixel is a computer graphic thing. Pixel is like a square and you have different colors in each square. One view is saying you perceive them one by one in the direct perception process, and there is no such thing as seeing all of these aspects in one instance, simultaneously. Because it's going so fast we see them all together as a colorful image. Actually we're perceiving them one by one which may be true, I think. This view is pretty interesting because if you really look at your own experience, in order to see something very clearly, you have to go one by one. When you generally look at this room, you see colorful images. If you want to know each image, if you really want to know what you're seeing, you have to go to each individual, like Tingzin, Wangchuk, Steve and Sangpo. You see them individually to see them very clearly.

Therefore, in direct perception, you can have different perceptions simultaneously. Different sensory perceptions, like the eye and ear consciousnesses, can appear together. While you see an image you can hear a sound. You can have two moments together, but it's two separate perceptions. If you just look at one perception alone, like the eye consciousness, then to see an image, you have to go through each aspect to perceive each aspect. It's a momentary perception; you do not see them all clearly in one instance.

Q9: That's actually called the binding problem in consciousness studies. Thrangu Rinpoche was talking about the four types of nirmanakaya: supreme, created, emanated, and various. Could you say more about the various type of nirmanakaya, like relics, stupas and mountains.
DPR: I think it's more like the activity of the nirmanakaya buddha, such as a reliquary shrine. Many sentient beings connect with the enlightened heart of that particular buddha by having some encounter with that substantial manifestation. It's more like the activity of the nirmanakaya rather than the living nirmanakaya. In a way, it's a living nirmanakaya buddha because even when the buddha is present and living in human form, buddha is not going through a conceptual process of labeling like us. It's not much different in some sense. Maybe that's what it is; I don't know exactly.
Q9: I've never been able to understand why they would posit things like little blue flowers in your eye and copper needles in your nose [laughter]. What possible function could that sort of reductionism have, outside of maybe writing poems?
DPR: [laughs] I think it's mainly to symbolize the subtle sensory organs. We can see the gross or coarse sensory organ, an eyeball or whatever we have in the ear. There's a more subtle aspect of the sense organ, and so this is showing what the subtle aspect is because we can't perceive the subtle aspect. They make these images to conceptualize, to think about it. They say that it is like a flower within the sensory organ, or something like that. I think that's what it means. Even when you do not have a physical body, there is some basis of sensory organ to give rise to these perceptions. Otherwise how can bardo beings see? There's no eyeballs, no physical sense organ. How can they hear sound, smell and taste? When we talk about the formless god realm, there's no physical form, physical existence. Still they have some aspect of these perceptions, mind, samadhi.

Q10: Rinpoche, I remember the definition of valid cognition as being both undeceiving and new. Here, under non-valid, there is just one of those, "undeceiving." New has dropped out of the picture. Could you comment on that? When we were going through inferential valid cognition, you were making the point that it has to be new. It seems like "not new" should be here because otherwise, you'd get in trouble if you did a valid cognition the second time. It couldn't be valid because it's not new. On the other hand, it's not invalid because it's not deceptive, not deceived.
DPR: In some sense it can be new but not valid. That's why maybe it's not there, like not new and yet not valid. It says, "Mind that has engaged in its specific object in a wrong way." When you get engaged in that particular object, in the first moment of seeing, for example the five aggregates, it may not necessarily be old. It can be just the first moment of perception, but then you see it wrongly afterwards. The afterthought is saying, "It's permanent, it's continuous, " or whatever

label we give it. In the logic we talk about the object of engagement. Some consciousnesses are mistaken in the object of engagement. For example, when you see a mirage, it's new, it's new consciousness, you're seeing it very new. Later you label it as "water," which is the wrong connection. In what we call the appearing object and the engaging object, you're making a mistake. You have the appearing object, which is just simply mirage, and the engaging object which is water, but then you don't get water, so it's wrong cognition.

Q10: I was thinking it should say "deceptive" or "new" because you said that the second time you do an inference, it's not new and so it's not a valid cognition. I would think that would have to be invalid.

DPR: The second time you put forth the syllogisms?

Q10: Yes.

DPR: Yes, it's not valid.

Q10: It's not deceptive is it? It's not deceived.

DPR: It's not deceived. No. It's more like recollection, memory, I think. It doesn't click you into any new knowledge or realization. You invoke the memory of knowing that reasoning. You say, "Oh, yes, it was impermanent." It's not saying, "Yes, it is impermanent," or "Oh, I see, it's impermanent." That's new realization and is not the product of second time syllogisms. Does that make sense?

Q10: I was thinking that everything broke down into valid cognition and non-valid cognition, but maybe it breaks down into valid, invalid and seemingly valid, which is the third category.

DPR: Yes.

Q10: Is that how it works?

DPR: Yes. You have valid cognition. There's seeming direct valid cognition which is not real direct valid cognition but appears like valid cognition.

Q10: Is that under the category of non-valid?

DPR: Direct valid cognition is presented as direct valid cognition and seeming direct valid cognition. So it's the second one, which also includes some of the inferential valid cognition.

Q: And that which is arisen from inference, which is exactly what Scott is talking about.

DPR: Sounds good. Maybe we can dig up the old file and check the seeming direct valid cognition, look at the divisions and categories and see where this falls into. Maybe that would help.

Q11: You mentioned something about subsequent cognizer. You said that the moment that is not inferential cognition, but is not new, is called a subsequent cognizer. Are you saying that that would be considered seeming direct valid cognition?

DPR: That is in our view. It's included in recollection. You remember what you have seen or understood, and so it's categorized as recollection or memory. That is seeming direct valid cognition.

Q11: Are you saying that seeming direct valid cognition is non-valid cognition?

DPR: Yes.

Q11: Are they equivalent?

DPR: Yes.

Q11: Is seeming direct valid cognition *tönchik* with non-valid cognition?

DPR: No. It cannot be because seeming direct valid cognition includes inferential valid cognition. This is a good place to do *musum* or *mushi*: [laughter] what is the *musum* or *mushi* relationship between seeming direct valid cognition and non-valid cognition? At first I thought it was *tönchik*. It's not.

Q11: When seeming direct valid cognition is presented in the text, it's talking about direct valid cognition.

DPR: That's right.

Q11: However, it includes inferential valid cognition. Seeming direct valid cognition is made up of a number of different things, some of which are direct valid cognition.

DPR: Yes. Seeming direct valid cognition is trying to show what is not direct valid cognition. So when you try to show what is not direct valid cognition, it includes the inferential valid cognition because it is not direct valid cognition

Q11: It also includes what is non-valid cognition.
DPR: That's right. Yes.
Q11: So this category on page twelve, non-valid cognition, refers to both non-valid direct and inferential cognition. When you say a consciousness which is deceived is a non-valid cognizer, can it be a non-valid direct cognizer as well as a non-valid inferential cognizer?
DPR: Yes. Conceptual as well as non-conceptual.
Q11: Does non-valid cognition apply to both categories of valid cognition: non-valid direct and non-valid inferential?
DPR: Not really. That's why we're saying it's a *musum* or *mushi* relationship. This is because inferential valid cognition is one of the seeming direct valid cognitions. This means it's not a direct valid cognition, but it is a valid cognition because it is inferential valid cognition.
Q11: Is there some kind of direct cognition that's also called non-valid?
DPR: Yes. That's the seventh category of seeming direct valid cognition.
Q11: The cataracts.
DPR: Yes

THE RESULT OF VALID COGNITION IN THREE PARTS

We have looked at non-valid cognition and today we'll look at the result of valid cognition. The explanation of the presentation of valid cognition has three parts. The first part is the result of valid cognition when there's no examination or analysis, which means there is no reflection or contemplation. The second part is the result of valid cognition when there is slight analysis or contemplation. The third part is the result of valid cognition when there is thorough analysis, which is more like thorough reflection, contemplation or the meditation state. Rinpoche has put these three into verse form, and so we have these three four-line verses.

When There Is No Analysis

The first verse is the result of valid cognition when there is no analysis is. Rinpoche says:

> "In terms of unexamined commonly accepted [understanding],
> The outer object itself is asserted to be the object of comprehension,
> The apprehended aspect to be a valid cognizer,
> And the cognition of the object to be the result of valid cognition."

At each stage there is an object, a subject, and then the result of that interaction. No examination or analysis here refers to the unexamined, commonly accepted mundane norm. It is the conventional understanding in our ordinary, mundane world without any intellectual analysis or insight of reflection. At this stage the outer object is asserted to be the object of comprehension. Outer objects refer to forms outside, sounds outside, and so on. In the Sautrantika view, they are the hidden object, but in the mundane conventional world there is no such distinction made between the hidden object and perceived object. They are seen as one, together, simply object. When we see this book, in the conventional sense we believe that we see the book outside. We don't talk about seeing an aspect of a book outside. We also do not talk about not seeing the hidden object or svalakshana level of indivisible, individual particles. Therefore, in this mundane conventional norm, the object is what we perceive altogether without making any distinction. Outer things are just simply known as the object.

The valid cognizer at this level, according to Dharmakirti, is the apprehended aspect. [laughs] That apprehended aspect makes reference to [and differs from—ed.] the aspect of an object that we were talking about in the Sautrantika view—the hidden object at the atomic level. The hidden object is the indivisible particles that we can't perceive or conceive directly by any consciousness. What you really perceive in the Sautrantika view is the apprehended aspect of an object. It is sort of a reflection of your mind projected on the particular object, a dual product of your mind as well as the indivisible particles. If you don't have the indivisible particles of the hidden object, then you can't have an aspect of that object. If you don't have a glass outside, you cannot have the aspect of a glass outside. In order to have an aspect of a glass in front of us, we have to have a glass outside, as well as an apprehending mind.

[A musical sound] That's nice. We need that from time to time. Next time it will be the gong. Is there a guitar here? In the Tashi Lumbo Gelugpa monastery they have developed a whole ritual on Dharmakirti's logic text, the *Pramanavartika*. They do a whole practice of the first chapter of the *Pramanavartika*, and they also have this great torma burning ritual connected to that chapter. So we could play cymbal, drum and music in between the Lorik.

The apprehended aspect is that whenever you have an object outside, you have the projected aspect of that object. If you have the color blue outside, you have the projected aspect of that blue. If you have a square shape outside, you have the projected aspect of that shape which arises from that hidden object as well as your mind projecting on that hidden object. For an ordinary person at the mundane level, they are seen as inseparable. When you say "glass," it is just simply a glass. We can not separate the hidden object of the glass and the projected aspect of the glass. We perceive it as just one entity, a mixed entity, which is confused mind.

We are making a subtle separation between the two. Whatever is the outer object is seen as the object, and the aspect of that object is a valid cognizer because it is an aspect of mind. It is not an outer thing. It is an aspect of mind that you project outside on the particular thing or entity.

The result of that is the cognition of the object. It is like the understanding of the object, or the perception of the object. Later you say, "Oh, I perceived a glass," "I've conceived a glass." That is the result of valid cognition when there is no examination. We are trying to see the difference between the hidden object, the real object outside, and the aspect of that object. When you say "object," there are two things happening. One is the *svalakshana* of the object outside, the compound indivisible particles. It is not perceived or conceived by any cognition, consciousness or mind. In the Sautrantika view it is not possible to perceive or conceive. Therefore it is always called the hidden object. It is hidden from perception, from conception, and it is not perceived or conceived directly. Like the fire on the other side of the mountain, it is always hidden as long as you stay here. That is one thing that is happening with the object.

The second thing is the aspect of that object which is perceived in the Sautrantika view. The aspect of the object, which we can perceive, is called the apprehended aspect. This is similar to modern science. Science says that you can't perceive the atomic level of things directly, you need machines to see it. You can't see it directly by your perception. You still perceive something, but what is it that you perceive? It is the aspect of that object, of the particles. That aspect that we perceive directly with our consciousness in the Sautrantika view is known as the apprehended aspect of the object.

There are two attributes to the object that we are talking about. In the first level, when we perceive an object we always think that we are perceiving the outer object directly, that our perception can see the atoms of the object directly. That is usually what we think. When we perceive a table we think that we are perceiving atomic existences outside the table. When we perceive a sound we think that we perceive all the particles of the sound directly with our ear consciousness. In the Sautrantika view, that is our mundane understanding of how object and perception work. We think there is the object, and there is a perception which perceives it. Out of that perception and object we get the resulting cognition of the object. We say, "I perceived the table," or "I conceived a table."

[A plane flies by]
DPR: Is that military? I didn't know Canada had a military.

Q: It's an older plane.

DPR: World War II? I?

Q: War surplus.

DPR: That is the first level of no examination or analysis. Dharmakirti says that as long as you are in that conventional level, the valid cognition that perceives the object is only the apprehended aspect. You can't directly perceive any object. Indivisible particles are not perceivable, conceivable. When we say, "the cognition of an object," it has both a perceptual level and a conceptual level. We perceive or see a thing, and then we have a concept of whatever we have perceived. There are two levels of the result. We say, "I perceived a glass. I saw a glass." When we say, "I saw a glass" there are two things happening: you are talking about your perception of perceiving a glass and you are conceiving the label of the glass. You are conceiving the mixture of perception and conception at the same time. Is that clear?

Q: Are you saying that the perception is the valid cognizer and the result is the concept?

DPR: In a way. The result has both because if you look at the chart, you can't have a concept without perception. Conception arises from these perceptions. Therefore both of them are in the result. Obviously it becomes more conceptual at the resultant stage. You say, "I perceived the glass." It's a very conceptual thing. At the same time the result has the result of the perception. You perceived a glass and that is why you have the concept.

Q: This statement says that the apprehended aspect is the cognizer, the one who cognizes.

DPR: That's right.

Q: It's like saying the object is subject.

DPR: That's right. In the Sautrantika view there is no object that has been perceived. It is the aspect of the object that has been perceived. That aspect of an object is an aspect of the mind that has been projected outside. That is why we are getting closer to the Cittamatra view, and why this Dharmakirti Dignaga view is seen as the combination of the Sautrantika Cittamatra view. There is a sense of the Sautrantika view because they still talk about the object outside, the hidden object. They won't give up the subtle level of atomic existence. They are not yet at the level of modern science, modern physics.

Q: In the first line, I understand that the outer object itself is mistakenly asserted to be the object of comprehension. Would that be correct?

DPR: Mistakenly asserted. Yes, you can say that.

Q: Would that also apply to the second line? The apprehended aspect is mistakenly asserted to be a valid cognizer.

DPR: Yes.

Q: And the cognition of the object...

DPR: [laughs]... is mistakenly the result of valid cognition. Yes.

Q: O.K. Good. Thanks. [laughter]

DPR: If you compare the first line with the second, it is a mistake. You are right. If you compare the second with the third, the second becomes more relative. We can't really say it's a mistake, in the sense that it is relative to that particular phenomenon in the world. When you get to the Cittamatra view, the Sautrantika view becomes more relative. When you get to the Madhyamaka view, the Cittamatra view becomes more relative.

Q: I don't think in the common experience you would even have an idea about apprehended aspect. It just doesn't occur. You just think that the object is out there. You just forget about the apprehended aspect.

DPR: Yes. Dharmakirti is saying that in the common, mundane sense, we believe that the consciousness or perceiver perceives an object outside. When you posit such a thing clearly and say what you have really perceived, which perceives what, then Dharmakirti says that the closest reality you can come to is to say that the apprehended aspect is the valid cognizer. Otherwise there is no way to say that we have perceived an object, because the hidden object is not perceivable, conceivable.

Q: Whenever you ask an ordinary being about images that occur in the mind, they would say that that is the mind, it's not the object.

DPR: When you say, "I perceive this glass," when you say that in the mundane sense, that perception is the apprehended aspect. Let's move to the second and third verses, and then come back.

When There Is Slight Analysis

The second verse says:

> "In terms of slight analysis,
> The apprehended aspect is asserted to be the object of comprehension,
> The apprehending aspect to be a valid cognizer.
> And self- awareness to be the result of valid cognition."

This is different. It changes a lot. It says that the apprehended aspect, which was earlier said to be the valid cognizer, is now the object of comprehension. This is getting closer to the Sautrantika view, or closer to the analyzed view of Buddhist tenets. The apprehended aspect of an object which we perceive to be the object of perception, is the perceiver. The valid cognizer, in this case, is the apprehending aspect, mind, the perceiver. There is more of a sense of perceiver in the apprehending aspect. It does not have any sense, feeling or idea of being an object. It is clearly the subject, the perceiver. It is very obvious. Whereas when we talk about apprehended aspect, it is still an object. There is a level of conception or perception that thinks that it is an object. It is felt to be more of an object than a subject. Here the apprehending aspect is clearly the subject that perceives or conceives the object, and that apprehending aspect is the valid cognizer. The apprehending aspect is the mind that perceives the outer aspects of apprehended objects. It is apprehending the apprehended aspects. [R. laughs] That's nice.

[illegible] description [illegible]

At this level mind is going into a more subtle experience of the object. It is not just an appearing object, but you are experiencing it more closely. In the earlier stage it was just the aspect of the glass. Now it is the experience of the aspect of the glass, however we experience it. We see it as a glass, we experience it as a pleasant or unpleasant experience, or a clear or unclear experience. We have so many different ways to experience the object. If you see this glass in a very dark room, you perceive the aspect, but not clearly. You experience it in a different way. Therefore the different aspects of apprehending are the valid cognizer at this level.

The result is self-awareness, the mind that experiences both. It is the mind that experiences insight, the inward experience of the perceiver. We comprehend or apprehend an object by our perceptions, but after we apprehend the object that perception is itself being perceived by self-awareness. That perception itself, the apprehending aspect, is perceived by self-aware valid cognition. That self-awareness is the result of this second stage. At the second stage the result is becoming more subtle than the conceptual level. At the first level there is more of a conceptual level of the result, where we say, "I perceived this glass. I heard a sound." It is a very coarse, gross aspect of an experience of the object. At this level we are going into a more subtle experience of the object, into the final level of experiencing the object that is being fully experienced by the self-awareness. The full experience of that valid cognition is the result of the second stage of slight analysis.

[illegible] between [illegible] 2nd stage

Slight analysis happens at the level of some contemplation; it doesn't happen in a mundane sense. It needs more inward contemplation and intellectual analysis which can be done in contemplation and analytical meditation. In analytical meditation you come to certain realizations or experiences of this second stage of the result of valid cognition. In a way it is getting more to the original state of experience, because our conceptual state of experience is a very superficial, surface level of experience. Our original level of experience is the actual experience of the apprehended aspect of an object which only happens at the level of direct valid cognition. Therefore, in the second stage we are going more into the state of direct valid cognition; we are getting a closer, more subtle, or more naked experience of the object.

When There Is Thorough Analysis

The third stage is called "thorough analysis." The text says:

> "When thoroughly analyzed by logic,
> Clear awareness empty of duality is asserted to be the object of comprehension,
> The apprehending aspect to be a valid cognizer,
> And self-awareness to be the result of valid cognition."

It is the same as the second verse, except the object changes. In the second verse, the apprehended aspect was the object, and in the third verse, the object is clear awareness, naked awareness. That naked awareness is itself free from duality. Duality is conceptual clothing. That naked awareness is the object which is perceived by the apprehending aspect, the perceptions. The self-awareness that arises from that perception is the result. At the third stage, we are going beyond even the dualistic concept of perceived object and perception. Therefore subject, object and result are all in one state of self-awareness. There is no difference between them. If you look at clear awareness as the object, or perception as the subject, there is not much difference between the two. The perceived object is self-awareness, perception is also the nature of clear awareness, and self-awareness is also the nature of clear awareness. No difference between subject, object and result means the actual basic experience, the fundamental experience of self-awareness. If you really look at self-awareness, it is the basic result of the third stage, the thoroughly analyzed.

Summary of the Three Stages in Relation to Madhyamika

To clarify further, if we look at these three stages in relation to Madhyamika philosophy, the stage of no analysis is the conventional truth, the ordinary, worldly mundane experience. We experience "me" as the subject, the water in the glass as the object, and the function of the subject/object relationship. We say, "I perceive the glass and the water." All this happens at the first stage. In Madhyamika, that is the conventional truth which, according to Chandrakirti, should never be analyzed. The conventional truth should never be analyzed, because if you analyze you can't find any conventional truth. There is no true entity to be found. That is the first stage, the stage of no analysis.

The second stage of slight analysis in Madhyamika is where we have all the Madhyamika reasonings to analyze the existence of things. We analyze and bring the ultimate view into a relative context. We bring the ultimate view of emptiness into the relative conventional world. We apply the ultimate analysis, such as how do things exist outside, and do they have any inherent existence or not. Then we come to a result, saying that it is emptiness, nothing really exists or has any inherent truth of existence. At this stage we get some kind of intellectual understanding of emptiness, some intellectual experience of emptiness, but we still don't have the direct realization of emptiness. It is still the object of intellectual mind, words and communication, and so it is still not the absolute Absolute. It is the absolute truth, but it is not the ultimate absolute truth (to make it a bit more confusing).

[illegible]

In the third stage of Madhyamika philosophy, that of thorough analysis, "thorough" means going beyond. When we have a thorough, thorough analysis, it goes beyond analysis. When you go beyond analysis, then you go beyond words, communication and concepts. At this stage the experience of emptiness, the true realization of emptiness without words and concepts...[tape is turned over]...actually can't be recorded. The last stage of thorough analysis is no analysis, the result of our second stage Madhyamika analysis. When you analyze in the second stage, that leads you to the stage where you come to an experience of emptiness, emptiness without words or concepts. It is called analytical meditation because the thorough analysis of Madhyamika leads you to the resting meditation of non-conceptual realization The third stage, which goes beyond words and concepts, is known as the real ultimate truth, the actual ultimate truth.

It is similar here in the result of valid cognition. First, we have a very rough idea of a mundane conventional sense of no analysis, then we have the slight analysis of the Sautrantika view, and then we have the thorough analysis, which is more like the Cittamatra Shentong approach.

Q1: Is the apprehended aspect conceptual? In the first stage of no analysis, is this apprehended aspect a conceptual construct?
DPR: I don't think so. It's the aspect that is projected outside as an object and is being perceived by the direct perceptions.
Q1: Is there another technical term that you could use to refer to it? Would you say that the apprehended aspect is a generally characterized phenomenon?
DPR: No. It is specifically characterized.
Q1: Is it *rangten*?
DPR: It's *rangten.*
Q1: I thought you said that the Sautrantikas said that you cannot perceive a specifically characterized phenomenon.
DPR: We are talking about the indivisible particles. You cannot perceive that kind of *svalakshana*, but you can perceive the aspect of that, the specifically characterized. That is an aspect of mind and the object which is the projection of mind..
Q1: Are you saying that specifically characterized phenomena have two levels?
DPR: No, it has different kinds. One kind is the hidden object, which is a specifically characterized phenomenon. In addition, all aspects of mind, your direct perception and concepts, are specifically characterized phenomena.
Q1: So concepts in and of themselves would be specifically characterized phenomena?
DPR: That's right.
Q1: But their content would not be.
DPR: That's right, because the concepts are perceived by self-awareness. They must be experienced by self-awareness. Concepts are the object of direct perception which is self-awareness. It must be a specifically characterized phenomenon because all the objects of direct valid cognition are specifically characterized phenomena. Direct perceptions cannot perceive a generally characterized phenomenon. There's no way that they can perceive it. And generally characterized phenomena are usually conceived by concepts.
Q1: So we could say that generally characterized phenomena are like the objects of thoughts, or contents of the thoughts?
DPR: Yes.
Q1: To conclude, when there is slight analysis, we speak of an apprehending aspect in the second and third stages. We use the word aspect here. Would it be true to call it the apprehending mind? Are apprehending aspect and apprehending mind the same thing?
DPR: Yes, they are the same.

Q2: It sounds like there are different types of *svalakshana*, and the definition of *svalakshana* has two aspects. One aspect is that it performs a function, and the other aspect is that it has some uncommon characteristic specific to itself. Is that correct?

DPR: I think the second one is the definition. (I don't remember exactly.) The first one is the definition of what we call a "thing" or "substantial existence." These are actually all synonyms, so it doesn't matter much. Thing, svalakshana and impermanence would all be synonyms or *tönchik* in the Sautrantika view.

Q2: So one level of *svalakshana* is the indivisible particles which in themselves don't perform a function until they're compounded into an actual object. The individual particles themselves are one level. Another level of *svalakshana* is when the individual indivisible particles are actually put together to form an object like a glass. The gross larger outer object would also be *svalakshana*. Is that true?

DPR: Yes.

Q2: The third level of *svalakshana* is when the valid cognizer becomes an apprehended aspect. In other words, the valid cognizer can't see the indivisible particles *svalakshana*, but it could see the apprehended aspect, the gross, larger, compounded *svalakshana*. When it perceives the gross compounded *svalakshana*, that apprehended aspect, which is a mental thing, is also a *svalakshana*.

DPR: Yes. It builds up together. In a way it is one because if you don't have the indivisible particles, you can't have the compounded level of particles. If you don't have the compounded level of particles, you can never have the apprehended aspect projected on it. Therefore, in a way it's a different level or separate. On the other hand, it is all one. You can't really separate them because the second and third thing cannot happen without having the indivisible particles.

Q2: You were saying that the Kagyus haven't translated any of the commentaries. All the commentaries that we are reading are the Gelugpa commentaries on Sautrantika.

DPR: That is O.K. because at this level of the Sautrantika Vaibhashika view, there is not much difference, except there is a slight difference in classifications. For example, we classify non-valid cognition into two, whereas they classify it into five. The seventh Karmapa says there is no reason to classify it into five because they can all be included in two. Apart from that, it is basically similar.

Q2: I was reading about the *svalakshana* in *Knowledge and Liberation*, and they were saying that this type of understanding is completely specific to Gelugpa. No one else has this way of understanding it.

DPR: Wow.

Q2: They actually make a big point of comparing this to other people's ways of understanding Sautrantika. They have a long section, like 20 pages, that talks about the general and specifically characterized phenomena and the different views of the Gelugpa schools.

DPR: I don't think it is different at this level. If you bring the *svalakshana* concept to the Madhyamika teaching, then you may say that that is the special understanding of the Gelugpa. Even at the Madhyamika level they assert some existence of the *svalakshana*, and this is not asserted by any other Prasangika view.

Q3: I was thinking that the way to cognize *svalakshana* would be through direct valid cognition, either sensory or mental direct. On the other hand, if I look at the hidden, indivisible particles, the only way I can cognize them is through inferential valid cognition. Is that the case?

DPR: That's right.

Q4: When I think "analysis," it seems conceptual. Can you talk about the aware side of it?

DPR: Analysis is conceptual. If you analyze with the philosophical view and look at the result of the valid cognition, it is self-awareness. If you thoroughly analyze, it's completely self-awareness. Analysis at his stage is still conceptual mind, but at the same time that conceptual mind is awareness. It is *lo* or *rigpa*. Within awareness they are all the same. What was the definition of *lo*?

Q4: That which is clear and aware.

DPR: So it is awareness.

Q5: During Thrangu Rinpoche's *Nyingpo Tenpa* teachings, he described the process of the sixth consciousness turning inward. From a situation of being turned outward towards objects it turns inward and sees the nature of mind. The progressions through these three stages sounds similar. What happens to perceived outer objects in the last stage? What was perceived as outer objects

before isn't even mentioned. Is it assumed that outer objects become a manifestation of clear awareness? How does one interact with this so-called ordinary world from this inward turning perspective?
DPR: At this stage you see the nondual nature of phenomena. You see that what was perceived as an object in the earlier stage has just been a mistaken perception. We have been seeing the aspect as an object outside where there is no real object that we have really perceived. All we have perceived is the comprehended aspect of an object, the reflection of our mind, projection of our mind. Therefore, at this stage you see the nature which is more like the Cittamatrin view. There is no outer object. It is all just your mind. That mind itself, if you look at it, is the nature of self-awareness. There is nothing but self-awareness. There is a nondual sense of realization.
Q5: In that text it is described that Buddha still interacts with ordinary beings and has so-called ordinary perceptions in order to communicate. So from that perspective, would it be correct to say that I would see that throne as self-awareness, as a direct expression of awareness?
DPR: If you take this to the level of Buddha?
Q5: Pure perception. Yes.
DPR: Usually it is said that the wisdom of Buddha perceives things, but there is no conceptual perception, no dualistic perception. For example, when you have a mirror, and when an object reflects in the mirror, the mirror has no dualistic mind, but it has the reflection of all the objects in the mirror. That is how the wisdom of the Buddha has been described. It perceives everything, but at the same time there is no dualistic mind, perception or conception. At the same time, it is not just perceived one by one, but everything is seen simultaneously; the whole room can be reflected in the mirror simultaneously, in one instant. Buddha sees the phenomena of the three times in one instant. Sounds good. [laughter]

Q6: In the third verse it says, "And self-awareness to be the result of valid cognition." We are not necessarily talking about self-aware direct valid cognition there, are we? Is self-awareness being used as a more generalized term?
DPR: That's right, yes. It's not just self-aware direct valid cognition, but every state of consciousness is in that nature of self-awareness.
Q6: We are not excluding in any way yogic direct valid cognition, which is still included in this general heading of self-awareness and everything else.
DPR: Yes. Yogis should not worry. [laughter]

Q7: You said the apprehended aspect is *svalakshana*. The other day I asked you about *nampa*, and whether it would be *svalakshana*. You said it would be both. Isn't the apprehended aspect the same term as *nampa*?
DPR: No, it is *songnam*, *songwa nampa*. Apprehended aspect.
Q7: So there is a difference between *nampa* and apprehended aspect.
DPR: They are *musum*. You have to debate.
Q7: This question is about the old discussion about external phenomena. [laughter] Longchenpa pretty much just refutes that everything is only one's own mind.
DPR: Which Longchenpa?
Q7: Longchenpa in *Buddha Mind*.
DPR: Tulku Tondrup's book?
Q7: Yes. He says there are external phenomena and people who believe in their own minds are like pigs. He says that people who believe in only whatever appears to their own mind are like pigs. He says that there are phenomena.
DPR: Pigs like Babe? [laughter] Babe is not stupid. [more laughter] He is very smart. Yes?
Q7: The *Dharmadharmatavibhanga* clearly says there are no external phenomena. What arises are common experiences and uncommon experiences. Common experiences are sort of a conglomeration of several minds. They are a result of different mindstreams. You said that if there were no sentient beings, there would still be the Abbey. Were you referring to sentient beings at the Abbey or if there wouldn't be any minds...?

DPR: Any monks?
Q7: Did you say that there are really external phenomena completely independent of other mindstreams?
DPR: Yes.
Q: There is matter which is not dependent at all on other mindstreams?
DPR: Yes. When you look at the *Treasury of Tenets* by Longchenpa, he goes through all the tenets. When he comes to the Cittamatrin view he may say there are no outer objects at all, whatsoever. Many Cittamatrins believe it is just your mind and there is nothing outside. That doesn't reflect Longchenpa's view, but that was written by Longchenpa. He is explaining what the Cittamatrins say in the same way that you would say that Vedantins say there is this great all-pervasive self. Longchenpa would write that in his writing. That doesn't mean that it is the view of Longchenpa himself.

In our Western sangha we have a limited translation of books from teachers. We take each book as the authoritative view of that author. We say, "This is Longchenpa's view and this is Tsongkhapa's view." But one book doesn't say the whole view of Longchenpa or Tsongkhapa. It's very nice for us to collect what Longchenpa said in this book, another book, and a third and fourth book. It is very important to have an understanding of all of them. To say that this is Longchenpa's view is difficult without bringing the whole view of Longchenpa together.

If you want to present the view of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great, then you have to read the *Treasury of Knowledge*, his commentary on *Uttaratantra*, his commentary on the *Profound Inner Meaning* and the *Hevajra Tantra*. Then you can come to the conclusion that in all these books Jamgon Kongtrul emphasized such and such a thing. What we can possibly safely say, this is his view. It is important for us to keep this in mind. When you quote someone, you can say that you have seen this in this book and maybe this is Longchenpa's view, or maybe the third Karmapa's view. We can't definitely say that this is his view. We haven't seen all of his teachings.

Q7: What is the main reasoning of people like yourself to assume the existence of matter?
DPR: What I would think is that it's a pretty good time for lunch. [laughter] I think, generally speaking, that as long as we live in the cycle of samsaric existence, as long as you have a mind, there is the object. You can't posit the existence of one, there are two. How can you say there is mind without matter? How can you say there is subject without object? Similarly, we can't say there is object without subject. They are both interdependent in the relative sense. Therefore, Chandrakirti says that as long as you remain in your dream, you have a subject and you have the object, and you have the sense organs of the dream. When you wake up, all these three things are equally non-existent. There is not just one non-existent and the other existent. All three things are equally non-existent. In a similar way, when we wake up from this dream of samsara, all these subjects and objects are equally non-existent. It is not like subjects exist and objects do not exist. At the level of existence, they are both equally existing. We can't deny that.

THE SECOND MAIN POINT: THE SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE ESSENTIAL MODES OF ENGAGEMENT OF MIND

The section that we have just finished is actually the main section of the Lorik. That is why it is called the general teaching about the important divisions of mind. It is the most important part the of Lorik and maybe the most difficult part. The second section is the specific analysis of the essential modes of engagement of mind. That's the second main point. In some sense it is not really different from the first section. It's like a little further stretch in looking at the different aspects of the modes of engagement of the mind.

Apprehending Generality and Particulars

The first part of this section is the mode of engagement of mind apprehending generality and particulars. There are two aspects of mind that apprehend these two phenomena. The mind apprehending generality is defined here as "a mind apprehending a phenomenon as pervading." Is this definition clear? [laughs] Okay, it's very clear to me [laughter]. This means the first mode of engagement, which is the mind that conceives a generality. This is a conceptual mind and is the subject of an all pervading phenomenon, all pervading general characteristic. For example, when we say "table," it's an all pervading phenomenon. The phenomenon "table" pervades all particular tables. There is a musum relationship between this table in front of us and "table" in general. "Table" in general is the phenomenon that is present in some sense. It is present in all these particular tables: the table in front of the sound system here, the table in front of me, and the table in front of the shrine. They are all in the category of "table." That general category, general term, general idea that pervades all these phenomena is called the generality. When we say mind apprehending a phenomenon as pervading, it means that the phenomenon is all pervasive, it's all over the particular things of that phenomenon. It has different levels. We can say that this particular table is a subset of "table," and "table" is a subset of furniture. Table is also a subset of a substantial thing and substantial thing is a subset of phenomena or all knowable things. Therefore we can have different levels of generality.

Regardless of any level, the mind that apprehends a phenomenon as pervading is the mind that apprehends a generality. We usually don't realize this or think about it. We are vague about all these things, but here we are reducing them into really subtle levels, so to speak.

The Three Divisions of a Mind Apprehending a Generality

There are three divisions of a mind apprehending a generality: A mind apprehending a type generality; a mind apprehending a collection generality; and a mind apprehending a term generality.

Generally speaking, the conceptual mind that apprehends a generality is conceiving the generally characteristic phenomenon. It's our conceptual mind that apprehends this phenomenon, this object which is a general characteristic. That general characteristic is, in one aspect, the isolate. The other term is exclusion (*selwa*). ཟློག་པ

More specifically, in the generally characterized phenomena, (I'm just trying to make it confusing, that's all) [laughs)] to be more specific about isolates, we can have a single isolate or a double isolate. This is a not not joke. [laughter, R. laughs]. For example, when you say "wood" it's basically a single isolate, a single reverse, a reverse from what is not wood. It's just one reverse, single reverse, single isolate. When you say "cedar tree," then it has a double isolate. It is not "not tree;" it is the reverse of "not tree" as well as "not cedar." This is interesting. Do you understand? When you say "cedar wood" it means it's a wood, which means it's a wood which is a reverse of what is "not wood." It's hard to say, but it simply means it's wood [R. laughs, laughter]. For example, when you say "wood," that means it's not a table, it's not a book, or it's not a glass. There's just one reverse which means it's a reverse of what is "not wood." When you say "cedar wood," there is one general isolate which is the reverse of "not wood" and there is a specific isolate which means it is not just any wood, but it is cedar wood. The second isolate is the reverse within the different kinds of wood. You have another isolate within an isolate. When you say "cedar tree," that means it's the reverse of "not cedar tree." It is the reverse of what it is not. That means it's not here, it's not a pine tree, it's not a redwood tree, it's not a wish fulfilling tree. [R. laughs, laughter] It is the reverse of everything that is not cedar. So there is a double isolate here.

Therefore when you look at this mind that apprehends a generality, it apprehends on two levels, so to speak. It apprehends at the level of a single isolate and at the level of a double isolate. When you perceive this table in front of me and you have a concept of it, then there is a double isolate. The first isolate is that this is a table; it isolates all that is not a table. The second isolate is that from all the other tables, this is a particular table. Is that clear? Is it clear to you, Lotsawa? Can you say it in your own words? Maybe that will make it clearer. We can have different ways of saying it.

Scott Wellenbach: The single isolate, as I heard you explain it, is the reverse of what's not wood, for instance. Then, among all wood, it's the reverse of what's not cedar. What's excluded in the first instance is everything that's not wood, and in the second instance, what's being excluded is all wood that's not cedar. I understand from what you are saying that we know things by excluding everything that they're not. By things we mean concepts as opposed to....

DPR: That's right. Is that clear? That makes it clear, yes. There could be no better way to express it. [laughter] That's very clear now.

Type Generality

We'll go through the three divisions briefly and then you can ask questions. This is brief in the text. The first division is the mind apprehending a type generality which is defined as "A mind apprehending a phenomenon as pervading many phenomena belonging to its own type." The meaning of apprehending a phenomenon as pervading is clear. When you say "table," "table" is the general phenomenon that pervades all subsets of table. That is the general phenomenon which pervades its subsets, and here it's talking about belonging to its own type. Type generality is a specific way of talking about apprehending mind of generality, general types, like when you say "cow". Cow is a type generality. We are talking about a specific type or specific aspect of being, such as PCs and Macs. Which one is good?

[Audience]: PC.

Oh good. [laughs, laughter] I agree. No debate.[laughter]

The second one, mind apprehending a collection generality, is defined as "A mind apprehending a phenomenon as pervading the objects of a collection." The third one, a mind apprehending a term generality, is defined as "A mind apprehending a phenomenon as pervading many means of verbal expression." These are three different ways of apprehending generalities. We can look at these throughout the divisions of the text because this whole section is about modes of engagement of mind. These are the different modes of engagement of mind in apprehending generalities. First you apprehend the generalities through type, then through collection, and then through terminology or sound. Therefore these conceptual minds conceive generally characterized objects apprehended through these three different modes. There's no particular way of experiencing or engaging an object directly, but it is engaged through these three different modes of the apprehending mind.

Therefore, when you look at these minds you usually have the object of the conceptual mind or apprehending generality. The mind apprehending generality is not clear; it's a very vague object, and that object is not separate from the particulars. When you say "table," for example, "table" is not separate from the particular table. On the one hand, you can't find any "table" without the real tables, the particular tables outside. Therefore, this general ideal table in our concept is a confused mind which mixes the isolates of our concept and the actual particular object outside. We mix the two together and conceive them as one. When you say the label "table," there's always a simultaneous association that we make with a particular table; we cannot separate the two. It's always seen almost as one entity.

Q1: We talked about levels of generality and you said there were four: knowable things, things, table and specific table. Is there these four levels of knowables or generalities? If so, what is the difference between knowable things and things?
DPR: Usually in the *Collected Topics* knowables are divided into two: thing and non-thing. Thing is impermanent and non-thing is permanent. The thing, the substantial existent, is divided into three again: form, consciousness or mind, and non-associated compositional factor, whatever that means. [laughter, laughs] Non-associated compositional factor is something that is neither form nor consciousness, but it is a thing and it is a composition of things. I don't remember the sub-categories, how many there are. There are many categories. Space? No. Space is permanent and is a non-thing. When we say person or individual, it is neither form nor consciousness. That's one example and there are about twenty subsets. The other example is vows, such as the pratimoksha or monastic vows, which start with the upasika vows. This is the non-associated compositional factor. In the hinayana Sautrantika Vaibashika view, we believe that the vows are existent, they are not form, but they are some kind of existent thing. Therefore, when you have the monastic or pratimoksha vow ceremonies, usually there is no high table in front because being a thing it obstructs the transmission. Our antenna or satellite dish is not that strong.

Therefore, we can divide, subdivide and subdivide and subdivide; you can have many subdivisions or levels of isolates. In general there are only two isolates, single or double isolates, in everything.

Q2: Why are there generally just two levels of isolates? In the example of cedar you could keep subdividing different kinds of cedar, isolating that which is not that one kind, and subdivide further and further. Why aren't there as many levels of isolates as you need?
DPR: There are infinite levels. Why do we say there are two? You can have many levels, but generally speaking there are two categories in everything we talk about. There is a general thing and there is a specific thing. You have a general thing and then subsets of that. That is the basic division, basic way of classifying things. In a basic sense of classification you can have these two levels: single or double isolates, and within the double isolate you can have as many levels as you can think of.
Q2: Are you saying that within the second one you could make many more?
DPR: Yes. The second level is again subdivided, as you said. There are many cedars and then the particular cedar that you see in front of you which is isolated from all other existent cedars. So you can have many.

Q3: When you were explaining single and double isolates, was that an explanation of the general category of apprehending generality or an explanation of type?
DPR: Generality. At this point we're talking about generality.
Q3: We're using the words generality and particular, and the definitions of these seem to be pretty close to, if not identical with, the generally characterized phenomena and the *svalakshana*. Are these two ways of apprehending the same or different? Since the generality seems to be conceptual and a permanent thing, that seems to be the definition of a generally characterized phenomenon.
DPR: Are you asking if mind apprehending generality and mind apprehending particular are the same or different?

Q3: Yes.
DPR: They're different.
Q3: What would the difference be?
DPR: When we finish the two maybe we can see the difference.
Q3: What is the relationship of a mind apprehending a generality to a generally characterized phenomenon?
DPR: They are opposite. You're talking about the mind, right?
Q3: Right. I thought a generally characterized phenomenon was always mind.
DPR: You are saying a mind apprehending a generality and a generally characterized phenomenon, and I am saying they are opposite.
Q3: Is this because one's a subject and one's an object?
DPR: No. The apprehending generality is still mind, and so it's a particular thing. It's not a generally characterized phenomenon. It's a concept, a mind.

Elizabeth Callahan: [laughter, laughs] I think what he's asking is: we have a mind apprehending a generality and a mind apprehending a particular. Is a generality the same thing as a generally characterized phenomenon and is a particular the same thing as a specifically characterized phenomenon?
DPR: I think so. We can look at the definitions later and see how the relationship develops.

Q4: Regarding the result of valid cognition, the first question has to do with the apprehended aspect in the unexamined understanding in the first *sloka*. My understanding is that it is an aspect of consciousness which is what makes it a cognizer. Although it's an aspect of consciousness, is it not itself a knower?
DPR: What's the definition of consciousness?
Q4: A mind or awareness. If we use the awareness one then it's a cognizer in the sense of being an aspect of awareness, but it is not itself aware of something. Is that true?
DPR: Are you saying the apprehended aspect is not aware of itself?
Q4: Not in this little piece of it, it doesn't seem to be.
DPR: [laughs] Not in this piece, little piece. I think it is said to be the valid cognizer, because in the mundane conventional sense, when you say, "I apprehend an object, I see an object," you are talking about direct seeing. There's no subtle understanding of the progression of the perceptions and their consequences. Therefore, the most basic level of a mind and its object communicating, touching is the apprehended aspect. First you have this object, and then you have this apprehended aspect projected to that form. That is the first sort of communication or relation developed between the object and mind. Before that there's nothing. Therefore I think this is seen as the valid cognizer. As long as you see the object directly, that's the only point when you really directly meet.
[illegible]
Q4: Would that be, for example, *sparsa*, contact, the nidana of contact?
DPR: Yes. That is what I think.
Q4: The second question has to do with the relationship between the apprehended aspect and the apprehending aspect in the second stanza. Is the reason that there is self-awareness because it is the result of this particular cognition? Are both the apprehended aspect and the apprehending aspect mind? Why would self-awareness be the result of the level of slight analysis? Is it because both the apprehended aspect, which is the object of comprehension, and the apprehending aspect, are mind, based on the previous stanza. In other words, is it mind comprehending itself at this level of slight analysis?
DPR: Yes. I think in the second level, when you think that you have apprehended your apprehending aspect, when you think that your apprehending aspect has apprehended, what you have actually seen is the aspect of mind. All of these three are nothing other than just self-awareness. It is what we think we have seen as an object outside, in the ordinary sense. We think that the subject, which is consciousness, has seen an object outside through the action of seeing or hearing. Actually you have only seen an aspect of an object, which is mind in this case, mind projection, and the subject of that which sees the object is also mind. Action is also mind, and so at the end what you
[illegible]

are left with is the result which is self-awareness. You have done everything, you know how everything is performed, and what reality is in the reality of mind. When everything has happened in the reality of mind, it is observed or perceived in the background level by self-awareness all the time.

Q4: So as we go further into the analysis we are taken further and further into a non-dual experience.

DPR: That's right, yes. At the level of slight analysis we are sort of coming to a point where we see that there is no solid duality. At the first stage we think that everything out there is an object and we are on this side as a subject; there is a strong separation of subject and object, perceiver and perceived, and thing is very strong at this stage. At the second level it becomes softer, and there is not such a strong division, because whatever you think is an object is nothing other than your mind projection. At the third stage it goes even beyond that to where you see the non-dual state of the subject/object experience.

[illegible] both

Q4: Is the self-awareness that's referred to here different than self aware direct valid cognition? Is it more like the self aware mind that the Cittamatrins speak of, of *parinispanna*?

DPR: Do you mean at the second or third stage? Or both stages?

Q4: Are the second and third the same or different?

DPR: At this point it is a Sautrantika Cittamatrin view together. In the third stage it is more a Cittamatrin view than a Sautrantika view; it is the notion of self-awareness. In the basic sense of self-awareness there's not much difference, except that the relationship with the object becomes different.

Q5: If the apprehended aspect is the valid cognizer, then at the level of the unexamined, commonly accepted understanding you would associate the apprehended aspect with either the perception or the assumed object, or that which cognizes. Would the self-awareness take the form of associating with what's being perceived? It seems at this level one would completely forget about the cognizer and just be completely fixated on the object. At the same time, consciousness seems to be strong at this level.

DPR: [laughs)] When we talk about the three stages, it's mainly taken from Dharmakirti's *Pramanavartika* view. At the first stage, we're not really looking at it with thorough analysis or more subtle understanding. We are just looking at it roughly, like how ordinary people, or mundane people like us look. Ordinary means at the mundane level of how we experience, feel and communicate. We are not really looking at the subtle functioning of consciousness. If you really look at this subtle level, it will be the second or the third stage. The first stage is like how it is understood in the mundane world. If you talk to anyone in the conventional world, they don't talk about self-awareness, the apprehending aspect or apprehended aspect being the object and apprehending aspect being the subject. No such distinction is made in the mundane sense. Therefore, the first stage is just simply presenting how ordinary, mundane people experience and relate with it. That leads gradually to the second level, which leads to the third level. This is why it is clearly stated in the seventh Karmapa's commentary that Dharmakirti and Dignaga gave such a progression in order to lead people to the correct understanding. At the first stage we say, "Yes, that is right, it is how we perceive, understand, and conceive." At the second stage, you can go a little deeper and more subtle. Then if you go more subtle it becomes like that. So it goes through different levels.

Q5: On the third level, if it's empty of duality then why is there still an apprehending aspect as a valid cognizer, why specify self if there is no duality? This seems to be the same as the question about matter and mind, that you have to realize the non-existence of the apprehender as well as the apprehended.

DPR: That's right, but we should not forget that this is the Sautrantika Cittamatra view. Therefore, they wouldn't necessarily say that there is the logic that we follow. That's more the Madhyamika view. Therefore, strictly speaking, in the Sautrantika Cittamatra view consciousness exists and matter doesn't. That's their main view. That's why they are known as Cittamatra, the Mind Only school. In the third stage it's mainly the Cittamatra view, where they still show a slight continuum or continuity of consciousness no matter what. No matter how subtle you go into it there is still a continuity of consciousness existing as self-awareness which is the subject.

Q5: Okay. In the *Bodhicaryavatara*, the analogy of the light illuminating itself is given. I agree with the Prasangika view [DPR laughs] that a light can't illuminate itself. The two reasons they give are: 1) because the very presence of a light means there is not darkness, there's a light, there just isn't darkness; and 2) you can't really use the analogy of light illuminating itself because to perceive light there has to be a consciousness outside of the light. What would perceive the mind other than the mind?
DPR: [R. laughs, laughter] That's good.
Q5: In terms of self-awareness, a light needs something to reflect off of to be perceived unless you are looking straight at the light, in which case you are in opposition to the light. The Cittamatra analogy doesn't make sense to me. If the Prasangika view isn't the final or absolute view, then I'm not sure how to understand self-awareness.
DPR: Self-awareness is taught at different levels. In the Sautrantika Cittamattra level it's basically the fundamental state of consciousness being aware of itself. Being aware of itself is known as the self-awareness. If you look at self-awareness from this point of view, (you can just look at a definition) you can just think about the example of how this definition can apply. That's how you would understand self-awareness in the Sautrantika Cittamatra view.

If you look at the Shentong Madhyamika view, then self-awareness is taught as self-aware wisdom rather than self-aware consciousness. That self-aware wisdom is the nature of mind which is luminous, and that luminosity is beyond duality. There's a sense of self-awareness. It's sort of a paradox. There's a self-awareness without self, in the sense that when you look at this luminosity mind of the Shentong view, as you have studied with Thrangu Rinpoche in the *Nyingpo Tenpa*, then that state of luminosity is totally free from all conceptual labeling. That luminosity is not empty of its qualities, but has all the qualities of the Buddha. That basic state of luminous mind is the wisdom of the Buddha, and that wisdom of the Buddha is taught as the self-awareness wisdom at the level of Shentong Madhyamika.

The Prasangika view, which is the supreme view in all Buddhist tenets, says that the assertion of self-awareness is not correct in the absolute sense. Therefore, they refute the notion of self-awareness with those reasonings, as you have just said. According to the Prasangika school, in the ultimate reality there is no such thing as a self-awareness or primordially existing qualities of the Buddha in this nature of mind. Therefore, according to the Prasangika view, the nature of mind is primordially pure in the sense of being totally free from clinging onto a self, and from any conceptual fabrications. They say that the nature of mind is in a state of natural liberation right from the beginning.

These are different views, and we can hold whatever view we feel more comfortable with or gain more ascertainment from through reasoning. That is the right view for us to hold personally. In the Lorik view we have to stick with the Sautrantika Cittamatrin view where the self-awareness is defined in a particular way.

Q6: My question sort of worked itself out. Thank you.
DPR: Good. That's a self liberated [laughter] question.

Q7: I had some problems with how to look at these three stanzas. I always try to find out who is asking whom what. It looks like this is an interview with three people, and there are three questions which are asked. The three questions are,: "What is the object of comprehension?" "What is the valid cognizer?" and "What is the result of valid cognition?" Regarding the first stanza, my suspicion is that the commonly accepted view is the Vaibashika's. The Sautrantikas mainly struggle with the Vaibashika view which doesn't have a notion of self-awareness. They don't distinguish between the outer object and the perceived object. They think you can actually perceive the outer object and that the apprehended aspect, they might say, is the imputed aspect of mind. We perceive phenomena and mistake them. We apprehend the qualities of the object as a thing, and that is seen as not truly existent. What truly exists is only the particles. If you ask an ordinary sentient being

what is a valid cognizer, he or she would never say that it's the apprehended aspect. He or she does not even know about that. However, the Vaibashika knows that there is something wrong with how we perceive phenomena. Wouldn't it make more sense to say that the first stanza refers to the Vaibashika view?
DPR: No.
Q7: No. [DPR laughs, laughter] Then how can you explain to somebody off the street? How would you would ask her these three questions?
DPR: You have to go to Pleasant Bay. [laughs, laughter]
Q7: Let's take the post office person in Pleasant Bay, what's her name?
Q: Gladys.
Q7: [more laughter from DPR and audience] I would ask Gladys, "What is the object of your comprehension?" She would say, "It's you," or "It's the postcards, it's the things out there, that's all fine." If I ask her "What is the valid cognizer?", she would say it's "me." She wouldn't say that it's the apprehended aspect. That's the problem I have.
DPR: That's a good question. I think it will be nice if you write down the interview. Really, that would be nice.
Q: I think you should ask Bill Dunphy too. [laughter]
DPR: As I said before, these are the progressions. The conventional reality is very clear in the *Ocean of Texts on Logic*, the seventh Karmapa's commentary. Dharmakirti and Dignaga's approach is trying to lead people from this very mundane, ordinary and conventional experience to something more subtle, and that leads them to an even more subtle experience. In order to bridge the two, you have to have a certain understanding of the tenet. Therefore, as long as we perceive the object directly, wherever you go and ask people, such as in Pleasant Bay, they will say "I see this glass." They won't say "I see the apprehended aspect of the glass." At this level of conventional experience the only valid cognition that we can possibly posit is the apprehended aspect. That's the only thing that has direct communication.
Q7: That looks to me like quite an analyzed view.
DPR: Yes. That's why I am saying that there is a slight analysis. It is because you are leading. Otherwise, how can you lead if you go totally with the mundane norm and everything? At this point it's very mixed, but what we have is a stronger mundane approach than the philosophical approach of the Sautrantika Cittamatra view. There is something that is slightly slipped in that leads those people to a second stage, which becomes more subtle and leads to another stage. I think that's how the progression works.

There is slight [illegible] even at mundane level, or else [illegible] to you [illegible]

Q8: The Sautrantikas say that we don't actually perceive and that we can't really communicate with the object. The object is hidden. All we have is the mind's projection. Where is the contact with the object? For example, from a Cittamatra point of view, I would say that you basically have it but there's nothing else there. However, there has to be something there for the object to arise. Are they inferring that there's an object which enables a perception in the first place? In other words, must there be an object as a basis for the arising of a perception?
DPR: Yes, they are doing their best scientific tests on the basis of the Vaibashika view. The first Vaibashika view arose in Buddhism, and then from there the Sautrantika view. You analyze the Vaibashika view and analyze your perception/object relationship. Sautrantikas concluded that you can't really perceive the objects that are hidden, but that the aspect has to arise from a mutual thing, from your mind as well as the object. Without the object there is no aspect of the object.
Q8: How do they meet if the mind can't perceive it? How does that moment of their mixing happen?
DPR: There's not really mixing is there?
Q8: It has to at least contact.
DPR: That's right. The contact arises when you have a subject/object relationship. When you have the subject object relationship, at that level you are developing the contact. If the glass is not here and if you are not sitting there to perceive it, then there's no contact of the glass with your consciousness.

Q8: You could explain that there's not really any glass, there's just a projection of mind into a perceiving and perceived aspect which is...

DPR: Like the psychedelic experiences, projected experiences? You can explain it or think about it, but I don't know how you can have it. If you are sitting in a room where no glass exists, you can think about it and try to project a glass on an empty table, try to project water in the glass, and try to drink that water to quench your thirst. But that doesn't really work.

Q8: It works when you're dreaming.

DPR: Yes, but not in a real world. In the dream you also have a subject and object.

Q8: But you don't have any real thing.

DPR: You don't even have the consciousness at that level. They are equally existent or equally non-existent. If there is a subject of the water in a dream, then there is the water in the dream. If there is no water in the dream, then there is no subject of that water. They are equally non-existent at that level, or equally existent. As long as you have the consciousness to project, there is the object. You can't say there is only mind in a dream and not an object of that mind. That is a very Cittamatrin fundamentalist view [laughs, laughter]. When you are in the dream the object is there. You can't deny that. As long as you are in the dream you encounter that object, have a relationship with the object. When you wake from the dream, then they both equally do not exist, or equally did exist.

Q8: When we talk about the actual *svalakshana* of the glass, how does the mind touch it? It must be there for that consciousness to arise, but how do they explain that the mind meets the object in order to have that projection of it? It's the part that is hidden from me.

DPR: Ah hah. It's hidden from you.

Q8: How do they explain that?

DPR: I'll think about it. We can stop here.

THE THREE DIVISIONS OF A MIND APPREHENDING A GENERALITY (CONTINUED)

We have had three divisions in the sub-category "A mind apprehending a generality." The first one is "A mind apprehending a type generality," which is basically the category of different phenomena, different types, and different kinds. These are also isolates. An isolate, such as "cow," isolates a particular type of animal from the others. That particular isolate is a type generality which is apprehended by our mind. When you apprehend a particular type generality that is the first mode, first category, or first division of this mind apprehending a generality. It is the same as the example of "table." It is one type of furniture, one type of a thing. We also have beings like cows or humans which are another example of a type generality. Type generality is the particular division of a generality.

Collection Generality

The second division is "A mind comprehending a collection generality." A collection generality would be something like "furniture." When you say "furniture," it is a collection of different things: chairs, tables, etc. The traditional example that is given is the forest. When you say "Forest," it is a collection of trees, different kinds of vegetation, and so on. The other day, in a group debate, we had tropical things as an example of a collection generality. If you say "Tropical forest," it is a collection generality. It is a combination of different kinds of trees, greenery, and whatever grows in a tropical area.

A collection generality is quite different from a type generality. A collection generality has more different varieties put into one basket, so to speak. When you look at a collection generality, it is a group of different things; they may not be of the same kind or type, such as when you say "forest." A forest may have different kinds of trees, not just one group of trees like cedar or sage. Different kinds of plants and trees together make up a forest. When you have a type generality, it is of the same type, same kind. When you say "cow," no matter what kind of cow it may be, they are all of the same type.

Elizabeth Callahan: Is it like the difference between cows and animals? Animals would be a collection generality and cows would be a type generality.

I think that it would be nice [makes debating clap] to debate this. My first thought is that "animal" is more like a type generality, but we can debate on that. The generally characterized phenomena are relative, and we look at the relativity of these things all together.

The collection generality is the isolate. It is also the isolate of a collection. When you have a collection, like "forest," it isolates itself from whatever is "not forest". It is a general characteristic. When you say "forest," is it a single or double isolate?

Audience: Single.

That was a long "S." Ssssssingle. [laughter]

Audience: Rainforest is a double isolate.

That's right. Rainforest will be a double isolate in general. That isolate is a collection generality, but we are not saying a mind apprehending a collection generality is an isolate. A mind comprehending a collection generality is a specifically characterized phenomenon. Why is it a specifically characterized phenomenon?

Elizabeth Callahan: Because it is ultimately able to perform a function?

That's right, you can have that reason. You can generally say it is because it is mind, because it is consciousness. Whatever is mind or consciousness is a thing, a substantial thing, ultimate truth.

In the last talk [and discussion—ed.] we made the divisions of knowables, things, and non-things. Here, we are talking about two things: subject and object. The subject is the conceptual mind which apprehends its object, a collection generality. That collection generality, the object, is an isolate.

Q: What I don't understand is how that mind is different from the mind that apprehends a tree or table.

DPR: That's right [laughs]. Can you replay the tape? [laughs, laughter] We'll talk about that, but what we are talking about here is two phenomena. One is the object and the other is the subject. The subject is a mind, and whether it is conceptual or nonconceptual it is still mind. As long as it is a mind it is a thing, because mind is a subset of a thing [laughs] in the Sautrantika Cittamatra view. Whenever it is a mind it is a thing. Whenever it is a thing it is capable of performing a function, and whenever it is capable of performing a function it is a particularly characterized phenomenon.

The last division is the definition of "A mind apprehending a term generality." "Term" is the collection of names and labels. The mind that comprehends or apprehends a term generality is the mind that apprehends labels. We use different labels, like "cup," "table," or "chair." That mind is called the apprehending mind of a term generality. The object in this third category of mind apprehending generality is the term generality.

What mind apprehends is a term generality. That term generality is also an isolate, an isolate of terms. When you say, for example "vase," it is a term isolate. It eliminates everything that does not mean "vase" when you say "vase." When you say "vase," that means it is something which is not "not vase." That's our not not joke. Is that clear or not clear?,

Q: It sounds the same as the first one. Are they separate isolates, like term isolate and type isolate are separate isolates? Like the term isolate of "cow" and the type isolate of "cow"?

DPR: Yes they are separate isolates.

if you say hed

We have these three divisions, and when we conceive or perceive anything it is always mixed with the generalities. The general characteristics and particular characteristics are mixed together. When, for example, you see a cow, you have this type generality which shows the particular kind of animal, particular type of being. At the same time you have this collection generality which sees different kinds of cows. If you see different kinds of cows together there is a collection generality. Then there is the term generality when you say "cow," when you have the label "cow" in your mind. Then we mix these two things together. The label or term generality, "cow," is mixed with the particularly characterized phenomenon, the actual cow. They are all mixed together and perceived or conceived as one.

When you see a cow, usually you see only one phenomenon. We see all of the aspects together as one. We see a cow, which is a type generality, which is the actual cow, which is the term or label "cow," which is also the collection generality. Everything is seen as one, not separate. We don't see this subtle separation of the two phenomena, generally characterized and specifically characterized phenomena.

Q1: In the collection generality, I don't understand how a forest could be specifically characterized, but not the forest in the collection generality. If a forest was a type generality then it wouldn't necessarily be specifically characterized, it would be an isolate. Can't a forest and a collection generality operate as an isolate as well?
DPR: Yes.
Q1 :When it is operating as an isolate is it not specifically characterized?
DPR: Yes.
Q1: So it can be both. A forest could be both a collection generality and specifically characterized?
DPR: I was trying to clarify that there's two things happening. We have the subject, a mind which is apprehending a collection generality, and the object, which is a collection generality. The object is an isolate here because all of these things are concept, conceptual mind.
Q1: Is the mind specifically characterized?
DPR: That's right. Mind is specifically characterized, whether it is conceptual or perceptual.

Q2: Sometimes animals could be a type generality in the sense that they are a type of sentient being. However, they could be a collection generality in the sense that there are many different types of animals. Is that just the way these two divisions work? Are they relative depending on what you are comparing them to? Is there a very distinct line? Can something be both in different contexts?
DPR: Yes, I think they can be both. That is why I think these generally characterized phenomena are not specific, not just one entity. If it is a specifically characterized phenomenon, such as a glass, it can never become water or something. It always stays as a glass, an individual glass. [taps glass] This individual glass will never become a collection entity of a glass. It will just stay a single glass and a specifically characterized phenomenon. In generally characterized phenomena, when you say "glass," it can be both. A glass can be a type generality or a collection generality depending on how we relate with it, or how we define it.

gen. char. phe
like a glass
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generality –
collection

There is no reason why this is a glass. In the actual state of this particular phenomenon, a glass, there's no reason for it to be a glass. It could be fire. It is just a label that is given to this particular thing. Who knows what it is? It is called "glass" in our terminology, but could easily be fire. If we had labeled this "fire" right from the beginning, we would be perceiving it as fire, not as glass. Therefore our perception or concept of seeing it as a glass is very relative, very confused. You can see how the concepts and perceptions get confused and mixed up with the particular specifically characterized phenomenon. In the specifically characterized phenomenon there is no element in this [taps glass] which says, "This is a glass." There's nothing related with the term, the label.
Q2: In one of the books, term generality was referred to as the mental image of a pot. The way that you defined it, it seemed to be focusing more on the term itself, the term generality. If that is the case, generally characterized phenomena are considered to be permanent. What is the permanent aspect in all three generalities? What makes it a permanent phenomenon?
DPR: It is because they are not momentary things.
Q2: The term "permanent" always confuses me when it is talked about in terms of permanent phenomena.
DPR: Especially in Shentong?
Q2: Especially there. [DPR laughs] Permanent is usually qualified as impermanent, a permanent impermanent phenomenon.
DPR: Do you mean two phenomena?
Q2: For example, you could say something is changeless. Its nature is changing but that doesn't change the quality. There is a moment of time. Consciousness is momentary based on momentary moments. Everything is momentary. Mind is momentary, the nature of mind is momentary, the nature of phenomena is momentary. Where does this permanent thing come in? Permanent can just be a qualification of an impermanent phenomenon.
DPR: Generally speaking, these are regarded as permanent because they are non-existent. [laughter] Really.

Q2: They don't have a function?

DPR: Yes. They are non-existent and therefore permanent. They are just an isolate that doesn't change whatsoever. "Table" is just a table, an isolate. When you look at the isolate of the table it is just the isolates, whatever is not not. It doesn't have any specific existence which changes momentarily. The table in front of us has its own existence as a thing, it is changing every moment by decaying, and falling apart, and changing its colors and shape. But the isolate has no existence.

Q2: No existence in the Sautrantika system means it doesn't have a function.

DPR: You're right. Empty of function.

Q2: Nevertheless, if we look at these isolates, they seem to create the whole of samsara.

DPR: Gee. [laughter, laughs]

Q2: It sounds like a paradox to say that they are nothing, if they create the whole mess of samsara.

DPR: That's wonderful. That's the whole point I think [laughs, laughter].

Q2: If they are not existent at all, why call them permanent?

DPR: No, we are looking at two things. The samsara that we are living in is more like the subject of these isolates. The subject of all these generally characterized phenomena is the concepts. Conceptual labeling and the conceptual world are the subject of these generally characterized phenomena.

Q2: Sorry, can you repeat the last sentence. I lost you there.

DPR: Can you play it again please, Brian? No, [laughs] just kidding.

Brian: The subject of all these generally characterized phenomena is...

DPR: [laughs, laughter] We are saying that the generally characterized phenomena, permanent things, are like the objects of our concept. They are not the same as the concept; they are different.

Q2: Yes.

DPR: The whole thing, as you call samsara, or the re-experiencing is the whole network or set of conceptual frameworks built on these non-existent phenomena.

Q2: Yes. In many respects. Maybe just let me go one step further. If we say the generally characterized phenomena are permanent, what do we mean by that? In western philosophy, for example, we have Plato's idea of permanent. He would say that's the real world. If you have a generally characterized phenomenon like a chair, it is the mental image of your mind which you have when you say the word "chair."

DPR: Yes.

Q2: And that cannot be destroyed by anything.

DPR: Wow!

Q2: And that is why it is permanent. Your image of the chair is permanent and it cannot be destroyed by external phenomena, even if it doesn't have a particular function. That is how I understand generally characterized phenomena. In other words, is this the same as saying that generally characterized phenomena are mental images of the mind?

DPR: Maybe similar, yes. I'm not sure of the details of Plato's view, Platonic philosophy, but you can say that the generally characterized phenomenon is a mental image. It is the object of your conceptual mind. It is hard to say that it is a mental image because then it sounds like a mind, a projected aspect of mind. When you say it is a projected aspect of mind, it is a part of your mind. So it becomes more like the apprehended aspect. Then there's a problem.

Q2: Would you say that generally characterized phenomena are not mind?

DPR: Yes, not mind. If they are mind they can be a thing. They can be permanent.

Q2: I am afraid I don't understand this whole thing.

DPR: That's good. [laughs]

Q2: It doesn't make any sense to me that something is permanent and that means it doesn't exist, it doesn't have a function. I just can't associate anything with it.

DPR: That is the object of your labeling, the isolates. When you look at the isolates, they are like the generally characterized phenomena, and they are known as permanent.

Q2: Why are they not part of mind?

DPR: Basically it is because they are not consciousness. You can say they are not consciousness, they are not an existent thing. When it is a mind it is an existent thing in the Sautrantika

Cittamattra view. Maybe we are mixing the Cittamattra and Sautrantika views a little.
Q2: I have difficulty saying that there are generally characterized phenomena, they are permanent, and that therefore they don't exist, and they are not mind. Doesn't this sound a little bit strange?
DPR: It is strange, yes. Definitely.
Q2: What can I associate it with? I would just call it a mental image.
DPR: You can call it that, yes. Maybe you can just look at it that way and then debate and see. It doesn't have to be this way or that way. We can take it as how we understand it, and then bring it to the class where you can posit your view. You can see whether the others see it in the same way or not.

Q3: You talked about how Sautrantikas will not give up their idea of hidden object. Do you mean that if they didn't give up their hidden object, they wouldn't go any further in terms of experiencing non-duality?
DPR: Is your question, "Is that an obstacle?"
Q3: Yes.
DPR: ...for the realization of non-duality? It will be if you hold onto that view. If you cling onto that existence, it will be a blockage to the realization of non-duality, selflessness.
Q3: Why is that?
DPR: Why do they hold onto it?
Q3: Yes.
DPR: In their analysis of philosophy and maybe in the analysis of their analytical meditation, they come to the conclusion that there is this hidden object. That becomes their ultimate analysis. They went to as far as they could go with their analysis and that was like the limit, the end, of their analysis. That's actually what tenets mean in Tibetan. How do you translate the words *trub* and *ta*?
Elizabeth Callahan: *Ta* is [unintelligible] and *trub* you could say is assertion, establishment, or what they can prove. The end of what they are able to prove.
DPR: Yes, it is the end in the sense of the ultimate assertion. At the same time, there's a limit or an end to what they can prove from their research or analysis. In any Buddhist tenet it is the same. In the Sautrantika view they came this far and found this exists in the ultimate sense.
Q3: From the Cittamattra point of view is what happened that they analyzed it further?
DPR: What happens? [laughs, laughter]
Q3: Or is it because they have this meditative experience that goes beyond this point of view?
DPR: Yes, Cittamattran analysis goes beyond that. They say there's no such thing as a hidden object existing in the ultimate sense. They go beyond that in a way similar to the dream analogy in the last talk. Cittamatrins say that it is like a dream in that they are just looking at dream from one perspective where there is only the dreamer, but not the dreamed object. They look at the continuation of our existence, before dreaming, as a subject while we are sleeping and going into the state of dream, and then as we wake up and the objects of the dream are not there. They see that continuity and say that the dreamer is existent and the dreamed object is non-existent. They see the continuation of the consciousness, existence of the consciousness, but not the existence of the outer hidden object, the phenomenon outside mind. They say that in everything that exists there is the apprehended aspect of phenomena outside which is not outer phenomena. It is just the projection of your mind. They still believe that there is a strong existence of mind the apprehender, consciousness. That is refuted by the Madhyamika. They say that's not true.

[illegible]

Q3: It is kind of amazing that they could even think this through analysis. Isn't there meditative experience that goes along with it?
DPR: Yes, [laughs] definitely. When you say "analyze," it involves a lot of analytical meditation, otherwise there's just technical analysis only. Throughout these views of Buddhist tenets the eighth Karmapa Mikyo Dorje distinguishes between those who hold the view, philosophers of the Vaibashika, Sautrantika, Cittamatra, and Madhyamika schools, for example, and the meditators of those schools. He draws a line between the two and sees them slightly differently. He says that there can be Sautrantika Vaibashika meditators who can go beyond their views, and not cling to the existence of atoms, and so on. They can realize the nature of emptiness or selflessness through their

meditation path. There can be another set of people who just simply hold the view of Sautrantika, which is very much like the professors in the universities. They just hold and propagate the view and go through a lot of assumptions and analysis, but do not meditate, and so do not go beyond their view. We get stuck with this view. Mikyo Dorje draws a line between the two; one propounds the view and remains a philosopher and one who goes beyond that in a total sense of meditation.

Q4: In the meditation we did this morning, mostly what I did was constantly memorize those phrases as they came. I can't apply the words that I memorized to the experience I had in the meditation. In other words, how does what I memorized, or tried to memorize, work in the practice of actually doing the meditation?

DPR: It is usually done through going through each stage. When you have memorized, for example, these verses on the result of valid cognition, and you're going through the analytical meditation, then you contemplate the content of that particular message, contemplate on the meaning rather than the words. It is not just reading a line, but after you read the line you have to contemplate on the meaning of that line, what it is saying. When you go through that conceptual contemplation, conceptual meditation, you look at, for example, an object and the subject, and see how you can experience it. This is not talking about the Buddha's perception; it is talking about ordinary perception, ordinary concepts. We are going through these experiences in everyday life, and what we are trying to do is see the three stages more clearly on a more subtle level. We should contemplate all these three stages of object, different levels of valid cognizer, and different levels of result. First you contemplate on the object. Also, it is obviously nice to memorize, but at the same time, if you can't memorize you can still look at it. You can read the stages one by one. You don't really have to try and memorize if you can't.

Q4: Where I'm coming from is how to put this into street language. The outer object itself is asserted to be the object of comprehension. Then in terms of commonly accepted, unexamined understanding, we're talking about anybody off the street, like Gladys in Pleasant Bay.

DPR: That's right.

Q4: Or Denny Blouin at Gampo Abbey...

DPR: [laughs, laughter] On Abbey Road.

Q4: [laughs] Right, but I can't let it be.

DPR: Right. [laughs, laughter)]You can, you can let it be [laughs, laughter]. With these words of wisdom you can let it be.

Q4: So, the outer object is the zafu, the zabuton, the apprehended aspect is what perceives zabuton, and that cognition is valid.

DPR: Right. And the result is that you say you have perceived a zabuton.

Q4: So that's something that's all verifiable in conventional experience.

DPR: Yes.

Q4: Then you say to both Gladys and me on Abbey Road, "Let's get a little more analytical about this."

DPR: That's right. [laughs]

Q4: What saw the zabuton is now what is the object of attention or comprehension.

DPR: Yes.

Q4: I have difficulty knowing how to translate the apprehending aspect into plain language here.

DPR: There are actually all the perceivers, like the perceptions, concepts...

Q4: So what sees the seeing of the zabuton...

DPR: ...is the valid cognizer.

Q4: If you get it that far then you're actually aware of the process of how this works in yourself.

DPR: Right.

Q4: Can we go to the last one? I really appreciate that you're going through this.

DPR: I'm enjoying the walk on Abbey Road, [laughter] that you're taking me on.

Q4: So now when you really want to get serious about analysis with Gladys and me [DPR laughs], clear awareness of empty duality is asserted to be the object of comprehension. What Gladys is going to say [DPR laughs] because she's never been here before and I have, [laughter] is, "What do you mean by clear awareness of empty duality. What is the emptiness of duality that we've got here?"

DPR: Yes.

Q4: You want me to answer, don't you?

DPR: Yes. [laughs]

Q4: Does it have something to do with the fact that the awareness and the awareness of awareness produce an awareness of duality, of the emptiness of duality? Is it that there's a short circuit in a certain way, something ordinary logic doesn't compute? And the only way to continue is that there is a non-dual state asserted to be the object of comprehension.

PR: I think that's right, yes. In some sense, in the third stage, everything is in self-awareness; there's nothing but the self-awareness. So whether you call it the object, subject or result, everything seems to be in one nature, which is self-awareness. Yes?

Q4: What is the apprehending aspect here?

DPR: I think at this stage the apprehending aspect is nothing but self-awareness. Self-awareness is the apprehending aspect in the third stage, when you look at the whole self process, there's nothing strongly divided into subject and object. Both of them are different aspect of mind. One is the aspect of object, which is also projection of mind; one is the perceiver consciousness, which is also an aspect of mind. There's no separate entity of duality at this point. All you can perceive, all you can really experience at this level is the self-awareness, which is experienced by itself. Self-awareness is aware of itself in this view. That self-awareness is the apprehending aspect of a valid cognizer, and when you have that self-awareness that is the result of a valid cognition. There's nothing separate. I think this makes it a little difficult to really explain because the third stage seems very much connected to the Shentong and Cittamattra Mahayana views, rather than the Sautrantika view. The third stage is not really explained in the *Pramanavartika*. I don't remember seeing this very clearly explained in the *Pramanavartika* and I haven't seen it explained in the commentary that I've recently been reading through. This third stage is very much like the interpretation of the view by Khenpo Rinpoche. In the *Pramanavartika* it only talks about the first and second stages. The third stage leads more into the Shentong view, which is the view of the seventh Karmapa, and which is clearly being stated here by Khenpo Rinpoche.

[illegible]

Q4: I've been sitting here trying to give names to those schools from Gladys' point of view.

DPR: That would be nice. Do you have names?

Q4: Vaibashikas are people who believe in things. Sautrantikas are people who do not believe in things, but do believe in hidden things in the mind . Cittamatrins are people who do not believe in things or hidden things, but do believe in mind only.

DPR: That's good. There's some similar terminology in Khenpo's short article in the *Nalandakirti Journal*. In that article he goes through these different schools' tenets and looks at the terminology, different names. Basically he just explains the names.

Q5: You were talking about the idea of how concepts work by the process of exclusion rather than inclusion. When I think about the idea of isolates, not not something, the process of exclusion, I don't see that happening. It seems like inclusion to me. It doesn't make any sense to me that it is through exclusion.

DPR: What do you mean by inclusion?

Q5: I guess inclusion is the opposite of exclusion. When I think about a concept, and I'm probably just missing the process because it happens so fast, it seems like it is inclusion and not exclusion. Someone says something, I think of it and I don't arrive at it through a process of exclusion. I probably do, but I just don't see it.

DPR: It is said in this school that when you look at the concepts or thoughts that conceive generally characterized phenomena, it is usually done through exclusion or isolation. For example, when you think about a chair you have a concept of "chair;" the object is just an isolate. There is no general chair. There is no generally characterized chair existent in any form or shape.

Q5: Do you mean because it is a concept?

DPR: Because it is a concept and it is also an object of concept: the generally characterized phenomena. You have this object which is "chair," and there is no such giant's chair which pervades all the different aspects of chair. When you think about the chair, the conceptual chair, the label "chair," or when you try to explain that to somebody, you also have to relate to a specific chair in your mind. When you say "chair," you have to relate to a specific chair, like the chair in your room, otherwise there's really no way to see that giant chair. In that sense, when you look at it as just the concept of "chair," and the object of that concept of a chair, it is just an exclusion. When you say "chair," in that concept it means whatever is "not chair." Probably the problem is that whenever we think about "chair" we always associate it with a specific chair, a specifically characterized chair. Whenever you want to have a clearer idea about a chair, then you may be thinking about this chair or that chair; it is specific already, it is not general anymore. At that specific level maybe you are working more at the inclusion, as you call it. At the level of a generally characterized chair, there's really nothing clear about it. It is just working at the exclusion level: What do you mean by "chair" if you just exclude that, if you isolate that level. That level is it is not that. You can't find any giant chair. Does that make sense?
Q5: Yes, it does.
DPR: If you look at that in that particular state, then it is exclusion, an isolate.
Q5: If it is a specifically characterized phenomenon then that's a different situation.
DPR: That's right. It is the mode of engagement of a mind apprehending appearance and elimination. This talks about how we apprehend directly and indirectly.

Q6: I want to ask about the relationship between the subcategories of mind apprehending generalities, and in particular, the relationship between type generality and term generality. Is it possible that term generality would be applied on top of type generality? Are they two different references to one generality or is it possible that once you have the term generality, say the term "vase," that the type generality depends on that, that you couldn't have the concept of the type without the term? Also if you take the isolate term "vase," you said it eliminates all that is "not vase" when you say "vase". Do you mean all that is not the term "vase" when you say "vase"?
DPR: That's right. Regarding term and type generalities, usually what we can clearly perceive or see, or relate with more strongly is the term generality. It is very strong, clear, and obvious, whereas the type and the collection generality is not very obvious in some sense. It is very unclear. Probably in one particular thing you can have both term and type generalities. Type generality can be expressed by term generality, conceived by the term generality. You can contemplate on that and see what relationship you can build between the two. Is it *musum*, *mushi*, *gelwa* or *tönchik* within these three generalities. That would be a good topic for debate.
DPR: In doing the analytical meditation on the mind apprehending a generality, we can contemplate on how we apprehend a generality. We can look at the different definitions, our different experiences of comprehending or apprehending generalities and try to identify them. We don't have to put so much effort into it; this mind apprehending generalities appears very easy in our mind. Once it appears in your mind you can try to clearly identify that particular mind apprehending a generality. You can clearly identify it as a type, collection, or term generality and see whether one concept or experience can have two of these generalities, or just one isolated experience. That would be a very nice contemplation. Maybe just one person can read the definitions slowly. The general definition and three subsets. We can read all four leaving a ten or fifteen minute gap between them.

If you have enough time at the end of the session, you could read the whole thing and have a summary of the whole contemplation. If you have difficulties with the two obstacles of excitement and dullness, and have problems concentrating or getting clarity, you should recite the four verses of Manjushri: "Great heroic mind." We should recite that and think about Manjushri. You don't have to go through a detailed visualization, just think about him clearly [finger snap] in one instant, and then go back to your analysis. Think that he's in your heart, on your shoulder, in your speech, or wherever you need him. Many times it is thought that you visualize on your shoulder, Manjushri is whispering words of wisdom [laughter] in your ear. [debating clap]

MIND APPREHENDING A PARTICULAR

The second aspect of the two modes of engagement of mind is the mind apprehending a particular. The definition of this is, "A mind apprehending the pervaded object of a pervader." Pretty straightforward, right? [R. laughs] This second aspect is a mind that apprehends the pervaded objects of that generality which is the pervader. We have talked about the pervader, or generality, and this is the individual particular object which the generality pervades.

The mind that apprehends the pervaded object of a pervader is a subset, so to speak, of the mind apprehending a generality. For example, when you say "glass," it's the generally characterized phenomenon. When you have a particular glass in front of you and when you see, perceive or conceive that glass, that glass becomes a particular object. It is a pervaded object. The whole general idea of "glass" pervades each individual glass. So what we are perceiving or apprehending is the particular aspect of that generality. If the generality is "glass," and we perceive or apprehend a particular aspect of that generality, of "glass," such as the glass in front of us or a collection of glasses at Gampo Abbey, that's the general definition of a mind cognizing a particular.

Its Three Divisions

We have had these two aspect of mind: the first is the mind which apprehends the generality and the second one is the mind that apprehends a particular. There are three subsets of that mind which cognizes a particular thing, that apprehends a particular object, rather than a general object. There are three subsets which are the same as the divisions of a mind apprehending a generality, except it's the mind apprehending a particular. We have a mind apprehending a particular of a type generality, a mind apprehending a particular of a collection generality, and a mind apprehending a particular of a term generality. These are exactly the same categories or divisions as the other one, except this refers to particulars rather than generalities. The first was a mind apprehending a type generality, and here is a mind apprehending a particular of a type generality. (Sometimes when it's not clear it's helpful to repeat; so we will try that.)

The first division is a mind apprehending a particular of a type generality. We can look at this definition, and since the rest are the same, we won't need to go through each one. The first subset is defined as, "A mind apprehending the pervaded object of a pervader of many [phenomena] belonging to its type." This is a mind which apprehends the pervaded object, the particular object. It's a particular object of a pervader of many phenomena belonging to its type. Examples of type generalities include cows, PC's, cars, and wild horses. We have a pervader of many phenomena, which means one generality pervades all the different particulars of a similar type, similar kind. When you say "car," it's a generality. Here we are using it as a type generality.

The text says, "Object of a pervader of many phenomena belonging to its type." What is the pervader in the example of the "car"?

Q: I thought it was mind.

Mind is the pervader? That must be a Cittamattrin car [laughter, R. laughs]. Pervader here is the car. The pervader is the generality, the car, and pervaded objects will be your car, Sangpo's car, or whatever. You don't have a car?

Sangpo: Not yet.

DPR: Oh, okay. Sangpo's future car. [laughter] Pervaded objects will be all these particulars.

Q: Could you say that the pervader is the car-ness?

DPR: Yes, you can say car-ness or quality of the car. When you say "car," it's a particular thing already, in some sense. It's defined by your concept in certain ways. There are pervaded objects which are the particular object of the general pervaders. The mind that apprehends the pervaded object of a general pervader is the first subset: a mind apprehending a particular of a type generality.

A mind cognizing a particular has three subsets or subdivisions. I don't think we have to go through each one. It's the same thing as the last talk; you just change from general to particular and that's about it. The rest of them are exactly the same definition.

The Mode of Engagement of a Mind Apprehending Appearance and Elimination

The First Mode: Apprehending Appearance

The next section is, "The mode of engagement of a mind apprehending appearance and elimination." This particular subject is regarded as being very important in the study of logic in Buddhism and Madhyamika. Lama Mipham clearly states in the beginning of his Madhyamika commentary that if you know these two things, then you can clearly understand Madhyamika logic more precisely. So this is treated as a very important subject.

There are two modes of engagement of mind apprehending appearance and elimination. The first one, apprehending appearance, is defined by Rinpoche as, "A mind that directly engages its specific object without depending on the exclusion of its opposite." "A mind that directly engages" is direct engagement, the direct valid cognition. Direct engagement is like the direct valid cognition: it's non-conceptual and it's direct experience of an object. The object is its specific object, and the specific object is the specifically characterized phenomenon. When you engage in such a mode with such objects, then the text says it is not dependent on the exclusion of its opposites; it's not dependent on the isolates or the general concept. It's more direct—it's specific engagement.

This mode of engagement is non-conceptual, and its function or accomplishment, so to speak, is completed right after the appearance of an object. After the appearance of an object its accomplishment, engagement is completed, and no more continuation is needed to complete something. It's complete in that very moment of its engagement. It is called the mind that is a collective engager. I've seen this in other translations like the Gelugpa translations. They also use the same terminology, collective engager. Somehow I feel it's not really a direct translation. It's more interpretive. It may have some kind of connection to the Tibetan term *drup juk*, obviously, but not direct I think. Someone asked me a question about the process of exclusion rather than inclusion. *Drup* has the meaning of inclusion rather than exclusion. The next one is called *sel juk*. *Sel* means to exclude. So *sel juk* means that you engage in an object with exclusion and *drup juk* means you engage an object with inclusion. Something like that. The term collective engager is an inclusive engager. To me, "collective" doesn't say much; I don't know about a native speaker. It's kind of tricky because collective generality is confused with collective engager. "Inclusive" gives you more of an idea than just "collective" because inclusive means it's not exclusive. So there's a sense that you can feel or connect with some kind of experience.

This particular type of mind engagement is divided into three. "Inclusive" means that you perceive the object directly. You engage in the perception more directly without having to work with the process of single or double isolates.

The Three Aspects of Inclusive Engagers

I don't know whether you can call these three "divisions." It's actually talking about three different aspects. The first one refers to the actual mode of being of the object, how the object of this engager exists. The second one is the mode of apprehension of the mind, how this mind perceives, how this mind apprehends that object. The third one is the concordance of mind and object; the subject has to arise in concordance with the object. These are not really three divisions of this mind so to speak. "Division" has a slightly different meaning. When direct valid cognition is divided into four, then the divisions are really clear. There is direct valid cognition of perception, mental direct valid cognition, and so on. Here it's talking about the object, then the subject, and then the relationship of the subject and object. So I don't know whether or not you can call these three "divisions" of the engaging mind.

The First Aspect: Objects

The first of the three are in the verses (we can recite these in the analytical meditation) says:

> "Concerning entities existing as [ultimate] objects
> One [entity] does not exist as different [entities]
> And different [entities] do not exist as one
> Therefore they exist without clear and unclear [aspects]."

I'll put this into the three modes so that you can understand easily. Then I don't have to explain. The first thing is to identify the subject, predicate and reason. The subject is the first line, "Concerning entities existing as [ultimate] objects." The predicate is in the last line, which says, "They exist without clear and unclear aspects." The reason is the second and third lines up to "Therefore."

This verse is trying to show how the object exists. The object of this engaging mind exists as an ultimate object. Rinpoche says that in the nature of the object there is no difference between a clear object and unclear object. There's no such distinction in the nature of the object; the nature of the object just exists as one nature, whatever it is. Therefore the entity of the object cannot become many or different entities. Different or many entities cannot become one entity. This clearly shows the *svalakshana* of the object. If it's the nature of the object to be one, then it can never become many. When you have many different natures of objects out there, they do not become one because they each have their own individual entity, individual characteristic, individual quality. Is that clear? Not clear? Undecided. [R. laughs, laughter] That's good. Take your time.

These three things are very similar to what the Sakyapandita presented in his *Treasury of Reasoning*. There you may find almost exactly the same or similar lines. It says that the ultimate nature of these existing objects exists in their own individual level, individual character. That individual character cannot change into another nature, another character. That character has its own continuity.

Q: Could you give an example?

DPR: For example, if you look at a fire or flame, the nature of that object, the entity of the flame has it's own quality, whatever it is. It is hot, burning, luminous, and so on. That entity, that individual character remains as the character of the flame. If you look at that individual flame with another individual flame, they have different characters. Even if it's the same sort of a quality, they have a different individual existence; the two don't become one thing, and each does not become two. At the level of individual existence as an entity, two different things cannot become one and one individual thing cannot become many. That is the object of our engaging mind. What is our engaging mind here?

Q: Inclusive.

DPR: Yes, that's right. Here, it's called collective engager, or inclusive or apprehending appearance. [someone sneezes] Bless you. Gee, I am busy. [laughter] Getting more busy.

The Second Aspect: Subjects

That was the object. The second verse shows the subject which says:

> "In terms of collective engagers such as sense direct valid cognizers
> One [entity] does not appear as different [entities]
> And neither can different [entities] appear as one;
> In engagement through appearance there is no remainder."

The subject here is the first line which says, "In terms of collective engagers." The predicate is the fourth line which says, "In engagement through appearance there is no remainder." The reason is the second and third lines, "One [entity] does not appear as different [entities] and neither can different [entities] appear as one," and the example can be a sense direct valid cognizer. This is basically similar to the first one. You have a very specifically characterized object, the phenomenon as an object, and when you have such an object, the perceiver of that object is also very specific. The perceiver of that object is also a very particular consciousness, a very particular perception. It's the inclusive perception or mind at this stage which is also very individual. When this individual perception perceives an individual object, in that process of perception there's nothing left. When you perceive that object you perceive it in full; nothing is left behind; nothing remains after. No remainder means that when you perceive an object directly, you perceive the wholeness of the object, the whole character, the whole individual existent. "No remainder" means there's no such thing as the first moment perceiving one half of it and then a second or third moment perceiving the remaining half. In this perception, in this mode of engagement, whenever you have the appearance of an object, you have the full appearance of the object, and you have fully or completely apprehended the object. There's nothing left behind, nothing remaining that has not been perceived.

"[illegible]"

The idea of no remainder is a very interesting concept because it is introduced right at the Sautrantika Vaibashika Cittamattra level, and goes all the way up to Madhyamika and to tantra. Therefore, Aryadeva said in his Madhyamika teachings that when you perceive or have the realization of emptiness of one object, you have the realization of emptiness of all, and there's nothing remaining. As far as emptiness is concerned it's one emptiness. When you have that perception or realization of emptiness of one entity, or one object, then you have the realization of emptiness of all phenomena—there's nothing left.

It will be nice in our debate or discussion groups to see if you can apply the three modes to the verses. You can establish the three modes now that I have identified the subject, predicate and reason.

Q: How's the word particular used here? Could the particular also be a generally characterized phenomena?
DPR: Yes, it can be. I think it can be both. Yesterday I said these are particular things that are more like the specific character. However, it can be both if you look at it as having different levels of isolates. For example, "vehicle" is one level, then "car," then Dodge, Chrysler, GM, or Ford cars. Then you have the subset of that, like Thunderbolt or something. [laughter]
Q: Khenpo Rinpoche gave definitions for the type and collection generalities. For the collection generality he gives the example of Mt. Kailash. In the collection generality he defined "collection" as meaning the eight particle substances of earth, water, fire, wind, visible odors and so on. These seem to be specifically characterized phenomena.
DPR: You mean that a collection generality is a specifically characterized phenomena?
Q: Not the generality itself, but what it's pervading. He said, "Marpa Point is the collection of rocks at Rocky Mountain Dharma Center. The eight particle substances are earth, water, fire and so on.

[illegible] can be [illegible]

So Marpa Point is a term which expresses a collection because it is a mass within which the eight particled substances are gathered." The distinction between the type and collection generalities seems to be that the type has other generally characterized phenomena as its reference. He seems to be saying that the collection generality has as its referent a specifically characterized phenomenon, like the eight particled substances.
DPR: We can discuss and compare these after we distribute a new set of definitions; then everyone will have copies of the two different definitions. Now people are getting confused. Both definitions are the same. Both are given by Rinpoche, this is also written by Rinpoche, and that's also written by Rinpoche. Both are from him and shouldn't really be different.

Q1: Does collection generality imply a collection even when you use it in the singular? In the example of a forest, that implies a collection of things and does not deal with particles or elements. Or you could say "herd" or "mob of people," or the word "collection" itself. If you use the word animal in the singular it doesn't imply a group or a collection. You could say a herd or a mob of people, the word collection itself rather than a word which implies, a class of things like animals. If you use the word animal in the singular it doesn't imply a group or a collection. Is that what collection generality means?
DPR: Yes, I think so. Khenpo Rinpoche's book begins with the most basic level of collection. At the most basic level of collection is the collection of the four elements, or eight elements. From there everything begins.
Q1: Does the generality pretty much depend on the term and how that applies to thing?
DPR: Mostly, yes, it's more conceptual.
Q1: Both in the type generality and the collection generality?
DPR: I think what you said is right.
Q: Can you repeat what you said?
Q1: Collection generality refers to a collection, that which has the idea of a collection inherent in the term, like a group, mob, army or forest..
DPR: Forest Gump [laughter].
Q1: Rather than...
DPR: Rather than Forest Gump.(R. laughs, laughter)
Q1: It is different than a word which is more of a general type, a type generality such as cow or animals; but I think they're both type generality. I also have a question about the term generality. It says "A phenomenon pervading many means of verbal expressions." Is that referring to the label and that to which the label is applied? Is it referring to the word itself such that many words can be applied to one isolate?
DPR: Say that again.
Q1: So it says "A phenomenon pervading many means of verbal expression." So the object, the phenomenon is itself the term, the label, and not that to which the label is applied. It's just the word. It says "Many means of verbal expression." Does that mean many different words can be applied to a certain thing? Could you say cow, bovine, vache or whatever?
Q: Vache?
Q1: It's French. I can't think of many words for cow. It says "A mind which perceives a phenomenon." Is the phenomenon which is perceived or apprehended the label or the term and not that to which the term is applied, not the object of the term?
DPR: Yes. I think the term itself is the phenomenon.

Q2: The other reference books say that, at least in the Gelugpa system, that the mind that apprehends the generalities is considered conventional. I thought you said that the mind that apprehends the generalities could be the *svalakshana*, a specifically characterized phenomenon, which would make it an ultimate. Is this just the difference between the two systems?
DPR: I cannot really say. There's a difference between the two traditions or schools, and in the presentation of generalities, there is a difference. That's for sure, this is especially very clearly taught in the seventh Karmapa's commentary. In that there are eight reasonings which prove that a

generality is a non-thing, whereas in the earlier school (I have used the terms earlier school of logic and later school of logic) there is a view in which they see some aspects of a generality as being a thing. They believe the isolate is not necessarily a non-thing. It can also be present in a thing. They believe in this. They have this theory which says there is an eliminating quality or thing that exists in things. For example, when you have this glass it naturally eliminates what is not glass in its own self. It's not only in your mind, in your concept, but it is also in its own self as a thing outside. That's the view of the earlier school of logic, whereas in the later school of logic we believe that all eliminations are conceptual. All the isolates and general characteristics are conceptual. Therefore, there is some difference in that view, I would say. We should use the more technical terms, earlier schools of logic and later school of logic, rather than breaking between the four schools.

Q2: I understood that the reason that they were positing a hidden object was precisely because the eliminating quality was inherent in the object and therefore when it was perceived by the direct, non-conceptual valid cognition there was an object that could be already presented to the conceptual or mind aspect. In other words, the mind aspect needed to have something to designate what the object was from the image of the sensory direct valid cognition. If the object didn't inherently have this eliminating aspect, you wouldn't be able to separate object from not object, in the third moment of conceptual cognition. It would just be a mass of undifferentiated whatever, unless the object itself had this eliminative quality inherent in it. Therefore they said this is how they establish that things exist. Does that make sense?

DPR: I think so, yes. There's different views, and that's why I presented the other day that Lama Mipham also accepts this view of the earlier school. I don't know whether he agrees completely with all aspects of the earlier school of logic or not, but he goes along with this eliminative quality being a thing, existing in a thing. This is not accepted by the later school of logic. If you look at the eliminating process, it's very conceptual. You have this is not this, not this, not this. In the actual state of the thing itself it has its own entity, which makes it separate from the others. It doesn't go through that process of elimination. That process of elimination is totally conceptual. The thing itself doesn't go through that process of, "I'm not a table, I'm not a chair, [laughter] I'm not Rinpoche, I'm not a microphone, I'm not Sangpo, I'm a glass." [laughter]. Maybe it does in "The Beauty and the Beast." [laughter, R. laughs] That's what the later school of logic is saying. They have an entity and we accept the entity which makes itself an individual, a particular. That's why we have the *svalakshana*; it doesn't mean it eliminates the others. The process of elimination is totally conceptual. That's why we're saying that the isolate that we give, or the eliminating process that we have, is conceptual mind. It happens in a conceptual mind, and that object is a conceptual object which is a double or single isolate. Within the thing itself outside is a [taps glass] substantial existence, there's no such elimination process going on. Does that make sense? It doesn't have to. It didn't make sense to the earlier school of logic.

Q2: In the way you're presenting it now it sounds like there's really no difference between the earlier and later schools. They really have the same view; it's just a difference in how they talk about it. I don't think the earlier school would say that the eliminative quality is conceptual They're just saying that the fact that there is an object there automatically separates it from not-object.

other schools

DPR: They go a little further than that, and they posit this isolate as a thing. That's why it's called the eliminating process within the object itself, as a thing.

Q2: So they actually make it like the nature of the object.

DPR: That's right, yes. It is that rather than just a conceptual process of elimination.

Q2: You said that in terms of the generality, it is the object of concept. I usually think of object in terms of object and subject. That would make the concept the subject, but the concept doesn't have consciousness. In this case, when you said "object," did you mean the content of the concept as opposed to the object, in terms of subject/object?

DPR: What's the difference?

Q2: If you say it's an object of the concept, then that makes concept the subject.

DPR: What does content of a concept mean?

Q2: It means what the concept is about, what the particular or specifics of the content is about. On some level "object" conveys it, but in the way we use the word object, it has a very particular

meaning. It's always related to subject; that makes concept the subject, and then that makes concept a consciousness, which it is not. Do you see what I'm saying?
DPR: I'll think about it.
Q2: The concept is not a subject, is that correct? It's not a consciousness?
DPR: I see. Maybe we are mixing up conceptual mind and concept. Is that right?
Q2: Yes.
DPR: Conceptual mind is subject, yes. If you just say "concept," maybe you can say it's the object.
Q2: Well you'd say it's the object of the conceptual mind, or the object of the concept.
DPR: It's the object of the conceptual mind.

Q3: I have an objection to saying that animal is not a type generality. When we use the term in the scientific sense we talk about it as not being a specific thing, but as a type generality. This problem came up in one of the syllogisms that we discussed. I didn't know exactly how to pinpoint the difficulty with the syllogism. It was a confusion about the difference between the type generality and the collection generality. Thupten was saying that animal is not a collection generality, and I'm saying it can be in the scientific sense.
Thupten: I would say that if you said "a class of animals" or "the class of animals" where you include the term that implies a collection, there it would be a collection generality. If you just said "animals" I think that's a type generality.
DPR: [laughs and makes debate clap] [laughter] These are very difficult to isolate, I think. It's difficult to isolate one or the other. We can have so many different ways of looking at it. It really depends on the context and on how you put it. You were saying...?
Thupten: A class or a collection of animals.
DPR: A class of animal, or whatever. If you put it in a different context, or approach it differently, then that can make it more specific. In general, if you must say "glass," it's very difficult to say whether it's a collective or type term. You have to make it more specific by using other helping terms.

Q4: I was hoping to clarify that this depends entirely on context. In the example of a tree, it would be a type within the collection "plants" or "forest," or it could be a collection of leaves, branches, roots, and anything that's a subset. A tree is a type in relation to a collection "forest," a forest is a type in relation to, say, a collection of landscapes, and landscapes is a type in relation to planetary features. You could go as far as you want in any direction.
DPR: Yes, did you discuss or debate these three generalities?
Q4: We contemplated that this morning.
DPR: Was it good?
Q: There were lots of questions.
DPR: That's good. I think we should debate on these three a little bit more, and then discuss more. We are hoping to hand out a collection of [laughter, laughs] different types of collected terms and definitions.[laughter, laughs] These are from Khenpo Rinpoche's *The Miraculous Key*. The definitions are slightly different because *The Miraculous Key* was based on the *Treasury of Knowledge* and this text is based on the seventh Karmapa's *Ocean of Texts on Logic*, and also Sakyapandita's *Treasury of Reasoning*. *The Miraculous Key* is based on the section on logic in the *Treasury of Knowledge* and is closer to the Gelugpa's definitions than this one. We may find slight differences between the two, but I think it will be helpful to have both. Both are from Kagyu Masters and we can use them both.

Q5: You mentioned yesterday that a non-thing is not mind and it's categorized as a knowable. Would you say that non-thing, that generally characterized phenomena, is an imputation of mind, something which is projected from mind? It's not mind because it's not in itself clear and aware, yet is it an imputation of mind?
DPR: In ancient Nalanda, Candrakirti and Candragomin had this debate for twelve years.
[R. laughs, laughter]
Q5: Similar to this?

DPR: Similar to Cittamatra and Madhyamika. We also have a continuation [R. laughs, laughter] from our last debate [R. laughs]. I think in the Sautrantika Cittamatra view, non-thing is imputed, it is a concept, an isolate, or something like that.

Q5: Is it that mind is doing the work, but it has nothing to do with mind?

DPR: This depends on which tenet or view we look at it. If you look at it from the Cittamatra point of view, everything is a projection of mind, there's nothing outside. Thing and non-thing are both projections of mind equally, and both appear as an object. As long as we remain in this duality, dualistic mind they appear as an object and we have the subject, mind. We perceive them as separate even in the Cittamatra view. As long as we remain in the duality we have the separation. Right? Subject/object separation and that is what is known as confusion. It is the imputed, totally confused state. When you realize that there's nothing outside except your mind, then it becomes a more other-powered nature or perfected nature. This is when you see the mind free from imputations.

Q5: In this Gelugpa text it says that whenever you say it's an imputation, then it's an impermanent phenomenon. They say that when the term "permanent" is used, it's from the point of view that it's an isolate. It doesn't change. It's actually impermanent by nature; they would even say that these isolates change. You might have a certain image about something in your mind and over the years it will shift. When they use the term "permanent" it doesn't mean that it's not impermanent.

DPR: So the chair will become a table? [laughter]

Q5: For example, before Nitartha Institute, Gampo Abbey was very much connected with practice.

DPR: [R. laughs] Not any more. [R. laughs, laughter]

Q5: The isolate changed.

DPR: Generally, when you say "Abbey," it's just an isolate. In this view the isolate is like taking the term or object "Abbey" and isolating it from all others that are not "Abbey." The other attributes are just more attributes, more labels. They are not the label "Abbey," but secondary labels like "always a practice center" or "it's a study center." You can have different attributes.

Q5: Previously you might have said "Gampo Abbey is not a study center, it's a practice center."

DPR: Who said that? Harrison is asking who said that.[R. laughs]

Q5: From their point of view there are certain mental images which...

DPR: Change.

Q5: Yes.

DPR: I am saying that you can have different attributes, but they don't really change "Abbey." The isolate "Abbey" is just an isolate of "Abbey." Whatever is not not "Abbey" is "Abbey." That doesn't change.

Q5: The isolate itself does not change, the image changes.

DPR: The isolate doesn't change, right?

Q5: Yes. You can say the isolate doesn't change because the "Abbey" is always the "Abbey."

DPR: That's right.

Q5: However, if you look at the mental image which occurs if you say "Gampo Abbey never changes..."

DPR: That's the "Abbey." When you put more attributes on the "Abbey," more labels, that could change. That doesn't mean the "Abbey" changes. The isolate label of the "Abbey" is permanent no matter what. Last year it was the "Abbey" and this year it was "Abbey Road" or something like that.

THE THIRD ASPECT:
THE CONCORDANCE OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT

We have finished two of the three divisions of a collective engager of appearances. The third division is, "The concordance of mind and object."

"In whatever way an object's [features] abide
In that same way they are apprehended by mind.
Therefore, without any confusion pred.
Object and subject abide in mutual dependence.
Given

We have talked about the nature of the object of this particular mode of engagement of appearances. It is called the collective engager. We have defined clearly the object of this mode of engagement and the subject of this mode of engagement. The third division is clear because it talks about the relationship between the two, the concordance of mind and its object. The subject of the three modes begins in the last line where it says "Object and subject." "Object and subject" is the subject. The predicate is in the third line, which says,"without any confusion." The reason is the first two lines and the last half of the fourth line: "In whatever way an object's [features] abide, in that same way they are apprehended by mind," and "abide in mutual dependence." "Abide" here means their relationship in mutual dependence. The subject, mind, is the mind apprehending appearance without any confusion in apprehending its object. In other words, there are no mistakes happening in this apprehension, there's nothing left behind. It has a complete sense of apprehending all the different aspects, all the different forms of its object at the direct perceptual level. Therefore, without any confusion, it apprehends the object in whatever way the object's features abide. When we look at the glass in front of us and apprehend it in this first mode, we apprehend all the different aspects or qualities of the glass, including the most subtle level of its existence. Its abiding features, such as its momentary nature and impermanent nature, are being apprehended directly by this first mode of engagement. That is the relationship between the subject and object.

When you have this first mode of engagement of mind, when the perceiver perceives the object, this collective or inclusive engager of mind apprehends all the factors of its object. There's nothing left. The reason why we do not see it clearly is because the conceptual labeling process tendency is much stronger than the basic perception. Therefore we do not have enough precision or contact with this basic engagement of mind. Our perception which sees all the factors of the object is covered or defiled by our conceptual mind that arises right after. The conceptual mind is stronger. It is a very relative thought that obscures our seeing of the object in its basic nature.

This fundamental Lorik presentation of engagement is pretty profound because it not only says that you see the object, but you also see all the factors or basic natures of the object. You see the impermanent nature, the momentary nature, and the most subtle changes that take place at the level of direct perception. You perceive them. At that level there's nothing left to perceive or apprehend. [R. laughs] In some sense this is saying that liberation or enlightenment is right here at this level of our apprehension. This is nothing like waiting for a long time to realize the true nature of phenomena as being momentary, impermanent and non-existent. It is saying that it is not far in the future, it's right here. Even at the very basic level of the Sautrantika Cittamatra presentation you can see how skillfully Buddha has presented this fundamental message of primordial enlightenment. The meaning of the primordial Buddha is presented in a very skillful way. This is why the seventh Karmapa and Khenpo Rinpoche always connect the view of logic in its ultimate sense to the Shentong school, and to the views of Mahamudra and tantra. At this point we can have some sense of a glimpse.

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The third verse says that the engagement of mind arises in dependence on the nature of the object. It is dependent on the object's feature, how the object's feature abides. The apprehender, perceiver or mind arises in dependence on the nature of the object that is apprehended. Therefore, in this relationship between the subject and object, there is no confusion. In the most fundamental state there is no confusion. There's nothing more to perceive or apprehend, because at that very moment of appearance, the mode of engagement of mind is complete and perfect in its own state. There's nothing more to be perfected or completed.

The Second Mode of Engagement: Mind Apprehending Elimination

The second mode of engagement is the engagement of a mind apprehending elimination. This is called the exclusive engager, or eliminative engager. The definition is "[A mind that] engages its specific object by means of the exclusion of its direct opposite." Previously we talked a lot about isolates, and the exclusion and reverse, which were related to the object aspect. Now we're talking about the mind. This is a conceptual mind which engages its object through eliminating or excluding its direct opposite. It's the eliminative engager. That mind apprehends the object, which [?] is mainly the generally characterized phenomenon. We apprehend the generally characterized phenomena which is basically an exclusion, reverse, isolate.

Its Four Divisions

This mind is the opposite of the mind of the collective engager. There are four divisions. "Minds that are eliminative engagers apprehending one as one, different as different, one as different and different as one." The first one is apprehending one as one; the second, apprehending different as different; the third, apprehending one as different; and the fourth, apprehending different as one. Fortunately Rinpoche says: "The first two among these four are easy to understand , [DPR and students laugh] however, the apprehension of one as different and of different as one will be explained." [Laughter] Unfortunately. [More laughter]

The Apprehension of One as Different

The first one is apprehension of one as different. Rinpoche divides this explanation into two verses. The first verse explains the mode of superimposition and the second verse explains the necessity of this particular engagement. The Tibetan word means both necessity and benefit.

Khenpo Rinpoche says:

> "Due to different objects of experience [or analysis—ed.] of conceptuality
> For one [object] there appear different isolates.
> In accordance with the mode of engagement of terms and concepts
> One imagines the differences to exist in the object as well."

This verse doesn't have three modes. Rinpoche is directly showing the reason; the subject and predicate have to be added onto this. The whole thing is the reason and there's no clear subject here. When we don't have a clear subject in debate, we usually say that the subject is the knowable. When you put forth the subject as a knowable, it can mean anything whatsoever. The predicate is: there exists the way of the mode of superimposition. The reason is the whole verse. It's a pretty short reason. [R. laughs]

The first line, "Due to different objects of experience of conceptuality" is saying that in our concept, in our experience of the conceptual mind, labeling mind, different objects are experienced (or conceived) by our conceptual mind.

The second line shows how these objects appear to your conceptual mind. It says, "For one [object] there appear different isolates." For one object, you can have two labels. Different isolates means two labels. For example, when we use words like impermanent, momentary nature, or produced, they have the same meaning, they are saying the same thing. You can have different isolates, or labels to say one thing. They are synonyms. What would be the other label for glass?

Voices: Vessel, cup.

DPR: We have water inside here and we can call this *wasser* in German or *chu* in Tibetan. For one object there appear different isolates. If you know different languages, when you see one object, you refer to it with all these different labels that appear to your conceptual mind.

The verse continues: "In accordance with the mode of engagement of terms and concepts, one imagines the differences to exist in the object as well." Our conceptual mind engages with these different terms, concepts or labels, but in the actual object, the basis of these labels, there are not different objects. There is only one object. You give all these different labels to one object. For example, you have your birth name, refuge name, monastic name, Bodhisattva name and tantric name. All these labels refer to just one object.

"In accordance with the mode of engagement of terms and concepts," means in accordance with how it gets engaged with these terms or isolates. In accordance with how our conceptual mind engages with these terms and concepts, we imagine that different objects exist outside as well. We get confused. With these different labels we see different objects. That's the first verse.

In one edition of the text, the Tibetan word for experience is used, and in the other edition the Tibetan word for analyze is used. It's the same word, but it has a different spelling in Tibetan. The text should read, "Due to different objects of analysis of conceptuality." In a way, that makes more sense, because it's a conceptual analysis of the object. It is the experience of conceptual mind which is analysis.

The second verse is the explanation of the necessity or benefit.

> Produced, impermanent and so on
> Are not understood to be one in essence.
> So that they can be understood to be one
> Scholars differentiate and thus connect.

It says there are different terminologies like produced, impermanent, and so on. They all say the same thing, but we do not understand them to be one in essence. We do not understand them as having the same meaning. We understand them as different, and we get confused with different labels. It says that in order to bring oneself to the complete understanding of these terminologies, and the connections between terms, scholars engage in differentiating and connecting them together. They differentiate them as well as develop their relationship clearly through the terms, labels, labeling mind, labeling thoughts. The subject is one thing, one basic object, which is the basis of labeling, the basis which is superimposed with two or many different or separate labels. The predicate is that when you analyze through reasoning there is a benefit. The reason starts with the second line, "Are not understood to be one in essence. So that they can be understood to be one, scholars differentiate and thus connect." The reason is these three lines. The first line, "Produced, impermanent and so on," is the example. You can establish the three modes on that basis. [R. laughs]

Q1: Is the object referred to here the apprehended object or the hidden object?
DPR: I think it's a combination of both in this view. The apprehended aspect cannot arise without the hidden object which is the basis of it.

Q: But would the hidden object be the previous moment?
DPR: Right. Something like that

Q2. I don't see much difference between the second and third verses. They both say that there is no remainder, and that in direct valid perception one sees all the features of the object. Aren't they saying the same thing?
DPR: They are slightly different. The second division is looking from the mode of apprehension, the mind, the perceiver. It is mainly focused on the perceiver and the question of what this perception is, or what is this mind that perceives this particular object which is appearance. This second verse is looking mainly from the point of view of the subject, describing the subject and its function. The third division is talking about the relationship between the subject and object. There is a certain connection and similarity because this division also includes the subject. It's very similar but the emphasis is a little different. The second one emphasizes the subject and the third one emphasizes both subject and object. In meaning they may not be much different.
Q2: I guess I was looking at the overall meaning rather than breaking it down.
DPR: Yes, the meaning is similar. They're all talking about the same thing which is the collective engager.

Q3: Rinpoche, from the point of view of the third division, is the understanding of impermanence a conceptual understanding or does it arise on the basis of the subtle perceptions that you described?
DPR: It's not conceptual; it's a non-conceptual perception. We are talking about the first engagement, which is the mind apprehending appearance. That mind apprehending appearance is non-conceptual. It is the mind that we called the inclusive engager.
Q3: Is the non-conceptual perception of impermanence, which occurs on the basis of subtle sense perceivers, related in any way to yogic direct valid cognition?
DPR: These two modes are more general than yogic direct valid cognition. Yogic direct valid cognition is a subset of non-conceptual mind. A collective engager or inclusive engager is more like an overall group or category which includes all valid cognition, such as sensory direct perception, mental direct perception, self-aware direct perception, and yogic direct perception. I would say the relationship would be that the yogic direct perception is a product of meditation. What condition was meditation?
Audience: Dominant condition.
DPR: That's right. I am just trying to see whether you remember [laughter]. Yogic direct valid cognition cannot arise without this dominant condition, which is meditation. The meditation can be non-conceptual. Basically we're starting our meditation with concept, conceptual meditation. Whenever you sit down and say, concentrate, it's conceptual. You think it's non-conceptual—you're resting in shamatha—but actually it is conceptual meditation. You always say, "Concentrate, concentrate one-pointedly on the breath," or "Let go," or whatever. Whatever you do is conceptual which leads to a state of non-conceptual resting at the end. After doing it for awhile you might get a non-conceptual state of resting. In a similar way, yogic direct valid cognition arises from different kinds of meditation, which can be conceptual and non-conceptual. From there you come to a sense of certainty and clearly see with direct valid cognition. Right now we may be seeing them, but we don't see clearly. There is a difference. Yogic direct valid cognition becomes a much stronger experience, and there's much more of a sense of ascertainment.

ད་གསལ་ལ
མི་གསལ།

Q4: I don't completely understand the first verse. It says "Entities exist without clear and unclear aspects." Does that mean that the entities are indescribable in some way, or that they are singular?
DPR: No. It means that there's no two states in the actual state of the object itself. There's no difference between clear and unclear. That is conceptual because in the basic object-subject relationship, it just perceives as it is. There's no label saying clear or unclear object, or clear or unclear perception.
Q4: Is that different from saying, for example, the object is clearly what it is? Is this a completely different category?
DPR: When we describe with words we may say that it's clearly or completely perceived. We use

such words. This says that in the actual state of the object itself, it is beyond these concepts, words and labels of clear or unclear, this or that. It is just what it is.

Q4: But then we go on to say, for example, that such entities might be impermanent or momentary. In other words they have many aspects. Is it that we're at a non-conceptual level prior to that kind of description?

DPR: Yes. It's a non-conceptual experience which is expressed in words and understood by concepts.

Q4: In the same verse, where it says, "One entity does not exist as different entities, and different entities do not exist as one," is it saying that they are singular and therefore not multiple in any way, or is it saying that they're not confused by being either singular or multiple?

DPR: That's interesting. In the most basic sense it means they are singular. You're right. When you say many, it is conceptual. In the actual state of the object it's just individual existence. There's many individual existences, and then we say "many people." But there's no such thing as one entity of many-ness, so to speak, in the object itself. It's all very individual.

Q5: Rinpoche, are the type and collection generalities being excluded as well in these two lines? Is it neither a type nor a collection generality?

DPR: Generalities are excluded here, yes, definitely.

Q5: In saying that one entity does not exist as different entities and different entities do not exist as one, do these refer respectively to excluding the type generality and collection generality?

DPR: These lines do not specifically exclude these two generalities. In general, when you describe the object of a collective engager or inclusive engager, it naturally eliminates such object generalities.

Q6: Is the *svalakshana* of a glass basically just one *svalakshana* or is it a composite of many *svalakshanas*, such as its shininess, whiteness or form? There might be different schools on that.

DPR: It can have many. That's why we say that one entity does not exist as different entities. The entities of being shiny, transparent, or whatever can each be individual entities. They're all based on one basic composite of indivisible particles.

in one
glass ;
can be
[illegible].

Q6: If I perceive a glass, it sounds like a general characteristic, and it is approached as one thing. If I perceive a glass directly, then it is broken down into shininess, form and whatever, and so there's no glass left. That's the problem.

DPR: That's wonderful.

Q6: Then we hold the Madhyamaka view. What is the Sautrantika view?

DPR: I think that when you break it down to its really ultimate level, reduce it to that level of subtlety, which is the ultimate level of Sautrantika or Cittamatra, then at that level you see impermanence, the momentary nature of things, tiny bits and pieces of moments. When you reach that level of the momentary nature of impermanence, it's not very far from emptiness. In some sense you may not find any solid existence to conceptually cling to, but at the same time there's a subtle existence at the level of indivisible particles where the collection of those particles manifest as different qualities, depending on how they are composed. Does that make sense? It doesn't have to. It seems that the whole Lorik doesn't make much sense. [laughter]

Q1: In the first verse, could the subject be, "one object," and the predicate be, "There appear different isolates?"

DPR: And the reason?

Q1: The reason would be lines 1, 3 and 4.

DPR: You can do that, yes. I think that's good. I'm just giving you the model. It would be nice to change that and then debate.

Q1: I understood you to say that, in reference to the first verse, line two, isolates are synonyms. Is that always the case, or could the isolates refer to different aspects, as opposed to synonymous aspects.

DPR: Yes, we are talking about synonymous aspects. Not all isolates are synonyms.

Q1: In other words, could we say that a thing is impermanent, produced and temporary, but if

we're looking at a glass, we could say it's clear and shiny. Would those be considered isolates in this type of use?
DPR: Yes.
Q1: They refer to different aspects, but they are not synonymous because clear is different from shiny.
DPR: They are expressing the quality of one object.

Q2: I don't fully understand what apprehending a term generality means. The text says, "A mind apprehending a [phenomenon] as pervading many means of [verbal] expression." To me that means many means of expressing a particular phenomenon or particular generality. You said that this particular mind apprehends labels.
DPR: Do you mean the eliminative engager?
Q2: No. I think I understand what type and collection generalities are, but term generality is still confusing.
DPR: I think that will be clear on page 17. We will talk later about the explanation of the mode of engagement of mind, objects of verbal expression and the means of verbal expression. If you wait a little and see what happens after this, it may clarify this for you.
Q2: Does it have anything to do with what we're talking about right now?
DPR: Yes, because the mind cognizing a term generality is part of this mode of engagement, which is elimination. We might say that it's one of the subsets of this mode of engagement, which is a mind apprehending elimination.
Q2: Does it have anything to do with different labels being applied to one object?
DPR: No, at this point, for the term generality, we're just referring to one label applied to one object. For example, when you say "glass," it is referring to one object, the generality of one object.
Q: Why does it say "pervading many means of verbal expression" with only a singular phenomenon?
DPR: "Many" here refers to a combination of many words. For example, when you say "vase" or "glass," it's a composition of words, letters and different terms. You can say "vase" or "*bumpa*" in Tibetan. You can say many different things, but they are all saying one term generality.

relationship of
seeing of [illegible]

Q2: So now what we're talking about is one object is mistaken to be a different object because different labels are applied. In the term generality, many labels can be applied to one object, but it's still understood to be one object, the same isolate appears with all these labels. In this one, things are understood to be one in essence; a mistake is made when different labels are applied. Because different labels are applied, the mind mistakenly thinks that there are different objects.
DPR: For example, "mistaken" here refers to something like sound. We have the eliminative engager mind, a concept which says "sound." Then we have a concept which says "impermanent," and a concept which says "produced." They are not connected at this point where you have these different labels. What you can do is connect them all together in one mode, and you can say, "Sound is impermanent because it is produced." At that level you bring them all together, connect them all together. At the same time you differentiate them, because first you know what sound is, you know what impermanent is, and you know what produced is. When you differentiate and understand each one individually, then you bring them all together into one common understanding: "Sound is impermanent because it is produced."

In a regular sense, we have an isolated conceptual understanding of the terms or labels "sound," "impermanent," "produced" and "momentary," but we don't connect or differentiate them. When you do differentiate and connect these terms with reasons or syllogisms, then you come to a conclusion and understanding of the connection and differences between them.

[illegible] verse
retrieving
is many

Q2: Do these labels [in section 2.2.2.2.1.1] talk about qualities and not whole things?
DPR: What do you mean whole thing?
Q2: If you say "sound" and "noise," they are different synonyms for an object, whereas impermanence describes a different quality.
DPR: What we are saying is, "Are understood to be one in essence." It's not necessarily that all of

them have to be synonymous at this level. We are trying to come to the understanding that whether it's produced, sound, or impermanent, they all have the same essence which is impermanent or produced. You need to have synonymous terms to get to that understanding. If you don't have synonyms like impermanent and produced, then you cannot get to the understanding of what is impermanent, how sound and impermanence are connected.

The mind apprehending a term generality is part of this mode of engagement. When you have this mind apprehending a term generality, you have to eliminate. For example, when you say "glass," you have to eliminate what is not glass, and then you understand the term "glass." Therefore, it is an eliminative engager, rather than a collective engager.

Q3: My question is about the classification of non-perceivability, the third syllogism. Which of the three, cause and effect, nature, and non-perceivability applies to, "Generally characterized phenomena do not exist ultimately because of not performing a function."
DPR: I think it's nature. It describes the nature of that phenomenon.
Q3: My question goes back to the definition that we have for the correct reason of non-perceivability. The definition is: "The existence of all three modes in the proof of that which is to be proved in this case, the negation of all three modes in the negation of which is to be negated." (You gave this to us as a definition.) Does that basically say the negation of the predicate and the negation of the reason?
DPR: That's the definition of what?
Q3: Non-perceivability, the correct reason of non-perceivability.
DPR: So your question is?
Q3: That seems to say there's a negation in the reason, therefore, the predicate is negated. Is anything that's negated in the proof and in the probandum non-perceivability? Is it possible to insert non-perceivability into the proof section there? It seems that the proof needs to include non-perceivability.
DPR: No. I think you can add that, but usually when you add that then you are adding the definiendum in the definition. What is to be defined here is non-perceivability. You're trying to define the reason of non-perceivability which is the definition. When you have the definition you can't have that in your definition.
Q3: But it's in the other definitions. When we defined the correct reason of effect, we said, "A result reason with the three modes," and when we defined the correct reason of self nature, we said, "A self nature reason with the three modes."
DPR: As I said before, you can add that to make it clear, but we have to keep in mind is that it is usually not added because of being the definiendum, what is to be defined.
Q3: It seems like the definiendum wouldn't work. For example, "Space is not impermanent because it's not produced," is obviously a nature syllogism and falls into this definition.
DPR: Because the reason is not defined?
Q3: It's not defined, but it is the negation of all three modes in the negation of which is to be negated. It's the negation of not produced in proving that it's not impermanent.
DPR. We can look at the definition.
Elizabeth Callahan: We're all having trouble figuring these out. Maybe our problem is in the way we're going about it. You have two types of negations: a non-affirming and an affirming. I'm wondering if our problem is that we're using affirming negations.
DPR: Right.
E.C: Do all these reasonings of non-perceivability have to be non-affirming negations?
DPR: No. I don't think they all are non-affirming negations.
E.C: The subject has to be something which is not perceived. Our Nova Scotia example didn't work because we still perceive Nova Scotia, even though it is not a tropical country.
DPR: That's right.

Q4: I didn't quite get the full syllogism on the explanation of necessity, [p. 16].
DPR: The second, third and fourth lines are the reason. The subject is the superimposition of one as different, imposing one object as different. The predicate is there is a benefit or reason to be analyzed, and the first line is the example.
Q4: This concerns the explanation of the mode of superimposition. We're talking about mind apprehending appearance and elimination and apprehending specific characteristics. This particular stanza reminded me of the case where you label objects. For example, one person may say, "That glass is beautiful," and another person may say, "That glass is ugly." We tend to assign those characteristics to the object, and think that beauty is inherent in the glass, or ugliness is inherent in the glass. Is that similar to superimposition, even though in labeling that way you're not talking about isolates, per se.
DPR: Are you asking if those are isolates, or are they superimpositions?
Q4: Well, they're not isolates. Is labeling something "beautiful" an isolate?
DPR: It is an isolate.
Q4: Would that be the same then as very neutral terms, like calling water, *wasser*, H2O or liquid?
DPR: Yes, it starts at that level. That is the basic imposition that we have. Then we can have many, but they are all equally isolates, like beautiful or ugly. But you have to have an object to give that isolate to. You have to have this glass in front of you in order to see it as beautiful or ugly. Without the glass you can't have the label or isolate of beauty or ugly.

Q5: I was reflecting on the power of some of these new tools that we have. A lot of us are sick and have colds. If you were a Cittamatra fundamentalist, would you view the relationship between your mind and body as *tönchik*, and if you were not a Cittamatra fundamentalist, would you view that relationship more as *mushi*? In the western world, we wonder about the relationship of mind to brain. It seems to me that that relationship would be *mushi*. What is the relationship of mind to brain, and what is the relationship of mind to body? Also, are these two questions *tönchik*?
DPR: In Buddhism, in general it is said that mind abides in our body, in our physical existence, and in different parts, whether it's the brain, heart, or whatever. Depending on that physical phenomenon, it also affects your mind, because if you have the human body and function in a human body, you see things in a human way. There is a certain strong relationship with that body. When you have an animal body and a mind abiding in that particular phenomena, then you see the world from the animal point of view, which is quite different. There is a strong relationship in the sense of the abiding place and abided mind that abides in that phenomenon. That doesn't mean that in Buddhism mind and body are one, that brain is mind, or heart is mind.
Q5: Can you articulate that within one of the four types of relationships?
DPR: Generally in the Sautrantika Cittamatra it would be *gelwa*. Body is seen as an element, a composition of different elements, indivisible particles. The mind is not particles. You can't grasp the mind; the mind doesn't have the same quality as the particles. So you can say *gelwa*. You can debate that. You don't have to say *gelwa* and just accept it. Someone can say *gelwa*, you can say *mushi*, and you can debate.
Q5: In Geshe Gyatso's book, he talks very briefly about a Buddha being able to hear, taste and smell with their eye. We call it synesthesia. Is that only the domain of a supreme Buddha, or do born Buddha's have that capability as well?
DPR: No, that begins much earlier. Even at the first bhumi there are certain capabilities. In some of the god realms, not just the bhumis, in Buddhism, they also experience that. They can smell or taste with the eye. One sensory perception can do it with the other sensory perceptions. They have one sense organ which does all the functions.

THE APPREHENSION OF DIFFERENT AS ONE

Today we are at the second category which is the apprehension of different as one. The verse says:

> [Phenomena] that have the same definition and function
> By the power of tendencies are mistaken to be one.
> In accordance with the mode of engagement of terms and concepts
> One imagines that these also exist as one object.

The first verse is the explanation of the mode of superimposition. The first line, "Phenomena that have the same definition and function," is the subject. The predicate is: There is a reason to be confused as one. The reason is, "By the power..." through the last line, "...exist as one object." All three lines are said to be the reason. I am pointing out these three bases of the three modes, as Khenpo Rinpoche has pointed them out. Of course you can look at them from different perspectives and make up your own three bases.

Whenever we see similarities in two different phenomena, when we have a similar definition, or a similar function of these phenomena, then we easily confuse them as one entity. We perceive or conceive them as one single entity, not two separate entities, when we see the similarities. The reason why we have this confusion of seeing one entity comes from identifying the different entities. The tendency here is that of seeing things as something else, seeing things with these definitions, terms and their functions. When we repeatedly see things with their definitions, terms and functions, then this tendency develops within the stream of our mind. Whenever we see similar entities, with similar function, similar definition, or whatever similar phenomena that arise, then we perceive or conceive them as one or the same entity.

The text says,

> "In accordance with the mode of engagement of terms and concepts."

This has to have a long explanation. It is almost like an explanation of the next section, which explains what terms and concepts are. So we can come back to this after the next section and see how the next section fits in with this verse. Depending on how our mode of engagement of concept goes, one imagines that these also exist as one object. We see the term generality or meaning generality as mixed with the object we perceive or see. Seeing or apprehending different as one is the confusion. We go through many stages, different things, but we apprehend them all as one thing. We have the sound "glass," which is heard by the ear consciousness. It's a sound that we hear first. Then there's a conceptual image of the glass. Then there's a conceptual understanding of the meaning of glass. Then there's the basis of that labeling or imagination which is the specifically characterized phenomena of glass. We mix all these things together as one, confuse them as one. When we see a glass, we also have the term generality, the meaning generality, and the perception of the glass, which is a specifically characterized phenomena. All these things mix together as one and we say, "I saw a glass." There is a lot of different things, characters, or phenomena involved in this simple expression, "I saw a glass." We'll go into more detail in the next section.

All of these current sections deal with conceptual mind. When we deal with conceptual mind the sections all have similarities and connections. They are all basically working with the generally characterized phenomena, isolates, reverse, exclusion, or elimination. All these things are working together; there is no real difference between them. They are all happening at the level of conceptual mind, therefore they are all very connected. This section is connected to the next one, the next one

b/c, it's about concep. mind + all the sections are connected.

is connected to this one, and then the next section is connected to the next one. They are all the same, in a way, but we look at them from different angles.

So the next verse is the explanation of the necessity or purpose or benefit.

> By the very power of taking as one
> All the variety of specific instances
> Of directions, time, situations and so on
> Refutations and proofs can be understood [to be valid] for all cases.

Let's first look at the basis of the three modes. Khenpo Rinpoche said that all four lines are the reason. The subject is, "When the mind confuses different as one, there's a benefit or purpose."

Q1: Can you give the subject and predicate again, please.
DPR: It's a specifically characterized phenomenon and so it cannot be repeated. [Laughter, R. laughs] The reason says that if we do not have this conceptual mind, which sees many different things as one, which confuses different things as one, then it will be very difficult to relate with specific phenomena. The conceptual mind works with general phenomena. If you do not have that conceptual mind, then our specific phenomena, which are all the variety of instances of specific phenomena, cannot really be understood or communicated in order to come to a closer understanding of their nature by means of refutations, proofs or any other means. "Specific phenomena" refers to say, the ocean of the eastern direction, southern direction or northern direction. Each different direction has a different specific phenomena. Then there are the three times: past, present and future. They are different states (I don't mean the 50 states) of being, situations and so on. We cannot really understand specifically characterized phenomena without such generalizing. Without this generalized conceptual mind we cannot really come to an understanding of their nature.

When we do refutations or proofs we take all of them as one. If you look at specifically characterized phenomena, they are all separated, they are individual. We can't make links between sound and impermanent or sound and produced. Specifically characterized phenomena are all just simply scattered, individual. When we bring them into a framework of understanding, then it's all done in conceptual mind. We bring in the notion of sound, impermanence, produced and, for example, a clay pot, butter lamp, or something like that.

These things are put together by conceptual mind. Even when you say "sound," you bring many things together. Otherwise you wouldn't be able to understand that all sounds are impermanent. If you had to go through each sound as a specifically characterized phenomena, it would be impossible to express and talk about each phenomena of sound as [laughs] impermanent. It would take an awful amount of time and you still wouldn't finish one probandum for kalpas and kalpas. This conceptual mind helps us to bring together all sound as one, one entity as a sound. We're actually confused, our mind is confused at this level, but at the same time this confusion helps. It's helpful because we can generalize and bring all sound together as one subject, all impermanent together as one predicate, all that is produced together as one reason. Then we have an example of butter lamp or clay pot. All the different aspects of butter lamp or clay pot are brought together as an example.

Khenpo Rinpoche says that that is the purpose, the meaning or benefit of the thought or conceptual mind which apprehends different as one.

Q1: In terms of eliminative engagers, apprehending one as one, different as different, one as different, and different as one, my understanding is that apprehending one as one and different as different would be unconfused. There's no chance of that getting confused in conceptual mind. When you take one as different and different as one, then you have the potential to be either unconfused or confused, depending on if you understand it properly. We didn't have an example of one is one and different is different.

DPR: What do you mean that you could get confused?

Q1: If you don't understand, for example, you say that all these things come together as sound. If you improperly understood what all those things are, which would be very possible and it seems like we do that quite often, then you would be confused. This is saying that if you understand it properly you have a clear unconfused conceptual mind. Is this making a distinction between confused conceptual mind and unconfused conceptual mind? Is it saying that there's the potential for both? Is that the point?

DPR. No. Not really. What Rinpoche is saying is that the first two are easier to understand and so we won't just go through them.

Q1: If you see one as one, then it's a clear, unconfused conceptual mind happening.

DPR: That's right. What I'm confused about here is the term "confused" because it is confused. I'm just kidding. The term confused is used quite differently at this point because it is said that all conceptual minds are confused.

Q1: That's not what I was talking about. I was talking about being confused about the confusion, not seeing it clearly.

DPR: I think that's fine. You're right. But if you use confused in a different sense, then that doesn't apply because all four of them are confused equally.

Q1: They are. One is confused too. Is that because it is conceptual mind?

DPR: It is because we are confusing a mental image with the actual object. ⇒ even the mind's conceptl perceiving 1 as 1 & many as many are confused b/c they mix name w/obj

Q2: I'm unclear about the last line, "Refutations and proofs can be understood to be valid in all cases." Will you explain that a little more?

DPR: It's mainly referring to communication. You can't refute or prove anything without using the conceptual labeling process; there's no way we can communicate. At the same time, there's no way we can really prove or refute something. It's like when we are talking about sound. When we say "sound," it's not really referring to anything. It's just a general concept, a conceptual mind which is confused, but it ~~has a benefit~~ when it is brought together with refutations and proofs. When you say, "Sound is impermanent," the sound, which is actually confused, and doesn't say much, says a lot in this confused way of engagement. It brings all the sound together. When you say, "All the sounds are impermanent," we can understand. We can come to a valid understanding of "Sound is impermanent." Whenever you hear the sound of a finger snap, birds chirping, or whatever, then you say, "Oh, it's impermanent." The whole general idea can have some effect on our mind, so that we understand that individual sounds are impermanent. ⇒ great!

Q2: When it says, "To be understood to be valid for all cases," all the cases are the first three lines, "By the very power of taking as one, all the variety of specific instances of directions, times, situations and so on." Is that correct?

DPR: Yes, it can refer to all. In Tibetan it says to bring them all together as one. It is like the nature of this mode of apprehension. You bring together all the different things as one. You apprehend them as one. Khenpo Rinpoche says that this part is very important. That is why he says to look in the *Critical Analysis* (this has not been translated yet, but you can read it in Tibetan. [laughter]) In the *Critical Analysis*, Khenpo Rinpoche refutes the notion of the eliminating phenomena, eliminating nature, isolates, reverse or exclusion existing in specifically characterized phenomena. The earlier school of logic believes that there is this exclusion existing within the objects themselves, within the objects of specifically characterized phenomena. This is what Khenpo Rinpoche really refutes in this section of the *Critical Analysis*.

He says that the eliminative engager and whole notion of eliminating is basically conceptual. The whole notion of isolates, exclusion, eliminating, or reverse are basically conceptual. There's nothing in specifically characterized phenomena. In the earlier school of logic they say that when you see a glass, the glass itself has this quality of isolate in the specifically characterized phenomena. The ~~glass is not mixed~~ with the table, the people, or the space. It has its own discriminating quality in itself. They say that the discriminating quality is the isolate, the exclusive quality, the eliminating quality, the reverse. It has its own reverse of the other things. [R. laughs]

view of
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In our view, we refute that. In the view of the seventh Karmapa and the Sakyapandita, all this exclusion, eliminating, isolate and reverse are conceptual and do not exist in the specifically characterized phenomena. There is no isolate in the real object. The specifically characterized phenomenon has no isolate in its own nature. In its own nature there is no isolate, reverse, exclusion, or eliminating. All this "not not" is in our conceptual mind. We say that it's not not a table or it's not not a Starbuck's coffee mug. All this "not not" is in our conceptual mind, and it's not out there. That is what Khenpo Rinpoche says here.

Q3: The glass appears clear and distinct at the level of a specifically characterized phenomena. At the level of *svalakshana*, it doesn't isolate itself in that state of mind that directly cognizes it. Is that what it's saying?
DPR: That's the whole point in the later school of logic. They're saying that the *svalakshana* itself is its own character. It has its own specific character of its own existence. In that there is no elimination happening, because all eliminations are basically conceptual. When you say it's not a mug, the glass itself has no such labels or distinctions as "mug." It has its own self or existence that makes it different.
Q3: So it's simply known?
DPR: Do you mean perceived?
Q3: Yes, in the sense of a sort of knowingness quality. It's not known by a concept. It's experienced at the level where concept doesn't apply and there is no division.
DPR: That's right. It's inclusive. The mind knows this in an inclusive manner. When your mind perceives the glass, it just perceives its existence; it has no eliminating qualities. It just perceives what it is.
Q3: We talk about concept as being confusion, not seeing things as they are. The assumption is if we were without concept, we would be abiding in wisdom. How functional is that mind? You know that thing but you don't know it as separated out. Does it have its own distinctiveness?
DPR: It does have its own distinctiveness, yes. That doesn't mean it is eliminating others, it is just distinctive. Its own mark is there. That is what the *svalakshana* is. *Svalakshana* means it has its own character, or characteristic mark. That is what makes it distinct from the others. At the same time, in its own mark it doesn't do all the exclusions. All the exclusions take place in the conceptual mind in this view. You should debate on this. This is very interesting because isolates that exist in → Mipham vie
the specifically characterized phenomena are also the view of Lama Mipham. He agrees with the earlier school of logic. There has been very intense debate on this subject. [R. laughs]

The Mode of Engagement of Mind Cognizing Objects of Verbal Expression and the Means of Verbal Expression

Its Definition and Divisions

In order to understand this section and the next section, we need to go into more detail on the notion of isolates, generally characterized phenomena, the reverse, eliminating, excluding, etc. We need to combine this (last) section with the next section, the modes of engagement of a mind. The mode of engagement of a mind is divided into different parts, but they are all connected together. In order to have a general view, we need to go through the whole section. This second section is quite interesting. The section heading says, "The explanation of the mode of engagement of a mind cognizing objects of [verbal] expression and the means of [verbal] expression." First there is the definition and then the divisions. The definition is:

> "A mind apprehending what is to be grasped by means of a term' is the definition of a mind apprehending an object of [verbal] expression, because 'what is to be grasped by means of a term' is the definition of an object of [verbal] expression."

[R. laughs] That is a very nice statement. The second definition is:

> "A mind apprehending what makes one grasp an object of [verbal] expression', is the definition of a mind apprehending a means of [verbal] expression, because 'what makes one grasp an object of [verbal] expression' is the definition of a means of [verbal] expression."

I hope the Tibetan makes it a little easier for me. Here we are mainly talking about two things. One is the object of verbal expression and the second is the means of verbal expression. The object of a verbal expression has two levels of object, and the means of verbal expression has two levels of means.There is the actual [or immediate—ed.] object and the actual [or immediate] expression. The actual object is the appearing object, and the actual expression is the appearing object. The other two are difficult to translate; I think they are translated here as "specifically characterized." There is the specifically characterized object and there's a specifically characterized expression. We have four levels (with two in one category and two in another).

First we should be clear about the numbers, and then we can look at the meaning of each. We have two levels of verbal expression, and two levels of the object of the verbal expression. The actual object is related to the actual expression, and the specifically characterized object is connected to the specifically characterized expression.

There are four, and we might say that two of them are generally characterized phenomena and two are specifically characterized phenomena. The two generally characterized phenomena are the actual object and the actual expression.

The specifically characterized object and expression are the specifically characterized phenomena. Specifically characterized phenomena is not really a direct translation of the term that Khenpo Rinpoche is using here. I will try to find the real translation of that later. First just know the definition and the two levels of each category, the generally characterized and the not generally characterized. Then we will go into a detailed explanation.

Q4: I was wondering about confused mind. Why is grouping things under a single term called confused mind? Why couldn't you just say that you are grouping these things together with respect to whatever quality you're imputing on these individual objects. You say with regard to any thing made of clay that it is going to break. That is not necessarily confusion. That is actually clarity. You are able to generalize in that way.
DPR: [Laughs] That's totally confused. [Laughter] Utterly. Confused here means that when we say "clay," we believe we are saying the actual thing, the specifically characterized phenomena, which is inexpressible. We think we are saying that but actually we're not. When we say clay it doesn't mean anything. If you say "clay" to someone in a nomadic town in Tibet, it just doesn't relate at all with the object, even if it's just sitting in front of them [laughter]. We think that when we say "clay pot," that it is so clear to us who know the term and the language. The label seems so clear; it connects with the object and we think we all must see it together. The term clay and the real clay out there are almost inseparable for those who know the terminology.

In general it doesn't mean anything, right? That conceptual mind of the label, and the understanding of the connection of the label to the actual object, if you really look at it, is confused. When we say "clay," we think we are saying the actual thing. That is what we think. At the same time, when we say "clay," it is very general. "Clay pot" is very general. We are actually not saying anything. There is no specific thing, no clay pot. It's a general isolate. When you say that a clay pot is impermanent for whatever reason, it helps you to understand, it gives you clarity. That is why the verse says that refutations and proofs can be understood to be valid for all cases. So that's what it's actually saying. The question of the connection of sound with the label will come up in a later section.

Q4: Is there a distinction made between inductive and deductive reasoning?
DPR: Can you explain those two?
Q4: If you say that all sounds are impermanent, you could argue that that is an inductive statement, because every sound you've ever come across has proven to be impermanent. But there may be a sound that is not impermanent, though in our experience we have not run across a sound that's not impermanent. Therefore, the certainty that we have that all sounds are impermanent is an inductively arrived at certainty. A deductive.argument might be something like: Clay pots break because clay breaks. Therefore all clay pots break. Is that distinction made in the Lorik?
DPR: No, not that I can think of. It is clearly done in *Tagrik*. It sounds more like syllogism in logic reasoning.

Q5: Regarding verse 2.2.2.2.2.1, does superimposition strictly mean that we are superimposing many different labels on one thing, or does it mean that we are looking at more than one thing and thinking that they are one thing? Does it mean both possibilities.
DPR: I think it mainly refers to many things, such as different sounds. We take different sounds to be one sound. We also have different phenomena that have a same or similar definition and similar function. We take them to be the same category. So this can have different meanings, different levels. We have talked about knowables, which are divided into two, thing and non-thing. The non-thing is then divided into many. All the things have a similar character or characteristic. They have similar definitions and functions, whereas all the non-things have similar definitions and functions as well. Within the things there are the different things, three divisions. So it can have different levels, starting with looking at sound, and then the sound has so many different sounds. From there we can go up.
Q5: It sounds like what you're saying is that we might hear a cricket...
DPR: or a frog or squirrel...
Q5: and we say, "I heard a sound," as opposed to "I heard the sound of a cricket," or "I heard the sound of a frog." Then we would not be making this mistake.
DPR: We still are because there are so many crickets and we are hearing only one specific cricket. It's all breakable into many bits and pieces. It's very interesting. Even the same cricket makes different sounds. Each time it makes a sound it is individual. If the cricket makes a sound for five seconds, within that there are also many segment of sounds. We are getting to that level of detail, in some sense, in logic.
Q5: You said that you must have the object in order to have the isolate, you can't have an isolate without an object. For example, if you're going to have the isolate of beauty, you can only have the beauty isolate in reference to an object. I don't know if you were just using it for one specific example or if you meant in general.
DPR: In general, I think. But there's a distinction within generally characterized phenomena. When you say isolate, or reverse, or when you look at the exclusion, there's two ways of approaching it. There's two ways of looking at it in detail. To make it more precise we have to look at it from two sides of exclusion or elimination.
Q5: I'm confused about what a generally characterized phenomenon is. I thought it didn't refer to a specifically characterized phenomenon, that it was just a mental concept without an object, and that is why it is extremely vague. Do you see what my confusion is?
DPR: No. [laughs)] But you know...[laughter] When we talk about the four levels of object and expression, we will go into more detail on the generally characterized phenomena. Let's see what happens after we look into it. I will try to present the view of the seventh Karmapa on these four levels of object and expression. Then we can look at it and see our own interpretation, our own understanding, and some other people's understanding, like Sakyapandita or the earlier schools of logic.

Q6: I've been trying to translate the material into an example which is way down in the other direction of Abbey Road, into the world of business.
DPR: Walt Disney? [Laughter]

Q6: Sometimes it's like that. Business. Sometimes management, those people who own and run a business, and labor, those people who work in a business see the same thing in very different ways. For example, management can say to labor, "You must take a paycut or we won't make a profit." And labor may say to management, "If you ask me to take a paycut and I take a paycut, that's my life, that's the life of my family, that's my income. I can't do that." And management says, "If you want a job you must."

We have the perception that profit is life, from one point of view, from labor's point of view, and the perception of profit as the survival of the business, from management's point of view. This is a general question. As you speak and as people ask questions I try to translate these views into workable terms that I can use in some of the work I do, and in particular, workable terms that can relate to the economic life of Nova Scotia. How does the isolate and the specifically characterized phenomena apply to the view of what is life and what is profit in economic terms?
DPR: [laughs)]Wow!

Q6: How do I get these two groups of people to talk to each other about something they see very, very differently, and that they're angry about.
DPR: What do you think, Lotsawa? [Laughter]
Scott Wellenbach: I would say we are definitely in the area of generally characterized phenomena, concept. It's an example of how one's projections color the situation differently, depending on who you are and your situation. As for how to get these people to speak with each other, given that they are angry at each other, I'm not sure that this material relates to that directly. When you understand how mind works, then we understand that we do this all the time, no matter who we are, whether you're labor, management, Jews, Hitler, or whatever. You [Rinpoche] yourself have a lot of compassion for sentient beings. If you can inject that into the situation perhaps it would help resolve things; people would start to see more, see how the other party sees things, and how they color and flavor the situation.
DPR: Right. That's very good. Don't you think?
Q6: Yes.
DPR: It is mainly very strong generally characterized phenomena. The specifically characterized phenomena, in this case, is the paycheck and the hard work.
Q6: The paycheck, on one hand, and the dividend check on the other.
DPR: It is the hard work of the laborers that they have to go through. Everyone here can think about it. Does that help?
Q6: Yes it does. As Scott pointed out this is one of the major questions concerning how people communicate with each other. I'm trying to translate my confusion.
DPR: I like what Lotsawa has just pointed out. It shows how we label things, and how we get into this generally characterized phenomena, as Khenpo Rinpoche points out, by the power of tendencies. There is the strong power of tendencies which are also involved in this projection of the labeling process. We see things differently from management's point of view and from labor's point of view.
Q6: Do the tendencies arise because of people's experiences?
DPR: Experiences?
Q6: Let's say of being in labor and management. I'm a worker and you're a boss.
DPR: [Laughs] Yes. I think it is definitely connected to it. But tendencies go much deeper than that too.
Q6: Is that what we are trying to penetrate in this text?
DPR: Yes, definitely. We are working with lots of tendencies.

Q7: Rinpoche, this question concerns collective engagers. You were commenting on the phrase "No remainder," and you said that in one moment of perception of direct valid sense cognition, you get the whole thing.
DPR: All direct valid cognitions.

Q7: You said that you understand not only the color, shape or whatever, but also the impermanence.
DPR: That's right.
Q7: Normally our conceptual idea of impermanence is something that changes through time. But here, in one moment, you understand impermanence. Obviously you are not comparing moments or anything like that, which is what we normally do. Can you say more about that, what that sense is like?
DPR: In this no remainder, the perception which sees impermanence is the subtle nature of impermanence. Its appearance is the most subtle level of its existence. In that direct valid cognition there is a sense of direct realization which is not contaminated by concepts of impermanence, by a conceptual imagination of impermanence. There is the real sense of the direct seeing of impermanence. I think that is what the logic of the Sautrantika Yogacara school is referring to. That direct experience is the experience of the most subtle moment of its existence of appearance. If there is any moment of existence and any moment of appearance, then that really subtle moment of existence or appearance is perceived or seen directly, strongly. Right now we are seeing just the continuity; we are not seeing the subtle level of appearance, existence, or any such thing. That is the realization that one can develop through relating to direct sensory perception or the other valid cognitions.
Q7: So if I look at the table or throne, in that moment would I sense its deterioration, or its being about to change, its possibility of change?
DPR: I think it is seeing the moment that is almost non-existent. This is called the realization of impermanence and it is not very far from the realization of emptiness. That is what Nagarjuna says. This is also happening in the meditative investigations. We talk about dividing time into three segments: past, present and future. If you look at the present, it's almost the past, almost the future, and then there's a tiny, tiny moment of the present. That present is very hard to find. That leads us into non-thought, a non-conceptual state of the realization of mind, nature of mind, in the meditation. The same thing happens with the object, not just in the meditation process. [laughs] It is not only through conceptual analysis, but also through the direct perceptual level that one comes to a certain realization of that. I would say that the sight, perception, or whatever that you see in this impermanence is almost non-existent. You see something but it's almost non-existent. It is non-graspable.

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Q7: In the Mahamudra investigations and in Nagarjuna's teachings, in some sense they're talking about what you try to do but can't, and the realization that comes from that. This language is saying what you can do or what you could do. Are you suggesting that it almost comes down to the same thing?
DPR: That's right. That's the view of the seventh Karmapa. That is why he connects this view with Shentong and Mahamudra later. He sees this presentation of logic not only as a tool for debate and understanding of logic, but also as a path enabling one to see the subtle reality of phenomena in the relative sense. That in turn leads you to the realization of phenomena in their ultimate nature.

Q8: You have been talking about direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition. You said that inferential valid cognition has the benefit of dealing with phenomena, communicating phenomena to other people. There seems to be two benefits: one relates to direct valid cognition and the other to inferential. However, the inferential cognition is considered to be confused. So ordinary beings need both of them. For Buddha, I assume that the inferential valid cognition would dissolve. If a Buddha has to live with just the direct valid cognition, does that mean that inferential valid cognition dissolves into yogic direct valid cognition?
DPR: Yes. For Buddha, there's only *jnana*, wisdom. There's no mind; it's beyond the category of mind here. If you want to look at it from the category of mind, it will be through yogic direct perception. The most perfected stage of yogic direct perception would be the quality of the wisdom of Buddha. It is very difficult to classify because right now we're just classifying mind in the most basic samsaric sense.
Q8: If we were to talk about Buddha from a Sautrantika point of view, your description of Buddha now is probably not the Sautrantika point of view.
DPR: I think it probably will be in the sense that they look at Buddha as an arhat with or without remainder, the two.

Q8: Would this arhat use just inferential valid cognition communication in order to communicate with other people out of his compassion? In other words, to other people it would be just a phenomenon, but for himself it would be yogic direct valid cognition.
DPR: I think so, yes. Arhats rest in their realization in samadhi, most of the time. They are mainly within that samadhi. As you can see in the Hinayana literature, the arhats are not just resting in that, but they also come out to do a lot of benefit for others. They also have great compassion and love.
Q8: In regards to inferential valid cognition, we say that's confused.
DPR: Confused. Where are you connecting that to?
Q8: In general, inferential valid cognition is considered to be relative truth. The ultimate is direct valid cognition.
DPR: Yes, generally. It's hard in that sense. I think we should look at it from the point of view of non-valid cognition. From that point of view it is a valid cognition. It's not non-valid, it's not confused from that point of view. It's valid. If you look at it from the point of view of the individual mode of engagement of mind in the inferential valid cognition, then there's a lot of conceptual analysis. From that point of view of conceptual analysis there is a certain notion of confusion. You confuse all sounds as one, for example. The mode of engagement is talking about a specific way in which our conceptual mind engages in the subject/object relationship. Generally speaking, direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition are both valid. We cannot say that inferential is deceived or confused at that level. We should make it clear that both are valid. Non-valid cognition is non-cognition, wrong cognition, and doubt.
Q8: I think it's easy to understand that we mingle up several objects and make one out of them. If you have a valid cognition, I assume it wouldn't mingle up the different objects.
DPR: That's right.
Q8: Even if they did mingle them up, one would be aware that they were mixing them, that they are applied in a mixed way. Would that be wisdom?
DPR: Direct valid cognition?
Q8: Yes. In other words, the thought process still occurs.
DPR: Yes.
Q8: It's the old discussion that thoughts get such bad press. Valid cognition seems to make the point that there's validity within thoughts. I'm trying to understand at what point it becomes a valid cognition. I assume that you have all these thoughts occurring and you just see them as an occurrence of thought.
DPR: Are you asking, is that valid?
Q8: I assume that is valid.
DPR: Yes, it is valid. Yes.
Q8: What would be the difference between that and a yogic direct valid cognition?
DPR: What you just said sounds more like self-aware direct valid cognition. You see the thoughts and the perceptions. You see everything clearly when it arises. That is more like self-aware.

We will begin to discuss the tenets of the Hinayana schools. We will go through the basic points, and if you realize that something is missing we can go into the details of it. We will mainly do Sautrantika, but we will do both Hinayana schools together briefly. We will concentrate more on the Sautrantika view, which is not really different from Vaibhashika, except there's some subtle improvement so to speak. [laughs]

I think we should do the analytical meditation more, because it is never done in the western Buddhist community. It's a very important criteria because we always talk about the three stages of hearing, contemplating and meditating. We are always missing the contemplating. The other day someone told me that we may contemplate in the kitchen when we cook, but that's no good because you may cut your finger. [Laughter] So this is a very nice place to do contemplation, it's very safe. [DPR & students laugh] Don't do it when you're driving.

I think this analytical meditation is very important to develop here. It's not generally done very much in the Kagyu Nyingma traditions. It's very much individually emphasized by different teachers. We had a strong emphasis on analytical meditation at Nalanda Institute; we did a lot of this, especially on the Madhyamaka view. If we begin with analytical meditation at this point on the Hinayana path, then we will have more familiarity with this meditation, and it will be easier when we come to the Mahayana path of the Madhyamaka view.

THE EXPLANATION OF THE MODE OF ENGAGEMENT OF A MIND COGNIZING OBJECTS OF [VERBAL] EXPRESSION AND THE MEANS OF [VERBAL] EXPRESSION (CONTINUED)

We are continuing with the section which is the "The explanation of the mode of engagement of a mind cognizing objects of [verbal] expression and the means of [verbal] expression." The conceptual mind has two objects, whereas the non-conceptual mind has just one object to perceive. The conceptual mind has the appearing object and the determined or referent object. This section deals with these two objects of the conceptual mind. When we say "blue," "a blue table," or "rock," there is the appearing object which appears to our conceptual mind as a mental object, a mental image. The image that we see in the conceptual mind is the appearing object. The referent or determined object is the actual thing out there which is the basis of that conceptual image, terminology or labeling. The object out there appears to our direct perception but does not appear to the conceptual mind directly. Therefore, each of these conceptual minds are going through the process of seeing these two different objects. We see one mental image as an object, conceptual object, and that mental image has a basis of its arising. There must be that blue table out there without any labels, conceptual impositions or imputations. There is something out there which is not expressible. What was our example for "inexpressible?"

Q: A Snicker's Bar.

Yes, it was a Snicker's Bar, the taste of a Snicker's Bar. That object out there is the real *svalakshana* which produces another image. It does not produce it directly, but on the basis of it we develop another image which says "blue." We have the image of "blue," the image of "table," and then the image of "blue table." Those two images (blue and table) are conceived by our conceptual mind.

That is the main thing about the conceptual mind. At the same time, we have to know that, basically speaking, "object," is usually divided into four in the logic texts. They talk about four different types of objects which are all similar. They are 1) the object of engagement, 2) the determined object or referent object, 3) the appearing object, and 4) the apprehended object. We have had these terms before. When you look at these four, they all seem to be referring to the same thing. There is not much difference between them, although the appearing object will be different depending whether it is the object of conceptual mind or nonconceptual mind.

Instead of going into the complications of these four, we will just look at the two objects: the appearing object and the determined or referent object. The referent object has the meaning of reference. When we have some ideas, they are in reference to something. When we talk about logic in general, in this lineage tradition our reference is to Dignaga or Dharmakirti, the seventh Karmapa or to Khenpo Rinpoche's book here. Similarly our conceptual mind conceives an image that has a reference. That reference is the *rangchen*, object.

Svalakshana is *rangchen*. The object here we are referring to is the truly existing thing. Therefore the appearing object can be referred to differently in different cases. In the case of conceptual mind, the appearing object is the image. If you look at, for example, sensory perception, then the appearing object will be the same as the determined object. There is no difference. Whatever appears to that perception is the actual thing itself. What appears to that perception is the apprehended aspect, which is the actual object. If we see a glass, it appears to the perceptions without the label "glass." The glass appears itself to that perception, so it becomes the appearing object.

In direct perception, at the nonconceptual stage or level, we don't have two objects. We just have one object which will have the same name. It doesn't matter what we call it. We can call it the apprehended object, determined object, appearing object, or object of engagement. That particular mind, the consciousness, is engaged in that object, and that is why it is called "the engagement object."

When it comes to the conceptual mind, then we have two objects. One is the directly appearing object and the other is the reference of that appearance or generality. When we say "table," it is very general. We get a general image of a table. The image that appears to our mind is the conceptual object, object of the conceptual mind. It is the appearing object, and the reference of that object is the actual table. All these tables are the reference [?] of that general characteristic. Therefore, the conceptual mind has two objects. The conceptual mind is not really direct; it goes indirectly to the actual object. It does not go directly, does not engage directly with the object. The understanding of the object is not very accurate, clear, precise, or complete, unlike the understanding of the object of direct engagement. (I also have lot of questions. [Laughter] I don't know who to ask.) If you keep those two categories in mind, maybe this section will be a little bit clearer. The topic here is the two stages of the engagement of mind cognizing objects of verbal expression and the means of verbal expression. The object of verbal expression means what is to be said. The means of verbal expression is what is saying that, or the means of saying it.

To give you a general idea (maybe this is not directly connected), the object of verbal expression, or what is to be said, usually refers to the subject or topic. Let's say if you are presenting Chandrakirti's book, the *Madhyamikavatara*. What is to be said is the subject or topic of that book, which is emptiness, the great selflessness, great emptiness, genuine emptiness. That is also called the object of verbal expression.

If we look at these direct meanings, maybe it will become a little more clear. When you just say "verbal expression," it is too wordy and without much meaning—to me at least. Maybe it makes more sense to native speakers. No? Wow! When you say "a clay pot," the specifically characterized object of that verbal expression (or "what is to be said".) is the composite, indivisible atoms of the clay pot. That itself is the specifically characterized object of verbal expression. When you say "clay pot," you are trying to say that thing, no matter how successful you are at saying it. That becomes the object of verbal expression, which is what is to be said. It is the specifically characterized object of a verbal expression. The means of verbal expression is the actual sound, the actual words, "clay pot." That is the way we attempt to say it. By using verbal expression, we make different attempts to say what the clay pot is. Verbal expression usually refers to sound, but in the general sense it can be anything. For example, you can show a picture of a clay pot, which would be a visual expression. It is the means of saying it.

We have discussed the first two sets: the specifically characterized level of the objects of verbal expression and the means of verbal expression. The second layer is the actual object of the verbal expression, the isolate. It is the reverse of everything that is not clay pot. The means of verbal expression is the term generality, "clay pot." It is the generality of that term "clay pot." "Clay," and then "pot," is the verbal means of expression.

I think the seventh Karmapa's commentary will be helpful. He gives three stages for each. We had this format of three stages in the result of valid cognition. They are the non-analyzed stage, the slightly analyzed stage and thoroughly analyzed stage. He gives these two sets in that framework, and so I will give that to you, and then you can contemplate and debate on that.

There are three sets of the object of verbal expression and three sets of the means of verbal expression. At the not-analyzed stage, the object of verbal expression is the specifically characterized phenomenon, the *rangchen svalakshana*. At the slightly analyzed stage, the isolate, the reverse, the generally characterized phenomenon is the object of verbal expression. At the thoroughly analyzed from [illegible]

stage there is no object of verbal expression; you can't find the object of verbal expression. At the slightly analyzed stage, if you thoroughly analyze verbal expression, you can't find it because it is a generally characterized phenomenon. This does not really refer to shunyata or anything like that, but just to the basic Sautrantika view. When you analyze the generally characterized phenomenon, there is no solid thing, no solid isolates or not nots. Therefore, at the third stage of thorough analysis, you think it is non-existent. I believe the seventh Karmapa means that it is non-existent as the object of conceptual mind. It doesn't exist in any form of expression at all. It is just a *svalakshana* whose existence or non-existence cannot be expressed.

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Slight an
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of con

Q: Sorry. Can you repeat that?

The specifically characterized phenomena do not repeat.[Laughter)] Only generally characterized phenomena repeat. I believe what he meant by the third stage is that specifically characterized phenomena cannot be objects of verbal expression because you can never express them. You can never conceptually express them because they are beyond terms and generalities. They are very specific. Those are the three stages for the objects of verbal expression.

And also, བརྗོད་བྱ་ is the བྱ་ ~~doesn't~~ is a [illegible] བརྗོད་བྱེད་ is

In summary, the first stage is: when not analyzed, the object of verbal expression is the *svalakshana* things, the actual things. When you slightly analyze it's the isolate, and when you thoroughly analyze you don't find the object of expression.

The second set is the means of verbal expression, "how it is said."

Q: Another word might be the expresser, what expresses.

DPR: Yes, that sounds interesting. I like that.

Q: Expresso.

DPR: Yes, I like Expresso, [Laughter] so it's good. We'll use "expresser."

no an
moe = rang t
Slight an.
moe = chi t
thorough
There is no
1. rangtsen
nothing
2. chitsen
exis

In the not analyzed stage, the means of verbal expression is the sound itself, the sound which expresses it. "Clay pot," the sound itself, is the expresser. At the slightly analyzed stage, the expresser is the term generality, which is the general image of the term itself such as "clay," and then "pot." At the third stage, thoroughly analyzed, you can't find any expresser. You can't find anything that says what is to be said, you can't find any means of verbal expression.

When we use these two together [i.e. the object and the expresser—ed.], what is to be said and the method of saying it, then when we go through this conceptual imagination or image of seeing, when we say "clay pot," we're really saying it. We are really saying the actual thing. We really think that we are saying the actual object when we say the word. When we hear it, or conceptually see it, we think we really see the actual thing. We totally mix the two objects. We get totally mixed with the two objects; we're completely confused at this level of our conceptual mind. When we say "glass," we think we are seeing the actual glass, saying the actual glass, seeing it, experiencing it. We mix together the two objects and two subjects.

When you enter into this process of communication and understanding of the object, it is useful to mix these together. Otherwise, we will never have the reference. We will never really pick up a glass when we say "glass." It is like the example I gave you of when you go to a nomadic town in Tibet and say "clay pot," it won't mean anything to the people there. Even if they were sitting in front of a clay pot, it wouldn't mean anything. Therefore, first you need to develop this relationship with the actual object. Then you have to have this mixture of the conceptual mind with the actual perceptual mind, and the conceptual object of the image with the perceptual object, the *svalakshana*. By mixing

"glass" can't actually describe the object b/c it can't ~~[illegible]~~ if it's doesn't English ≠ [illegible] the actual object transcends names and terms.

them together, we can get the result or benefit of the term generality. Otherwise if we don't mix these together, there is not much meaning or benefit in the label or term generality.

Then there are the divisions which follow. The verse says:

> "In the situation of explaining and listening,
> Two aspects: object of expression and means of expression;
> In the situation of using a term,
> Two aspects: object of expression and means of expression."

It says that in the situation of explaining and listening, that is the time to learn the label. That is the stage of learning the term generality, the meaning generality and the object. Sakyapandita's text says that you need to differentiate or distinguish the means of verbal expression and the object of verbal expression. You say, "Okay, this is what we are trying to say, and its name is 'glass.'" We have to point out and distinguish what is glass and what is not glass, which is which. At this point you have the two, object of expression and means of expression. Sakyapandita said that at this time of explaining and listening, it is skillful to differentiate what is to be said and what is the method of saying it.

At this stage, we need to differentiate or distinguish between what is to be expressed and what expresses it. In the situation of using a term, in the situation of entering into the world of labels and communication, Sakyapandita said it would be more skillful, helpful, to mix the two. When you say, "glass," it's [finger snap] this one. Suddenly, you say, "This is a glass." You don't say, "Oh, okay, glass is the term generality, the label, which expresses this thing outside which we call in Tibetan blah blah blah..." All these distinguishing things will not help very much when you are communicating or using the term. When you use it with the mixture of the two together, then there is a benefit, a result.

Rinpoche gives this general, very short verse on these two classifications. At both stages, they are conceptual, not non-conceptual. In both stages we have the object of reference, the referent object, and the determined object. The determined object and the referent object are the same.

Khenpo Rinpoche says,

> "If one analyzes thoroughly, there is no actual object of expression of a term; the term generality and the object generality are the actual [or immediate] means and object of expression; and the specifically characterized sound and object are the referent means and object of expression."

I think that's what we have been saying. The actual object of verbal expression is the isolate, the generalities. Just consider the second stage of slight analysis. The actual object of verbal expression is the generality, the generally characterized phenomenon, the basic isolate, the reverse. When you say, "clay pot," the isolate is the object of verbal expression. What expresses that is the term generality. The immediate means of verbal expression or the actual thing which expresses it is the term generality, "clay pot." "Clay pot" has it's own general characteristics apart from the basic isolate. The specifically characterized object of verbal expression is the *svalakshana* outside, the real existing clay pot, the specifically characterized object of verbal expression. The specifically characterized means of verbal expression is the sound "clay pot." Is that clear?

In general, we can look at this as having four stages. The first two categories are the actual thing which has the actual object and the actual means of expression. The second two categories are the specifically characterized object and the specifically characterized means of verbal expression. You can just look at it as the four general categories, then you can have a greater understanding of the seventh Karmapa's presentation. The two objects that I have been talking about are to help you to understand this, but do not take them as a direct categorization from this section. When you debate, just debate in the framework of these four. Then, in order to have more insight, think about the seventh Karmapa's explanation. You can think from the point of view of having two objects. These things are for your reference.

Q1: I am confused about the two groupings. The text says that we have the means and object of expression. Then we have what they translate as "conceptualized means and object of expression." I thought the words you were using were "specifically characterized means and object."
DPR: Oh, they translated *shenpa* as "conceptualized." That's fine. That is showing that the specifically characterized category is the referent object.
Q1: I think the problem is that we think of conceptualized as belonging to generally characterized, and specifically characterized to non-conceptualized.
DPR: I think it is better to say "referent." Referent means an object of expression.
Q1: This ties into the four types of objects. Is the determined object the same thing as the "specifically characterized phenomenon?"
DPR: Yes.
Q1: So maybe when we talk about conceptualized means and object of expression, we have to find another word.
DPR: Referent means and object of expression is the same.
Q1: Does the Tibetan word *shen* sometimes mean "conceptual" and sometimes not? Is that part of the translation difficulty?
DPR: No, this is a technical term. "*Shenyul*" ཞེན་ཡུལ། is a technical term in the Logic which means the referent object. It is referring to the object of the conceptual image.
Q1: Is "actual" happening on a conceptual level?
DPR: It's more immediate in the meaning. It is the most immediate object of the conceptual mind.
Q1: When we say "actual means and object of expression," then are we operating on the conceptual level?
DPR: That's right. They are all on the conceptual level. The actual object and the actual means of expression are functioning at the level of conceptual mind.
Q1: It's the way we normally think of the actual object of expression.
DPR: "Actual" here means "the direct." You cannot say "direct" because then it sounds like a direct perception. It doesn't mean direct in that sense. Maybe "immediate" is workable at this point. We could say the immediate object of the concept of verbal expression and the immediate means of verbal expression. Technically we call it the "actual." It doesn't mean that it is the referent, the actual thing in the referent sense. It is the actual in the sense of being the immediate object of concept.
Q1: Does specifically characterized sound refer to the sound that is made, or does it include the idea of the word?
DPR: It's mainly sound, the sound of a word, the sound of each character, how it is said.

Q2: I understand the two levels of the referent and the appearing object. How that goes into four confuses me. I don't see the difference between the actual means of verbal expression and the specifically characterized means of verbal expression.
Q2: Could the word "apparent" be used for the word "actual?"
Translator: For example, we say "apparent object."
DPR: That would be fine. Maybe we can use that to clarify. That is the meaning. Technically, we need another term, but that's the meaning and so it doesn't matter. Who cares? If we get the meaning, it is good.
Q2: What's the whole phrase then?
DPR: It is the apparent object of verbal expression and apparent means of verbal expression. That would be equivalent to the actual object of verbal expression and actual means of verbal expression. The actual player got hurt a little bit so we have to replace him with "apparent." He's number 12. [Laughter.] These two will have the referent object. Were you confused with the referent object? Was that your confusion?

Q2: Well, there's lots of levels of confusion.
DPR: What is the first level? [Laughter]. Please.
Q2: You said that we have an apparent object and a referent object. The appearing object is the image in the conceptual mind and the referent object is the actual object that is the basis. Now I'm not sure how you're using the word "apparent."
DPR: Oh, forget about it. When you have this conceptual mind which has an apparent object, appearing object, as an image, then you always have the referent object of that. Without the referent object you cannot have that clearly. Even if it's something non-existent, like the horn of a rabbit, you still have the referent object of the rabbit and a horn. Then you put them together. When you don't have this image as an object, when you have a direct object, you don't have a referent object, because what you are perceiving is the referent object, the appearing object. What you perceive is the object you are engaging with. Your mind is getting engaged.

If the classification of the four is clear, if the two objects are clear, and if it's clear how the seventh Karmapa presents the three stage things, then that's good enough for now. Don't expect to have a clear understanding of the whole thing. Just clearly understand these and that will be good enough. We should contemplate more on them. Before we say, "I don't understand the whole logic," or "I do," or "I don't," you should digest for a while, work with the information, and debate. Debate will really help. If these four are not clear, then you should ask more because otherwise you have nothing to debate about, or contemplate.

Q3: I am not clear about the explanation of the mode of engagement of mind...
DPR: When we say "object of verbal expression," we're talking about two things: object of verbal expression and means of verbal expression. So I was saying that in different ways. "Object of verbal expression" is "what is to be said," and the "means of verbal expression" is "what says it."
Q3: It occurred to me that this is getting so mechanically perceptual. These are the mechanics of perception, and it seems to me that this is the way a child learns before the child has a name for things. The child acquires a name for things basically by the world making connections for him or her. What we're learning is that basic mode of acquisition of knowledge. What's being broken down here is that basic mode of acquisition.
DPR: Yes, it is how we see things, conceptualize things, mix things up.

Q4: Is the engagement of a mind cognizing an object of verbal expression the same as thinking?
DPR: You should debate on that and find out. I think you have to specify specify which one. We talked about two, right? We also talked about also dividing into three according to the seventh Karmapa's presentation. You have to see what you want to refer to.
Q4: Is there a distinction between the terms "concept" and "verbal expression?" How could one describe thinking? Is this a description of thinking? Thinking is somewhat difficult to get close to. Talking is easier.
DPR: I think thinking can be the subject of the object of verbal expression.
Q4: How are you using the term "subject?"
DPR: It is subject in the sense of subject-object, as we always talk about.
Q4: Can I have one more?
DPR: You should discuss and talk, debate and see what these things are.
Q4: When you described the referent object, you used to talk about the hidden object.
DPR: Used to! No, it's America. We have to change every minute.[Laughter]. We have to have a new thing.
Q4: Nevertheless, you said that the direct valid cognition has just one object. In other words, for sense direct valid cognition, the determined object, the referent object, and the appearing object would be one object. If the sense direct valid cognition doesn't see the hidden object, is the hidden object the same as the determined object? Or is it somewhere else?
DPR: No, I think, all of them refer to the object of direct perception, direct valid cognition. We experience it more directly than any other consciousness.

Q4: Where does the hidden object, which no one has ever seen and which Sautantrikas inferentially conclude, come in?
DPR: That is the apprehended object. We are apprehending by perception.

DPR: How was the meditation this morning?
Q: Helpful.
DPR: Good. I think the more we do it, the more it will become clear. Maybe we should have more guidance from the discussion group leaders in the debate format. This will ensure we are not just talking too long on certain things. Sometimes it's good to talk long, but if it doesn't say anything extra or help us to understand, then there is not much point to going on. It's better to come back and do something else, to try another way of understanding the same topic. I don't mean we have to stop talking about the topic, but stop the method, and come back to another method. You can look at the same thing from a different perspective in a different way. Maybe someone should talk and maybe the other person has a better way to express it which can make it better. For example, we had "apparent object" and "apparent means of expression." These help to make it easier to understand. Maybe you can focus on having more direction, and more sense of balancing. Thank you.

UNTITLED TALK

We have discussed the object of verbal expression, means of verbal expression, and some ways of classifying the two divisions. More briefly, all conceptual minds have two objects. First, there is the direct object, immediate object, or actual object, which is the generally characterized phenomenon. Second, there is the indirect object, the non-immediate object or referent object. I have given you the names of the four objects, and I think it is too complicated to go into the differences between them. That would involve a whole other session. Just understand that there are four objects and that we should concentrate mainly on these two objects. Again, there is the appearing or direct object, and the referent or indirect object.

All conceptual minds generally have these two objects, especially in the case of the object of verbal expression and the means of verbal expression. All non-conceptual minds, the direct perceptions, basically have only one object, the appearing object.

The confusion lies in the term "appearing object" which is used for both the conceptual and non-conceptual direct objects. The term used is the same and the category of object is the same, but the actual nature of the object is different. When we say "appearing object" it refers to the direct, immediate object of consciousness, whether it is conceptual or non-conceptual. The immediate object of that subject, mind, is the "appearing object," which literally means "appearing to that mind." Whether it appears to the conceptual mind or perceptual mind, to whomever it appears, that object is known as the "appearing object." You should not think that all appearing objects are the same. The appearing object for the conceptual mind is different from the appearing object of the non-conceptual mind. Is that clear?

We should just think in terms of the two objects, rather than the four categories. We don't have much time to go into the details, and so it is very complicated to try to talk about something that we haven't gone into in enough detail. We would have to make a lot of assumptions and guesses, and so it would not be very healthy and easy to talk about. There would be different guesses which don't have any common ground of understanding. Just talk and debate in terms of the appearing object and referent object. (You can also use determined object for referent object; they are two different ways of translating.)

onceptual mind perceives referent object indirectly.

One must clearly understand that the conceptual mind perceives the referent object indirectly. The referent object doesn't appear directly to the conceptual mind; it appears indirectly. There is a barrier between the conceptual mind and the specifically characterized object, the referent object. It does not see directly, but through something. What it sees through is the appearing object. For example, when my eyes are not very good, then I see objects through my glasses. Without my glasses, I don't see clearly. In the same way, without the glasses in between the object and subject, what we have is the appearing object for the conceptual mind. The conceptual mind goes through this filter to perceive the object--the object doesn't appear directly to the conceptual mind. In the case of direct perception the object does appear directly to your mind.

The translation says "conceptual means and object of expression." We have had a number of discussions about that translation. From one perspective the translation may be indirectly correct because only the conceptual mind can have these two objects. It is the only mind that will have a referent object. A referent object is an object perceived through some filter. Direct perceptions do not go through that filter and so there's no sense of a referent object; all objects are direct objects, immediate objects. Direct mind perceptions, non-conceptual minds, do not go through that filter. There is no sense of indirectness in the nature of non-conceptual mind. Therefore, they don't need to worry about this referent object, conceptualized object.

The only problem here is that it's a little confusing when you say "conceptualized object." The nature of the object itself is not really conceptualized; it is the indirect object of a concept, but it is not conceptualized. Later this word, which we translate here as "conceptualized," is translated as "taken." Sometimes it is translated as "referent object," or "determined object." There are many different ways of looking at this word [laughs]; translation work is purely conceptual.

The Mode of Non-existence of an Actual [or Immediate] Object of Expression of a Term

Khenpo Rinpoche's verse says:

> "In this context the mode of non-existence of an actual object of expression of a term is as follows: The specifically characterized entities of both object and consciousness cannot be expressed."

This is very clear, right? We have been talking about the *rangchen, the svalakshana.* It cannot be expressed. What is our example of inexpressible?

Q: Snicker's Bar.

DPR: That's right. Thank you. [Laughs] It is the experience of a Snicker's Bar.

The text says:

> "Since both term generality and object generality
> Are non-entities they are not objects of expression."

Khenpo Rinpoche made a syllogism which identifies the basis of the three modes. The subject is, "Both term generality and object generality," and the reason is "are non-entities." The predicate is "not objects of expression." So that's one complete syllogism.

The term generality and the object generality, which are two of the four categories, are not objects of expression. This means they are not expressible; they are not specifically characterized objects of expression because they are non-entities, non-existent. Non-entities are non-existent, they do not exist in any form of a thing.

thoroughly I think – see p. 160-1

This is showing the stage of slight analysis. In this stage, object generality and term generality are not really objects of expression because they do not exist. There is nothing to express because they are just isolate. When we try to express something, usually there is something to express, some existent to be expressed. When we say "clay pot," we try to express the existence of that particular thing that we perceive or experience. In this case, the object generality and term generality simply do not exist in anything. They simply exist in our conceptual isolate, conceptual mind. Therefore, Khenpo Rinpoche is saying that they are not objects of any actual expression, real expression.

The text says:

> "Therefore if one thoroughly analyzes by logic
> In reality there is no object of expression."

"Therefore" is the reason, which is very helpful. "Therefore" means "for that reason." The subject is, "If one thoroughly analyzes by logic" and the predicate is, "In reality there is no object of expression." If you thoroughly analyze by logic, by more subtle prajna, you will find that in reality there is no object of expression. This object of expression refers to the actual [or immediate] object of expression, which is the object generality. Therefore, Rinpoche is saying that in actual reality there is no object of expression, because if one thoroughly analyzes by logic you can't find an object; all you find is a non-thing.

If you thoroughly analyze the object of expression and the means of expression, even at the Sautrantika Cittamatra level, they are simply individually characterized existent things. You won't find any connection between the word "glass," the sound "glass," and the actual object, the basis of that designation "glass." You won't find connection at their own *svalakshana* level. There is no connection at all, there are just three different things: the word, the sound and the actual object outside. They are all just very different. Therefore, there is no real object of expression, and there is no real means of expression in all the things that take place in our conceptual mind (which will come later in the verse). We are getting pretty close to Madhyamika.

no connectio between word, sou & actual obje

The text says:

4 "For conceptuality essentially mistaken
An image of the outer object of expression appears.
This is taken to be the outer object of expression."

We have the appearing object which is "taken" to be the outer object of expression. "Taken" is the translation of the same word translated as "conceptualized" in the earlier paragraph. This has also been translated as "referent" or "determined" object. It's interesting. It doesn't stay with one meaning.

The text says:

"And designated as the object of expression of a term.
Since [these] are distinguished at the time of explanation
One is learned in the ways of the specifically and generally characterized.
Since they are mistaken as one at the time of application
Beings are able to accomplish their aims."

In the next few lines Khenpo Rinpoche is describing how these objects of expression and means of expression appear to the conceptual mind, and how they function in our world as one connected thing. He says that the conceptual mind is essentially mistaken in its nature, and for that conceptual mind, the image of the outer object of expression appears. The conceptual mind gets that image, the generally characterized phenomenon, the isolate. The image of the outer object of expression, such as a glass, appears to the conceptual mind as a glass. We get confused by that appearing thing. The conceptual mind takes it to be an outer object. The conceptual mind cannot distinguish between the image of an object that appears to it and the real, actual object outside. It takes them to be one object. The conceptual image that we see in the conceptual mind is taken to be the object outside. We think that it is the actual object of expression. It is designated as the object of expression of a term, as the object of the means of expression.

The text says, "Since these are distinguished at the time of explanation...." There are two stages. One stage is the time of explanation and the other stage is the time of application. In the previous verse where Khenpo Rinpoche says, "The divisions are as follows...," we had "...the situation of explaining and listening," and "...the situation of using a term." Here, we are at the first stage of explanation. At the time of explanation it is useful to distinguish and say that this is the actual thing, which is called the "glass;" "glass" is spelled in this way. It is distinguished clearly and then taught and learned through various means. That is the time of explanation.

In other words, at the time of saying "glass," there is basically a distinction. We think about the glass outside, we say "glass" and then we get the glass later. Through distinguishing what it is, Khenpo Rinpoche is saying that you become learned. By distinguishing these two phenomena, you become learned in the fields of specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena. You master them. You get a clear idea about what the conceptual image is and what the actual object is. You get clear understanding and become learned.

The text says: "Since they are mistaken as one at the time of application...." When you apply the term that you have learned, it usually works better in the application process when you use it in a way that it is mixed or mingled together. It is more mistaken. When you say "glass," then you always have a clear idea of mixing all together the actual object of "glass," the sound and the image, and then we see just this one glass clearly. At the time of application, by mixing them all together you accomplish your aims. It is easier to accomplish your aims by mixing them together at the time of application. If you still go through the distinguishing process, then you will never get the glass because there is no connection whatsoever between the term or sound, the general characteristics and the specifically characterized phenomenon. If you distinguish them in the application, then you will never get the glass, because the term "glass" doesn't mean anything. How can you get the glass by saying "glass"? There is no way you can get it unless you mix these two phenomena together and enter the world of conceptual reality.

conceptual mind tries s/more & more fails to capture the object in one of its rough elim. it can ever really get at it. it just gets ~~great~~ more conceptual.

In the conceptual process, when the ear consciousness hears the sound and each syllable of the letters, then those letters and syllables become the object of your ear consciousness. That is the basis of the means of expression. With these letters and sounds we can express something. They are the basis of our expression. What is happening in our mind is that when our ear consciousness hears each individual syllable and sound in a word, it goes through the gradual process of hearing these first, then the conceptual mind goes through a further process of identifying each syllable and word that we have heard. It identifies different levels of the object. When you say "vase," it will identify with the object, the general nature of the object "vase." When you say "clay vase," it identifies with the more specific quality of the object. When you say "the good beautiful clay vase," it becomes even more clear and specific. When you add more words or more expressions, it clearly identifies with more different things. It is going through different levels of the process of identifying. First it identifies with one general characteristic, such as when you say "glass." It identifies with that which is a whole group. Then it identifies with the glass and if it is in front of us, it further identifies with the glass and the glass being three-quarters full with water. The conceptual mind goes through different processes of conceptual labeling, identifying. In the process of identifying, it connects the mental image with the different aspects of the object, such as "glass," "water," "clear water," "clear glass," and so on. It goes through this process at the conceptual level.

At the time of explanation and at the time of application we go through different aspects of isolates, reverses, exclusions. First, you have to give the term or label at the stage of explaining and listening. Then when you apply the label you have to exclude the others from the application. You have to have a specific way of applying that label to a specific thing. Therefore, in both stages or levels we go through the exclusion and isolation process.

There are too many objects and expressions, so we should stop here. Chart four pretty clearly shows the three levels of analysis. You can also look at the four ways of dividing these layers, which occur in the first two stages of no analysis and slight analysis. There is the object of expression, which is the specifically characterized object, and the object generality, and the means of expression which is the specifically characterized sound and the term generality. These are the four levels that we have been talking about.

We also have the *Mode of Engagement* chart, chart three. Is there any complication in this chart?

Q1: In the first column, where it talks about generality and particulars, there are three sub-headings: type, collection and term. In the section we have been studying the object generality was not included in our previous discussion. We only had type, collection, and term. How does object generality fit in with these three?

DPR: Maybe they are all the object generality. We can have the object generality of type, collection and term. I don't know about "term." Term can be a term generality, and type and collection can be object generalities.

Q1: It seems in our present discussion that term generality and object generality are a pair of things, things that are compared or contrasted.

DPR: I think term generality can be term generality, and the type and collection generalities can be object generalities. Let's look at it that way and see what happens. Is there a mike down there? Where's Mike?

Q2: So this is really the secret to enlightenment. [DPR laughs] You could say that at one level, we run around eating the menu instead of the meal. We live in the world of a map. It seems to me that one application of what we have been doing, in relation to meditation practice, is, for instance, if I took the word "car" and simply said the word "car" over and over. Sooner or later I would strip the meaning from that word, strip the map away, and be left with the territory of sound. Is that what happens when we do our meditation practice? We sit there watching the same map, the same boring scenario over and over again. [DPR laughs: "Boring."] It seems that would have the same function of stripping the map away and being left with just the energy and the play of the mind. Is it fair to say that?

DPR: Yes, I think that would be a way to look at it. We are trying to strip away our conceptual clothing that we put on this naked nature or truth. We say, "Harrison is like this, Sangpo is like this, and Thupten is something like this."

Q2: Would we say that the situation of explaining and listening is the level of slight analysis? Are these synonymous?

DPR: Yes, we have that in chart four.

Q3: The text says [p.17]: "At the time of explanation, one is learned in the ways of the specifically and generally characterized." The time of explanation means to me that you point to the object. Then you say the word, "Book." Is it the process of connecting the referent object and the sound? Is this at the level of no analysis?

DPR: That is what we have on the chart, yes.

Q3: It is not saying that one is aware of the concepts of the specifically characterized and generally characterized at the stage of no analysis. If you are talking to a little kid and you say, "This is a book," the kid doesn't say, "Well, do you mean specifically characterized?" [Laughter] Does it mean that "One is learned in these ways," if it's the level of no analysis. It can't mean that one has realized what it means to be specifically characterized and generally characterized.

DPR: There's a chance. Probably we could say more like "One is skilled in these ways." In general, we may not have all these labels, saying, "Oh, this is specifically characterized, this is generally characterized phenomena..." There is a basic sense of understanding when you have distinguished the two. This is the label that we give to this thing.

Q3: I thought one was not able to distinguish at the level of no analysis. You are so skilled that you aren't able to distinguish between specifically and generally...

DPR: No, one is skilled in the term and its object. When you say "Paper," you know what it is. You are skilled in that. When you say "paper" you know this is paper. When you say "glass," you know this is glass. That is the level we are talking about here.

Q4: On page twenty-three of the definitions, it says, "Fully distinguishing specifically and generally characterized phenomena" defines "superior knowledge." The verse says, "Since these are distinguished at the time of explanation, one is learned in the ways of the specifically and generally characterized." That was just a comment on Thupten's question [Q3].

DPR: Wow! That's great! What's your question, then?

Q4: We were discussing whether any of this process was conceptual or non-conceptual?

DPR: Which process are we talking about?
Q4: The four levels. I understand from the chart that this is a diagram of a thoroughly conceptual process. It explains how the mistaken mind works because it's not tuned in to the non-conceptual activity that's happening at the same time.
DPR: I didn't get your question. In the third stage?
Q4: In the whole process. Is this chart a description of the activity of a mistaken mind which is not aware of the non-conceptual activity that's happening throughout the whole conceptual process?
DPR: I don't think we can generalize the whole chart. It is going through a three-stage process. The seventh Karmapa is looking at the whole process from the three levels of analysis. When you look at the three levels of analysis it is difficult to generalize the whole thing together as one. Generally speaking, all these topics of discussion happen in the conceptual mind. There is no determined object without the conceptual mind. You have to have the conceptual mind in order to have the determined object. The non-conceptual mind is so direct with the object; it doesn't have to go through the filter. When you don't have to go through the filter, there's no sense of indirect object. All the objects become direct. Therefore, the object of expression and means of expression relate to the conceptual mind, because in the actual thing there's no connection to the object or means in any sense. The whole topic is conceptual mind, but I don't think we can really generalize and say the whole process is conceptual.

Q5: I understand that isolate is synonymous with mental image. The term "mental image" is sort of a visual image and the term isolate seems to be much more abstract. Does the isolate, which is the object of a concept have a visual aspect to it, or would that be separate from the isolate itself?
DPR: By visual isolate do you mean that you can see it?
Q5: When we talk about mental image, I associate it with something visual. When we talk about isolates which are not the same as the referent object, do they have a visual aspect?
DPR: You can have an isolate of anything, not just visual objects. There is the isolate of a sound, taste, texture or whatever. You can think about a rough texture or a soft texture.
Q5: I am confused because when we talk about isolates I try to come up with some kind of experience of them. When do I experience an isolate? If I say, for example, "table..."
DPR: That's a good example
Q5: ...is there a mental image which occurs unclearly in my mind? Is the mental image of a table different from a sense perception image.
DPR: Yes, that's right.
Q5: Is this image, which has a visual component in my mind, referred to as an "isolate?"
DPR: Yes, visual. It depends on what we say is "visual." For example, when you say "table", when you think about "table," the isolate of the table, and if you really look at it, it is not clear at all. It's not a clear image. It's just "table." That is why we are saying that there is no such thing as a giant table that you can see clearly. When you say "table," it is just something that is not a table, but we conceive it as a table. If you really think about what a table is, if you have a clear visual image, that will be an image of a specific table. It will not be a "table" image.
Q5: I am still confused.
DPR: Think about "Table." You can do the analytical meditation on that kind of isolate. I'm not kidding. Just look at it and say, "Table."
Q5: I tried doing that. That is why I've come up with the question.
DPR: When you do that, if you have a clear visual image, that will be a specific image of a specific table and not the table that we're talking about.

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ive over the
[illegible]

Q5: If a visual image occurs in my mind, would that not be the isolate?
DPR: It can be.
Q5: If I visualize a table...
DPR: That would be an image.
Q5: That would not be an isolate?
DPR: It would be an isolate of that specific table that you are visualizing. It's not the general "table," but a specific image of a specific table, an isolate of a specific table. It's mind. What you're

experiencing is the seeing, the clarity. That could be something that is just experienced by the self-awareness. The self-awareness which sees the concept can be the clarity.
Q5: Is an isolate this notion of "A is not not A." Is it that abstract? There are no particular visual or audial aspects associated with it.
DPR: Otherwise it would be specifically characterized.
Q5: That's why I was confused about the term "mental image." I took it to be something visual. Maybe image is the wrong term.
DPR: Impression. Is that better?
Q5: I'm not sure.
DPR: (Repeating student's suggestion) Imagination. Same as "image".
Q5: I think "apercept" would probably be better.
DPR: Apercept. You can contemplate on that. Whenever we see a specific image, that will be the image of the specific isolate. We can still experience and debate

Q6: When you were distinguishing between a vague isolate of a table and the specific isolate, were you referring to a double isolate?
DPR: Yes, the specific one would have a double isolate.
Q6: I was confused about whether the second part of the double isolate always refers to a specific phenomenon. It's not just a more precise description of a general isolate. For example, if I said "a building" that would be an isolate. If I said "a wooden building with a red roof sitting on a cliff," that is still an isolate. It just has more distinctions. If I said "Gampo Abbey," and I had an image of that, then that would be a double isolate.
DPR: Yes.

THE FOURTH DIVISION OF THE MODES OF ENGAGEMENT OF MIND: COGNIZING CONTRADICTION AND CONNECTION

We are at the fourth division of the modes of engagement of mind: "The explanation of the mode of engagement of a mind cognizing contradiction and connection." This has two sections: a mind cognizing connection and a mind cognizing contradiction. Connection has a *musum* or *tönchik* kind of connection. Contradiction is *gelwa.*

A. The Mind Cognizing Connection
Its Three Stages

The First Stage: the General Teaching

The first one, connection, is divided into three stages: "The general teaching on the mode of engagement of mind cognizing connection," "Refuting connection ultimately," (you know what "ultimately" means in the Sautrantika Cittamatra view) and, "Proving connection from the point of view of conceptual mind." The first stage is the general teaching on the mode of engagement of mind cognizing connection. (It is very wordy and long.) The definition is, "A mind apprehending that something is a phenomenon and that it is not canceled by another phenomenon." It is one of those not not jokes. The mind that cognizes the connection is actually a mind apprehending that something is a phenomenon. One phenomenon is not harmed, canceled, opposed, injured, or refuted by another phenomenon. In the connection of two phenomena, one phenomenon is not harmed, refuted or opposed by the other one. The mind that apprehends that connection is the mind cognizing connection.

The Two Connections:
That of Identical Essence, and That of Cause

There are two connections: the connection of identical essence and the causal connection. There are also two minds apprehending them. The connection of identical essence means two things are identical, and the causal connection indicates a cause and effect relationship. These are two stages of divisions of connection.

The first one, "A mind apprehending connection of identical essence," is defined as, "a mind apprehending that [two phenomena] are different isolates and that by having the same essence do not cancel [each other]." That is pretty straightforward. It says that a mind apprehends that two phenomena are different isolates and that by having the same essence they do not cancel, oppose, refute or injure each other. For example, impermanent and momentary things are two different isolates. One says "impermanent" and the other says "momentary," but they both have the same essence or identical nature. When you say "sound is impermanent," it means that sound is a momentary thing. When you say "sound is a momentary thing," it means that sound is impermanent. When you say, "Sound is impermanent," that is identical to saying, "Sound is a momentary thing." It is a *tönchik* connection. དོན་གཅིག

If there is a *tönchik* connection, then there should be the eight doors of pervasion. For example, whatever is impermanent is a momentary thing, whatever is not impermanent is not a momentary thing, wherever there is impermanence there is a momentary thing, and wherever there isn't impermanence there isn't a momentary thing. The eight doors of pervasion enable you to see whether it is *tönchik* or not. That is how you challenge. If someone says that something is *tönchik*, then you should see whether or not there are these pervasions between them. If you cannot develop the pervasion, then that means it is not a *tönchik* connection; you cannot prove it. This first division, the identical essence, is the *tönchik* connection. We have talked a lot about isolates. Two phenomena are different isolates and by having the same essence do not cancel each other. That is the definition of connection of identical essence. If you want to posit a definition of *tönchik*, that is the definition.

The second division, "A mind apprehending the causal connection," is defined here as, "A mind apprehending that [two phenomena] are different and through [being related as] cause and effect do not cancel [each other]." In the second connection there are also two separate phenomena that are different but have a connection. The connection they have in common is that of cause and effect; they are connected through the relationship of cause and effect. By having that connection they do not cancel each other. For example, the connection between the seed of a rose and the rose flower itself would be this second connection. The mind that apprehends this connection is the mind cognizing the causal connection. Not being contradictory, or not canceling each other, means that the seed of a rose flower will not oppose or stop the birth of a rose flower. The rose flower is also dependent on the cause, which is the rose seed of the rose flower. Without the seed the flower cannot arise. There is a strong dependence and connection between the two. That is the definition "because '[two phenomena] being different and through [being related as] cause and effect not canceling [each other]' is the definition of causal connection." Many of the *musum* and *mushi* connections can have such a relationship. This section mainly presents these two connections: the identical connection and the causal connection.

The Second Stage: Refuting Connection Ultimately

The next verse says:

> "The refutation of connection ultimately is as follows:
> Concerning phenomena of the same essence
> Two phenomena in the [ultimate] object are impossible;
> If in the [ultimate] object two phenomena are impossible
> Connection in the ultimate object is impossible.
> If there is earlier and later this contradicts simultaneity
> And [if there is] simultaneity, [this] contradicts causality.
> Therefore entities that are causes and effects
> Are not connected in the [ultimate] object."

Now let's look at the basis of the three modes. In the first verse the subject and predicate are implied. The subject is, "All phenomena that have identical connections," and the predicate is, "Do not have the connection ultimately." The reason is, "Concerning phenomena of the same essence, two phenomena in the [ultimate] object are impossible." That is one reason. The second reason, which proves the first, is, "If in the [ultimate] object two phenomena are impossible, connection in the [ultimate] object is impossible." Khenpo Rinpoche is saying that those phenomena which have the same essence, in their own essence in the ultimate sense cannot be two. We cannot have two objects in the ultimate level because [if we could—ed.] there would be no identity and no oneness—there would be two. At the *svalakshana* level, or at the level of the essence, we cannot say there is two phenomena because it is just one identical essence. It is impossible for there to be two phenomena in the ultimate level because there cannot be two phenomena in the ultimate object. Therefore, the connection of the identical essence is not possible in the ultimate level.

= a set Why
phen. connected
by having the
same essence
= impossible.

Q: Would you say it again?

DPR: The specifically characterized sound does not repeat again, but I will repeat the generally characterized phenomenon. [laughs] The first reasoning is: the identical essence connection is not established ultimately because phenomena which have the same essence cannot be two separate phenomena ultimately. If you have two separate phenomena, ultimately they cannot have the identical essence. They are separate.

The second reason that Khenpo Rinpoche gives is that because there cannot be two separate phenomena in the ultimate level, therefore there is no connection at the ultimate level. At the ultimate level there is no connection because there is no two phenomena to have a *tönchik* connection. In order to have *tönchik* or *gelwa* you have to have two, and then you say these are *tönchik* or *gelwa*. In the ultimate sense there are not two phenomena; you cannot compare them and say whether or not they are *tönchik*.

Q: Would there be no cause and effect?

DPR: The same applies. In the second verse Khenpo Rinpoche is saying, "If there is earlier and later, this contradicts simultaneity, and if there is simultaneity, this contradicts causality. Therefore,"entities which are cause and effect are not connected in the ultimate object."

The subject of this verse is, "Entities that are causes and effects;" the predicate is, "Are not connected in the ultimate object;" and the reason is, "If there is earlier and later this contradicts simultaneity, and if there is simultaneity this contradicts causality." That is the basis of the three modes.

This verse says that if you look at cause and effect in order to establish the relationship, you need to have the two phenomena, and these two are related or not related. [Ultimately,] at the level of cause and effect, when there is a seed then there is no effect, when there is a cause there is no effect. When there is an effect there is no cause of that effect. It is already gone. Khenpo Rinpoche is saying that there is no connection whatsoever in the ultimate sense, at the basic level of existence. Therefore, if you look at cause and effect, they are two separate things (one is cause and one is effect). You cannot develop any connection between the two at the ultimate level. The "ultimate level" refers to the level of the specifically characterized phenomenon. This verse gives us a nice overview of how phenomena exist and how they don't exist.

Ultimate: refers to level of Sp. char.

The Third Stage: Proving Connection from the Point of View of the Conceptual Mind

The text says, "The proof of connection from the point of view of [conceptual] mind is as follows:

> Though in the [ultimate] object connection is impossible
> Due to habituation to tendencies of conceptuality
> Concepts of connection of
> Identical essence and cause and effect vividly arise."

These four lines seem to be the reason. The subject is, "From the point of view of conceptual mind the connection is established." Khenpo Rinpoche is saying that the connections are only possible in the conceptual mind, only established in our conceptual mind. Within the isolates of conceptual mind we develop connections because in the ultimate object there is no connection. A connection is impossible to establish [ultimately]. All these connections arise from our habitual tendencies. From habitual tendencies we get the conceptual labeling process of connecting something or contradicting something. In the ultimate sense we can't develop any connection; all connections are conceptual and developed within the isolates. For example, from the isolates of "impermanent" and "momentary thing" you develop the connection that they are identical in essence. From the isolates of a flower seed and the effect, the flower, you develop the connection that the flower arises from the seed. They have this cause and effect connection, but if you really look at the cause and effect, it is very difficult to find any relationship between the two moments of being a cause and being an effect. That is a summary of the connection [at the ultimate and conceptual levels].

8- The Mind Cognizing Contradiction

Its Three Divisions

In the next section contradiction is not very different from connection. They are pretty much the same, and so we will look at the contradiction briefly. The text says:

> "'A mind cognizing that something is a phenomenon and that it is neutralized by another phenomenon' is the definition of mind apprehending contradiction, because 'something being a phenomenon and being neutralized by another phenomenon' is the definition of contradiction."

"Neutralized" may be translated as "canceled", "opposed" or "stopped." When there are two contradictory phenomena, like dark and light, water and fire, or hot and cold, one is neutralized by the other. When we have hot, that neutralizes cold, when you have cold that neutralizes hot. It is like the opposite of the thing. When you have light there is no darkness, and when you have darkness there is no light. While one phenomenon is absent the other phenomenon is present. That is the notion of *gelwa,* contradiction. So that's the definition. It is when something is a phenomenon and that is neutralized by another phenomenon.

Q: Is the causal connection a *gelwa* connection?
DPR: No, *gelwa* is not called a connection, it is called a contradiction.
Q: Cause and effect have different moments. Are the two elements of causal connection *gelwa*? For example, what is the relationship of a rose seed and a rose flower?
DPR: Cause and effect.
Q: Would you say that their relationship is *mushi* or *musum*?
DPR: It is the second connection, the causal connection in general, when we debate.
Q: So you don't look at it in terms of *musum* or *mushi*? You just say they have a causal connection?
DPR: If you look at two separate incidents, two separate moments, like a seed which has no result, at that point there is no result. If you look at the result, there is no seed of that result existing. In that case you can't even say gelwa because the other thing does not exist. [laughter] To have *gelwa, musum* or *tönchik* you have to have two things to compare. In general, if you talk about all seeds, and the results of them, then maybe you can say it is *gelwa*. But if you look at the connection itself, you can't say it is *gelwa* because there is no two things.

Q1: When we say momentary and impermanent are identical in essence, the way we use "impermanent" covers more territory than momentary. For example, if we say that my life is impermanent, would those two concepts still have a *tönchik* relationship?
DPR: What do you mean by "territory?"
Q1: What is momentary is impermanent, but what is impermanent, such as "my life," in the ordinary use of the word, isn't necessarily momentary, even though we could analyze impermanent down to meaning momentary.
DPR: In essence, it is basically identical.
Q1: So when we talk about identical there is some analysis of what the essence is.
DPR: Yes, I think so. It should have analysis.

Q2: Could you give another example of identical in essence.
DPR: Selflessness and emptiness. That is easier.
Q2: Wouldn't you apply this to substantial things?
DPR: You can, as we do.
Q2: Could you apply it to any two substantial things?
DPR: We can apply it in the sense of impermanence of substantial things, but as Khenpo Rinpoche says, the real connection is not there in the substance itself, but in our conceptual mind. We can

apply impermanence to a lot of substantial things. If you can find any synonyms of substantial thing, it will be the identical essence.

Q3: It seems like the conceptual quality of the isolates "momentary" and "impermanent" is irrelevant to the *svalakshana*. Why do you even need two or three isolates?
DPR: Why do we need these labels or connections?
Q3: I don't understand the reason behind concepts or isolates having qualities that point to the same thing.
DPR: The reason is to make someone understand that thing. If you don't know one term you have another term that says the same thing. We try to say the same thing by different means. For example, somebody might not know that sound is impermanent, but might know that sound is a momentary thing. You can use the momentary thing to tell him or her that sound is impermanent. He or she knows that sound is momentary but doesn't know that sound is impermanent. In that way you can help him or her to understand.

Q4: What are the eight doors of pervasion?
Translator: The eight doors of pervasion are divided into two sets, each having four parts. Taking as our subjects impermanent and composite, the first set of four is as follows: whatever is impermanent, it follows that it is composite; whatever is composite, it follows that it is impermanent; whatever is not impermanent, it follows that it is not composite; and whatever is not composite, it follows that it is not impermanent.

The next set of four just changes the verb, otherwise it follows in the same way. The first set uses the verb "is," or *yin*, in Tibetan. The second uses "have" or "has," or *yod*, in Tibetan. In trying to understand this I asked Rinpoche if it would be all right to use the word "nature" in this set, and he said that it was all right.

The second set is: whatever has the nature of impermanence, it follows that it has the nature of being composite; whatever has the nature of being composite, it follows that it has the nature of being impermanent; whatever does not have the nature of being impermanent, if follows that it does not have the nature of being composite; and whatever does not have the nature of being composite, it follows that it does not have the nature of being impermanent.

Q5: Do the relationships of *gelwa*, *musum* and *mushi* also have similar sets of pervasions as the eight doors of pervasion of the *tönchik* relationship?
DPR: They do not have the same eight.
Q5: Do each of the four relationships have eight ways of pervasion?
DPR: No. Only *tönchik* does.
Q5: What are the other types of pervasion in the other three types of relationships?
DPR: There are some pervasions in *musum* and *mushi*. If you look at the chart, I think it will be pretty clear.
Q5: So in *musum* there is three possibilities, and in *mushi* there are four possibilities.
DPR: That's right, yes.
Q5: In *gelwa* there is no possibilities.
DPR: That's right, yes.

THE TWO DIVISIONS OF MIND COGNIZING CONTRADICTION: DIRECT AND INDIRECT

We are continuing with the explanation of the mode of engagement of mind cognizing contradiction. This has two divisions: apprehending direct contradiction and apprehending indirect contradiction. The first one is, "'A mind cognizing that something is a phenomenon and that it negates it's direct opposite' is the definition of a mind apprehending direct contradiction." The direct contradiction here is a phenomenon that negates its direct opposite. When ever a phenomenon's opposite is in a complete fruition stage, then that negates the phenomenon. The definition of a direct contradiction is "something being a phenomenon and negating it's direct opposite."

The second division, "A mind apprehending indirect contradiction," is defined as, "A mind cognizing that something is a phenomenon and that it negates the pervader of the phenomenon to be directly negated." This phenomenon negates the pervader of the phenomenon to be directly negated. For example, when you experience the cold temperature of frost, the specific thing that you are experiencing is the general opposite of the fire element, the general pervader of the opposite. What you experience is a specific part of the opposite. The direct opposite is cold. From among the many different aspects of cold experience, you have one particular experience of a cold temperature, which is the coldness of frost. That experience negates the general opposite which is like the experience of a fire or warmth.

There are many different views of the indirect opposite. Some people say that the opposite simply means not having two things on one particular basis. For example, you might say fire and water are not opposite; you can have both side by side. What we mean by opposite is that the same space cannot be occupied by two equal strengths of opposite elements. That is actually what *gelwa* is. Sometimes in debate it comes to the point of saying that your two hands are *gelwa* because they do not occupy the same space. That is why the definition *gelwa* says neutralize, cancel, refute or negate, because these two hands do not negate each other. They are not really *gelwa* in that sense.

Q: What if you put one cup of boiling hot water in a glass and then one cup of ice cold water in the glass. You have boiling hot water and ice cold water in the same container. Are they no longer contradictory because they exist in the same place? They won't be boiling hot water or cold water; they will be lukewarm.

DPR: Yes, they do not exist at the same time together. They are neither hot nor cold together, but they become something else. The boiling element of water is not really mixing with the ice cold water. At first, when you put them together the two elements gradually mix. We can think about *gelwa*. It's a very interesting subject in Tibetan debate; there are different views on gelwa. In a way, just saying *gelwa*, opposite, seems so simple, but when you define direct opposite and indirect opposite and how you want to debate on it, sometimes it gets very tricky.

Khenpo Rinpoche defines indirect contradiction as something being a phenomenon and that it negates the pervader of the phenomenon to be directly negated. For example, when you experience the coldness of frost, you negate warmth, hotness or fire.

Q: I was wondering about the phenomenon of dry ice. Dry ice is so cold that when you touch it, it has a burning sensation. How does that experience relate to the experience of frost?

DPR: What do you think?

Q: I think in this case, there are two things that are being confused: the object itself and the experience of the experiencer. The experiencer feels a certain type of pain, which can be produced by either something hot or something cold. You can't really call it "burning."

Q: I think that when you label something hot or cold, it is arbitrary. The label that you put on that sensation of cold or hot can be any label. When you have the sensation that I call "burning," it is direct sensory perception.

DPR: That's right. As we have been talking about, labels have nothing to do with the actual phenomena, the particular phenomena. The label is not really a problem here because it is just given anyway. We can call this a table and if we have labeled this table right from the beginning, then everyone will look at it when we say table. The label doesn't really matter. What we are talking about is the experience of a phenomenon of a label and the actual particular thing as mixed. We have to mix them because *gelwa* is just conceptual, the whole concept of contradictory or connection is conceptual. In actual experience there is no *gelwa* or connection. It is just an experience, as you said. It is a direct perception which is beyond any *gelwa*, connection, or *tönchik*. It doesn't have any such thing in the actual state or experience. Therefore, we are working at a level where concept, your experience and the actual thing are mixed together. Based on this, we make contradictions and connections.

The text says,

> "The refutation of contradiction ultimately is as follows:
> Just like connection, contradiction as well
> Does not exist in entities [that are ultimate] objects,
> Because both that which is to be neutralized and its neutralizer
> Are an entity or a non-entity."

This shows that contradiction ultimately does not exist. It is similar to the verse on connection. Khenpo Rinpoche says, "Just like connection," which is the example. The basis of the three modes is: the subject is, "contradiction as well;" the predicate is, "does not exist in entities that are ultimate objects;" and the reason is the last two lines, "Because both that which is to be neutralized and its neutralizer are an entity or non-entity."

If you look at the ultimate level, from the point of view of specifically characterized phenomena, there is no contradiction. Contradiction does not exist. The reason is, when you have two things that contradict, one neutralizes the other. When there is a neutralizer, there exists no other phenomenon; what has been neutralized is already gone. When there is the other thing which is to be neutralized, at that point the neutralizer has not [yet] become an entity. For example, when there is a strong fire, at that point no water exists in that same element. When the water comes and puts out the fire, at that point the fire is not there. When one is a thing, the other is a non-thing. When one is an entity, the other one has no entity. When the other one is an entity, the previous one doesn't have an entity. Therefore these two things do not exist at the same time.

Just as in the discussion on connection where you have to have two things together simultaneously, in order to say *gelwa*, in the ultimate sense, you have to have two existing entities. When you examine the process [of contradiction] you find that these two things do not exist at the same time. At the point [of contradiction] one thing does not exist. Therefore, you can't say *gelwa* because there are not two things at the ultimate level. In order to say *gelwa* or *tönchik*, or to have any connections, there have to be two existent things to develop the connection or the contradiction. "Are an entity or non-entity" shows how the contradiction doesn't exist ultimately, and it shows the proof of contradiction from the point of view of conceptual mind. The contradiction only exists at the conceptual level.

The text says:

> "Although in the [ultimate] object contradiction is impossible
> Due to habituation to tendencies of conceptuality
> Concepts of contradiction [in terms] of
> Negating its opposite and the pervader vividly arise."

This is similar to the verse on connection. The basis of the three modes is: The subject is, "To a conceptual mind;" the predicate is, "Contradiction is possible" or "Contradictions exist;" and the reason is the entire verse. Even though at the ultimate level the contradiction does not exist and is not possible, at the relative level, due to our habitual tendencies, the contradiction appears to the conceptual mind. We have concepts of negating the opposite. We bring together two phenomena in our conceptual mind and then make the contradiction between them. These two phenomena have a referent object. The appearing object is what appears to the conceptual mind as a fire element or water element, and the referent object is not just conceptual, but the actual object. You say, "Water means this and fire means that." These two things have two opposing elements and so do not exist together. Therefore, in our conceptual mind contradiction is possible, but with regard to the actual thing it is not possible; opposing something or agreeing with something is just conceptual. So whenever we struggle with opposing some idea or country or becoming allies with it , or whatever, that is just conceptual. All that doesn't exist, which is very wonderful. It means that there are no enemies or friends; they are all just conceptual.

There is a concluding verse by Khenpo Rinpoche which is just like a poem. It says:

> "All presentations of proof and refutations without exception
> Depend upon contradiction and connection;
> Therefore for those establishing logical proofs and refutations
> Ascertaining contradiction and connection is of utmost importance."

That is Khenpo Rinpoche's ending remark. He is giving his own advice or opinion. So that you have something to argue about, the basis of the three modes is: the subject is, "For those establishing logical proofs and refutations;" the predicate is, "Ascertaining contradiction and connection is of utmost importance;" and the reason is, "All presentations of proofs and refutations without exception depend upon contradiction and connection." Khenpo Rinpoche is saying that all assertions and presentations of proof and negation are based on the notion of connection and contradiction. Therefore, for those intellectual people who want to reflect precisely on the basis of their own intellect, it is very important to understand this reality of contradiction and connection.

The Fifth Division of the Modes of Engagement of Mind: Ascertaining Definition, Definiendum and Illustrating Example

The last mode of engagement is a mind ascertaining definition, definiendum, and illustrating example.

These three things are very much emphasized in the Buddhist logic and debate. They are like the key to all our debates. We have realized by now that we need the definition, the definiendum and the illustrating example. Without these three things there is nothing we can do in our analytical meditation or debate. The explanation is divided into three parts: the mode of engagement of a mind ascertaining a definition, a definiendum and an illustrating example.

The Definition of Definition

The first definition is defined as:

> "'A mind apprehending the essential nature of that which is the cause for assigning a definiendum' is the definition of a mind ascertaining a definition, because 'the essential nature of that which is the cause for assigning a definiendum' is [the definition of] a definition."

This is a Buddhist tongue twister. The definition of this mind is the essential nature of that which is the cause for assigning a definiendum. In order to assign a definiendum you have to look at the basic quality, the basic element, of the essential thing. The nature of that particular phenomenon is the basis for any definiendum. For example, burning and warm are called fire. The definiendum is based on the essential nature of a phenomena, experience of a phenomena. In the other text, Khenpo Rinpoche's definition of definition is that which establishes the isolate of the meaning and eliminates explicit contradiction. Usually the definition is defined in the definition book as having three qualifications: it is itself a definition, it is established on its illustrating example, and it does not define any phenomenon other than its own definiendum. Anything that has these triple qualifications is the definition of a definition. If you can give the triple qualification for any phenomenon, that becomes its definition.

The *Collected Topics* defines definition as having this triple qualification. In Khenpo Rinpoche's *Collected Topics*, it is defined as that which establishes the isolate of the meaning and eliminates explicit contradiction. A third definition that is given in the Lorik is the essential nature of that which is the cause for assigning a definiendum. The last definition is based on the seventh Karmapa's view as well as the Sakyapandita's view. Khenpo Rinpoche says that a definition is based on the phenomenon's essential nature. That is the determining factor of the definition which defines its own definiendum.

The Definition of Definiendum

The definition of mind ascertaining a definiendum is, "A mind ascertaining a particular name assigned by a definition." The definition of definiendum is the particular name assigned by a definition. In the *Collected Topics* this has a triple qualification. The definiendum cannot be used for any other phenomenon than its own definition. In another text, the *Collected Topics*, Khenpo Rinpoche defines this as that which establishes the term and the consciousness which possesses the reason. The seventh Karmapa says in his commentary that when you say "definition," it refers to the qualities of the actual thing. For example, if you were talking about fire, it is referring to its actual nature of hot and burning. It is the direct experience of the quality of whatever the object is. The definition basically refers to a specifically characterized phenomenon, but when you look at the connection between definition, definiendum and illustrating example, it is taking place in your conceptual mind. We are still going through the conceptual process of mingling the specifically characterized phenomena, the qualities of the actual thing, and the labels of definition, definiendum and illustrating example. The definition, in general, refers to the actual thing, actual qualities; and the definiendum is the label that is given to the phenomenon of the definition. Definiendums are generally characterized phenomena and refer to term generalities and so forth. In the *Collected Topics*, the definition is classified under specifically characterized phenomena and definiendum is a generally characterized phenomena. A definiendum is permanent while specifically characterized phenomena and definition are impermanent. They are categorized according to their own nature, but when we look at the connection of these three together, they take place in our conceptual mind, and so exist at the level of isolates when we develop the relationship between the three.

མཚན་ཉིད་ =
རང་མཚན།

relationship
between
མཚན་ཉིད།
མཚོན་བྱ།
and མཚན་གཞི is a relationship of isolates.

The Definition of Illustrating Example

Illustrating example is defined here as, "A mind apprehending the basis for establishing the connection between definition and definiendum." The illustrating example is the basis for establishing the connection between definition and definiendum. For example, when you say "water," it is the definiendum. Water is defined as wet, fluid, cleansing, clear, etc. They both connect together in this water in front of us. When you see the water in front, it has the definition, the quality of being wet, clear, or whatever we say the definition is, and it has the definiendum, which is water. Both are established in this illustrating example, which is the glass of water in front of us. Their connection is made by means of an illustrating example. The mind that ascertains that illustrating example is called the apprehending mind of the illustrating example. It is defined as the basis for establishing the connection between definition and definiendum. This definition is almost the same as in the *Collected Topics* in general. There Khenpo Rinpoche defines illustrating example as the basis for establishing the relationship between definition and definiendum. Instead of saying "connection between," it says "relationship between."

Summary of Definition, Definiendum and Illustrating Example

Those were the three definitions for definition, definiendum and illustrating example. The summary in verse says:

> "The definition provides the causes for assigning the definiendum,
> The definiendum is the result of this assignment,
> The illustrating example is the support connecting definition and definiendum;
> All are assignments assigned [in dependence upon each other]."

The basis of the three modes is: the subject is, "All are assignments;" the predicate is, "Assigned in dependence upon each other;" and the reason is lines one through three. Khenpo Rinpoche is saying that all three of them and their connections are dependent on each other. The definiendum is based on the definition; without the definition there is no definiendum, or without the definiendum we can't find the definition. Without the illustrating example we can't establish their relationship, and so their relationship is established on the basis of an illustrating example within our conceptual mind. They are not established on the actual object, but on our conceptual mind and an illustrating example. (The definition and definiendum relationship is taking place in our conceptual mind.) It is said that the definiendum needs the definition for the definiendum to be understood, but you don't need the definition of the definition to understand what the definition is because it is so obvious. For example, if you get burned by sandalwood fire, if you didn't know the definiendum, from having had the experience of being burned you would wonder what that phenomenon was. Knowing the definiendum, you would say, "Oh! It was fire." You don't need to define the definition in actual experience, such as when you experience fire very vividly, you look for the definiendum, what it is. Therefore, it is usually said that the definition doesn't need a definition, but if you want to apply a definition to the definition you can use the triple qualification.

Q1: Throughout the Lorik text, definitions are given using three different verbs: cognizing, apprehending, and ascertaining. Could you give the definitions of each of these three? They all seem to be saying the same thing. For example, the text says, "Mind ascertaining a definition," and "mind apprehending a definiendum."
DPR: In general, ascertaining is more conceptual and apprehending and cognizing seem to be much more related to non-conceptual mind. Cognizing and apprehending can be general as well, but ascertaining is very conceptual in this view. As we said before, the seventh Karmapa does not believe that direct valid cognition has ascertainment. Other than that, I think there is not much difference between cognizing and apprehending.

Q2: Do the five modes of engagement of mind basically cover everything, you know, how we engage the world. Secondly, do they build on each other beginning with the generalities and particulars? In other words, you couldn't have appearance and elimination without first having generality and particulars.
DPR: That's right.
Q2: And you couldn't have verbal expression without first having generalities, particulars, appearance and elimination. Does it build in that way?
DPR: Are you asking is all of mind included in these five?
Q2: In all the ways that we engage the world, or what we think of as the world.
DPR: Yes, all the modes of engagement of our minds are included in these five. It is conceptual, non-conceptual, and all the different ways of engaging.
Q2: If you are engaged in cognizing connection and contradiction, does that mean that you very quickly arrive at that type of engagement, that you have almost imperceptibly gone through generalities and particulars, appearance and elimination, and object of expression?
DPR: Generally speaking they are all connected. They are not separate, in the way they are shown in the chart or in the Lorik. The way we are looking at it is to clearly see what kind of labeling process, actual reality, and connections are built into our conceptual mind. We are reducing down to different subtleties in order to get a clearer understanding of the mind and its functions. That doesn't mean that it has to go through all those stages, because one can have all of them. The basic elements of generalities and particulars, appearance and elimination, and objects and means of expression are all connected. They are not really separable entities. We can't make a clear separation between generalities and particulars, on the one hand, and connections and contradictions or different objects of expression and means of expression, on the other; they are all connected. I think we go through these processes in every level of our conception.

Q3: Is a mind cognizing dryness a phenomenon which negates the wetness of water?
DPR: Is dry and wet more of a direct opposite?.
Q3: Yes, those are direct opposites.
DPR: Yes, so it is not indirect.
Q3: In the example that you used, the coldness of frost negates the warmth, which is the pervader of fire. I don't see any difference between that and my example of dryness.
DPR: Is that a question or a statement?
Q3: If you say that my example is not correct, then I would say that your example is not correct either. [laughter]
DPR: In the example, we were looking at a particular state of a coldness. If we say, "The cold experience of frost," what is the pervader of that particular state of coldness?
Q3: Coldness.
DPR: Right. So the direct opposite of the coldness is the warmth. We are negating that general pervader of warmth, but looking at a particular coldness. In your case it's a direct opposite. If you say dry and wet, it's a direct opposite.

Q4: I have a question about the ultimate non-existence of contradictions. The way you refuted it, and the way Khenpo Rinpoche refute it seem to be contradictory—or at least a kind of enigma. If I understood you, you said that the contradiction of fire and water doesn't exist ultimately because they cannot exist in the same instant. Khenpo Rinpoche says that the contradiction of fire and water doesn't exist ultimately because they are an entity or a non-entity. I don't understand it, his reason.
DPR: Whenever we explain that reason, we say they are an entity or a non-entity. When the fire is an entity, the water is a non-entity. If you have a fire, and we need to put out that fire, you need to have water, sand, or whatever to put out the fire. When there is a strong fire burning the house, at that point the water is non-existent in that space. It is pervaded by the fire. The fire is an entity at that point and the water is a non-entity. When the water or sand become stronger and puts out the fire, at that point the fire is a non-entity and the water is an entity. That is what Rinpoche is saying and that is what I thought I was saying.

Q4: I don't think that is what Rinpoche is saying.
DPR: What do you think he is saying then?
Q4: He is saying that that which is to be neutralized and its neutralizer are an entity or a non-entity. They cannot be both at the same time.
DPR: No. I think you have to realize that this is in Tibetan verse format. In Tibetan verse format you cannot write like you can in English. In English verse maybe you can say, "Either one of them has to be this or that." You can make it longer. In Tibetan verse you cannot make it longer. Either it is a seven, nine or eleven syllable verse. Rinpoche wrote this in a verse format which is not stretchable. [laughter] You can not add words to it. Also, my explanation is coming from notes that I have from Khenpo Rinpoche's talks.
Q4: We talked about *tönchik* and that there are eight modes of pervasion. You described two relationships between A and B: A is B and A has B. I do not understand the difference. I was thinking that if A is B, then A has the nature of B, or B has the nature of A.
DPR: When we say "is" or "has," you cannot have a situation where A is present and B is not present. When impermanence is present, momentary nature is present; when momentary nature is present, impermanence is present. You cannot have two states, such as a subtle state where impermanence is present but momentary is missing. "Has" means both are present.
Q4: That was the is.
DPR: No, has.
Q4: What is the is?
DPR: It means not separable. Whatever is impermanent is momentary nature, whatever is momentary nature is impermanent. It's more like presence. It is trying to leave out the possibility of the presence of one and the other.

Q5: Is it correct to say that a definition is an object generality and that a definiendum is a term generality?
DPR: At the level of a conceptual stage of seeing these three things together, and seeing their connections and differences, you can make that association. In the actual sense, definition is *tönchik* with entity, thing, substantial thing, or functioning thing. Therefore, it is not really a generality in that sense; it is more a particular. When we have the understanding of definition, definiendum and their relationship, then it becomes *tönchik*.

Name or
[illegible]

Q6: My question is about definiendum. The English translation says it is a mind ascertaining a particular name assigned by a definition. Therefore, the definiendum has to do with ascertaining the name.
DPR: Right.
Q6: I'm confused about that.
DPR: Ascertaining is actually the part of definition of the mind that apprehends the definiendum. The definition of definiendum is the particular name assigned by the definition. The definiendum is a particular name which has been assigned on the basis of that definition, that essential nature of the thing that we see.
Q6: Yes. That is exactly the point I was struggling with. It seems to me that understanding the definiendum is understanding the essential qualities of whatever you are talking about, and not the name so much.
DPR: That would be more like the definition. Maybe you are looking at the connection between the two. The actual thought or concept which sees the definiendum is seeing this particular label.
Q6: Seeing the name.
DPR: Yes, seeing the name. If you say "table" or "glass," that is the definiendum, and the consciousness that sees the definiendum is the apprehending mind of the definiendum. So Rinpoche is trying to define that which sees these labels.
Q6: For instance, "fire" is a word that refers and the definition is, "that which is hot and burning."
DPR: Right.
Q6: "That" refers not to the *svalakshana*, but to the isolate of fire.

DPR: Yes.
Q6: And I want to get to not just the name, but to that hot and burning quality.
DPR: That's right, yes. That is why you have a definition. You cannot have that particular name without the definition. It is assigned to a definition, which means you also have to look at that which assigns the name.
Q6: Yes, that part I think I am o.k. with. I think it is partly a translation question. I was thinking it could mean the particularities of the name, what the name refers to, rather than the particular name. Maybe the translation is just fine.
DPR: If you go towards the particularities of the essential nature, then you will get closer to the definition. For example, the particularities of the quality of hot and burning get closer to the definition than to the definiendum. The definiendum is basically a label, a name. It is a particular name given to a very particular thing. For example, fire does not define table. The mind comprehending that is actually included in the definition. It says it is a mind ascertaining a particular name assigned by a definition. In order to understand this assignment, you have to connect with the definition. We have to see which definition is assigning what name to what label.

SUMMARY OF DEFINITION, DEFINIENDUM AND ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE (CONTINUED)

definition

The definition of definiendum in the *Collected Topics*, in general, is a "Triply qualified substantial existent." The definition of illustration is, "That which serves as a basis for illustrating the appropriate definiendum by way of its definition." A triply qualified substantial existent is, 1) itself a definition; 2) established on its illustrating examples; and 3) does not serve as a definition for any phenomena other than its own definiendum. In other words it is a definiendum itself, established in terms of its illustration and does not serve as the definiendum of any phenomena other than its own definition. If you say "thing," then "thing" is the definiendum which is defined as that which is able to perform a function.

The Third Main Section of the Lorik: The Distinction between Mind and Mental Factors

Its Three Divisions

Today we will begin the "Delineation of the necessary distinction between mind and mental factors." We do not have enough time to go into the details, but we will go through it briefly. Khenpo Rinpoche gives three divisions: 1) "The definition of mind and mental factors;" 2) "Establishing mind and mental factors to be congruent;" and 3) "The explanation of the 51 mental factors."

The First Division: Definitions of Mind and Mental Factors

In the first division we have the definitions for mind and mental factors. "Mind" refers to the main, principal or primary mind. That which apprehends the mere entity of the object is what we call mind. Mind in this case, the primary mind, refers to the main mind which apprehends the object's basic entity. It is defined here as, "That which causes awareness of the essential nature of an object." That refers to the actual object which is the fundamental basis, or the fundamental nature of the object condition which merely appears to a consciousness. The consciousness that perceives or conceives this appearance of the object is called the "primary mind."

"The essential nature of an object" refers to the basic object. Form, sound, or smell,for example, is what we call the essential nature of an object. This gives rise to a consciousness which gives rise to a mind. That mind is called the main, primary or principal mind.

"That which causes awareness of the particular attributes of an object," is the definition of a mental factor. On the basis of the fundamental nature of an object, we have different qualities, different aspects of that object. First you have form, and then on that basis you have different kinds of forms; or, based on sound, you have different kinds of qualities of sound. These are what we call the particular attributes of an object—attributes that give rise to happiness, suffering and so on. Then, [from those—ed.] you get different ideas, such as, "Oh, that's beautiful, that's impressive, that's not beautiful, that's ugly."

The essential nature of form is just form. There is no difference between ugly form and beautiful form. It's essential nature is form. The mind that apprehends that essential nature is what is called the principal or primary mind. The mind that apprehends the different aspects of that form, the different qualities given to it, is what we call the mental factors. They are the secondary nature of mind, the one which perceives the particular attributes of an object.

The primary mind is the eight consciousnesses. From the point of view of the Sautrantika Cittamatra, all eight consciousnesses and the fifty-one mental factors are the primary mind. In the general Buddhist view, the primary mind is the six consciousnesses and the mental factors. Sometimes there are fifty-one mental factors and sometimes forty-six mental factors. It doesn't really matter; these are just different ways of looking at it. The second classification, mental factors, is the consciousness which apprehends qualities and features of the object. It affects the manner in which the mind apprehends its object.

The Second Division: The Congruence of Mind and Mental Factors

The text says, mind and mental factors "Are congruent, in terms of the five kinds of congruence." They are congruent in terms of support, focus, aspect, time and substance. You can clearly see that mind and mental factors are not two separate entities. They are not really two completely separate things, but basically the same entity, arising in different levels of apprehending the object.

mind & mf
are not
sep. entities.

The first congruence is support. Khenpo Rinpoche says, "They depend on the same sense faculty." "They are congruent in terms of the support;" they have the same basis. They both depend on the same dominant conditions, the sense faculties.

"They are congruent in terms of focus." "They focus on the same object," the object condition. We talked about object condition earlier. They don't have different object conditions. If the object is form, it is the form. If the object is sound, it is the sound.

"They are congruent in terms of aspect." "They have the same apprehended aspect of the mode of apprehension." They both apprehend the same aspect of the object. If the primary mind is apprehending the aspect of a blue object, then the mental factors are also apprehending the [same] aspect of the mental object. They don't have different aspects. They apprehend the same aspect, which is the blue.

"They are congruent in terms of time." "They occur at the same time." That is very simple. Actually there are some debates about whether they occur at the same time or are momentary. There is a lot of debate on time and substance and whether they are contradictory or not.

"They are congruent in terms of substance." "They share an equal number of moments of a similar type." They both arise, abide or exist at the same time, and cease at the same time. "Substance" refers to these three moments of arising, abiding and ceasing. They share the same equal moments of arising, ceasing and abiding. They go through the same process.

The Third Division: the Fifty-one Mental Factors

The next section is the explanation of the fifty-one mental factors. These mind and mental factors are based on a text called *Thirty Verses*, by Vasubhandu. The first group is the five omnipresent mental factors. In the *Thirty Verses* it says they are feeling, discrimination, impulse, contact and mental engagement. These are each presented in terms of definition, definiendum and example.

The Five Omnipresent Mental Factors

"The definition, 'that which has the nature of experiencing' defines feeling." It is defined as that which has the nature of experiencing object particulars. "The illustrating example is the feeling of happiness. In the same way the illustrating examples following on this are to be added using one's own understanding," which is difficult.

Then "The definition 'apprehending characteristics' defines discrimination." Discrimination is the mind which apprehends the uncommon signs of the objects. Discrimination here is apprehending the specific nature of the object and defining it in a certain way. We have this apprehending characteristic so that when you clearly see the characteristics of each phenomenon, you can discriminate it clearly at the level of the definiendum. In order to discriminate the definiendum first you need to have some sense of certainty about the characteristics

The next one is impulse. Sometimes it is translated as intention, but here it's translated as impulse. I'm not sure which one is better. "The expression of the mental [consciousness] (or mind) in the phase where mind moves towards an object defines impulse." [Laughs] Is that helpful? "Mind" is sort of distracted or impressed by a certain object, and so it moves towards that object. The movement of our mind towards that particular object is intention or impulse.

The next one is contact. "'That which fully determines the change in the sense faculty in accordance with pleasant or painful feelings occurring due to the meeting of object, sense faculty and mental engagement' defines contact." Contact is the mind which serves as the basis for giving rise to different feelings such as pleasure, pain or neutral feelings. The feelings do not arise without contact. This is the same or similar to contact in the context of the twelve nidanas. In the twelve nidanas you have contact, and then from contact you get feeling. Contact refers in a subtle way to not just conceptual contact, but the sense faculty meeting the object, apprehending the object. We apprehend the object with the sense faculty and the sense consciousnesses. When you come into contact with the object, then that is what we call contact. It is the sense faculty or the consciousness coming in contact with the object, which develops a basis for pleasure, pain and neutral feeling.

Mental engagement is "apprehending the object of focus as something particular to which the mind is directed again and again." It is an intensified, repetitive state of mind that is more like discrimination. Discrimination and mental engagement are similar. They both apprehend something particular towards which the mind is directed. In this case it is apprehending again and again.

"Given these five, there is a reason to call them the 'five omnipresent mental factors,' because they are present as the attendant factors of all primary minds included in the three realms." These five omnipresent mental factors are said to accompany every aspect of basic primary mind. Primary mind is always attended or accompanied by these five omnipresent mental factors. As for "included in the three realms:" I don't know about the other realms, but we can definitely examine within our own realm to see whether they are present or not.

The Five Object-Determining Mental Factors

The second group is called the five object-determining mental factors. It is said that if one of these five object-determining mental factors is present, then all five are present. But it is not necessary that these five object-determining mental factors accompany all mental factors. These five object-determining mental factors usually accompany the virtues. It is stated in the same *Thirty Verses*: "Aspiration, belief, recollection, meditative stabilization, and superior knowledge: these are the five kinds of object determining-mental factors."

Aspiration here is defined as "striving for an intended object." Sounds good, right? I don't know whether we can apply that or not in our own experience; that's another question.

"'Apprehending something about which certainty has been obtained as exclusively that' defines belief."

Recollection is defined as "not forgetting familiar objects." [Laughs] It is not having Alzheimer, or someheimer, not all, but some. That's recollection.

ཏིང་འཛིན་

Meditative stabilization, (that's Tingzin) is samadhi. It is defined here as, "One-pointed mind concerning objects to be examined." [Laughs] The definition of samadhi is one-pointed mind concerning objects to be examined.

Superior knowledge here is defined as, "fully distinguishing specifically and generally categorized phenomena." That we know. That's clear, right?

"Given those, there is a reason to call them the 'five object-determining [mental factors]', because since the mind does not apprehend anything other than those objects that are intended, certain, familiar and to be examined, just those objects are determined." "Actually intended" refers to aspiration, "certain" refers to belief, "familiar" refers to recollection, and "to be examined" refers to the superior knowledge. Those are the five object-determining mental factors. The objects are determined. It is said that these five object-determining mental factors usually do not accompany all the mental factors. Maybe that is more of a Sautrantika view and this presentation is more of a Mahayana view. I'm not sure.

THE THIRD DIVISION: THE FIFTY-ONE MENTAL FACTORS (CONTINUED)

We are almost done with the Lorik. I would like to make some brief remarks on the last two sections, from within the explanation of the mental factors. The fourth group is the six root afflictions of desire, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, and afflicted view. Following that there are the twenty secondary afflictions. The main thing we have to know is that it is not possible for the six root afflictions to arise simultaneously, all six together at the same time. Isn't that great? This is not to say that these six are not present in one individual being; you can have all six, all twenty, and even more. If you look at these six, by definition they are quite different. It is possible for one of the six root afflictions to arise simultaneously with any of the twenty secondary afflictions, but it is not possible to have all six arising simultaneously.

The sixth group is the four changeable mental factors. They are called "changeable" because they are dependent on conditions. If the conditions are positive then these mental factors can be positive; if the conditions become negative then these mental factors can become negative. Condition is the motivation which arises right before these four mental factors. The mental factors are: contrition, sleep, examination and analysis.

Concluding Remarks

I think we can leave the Lorik at this point. Hopefully there will be more opportunity to go through the mind and mental factors. We didn't have time to go through them in detail. I think it's very important to go through these fifty-one mental factors and basic mind, because in order to understand the nature of mind, we have to understand these fifty-one mental factors in order to have a better sense of control.

I would like to thank you all for your participation in the pioneering of this Kagyu intellectual path of studies and meditation. In many respects this has been a very courageous step for all of us. It has been very encouraging to me to witness your dedicated interest and devotion on the path. In this way we have been pursuing in-depth studies and understanding of the view and meditation. If you look at each segment of what we have done, each session of debate or discussion, it may not seem that powerful. We talk a lot and struggle to establish the three modes [laughs] and identify the four possibilities, and so on. Sometimes we may not see the whole picture, but in general this has really been ground-breaking work for Kagyu intellectual studies and the analytical meditation path.

Whatever effort, energy and time we have invested in this work I think is a great contribution to the Karma Kagyu sangha in the west, as well as to the Karma Kagyu sangha who can speak the English language. It has been a great service to the lineage. In order to genuinely propagate the teachings of the lineage, one must have this precision of learning and contemplating through which we reach the level of meditation, the resting meditation. In order to have a complete path of the lineage, this is a very important segment, which we have always been missing, in some sense. We always talk about the three prajnas, three processes of hearing, contemplating and meditating, but we always miss the second one, and sometimes we miss the first one. It is possible to jump into the third one, meditation, but sometimes it is not very stable; our path does not become stable, and the presentation and understanding of dharma is not very stable. In order to stabilize and really have a sense of dharma taking root in our own being, as well as in the English language culture, one must go through certain steps, such as the precision of what we are trying to do. Whatever we have laid out in any form of debate discussion or studies is simply the first step in our long process of development. This particular style can be developed further into something that can be more suitable, inviting, and flexible really to accommodate such precision in the English language. This may take some time to really develop, but is something we should aim for in our studies and practice.

Whatever we have studied we should dedicate for the benefit of all the sangha members whom we know, to those we don't know, and to the sangha members of the future. The wisdom and prajna that we have accumulated should be shared with all sentient beings by means of our dedication.

I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to spend time with you. I have had a wonderful time going through this pioneer study program; it has been a wonderful experience for me. It has definitely been a very inspiring and worthwhile experience for my own growth on the path. It has also been a great opportunity for me to be more selfish and to accumulate merit. [laughs] Usually I accumulate more mileage than merit. [laughter] This has been wonderful. I thank you all for giving me this opportunity and hope to see you all next year in our continual program and struggle. [laughs]

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1. Mind

(mind - *lo*, consciousness - *shepa*, and awareness - *rigpa*)


Valid Cognition
a new and undeceiving awareness, clarifies what was previously unknown
Non-Valid Cognition
a consciousness which is deceived
Direct Valid Cognition
a nonconceptual, non-mistaken awareness
Inferential Valid Cognition
an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven from a reason having three modes (see Chart 2)
Sense DVC
Mental DVC
arise on the basis of its own dominant condition
Self-Aware DVC
experiences itself
Yogic DVC
arises from the last moment of highest meditation
Seeming Direct Valid Cognition
a mind that is not non-conceptual and/or not non-mistaken
Mistaken conception
Conventional consciousness
Inference
Arisen from inference
Recollection
Actual wish
CONCEPTUAL
Arisen from an impaired basis
NON-CONCEPTUAL
DOMINANT CONDITIONS
physical sense faculty
mental sense faculty (arising from the immediately preceding moment of sense consciousness)
Samadhi
DIRECTION
outward directed
inward directed
both (?)

(mind - *lo*, consciousness - *shepa*, and awareness - *rigpa*

(mind - *lo*, consciousness - *shepa*, and awareness - *rigpa*)

Valid Cognition
a new and undeceiving awareness, clarifies what was previously unknown

Non-Valid Cognition
a consciousness which is deceived

- Doubt
- Wrong Cognition

Direct Valid Cognition
a nonconceptual, non-mistaken awareness
(see Chart 1)

Seeming Direct Valid Cognition

Inferential Valid Cognition

IVC for Oneself
an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven (the probandum) from a reason having the three modes (a syllogism)*

EXAMPLE	SUBJECT (A)	PREDICATE (B)	*REASON (C)*	
	My five aggregates	are impermanent.		(the probandum)
	My five aggregates		*are produced.*	(1st mode)
		Whatever is produced (C)	is impermanent. (B)	(2nd mode)
		Whatever is not impermanent	*is not produced.*	(3rd mode)
	My five aggregates	are impermanent	*because they are produced.*	(syllogism)

(*a syllogism has one of three correct reasons; effect, nature, or non-observation)

IVC for Others
*a sentence construction (a correct proof statement) fully clarifying for others the fact (that which was newly realized**) seen by the disputant himself*

*(** because this was already realized and is a sentence not an awareness IVC for Others is not really a valid cognition)*

Concordant Correct Proof Statement - mainly based on the 2nd mode, the forward pervasion†
a construction where both the subject (A) in question and the example subject (D) have concordant attributes in terms of the reason (C) and the predicate (B) of the probandum (i.e. C,B,D,A)

Whatever is produced (C) is necessarily impermanent (B): for example, like the five aggregates of one's own continuum (D). **My five aggregates (A) too are produced.**

Discordant Correct Proof Statement - mainly based on the 3rd mode, the reverse pervasion†
a construction where both the subject (A) in question and the dissimilar example (D) have discordant attributes in terms of the reason (C) and the predicate (B) of the probandum (i.e. not B, not C, D - e.g. of not B and not C, A)

Whatever is not impermanent (B) *is necessarily not produced (C)*: for example, like space (D).
My five aggregates of my own continuum (A) are produced

(† the last sentence is in the first mode)

II. The Modes of the Engagement

Mind apprehending...

- Generality & Particulars
  - Generality
    - category
    - *a mind apprehending a phenomenon as pervading*
    - means in all instances
      1. Type
      2. Collection
      3. Term
  - Particulars
    - since instance
    - *a mind apprehending the pervaded object of a pervader*
      1. Type
      2. Collection
      3. Term
- Appearance & Elimination
  - Appearance
    - Valid cognition Non-conceptual
    - Inclusive engager
      a mind that directly engages its specific object without depending on the exclusion of its opposite
      1. Mode of being of the object
      2. Mode of apprehension of the mind which is the subject
      3. Concordance of mind & object
  - Elimination
    - Exclusive engager
      a mind that engages its specific object by means of the exclusion of its direct opposite
      1. 1 as 1
      2. Different asdifferent
      3. 1 asdifferent (superimposition & necessity)
      4. different as 1 (superimposition & necessity)
- Object of expression & Means of expression (verbal)
  - Object
    - Conceptual, mental image actual object
    - Referent, Basis for actual object
    - *a mind apprehending what is to be grasped by means of a term*
  - Means
    - Conceptual, term, label = term
    - generality
    - *a mind apprehending what makes one grasp an object of [verval] expression*
    - Non-conceptually, Direct Sense Valid cognition!
  - (both of these have 2 aspects: in the situation of explaining and listening,
    - an object of expression
    - means of expression

    in the situation of using a term,
    - object of expression
    - means of expression)
- Cognizing connection & Contradiction
  - Connection
    1. General teaching
       a mind apprehending that something is a phenomenon and that it is not cancelled by another phenomenon
       - a) Identical essence
       - b) Causal connection
    2. Refuting connection ultimately
    3. Proving connection from the point of view of [conceptual] mind
  - Contradiction
    1. General teaching
       a mind cognizing that something is a phenomenon and that it is neutralized by another phenomenon
       - a) Direct
       - b) Indirect
    2. Refuting contradiction ultimately
    3. Proving contradiction from the point of view of [conceptual] mind
- Ascertaining definition, definiendum & Illustrating example
  - Definition
    a mind apprehending the essential nature of that which is the cause for assigning a definiendum
  - Definiendum
    a mind ascertainging a particular name assigned by a definition
  - Illustrating Example
    a mind apprehending the basis for establishing the connection between definition and definiendum

Mode of engagement of mind cognizing objects of (verbal) expression and the means of verbal expression*

	Object of expression	Means of expression	
No analysis	specifically characterized object	specifically characterized sound	Conceptualized (referent) using a term
Slight analysis	object generality (generic object, isolates & generally characterized phenomena)	term generality (generic term)	Actual (immediate conceptual) explaining & listening
Thorough analysis	no object of expression- a specifically characterized phenomenon cannot be an object of expression	no means of expression	

---

* from Karmapa VII's *Ocean of Reasoning*